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
Prime Minister's visit to Paris

The grand design of Giscard d'Estaing

The Pacific realm of Japan

Peacekeeping and peacemaking

• Prospective look at U Thant



International Perspectives

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Restoring relations with France and opening new doors to Europe

John G. H. Halstead

The Prime Minister of Canada visited Paris and Brussels from October 21 to 25 last year. This was his first official visit to Western Europe, and he went with the intention of opening a new era in relations between France and Canada, strengthening Canada's ties with Belgium and Luxembourg and promoting Canadian relations with the European Communities. In evaluating the success of this visit, I believe

we can say that, broadly speaking, all objectives were substantially achieved, even though the wording of the agreement reached with the European Communities was perhaps not as precise as we might have wished. Moreover, special mention should be made of the Prime Minister's visit to NATO, which was the occasion for a profitable exchange with our allies and the Secretary-General Luns concerning the problems of *détente* and Canadian participation in the Alliance. In Paris, Mr. Trudeau also had a useful conversation with the Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Because of the tremendous interest shown by the news media in Europe as well as in Canada, the Prime Minister was able to promote new levels of mutual understanding and awareness on both sides of the Atlantic. A number of newsmen presenting television, radio and the press accompanied him from Canada and were joined in Europe by a strong contingent of the local press from France, Belgium, Canada and elsewhere. Public interest in the visit, aroused in advance by in-depth articles published in leading newspapers, was heightened by Mr. Trudeau's press conferences in Paris on October 23 and in Brussels on October 25, and by an hour-long televised interview, which reached an audience of some 15 million viewers in France and neighbouring countries.

The establishment of a network of direct, personal relations between the Head of Government of Canada, on the one hand, and some of the highest political and economic authorities of Western Europe, on the

other, was another important result of this visit. The Prime Minister established or renewed personal contact with the President of France, the Prime Ministers of France, Belgium and Luxembourg (often surrounded by their closest aides), the Secretary-General of NATO and the Secretary-General of the OECD, and the members of the Commission of the European Communities, including the Vice-President for External Relations, Sir Christopher Soames, and President François-Xavier Ortoli. For, while the main objective of the Canadian initiative was to strengthen our ties with the Community, it is equally important for Canada to strengthen the already close bilateral ties it maintains with each of the Community's members. Moreover, Canada intends to maintain a balance between these two levels of relations. Finally, we are aware that the process we have begun with the Community and its member states will make it easier for us to define our own policies in fields such as energy, natural resources and investment, in terms of our relations not only with the United States and Japan but also with Europe. Following through on this approach, Prime Minister Trudeau plans to visit other Community capitals next March.

Bilateral ties to remain in any new relationship

France-Canada relations

The importance of the bilateral aspect of the visit to Paris cannot be over-stressed. It must be recognized that relations be-

Mr. Halstead is Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and has served in a number of positions, notably as Head of the European Division and Departmental Chairman of the Special Task Force on Europe. He accompanied Prime Minister Trudeau to Paris and Brussels in his capacity as Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

tween Canada and France have not always been as close as history and mutual interest would have seemed to dictate. It was thus a matter of giving France its rightful place, not only as the country of origin of nearly one-third of the Canadian population but also as an economic power playing a key role within the European Communities and on the international scene. Internal political developments in France, as in Canada, had in recent years prevented the Canadian Prime Minister from visiting France to consolidate the normalization of relations begun under President Pompidou. Wishing now to establish a new basis for their relations, the Canadian and French Governments expressed their determination to give them greater substance. Thus it is not surprising that conversations between the two governments concerned the future rather than the past. Cultural affairs, which are well-established and will continue to occupy their rightfully important place, nevertheless gave way to more topical discussions concerning technical, scientific, industrial and economic exchanges.

The determination of our two governments to work toward strengthening bilateral relations was translated into a series of concrete measures. One of these was the creation of a joint task force on energy and another on industrial affairs, with particular reference to transportation. These task forces will help to prepare for the next meeting of the Canada-France Economic Commission, which will meet at ministerial level during the first half of 1975. A delegation of Canadian businessmen headed by the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce will visit France next autumn. The French Government has given its consent to the opening of a Canadian Consulate General in Strasbourg, which will carry out all the functions for which such missions are normally responsible in the fields of consular assistance to Canadians, information and cultural exchanges, trade promotion and immigration. The activities of this Consulate General will take on a European dimension and include services to Canadian Parliamentarians by reason of the fact that the Alsatian capital is the headquarters of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament holds its sessions there.

The Prime Minister informed the French representatives of Canada's desire to associate itself with France, with the full participation of Quebec, in the Franco-German experimental satellite project known as "Symphonie". Mr. Trudeau emphasized Canada's interest in the project, not only in terms of bilateral relations but

also in the context of the communities of French-speaking nations. He explained the political, cultural and linguistic implications upon which our actions with regard to the community of French-speaking nations are based, stressing that a substantial degree of co-operation between France and Quebec is perfectly consistent with our approach to relations with France. The French, for their part, expressed an understanding of the Canadian Government's position and their desire to operate with Canada.

Visit to Belgium

The Prime Minister's visit to Brussels was particularly useful in terms of bilateral relations. It is expected to bring about tangible results, especially in the field of trade and investment. It was also an opportunity to strengthen scientific and cultural relations between our two countries. Perhaps the strongest bond between Canada and Belgium is that bilingualism is a fact of life in both countries — a situation which undoubtedly creates problems but at the same time an undeniable source of enrichment. By force of circumstance, both Canadians and Belgians must adapt to their pluralistic society, and the ability to do so is a valuable aid to successful development in the pluralistic world in which we live. Co-operation between the two countries must obviously take into consideration, and even profit from, their respective constitutional situations. As did in France, Mr. Trudeau noted the francophone dimension of our co-operation with Belgium and Canada's interest in participating in the "Symphonie" project in the context of the community of French-speaking nations, at the same time offering English-speaking Canadians and French-speaking Belgians the largest possible opportunities in projects involving our two countries.

During his official visit to Belgium, the Canadian Prime Minister was quite willing to accept an invitation to meet with his counterpart from Luxembourg, Mr. Thorn. Their talks, which touched on bilateral and multilateral questions, would seem to have contributed to increased co-operation between our two countries, particularly in the context of the multilateral organizations to which they belong.

Canada and the Communities

In his conversations with the European leaders, the Prime Minister was able to reach considerable agreement concerning such major current problems as inflation, the energy crisis and the proliferation of nuclear arms, as well as proposed measures for solving them. However,

Joint task forces set up on energy and industry



UPI Photo

ime Minister Trudeau enjoys an after-lunch walk down rue Varennes with Frenchime Minister Jacques Chirac. During the visit Mr. Trudeau also met with President
iscard d'Estaing before proceeding from Paris to Brussels.

mary objective of these contacts was to
engthen our ties with Western Europe,
l particularly with the European Com-
nities, with which we hope to negotiate
orm of agreement or contractual link
t will provide a framework for trade
l economic co-operation and a solid
sis for a more sustained dialogue. While
e precise form of such an agreement has
to be worked out, the Prime Minister
s assured of our European partners'
eement with the objective of the Cana-
n initiative in terms of defining future
ations between Canada and the Com-
nity on the basis of mutual interest and
recognition of the dynamic development
the Community. It was in this spirit
t the Prime Minister presented Cana-
a's submission to the Commission of the
european Communities, explaining that
had initially proposed the conclusion of
ade agreement as one of a number of
sibilities but that, if the Commission
l other ideas, we were prepared to look
them. President Ortoli, Vice-President
ames and the other Commissioners were
npathetic toward our initiative and
wed willingness to get things moving to
lore all possibilities. Thus it was agreed
t a new negotiating phase should be
ened, beginning with exploratory talks

for the purpose of defining the form of a possible contractual arrangement. This in itself was a noteworthy success for Canada if we consider the difficulties of the undertaking, stemming from the complexity of the Community structures, the fear of some members of creating a precedent that might be exploited by other highly-industrialized countries, and the hesitation of others to deal with questions lying outside the present competence of the Community. Thus, in Brussels as in Paris, and in dealing with the Commission and other governmental authorities, there is reason to believe that the Prime Minister succeeded in making his hosts more aware than before of the specific nature of Canadian interests and Canada's position that distinguishes them from those of the United States. Against this background, it is a matter of satisfaction that the Community has decided to open a permanent mission in Ottawa in 1975, similar to the ones it maintains in Washington and Tokyo.

NATO visit

The Prime Minister's visit to NATO placed the highest possible importance on Canada's role in Europe by demonstrating that the current diversification of our external relations includes a continuing commit-

ment to the alliance. This visit also enabled him to stress that we share with our allies a desire for close co-operation in many different areas and a common concern with the problems of security and *détente*.

It is obviously out of the question to attempt any definitive evaluation of such a trip at this time. Its repercussions and concrete results will become apparent during the coming months, creating in turn a "spin-off" effect in areas which could not be covered in the necessarily limited range of discussions at the prime ministerial level. It is certain, however, that the visit accomplished the important task of making our European partners aware of the difficulties of the undertaking and the qualifications imposed by our constitutional, political and economic situation. It also served to reassure them that we are serious in our efforts to escape as much as possible from the constraints imposed upon us by geography. In addition, the visit helped increase our reserves of good will and understanding among the European leaders, and at the same time

made the general public in Europe more aware of Canada's situation, thanks to the close co-operation received from the news media.

In Canada, the visit served to impress upon the general public and Members of Parliament, whose support is essential to the success of our policy of diversification, the importance of Europe for Canada and the Canadian people. It is, moreover, significant that the Canadian Government, in response to the great interest in Europe aroused by the Prime Minister's trip, made the exceptional decision to table in the House of Commons the principal documents marking the progress of the Canadian initiative with respect to the Nine, namely Canada's memorandum to the Nine dated April 20, 1974, the draft trade agreement which was attached to it and the Canadian communication of last September 26 to the political directors of the Nine. Canadians who follow European affairs closely will undoubtedly be pleased that these documents are now in the public domain.

*Escape from
constraints of
geography*

The new triangle: Canada-France-Quebec

By Paul Painchaud

The primary purpose of Mr. Trudeau's European visit, we are told, was economic. It was also, however, part of a clearly political design involving Franco-Canadian relations, which have suffered periods of strain since 1967. For this reason, the realization of "the Third Option", which was the acknowledged purpose of the visit, included the normalization of relations between Ottawa and Paris.

In view of the state of affairs since General de Gaulle's visit, the normalization could not be achieved without Quebec's participation. Regardless of Quebec's scope for manoeuvre, or the degree of its influence in Paris and in Ottawa, in the final analysis there could be no *rapprochement* between France and Canada over Quebec's opposition or without its consent. For the Quebec government this was a political asset for which it could not claim full credit, but which represented the state of its relations with France over the past ten years. From this

point of view, it has become an equal "diplomatic partner" with France and Canada in the fullest sense of the term.

Paradoxically, Mr. Trudeau's trip will serve to reinforce the effect of General Gaulle's visit, especially if, as appears to be the case (this was written before Mr. Bourassa himself visited Paris), it results in no change in the basic character of Franco-Quebec relations, or in their scope, which has been unprecedented since 1967. In practical terms, this visit clarifies and consolidates the triangular situation that has developed between Canada and France. By rendering Franco-Canadian relations much less "emotional" and putting them on a positive footing, Mr. Trudeau has stabilized and, in effect, confirmed the Franco-Quebec precedent. By the exercise of a little imagination and effort, the Quebec government will find that Mr. Trudeau's visit, far from having diminished its potential for action, has in fact increased it. To all intents and purposes,

*France-Canada
rapprochement
requires
Quebec consent*

tension between Paris and Ottawa was longer necessary to Quebec, and it had nothing to gain from a broadening of one's sphere of influence in relation to Federal Government.

Franco-Canadian relations are, therefore, entering a much more clearly-defined phase of three-way interdependence. In this game, relations between any two of the players must take into account the relations each has with the third. There will, of course, be relative freedom of action in the areas for each of the three, but these areas will necessarily be limited by the very nature of the game. For each of the participants, this is an advantage in relation to the previous situation.

Breakdown possible

This interdependence could, of course, break down, if the governments involved decided, tacitly or by common agreement, to do nothing at all. By definition, however, this is impossible under the present circumstances since the very existence of this new triangle is based on the willingness of both France and Canada to improve relations. We should, therefore, expect Franco-Canadian relations to take on a much more dynamic aspect, not only because of the renewed *entente* between Paris and Ottawa but also because of the effect this reconciliation will have on Franco-Quebec relations. All these interactions will not necessarily conflict, though this possibility should not be ruled out, particularly if Quebec should become involved in "serious matters".

Further developments in Franco-Canadian relations will be all the more interesting to observe since they are somewhat analogous to the inverse situation. Canadian diplomacy is attempting to create a balance with respect to Western Europe. Here, again, is an illustration of two-tier diplomacy, directed, on the one hand, toward the European Community as a whole and the consolidation Canada wishes to promote, and, on the other hand, toward each of the member states. On the bilateral level, Canada favours certain nations — France and Britain, for example, for reasons that may be quite dissimilar — in the same way that France tends to show favour to Quebec while not necessarily precluding relations with the other Canadian provinces. Viewed in this context, and without minimizing the importance of the other European countries, France becomes, following Mr. Trudeau's visit, the pivot of Canada's Western European diplomacy, the central link in two separate but interdependent alliances: Ottawa/Paris/Quebec and Ottawa/Paris/European Community.

It is a gain for French diplomacy that General de Gaulle would not have rejected, and that he undoubtedly desired — provided, of course, Quebec remained a vigilant participant.

No substantial relations

It would be worth while to consider how the current situation came about. It must be said that Franco-Canadian relations were not substantial before 1967. At the governmental level, neither country saw any strategic advantage in their relations, here defined in the broad sense of diplomatic, cultural and economic ties. For Canada, France was simply one country out of many, a nation with which it was certainly advisable to maintain good relations and avoid conflict, primarily because of the Franco-British alliance, but also in deference to French-Canadian opinion (French-Canadian attachment to the former mother country was, however, overestimated). Consequently, there was no particular awareness of France comparable to that which characterized Canada's relations with Britain or the United States. The explanation for this is historical and goes back to the bonds that developed at all levels between Ottawa, London and Washington during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These bonds were to create for Canadian leaders a structured image of the international system, in which France could not occupy a position different from that of the other European countries. Underlying Franco-Canadian relations, there was thus a basic fact: the élite who were to shape Canadian foreign policy over the years belonged to an interest group whose conception of the international scene was one in which

Early bonds structured leaders' image of international system

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France could play only a secondary role. The minimal participation of French-speaking Canadians in the formulation of foreign policy would do nothing to alter this power structure.

This is all the more evident in the light of the rather tenuous bilateral relations between Canada and France. Exchanges on the economic level, as well as on the cultural and social levels, tended to be superficial. There were almost none with English Canada. While exchanges with French Canada were not completely lacking (recent studies show that certain notions in this regard will have to be changed), they were unrelated to the real nature of French-Canadian society. In any event, France was not regarded by any level of that society as essential to its survival.

A similar situation existed for the French Government. Canada played only

a minor role in France's general foreign policy strategy. The sincere gratitude the French felt towards the Canadian people for their participation in the two world wars did not alter this view. To the political leaders of France, Canada was a somewhat remote country and Quebec a vague memory from the past.

De Gaulle's visit

General de Gaulle's visit in 1967 was to change all this. On the governmental level he raised, though in a rather negative way, the entire question of France's place in Canadian diplomacy. With France now a possible threat, however indirect, to political order in Canada, Franco-Canadian relations took on unprecedented importance for Ottawa. We may deplore the method used by de Gaulle from a legal or moral standpoint. Politically, however, he gave a significance to Franco-Canadian

And then a visit to Mr. Ford

By Duart Farquharson

WASHINGTON: — Prime Minister Trudeau's brief working visit here December 4 and 5 was a moderately useful exercise in re-establishing Canadian good will with a new President. It had at least one advantage over the last two meetings between Prime Minister Trudeau and former President Nixon. There was no exaggerated claim of accomplishment made, and thus no consequent let-down after the event.

In his departure press conference this time, Mr. Trudeau did not boast of a "fantastic breakthrough" as he had in December 1971. Instead, he bluntly acknowledged continuing differences with the U.S. on beef and cattle, and supplies and prices of Canadian oil. Nor was there any attempt to announce some major new agreement such as the bilateral accord to clean up the Great Lakes signed by Mr. Nixon and Mr. Trudeau amid all the pomp and ceremony Ottawa could muster in April 1973. On this occasion, the Prime Minister politely but firmly reminded the new President that Canada expected the U.S. to honour clean-up commitments on which it had been lagging.

Mr. Farquharson is the Washington correspondent of Southam News Service. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

Canadian officials laid great stress on the warm personal *rapport* they said Mr. Trudeau achieved with Mr. Ford in their first meeting. The President invited the Prime Minister upstairs alone to meet the family after a stag dinner for 30 in the White House. They reportedly spent most of their hour together talking about skiing. Mr. Trudeau always appeared to get along swimmingly with Mr. Nixon too, despite their contrasting backgrounds, which were as different as the Canadian's is from Mr. Ford's. Certainly, Canadian officials always claimed they did. The Prime Minister said he wanted the President to phone him from time to time just the way his predecessor had done. We know now, through the Watergate tapes, how insultingly Mr. Nixon really regarded Mr. Trudeau even when putting through or cancelling a call.

The Ford friendliness the Prime Minister encountered was, of course, no unique gesture towards Canada. All the allied leaders who met the President at year's end, according to a *New York Times* survey of their home capitals, found him warm and personable. Mr. Trudeau was the only one quoted as making a critical comment. He found the President, an aide told the *Times*, "not very articulate".

The "working visit" format was officially said to be the choice of both

sitions that all the pious speeches of the
t failed to give. In this respect, General
Gaulle's gesture was beneficial not only
Quebec but, in the long run, to Canada
well. He brought Ottawa's relations with
ance down to a more concrete level. He
blished a strategic premise on which
base the Franco-Canadian relations.
is was, at least implicitly, what the
nadian Government did. De Gaulle of
urse, "en allant au fond des choses" was
ying his hand cautiously. From then on
ection could follow; but he reckoned
rectly, as has finally been borne out by
Trudeau's recent visit. We should do
ll to compare, for example, this Paris
it to those made by previous Canadian
me ministers.

De Gaulle's Canadian policy was also
give Franco-Canadian relations a base
t had always been lacking in the past—
ong bilateral support. Indeed, the Gen-

eral's visit marked the beginning of the
particularly rapid growth that has character-
ized Franco-Quebec relations over the
past seven years. The exchanges between
France and Quebec were remarkable not
only because of their diversity but especially
because of the spirit in which they
were made. For the first time, France was
establishing relations with Quebec that
were devoid of any paternalism. This
evident political co-operation would not
have been possible without the underlying
assumption that was the basis for France's
Canadian policy, and that de Gaulle so dram-
atically brought home to the Canadian
people: the distinct and unique character
of Quebec society, in whose development
France now had a very definite interest.
This was the true meaning of de Gaulle's
famous rallying cry from the hotel balcony
in Montreal, a proclamation that was
anything but a call for Quebec indepen-

Canadians and Americans to advance
personal relations. Such exchanges can
be arranged relatively easily, sand-
wiched between other visits as this one
was, because they involve few of the
protocol requirements of a state visit.
With the "ballyhooed" state visit of
West German Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt beginning the day the Prime
Minister left, however, inevitable but
inconsequential criticism emerged in
sections of both the Canadian and
American press that Mr. Trudeau was
being given second-class treatment. It is
true that the Canadian talks went un-
noticed by many Americans. As is usual
with North American summit meetings,
the visit received insufficient attention
in the U.S. media and probably more
than it was worth in the Canadian.

One might have expected greater
American interest this time because it
was the Americans who had most of the
complaints to voice. American reporters
who did attend the Trudeau press con-
ference generally gave the Prime Min-
ister high marks for his explanations of
Canadian policies. President Ford, after
voicing his country's obvious interest in
continuing imports of Canadian oil at
lower prices, must also have been im-
pressed with the Canadian argument
that "Operation Independence" cuts
both ways. A gradual phase-out of ex-
ports of Canadian crude is clearly better

for American refineries than an abrupt
curtailment, the only realistic alterna-
tive when Canada too is running out
of oil.

Treasury Secretary William Simon,
a former U.S. energy czar, has since
remarked that his country "would act
the same way" if it was in Canada's
shoes. And Senator Henry Jackson, the
influential Democrat from Washington,
has said it is "unreasonable" for the
U.S. to ask Canada to cut the price of
oil it exports.

Some American criticism remains,
of course. Senator Walter Mondale, a
usually friendly Minnesota Democrat,
warned in an unfortunate phrase after a
Senate breakfast with Prime Minister
Trudeau that relations between the two
countries "could become ugly". Other
senators continue to talk — unrealis-
tically, as Mr. Trudeau was quick to
point out — about possible retaliation
against oil passing across U.S. territory
on its way to Canada.

The Ford-Trudeau meeting may
have solved nothing on the bilateral
front. The two leaders, after all, spent
most of their time talking about world-
wide economic problems and the danger
of war in the Middle East. North Amer-
ican irritants will continue to come and
go. At the summit, quite rightly, the
larger picture will dominate.

dence. What sent even greater shock waves through the rest of Canada was the affirmation of a historical and sociological reality, which, because of its coherence, permanence and inevitably political ramifications, was quite different from the traditional notion of an "ethnic group" that had long been an important feature of the Federal's attitude toward Quebec.

This issue was essential to the development of relations between France and Quebec. In the mind of General de Gaulle — his parting address at "Man and His World" is explicit on this point — it was not simply a matter of France's lending support to Quebec or setting up bilateral programs, as two governments do from time to time. On a more fundamental level, it was an attempt to achieve a certain "osmosis" between the two societies, founded in respect for their individual characteristics and the constraints imposed by their geography. In short, the purpose was to establish between France and Quebec an intimacy such as English Canada had always enjoyed with the rest of the English-speaking world, but which had not been possible since 1760. Needless to say, neither the French Government nor Quebec ever believed that their exchanges could have an influence on Quebec society equal to that, for example, of the United States. Nevertheless, France and Quebec

could henceforth communicate freely at all levels whenever they felt the need.

We can assess this policy and results in various ways. It is clear, however, that a new and fundamental element is present in Franco-Canadian relations which now enjoy a firm base never before achieved. It must be acknowledged, that the Federal Government itself would never have been able to arrange bilateral relations of this nature between France and Quebec; on the one hand, the Federal Government never had any real control over Quebec society, and on the other, organization and general responsibilities in matters of foreign policy tended to constitute a screen between its own objectives and the particular needs of Quebec. It was an undertaking whose success required that France and Quebec alone work together in complete freedom.

Acceptance necessary

This new situation will not, of course, have any real significance unless Canadian foreign policy acknowledges and accepts it for what it is, instead of regarding it as a deviation. Relations between France and Quebec are by no means ordinary; very few equivalents can be found in current diplomacy. To alter these relations would certainly jeopardize the positive effects they have on Franco-Canadian relations.

Author's note:—

I must first confess my hesitation in agreeing to publish this article in *International Perspectives*. The External Affairs Department has never given any indication as to the objectives or nature of its publication. We are simply told that it is "une forme inédite de publication officielle" ("an original government publication"). *Inédite*, yes, and therefore ambiguous. In a democracy, very seldom does a government become an "idea-monger" at the public's expense. *International Perspectives* is primarily a publication of opinion, not of information. An academic who is asked to contribute to such a publication must, therefore, give the invitation some thought.

I shall provisionally agree, however, that it is an experiment that must be tried. Somewhere between an ideological puritanism, on the one hand, and political *naïveté* or opportunism, on the other, there is perhaps a place for new forms of dialogue between government experts and university specialists.

With this in mind, there remains

the question of whether or not this publication is, by its very nature, merely a disguised vehicle of support for government policies. A certain professional quality, combined with a somewhat ambivalent liberalism, can be a very effective form of propaganda, especially when we consider that few private organizations have the material means of producing a publication of this type.

If this were the case, would it then be wise for academics to contribute and thereby create the impression that there exists a consensus in matters of foreign policy?

P. P.

Editor's note:—

The objectives of *International Perspectives* were stated in a foreword to the first issue. These do not include the creation of an impression of consensus on foreign policy. The difference between the views expressed in Professor Painchaud's article and those in the companion piece by the Deputy Under-Secretary should be reassuring on this point.

Canadian diplomacy will, therefore, have to demonstrate a certain resourcefulness in adjusting to this unusual situation.

Quebec is clearly at a turning-point in the formulation of its international objectives, more particularly with respect to France. To begin with, its co-operation programs will have to be rethought. Moreover, one of the objectives implicit in Franco-Quebec relations — the promotion of Quebec's constitutional position with respect to Ottawa — is now obsolete. This fact must be accepted not only by the government, but also by those in and out of politics who are particularly concerned with the problems of federal-provincial relations. Quebec public opinion has matured since 1967, and the growth of the independence movement itself renders this initial objective meaningless. Quebecers today realize that their constitutional future, whatever it may be (including complete

independence), depends on themselves and themselves alone.

For this reason, it would be wrong to reproach France for its policy of *rapprochement* with Ottawa. It is quite normal for France to base its foreign policy on self-interest. It is, therefore, up to Quebec to show that it shares important mutual interests with France. In this perspective, it might be said of the *rapprochement* between Paris and Ottawa — as was already being said of relations between Canada and Britain in the mid-nineteenth century — that it represents a "declaration of independence" by France with respect to Quebec. This independence will be mutually beneficial only so far as Quebec is forced to define its relations with France more clearly in terms of advantages and disadvantages. In other words, Quebec will now have to adopt a strategy and soundly-based doctrine on the international level.

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in search of a grand design

by Jean Lecerf

In the first press conference the new President of the French Republic, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, was to devote to foreign policy was about to begin. "What do you expect?" I asked Pierre Charpy, one of the top French policy analysts. "He won't say anything noteworthy," he replied. "Any major change he announced might cost him his majority." The prediction was correct. The President is still hesitating between continuity and a search for new directions in his diplomacy.

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has chosen a diplomat, Jean Sauvagnargues, as his Minister of Foreign Affairs, no doubt indicating that he intends to direct foreign policy himself, as did General de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. The first concern of the new head of the Quai d'Orsay was to follow the policy of his predecessor, Michel Jobert, but he went about it in a very different manner. Jobert seemed to take an almost malicious delight in throwing verbal darts at Henry Kissinger, interjecting a note of tension into proceedings. At the conference on NATO in Ottawa, Sauvagnargues hastened to adopt a different style, but one in which courtesy did

not imply a lack of firmness. He likes to reminisce about certain great moments in his career; these centre around his ability to say no firmly but diplomatically. Such behaviour in a minor French diplomat once aroused the fury of Anthony Eden at an international conference. On another occasion Sauvagnargues's approach changed the course of the negotiations on Berlin.

But behind this more accommodating style, what theses will be defended regarding Europe, East-West relations, the

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Middle East and energy, defence and peacekeeping?

European Community

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing inherited a European Community in serious trouble. It had known its great moments with the admission of Britain, Ireland and Denmark on January 1, 1973, a few months after the Paris summit meetings, at which a very constructive work plan was formulated for the Community of the Nine. The summit meeting in Copenhagen in December 1973, to which the Arab League had sent ministers to make a plea for co-operation, seemed to be the boost needed to solve the Community's problems. Alas, it quickly became clear that the "political will" asserted at the top level had not solved anything. Mr. Wilson's request for a renegotiation of the membership conditions and the threat of England's withdrawing has thoroughly complicated matters.

From July to December 1974, the French were to preside over the Community, and had raised hopes that they would be able to initiate a revival. There were signs of hesitation in the preparation of this initiative. On July 31, the Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, spoke in Copenhagen of the "transfers of sovereignty" which were to be considered. The expression elicited reactions that Mr. Chirac played down on several occasions the following day. Jean Sauvagnargues took up the same theme again in October before the European Parliament, when he said, in response to one of the Communist members, that the European union the Community hoped to achieve by 1980 would involve some major relinquishment of sovereignty. When questioned on this subject, however, the President of the French Republic said that the formation of any organization involved reductions in sovereignty — he was not certain that it was possible to talk about "transfers". He added that, rather than advancing Europe, such discussions of "theology" were making it regress by locking the Europeans into their quarrels.

France proposed an economic revival based on a joint loan from the oil-producing countries. Germany resisted, and then finally agreed on condition that the amount did not exceed the modest sum of \$2 billion. The divergence of expansion policies and consequently of prices (a 7 percent increase in one year in Germany, twice as much in France, and even more in England), with each country wishing to maintain its total independence, is not highly favourable to anything that might lead, in one way or another, to a pooling of resources.

Threat of British withdrawal complicated community life

Reduction of sovereignty inherent in formation of organizations

Mr. Giscard d'Estaing suggested his Community colleagues that a summer meeting be held in Paris late in November or early in December at which the medium term prospects regarding balance of payments, supplies of energy and raw materials, growth, employment, European institutions and political union could be discussed. Mr. Sauvagnargues presented a plan for a general revival to his partners. He suggested that the heads of state who were members of the Community Council meet periodically to discuss politics and the economy and that they be assisted by small secretarial staff. A date would be set for the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage. This proposal met with a cool reception.

There has been nothing so far to indicate that Giscard d'Estaing is prepared to accept or propose a form of Community discipline. There is considerable fear that he is trying to turn the Community into a sort of club of statesmen who would work together but without making any commitments or decisions. This is not a certainty since no doors have been closed, but it is nevertheless very disturbing. The President has also spoken of France's desire for independence and has said he was in favour of universalism. There is nothing particularly worthy of note in this, except perhaps the fact that these are themes often raised by those for whom European construction is not a very high priority.

Other relations

France's attitude toward the United States has changed somewhat in form; but what is new in the way of content? Let us leave aside for the moment the question of energy and the Middle East, which will come back to eventually, and simply say that Valéry Giscard d'Estaing postponed study of the essential problems until the middle of December, when he met with President Gerald Ford in Martinique, just as he left matters pertaining to the Communist world until he received Leon Brezhnev in Paris in early December. Mr. Giscard d'Estaing has long been interested in exchanges between France and the Soviet Union, but he still has to come up with a new approach to them. He is further ahead in his dealings with Canada, having received Mr. Trudeau in October. The meeting centred on a joint approach to energy problems (uranium, coal and petroleum), but the problem of a strengthening of relations between the United States and Europe was also discussed at length.

France definitely supports closer relations between Canada and the Community. There is not yet any agreement, however,

to the form this *rapprochement* will take. Canada suggested a trade agreement with the Nine based on the most-favoured-nation clause and on a reaffirmation of the provisions of GATT, which would provide for consultation. In addition to tariffs and quotas, the agreement proposed by the Canadian Government dealt with domestic taxes, valuation, direct shipping, and so on.

Anxious to uphold the commitments of the European summit meeting in Paris, which the Canadians were promised a "constructive dialogue", the Community is at present showing signs of embarrassment. What is the point, the European Commission asks, of formally agreeing to hold consultations when these are running very smoothly without any such contract? What is the point of reinstituting provisions that are already binding on both the Community and Canada under GATT? This would have more disadvantages than advantages if the provisions of GATT changed or if the bilateral agreement were to be used as a means of appealing deviations made in accordance with GATT. The Community has signed numerous agreements with less-developed countries but Canada is obviously in a different class and the Community does not yet know how to establish bilateral relations with industrialized countries.

The European Commission would like to discuss new and much more interesting topics with Canada: guaranteed access to supplies of raw materials and energy, reciprocal investment incentives and promotion of industrial and technological co-operation. However, the problem is that the very interest of these issues has greatly delayed the Community's decisions on them. The question is still open.

Middle East and energy

The issues on which Mr. Giscard d'Estaing's foreign policy is most clearly defined are energy and the Middle East. On the energy question, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing has been upholding the policy of Georges Pompidou and Michel Jobert against that of Henry Kissinger. The Americans have not concealed their desire to head the international co-operation made necessary as a result of the energy crisis; in February 1974, they organized a conference in Washington bringing together the major oil-consuming countries. The French position is that, if the consuming countries discussed the problem first among themselves, it would develop into a confrontation between producers and consumers, while, if the major producing countries discussed it, this would probably mean pushing into the background the fact that by far the hardest



UPI Telephoto

Since his succession to the presidency Valery Giscard d'Estaing has emerged as one of the most active figures in the international community. He is pictured here at a press conference following the December summit meeting of the leaders of the European Common Market countries. He reported that the meeting had agreed on the importance of a common policy to face the worldwide energy crisis.

hit by the crisis were the developing countries that had no raw materials.

Giscard, finally, was afraid that, if the problem were discussed under American leadership, the fact that the problems of the various countries were radically different might well be overlooked. As one of the members of the European Parliament, Mr. Cousté, said to President Ford: "You produce 85 per cent of your petroleum and are short the other 15 per cent. In our case the proportions are reversed. You can afford to chance a confrontation; we cannot." This explains why before Martinique Mr. Giscard d'Estaing was proposing a tripartite conference on the problem and was looking for support for his position in the international community. It was also the reason for his refusal to sign the agreement of the Twelve on petroleum-sharing when all his fellow members of the Community signed it.

It is perhaps the Palestinian question that is of greatest interest to the new President. One of the journalists who interviewed him told me that Mr. Giscard d'Estaing had only one map in his office, a map of the Middle East, and that he used it to explain his point of view on the Palestinian question. He considers the Palestinians to be a nation and says that

Americans could afford confrontation France could not

it is natural for any nation to want to have a homeland. He personally decided that France would vote in favour of Palestinian participation in the UN debate, even though his partners in the Community, most of whom abstained, asked France to abstain as well so that the Community might take a unanimous stand. Giscard d'Estaing feels that, in order to end terrorism, ensure lasting peace in the Middle East and bring about a reconciliation between France and Israel, an acceptable solution must be found to the demands of the Palestinians.

Atomic weapons

At a press conference, I asked the President this difficult question: "Our generation has made great progress in the art of annihilating mankind. If we do not do something effective to limit the arms race, our descendants will regard us as criminals. France has equipped itself with atomic weapons. It is reluctant to support any initiatives toward organizing peace and international security. What do you, Mr. President, intend to do?"

Mr. Giscard d'Estaing evaded the part of the question dealing with international security, leaving little hope for the moment that France would radically alter its policy on this issue. On the other hand, the President stated solemnly that France would not allow itself to use either its arms or the threat of its arms against a non-nuclear power unless that power was threatening French soil. He hoped that this attitude would gradually be adopted by other countries. He also said that he would like to see research done into what made non-nuclear nations want to equip themselves with nuclear arms. Such a statement is likely to have little effect, even though in this case it was followed by a promise of further details on the action France plans to take to contribute to arms limitation. But it might mark the beginning of a research policy that will perhaps lead to the heart of the problem. It is to be hoped that other countries will take an interest in this proposal, and either support it or propose an alternate approach.

On the whole, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing's first steps in the realm of foreign policy have been cautious and cannot be used to make any specific predictions. There have been no abrupt changes in direction, even though the style is more easy-going. As regards Europe — the main concern at the summit meetings — de Gaulle's ideas that

were taken up by Pompidou remain central to the project. Regarding other issues, Giscard d'Estaing has a positive general attitude, but it has had few visible concrete effects. The December meetings were important for both the East and the West. No doubt the new thrust of French policy will be revealed more at future sessions. At Martinique, France and the United States came closer together on the oil question. But France still has its own attitude on oil, which continues to be different from that of the Americans. As for the Palestinians, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing argued that they should be treated as a nation. As for world security, the direction to be followed is still not fully clear, but the problem has been raised.

More important than these first few steps is what we know about the man and his position. He is a liberal but is not doctrinaire, a European who distrusts dogmatises, an urbane man who rounds off the angles, but without repudiating the heritage he has received. Giscard d'Estaing is a man who likes to navigate by sight, to manage the unforeseeable, a man who prefers specific achievements to grandiose plans. In his case, facts will speak more loudly than doctrines, but it is possible that he will hesitate when confronted with a major decision. He was elected President by a narrow margin. The foreign policy he perhaps favours personally (he is considered to be more "Atlantic" and "European" than his predecessors) might cost him part of his majority, the orthodox Gaullists, and provide ammunition for the Communist wing of the Opposition, which favoured Gaullist diplomacy.

A slow and subtle struggle is taking shape, and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing is ready for it.

Recent changes were announced in the editorship of *International Perspectives*. One other change remains to be noted. Professor Louis Balthazar has succeeded Mr. E. R. Bellemare as French editor. Mr. Bellemare is a retired officer of the Department of External Affairs who served in a number of positions at home and abroad before being associated with *International Perspectives*. Louis Balthazar is on leave as professor of political science at Laval. In addition to his present duties with *International Perspectives* he is a visiting professor of political science at York University.

Common goal of expansion unites Canada and Japan

Stephen Heeney

cision-makers in Ottawa are turning to Canada's relations with Japan, not only because of the attention Canada's second-greatest individual trading partner would automatically warrant but also as an integral part of Canada's basic foreign policy. The Government's foreign policy review determined that the most appropriate policy for the 1970s will be one that strengthens

and extends sound domestic policies dealing with key national issues. Foreign policy is seen as supporting a long-term strategy for developing and strengthening

Canadian economy and other aspects of national life. In the foreign arena, this objective is achieved essentially through diversification, with the aim of achieving a sounder, less vulnerable economic base

competing in domestic and world markets and of deliberately broadening the spectrum of markets in which Canadians can and will compete.

In this context, hard and favourable looks are being given to the role of Canada-Japan relations in the light of the Canadian government's domestic and foreign policy objectives. Indeed, the Secretary of State for External Affairs recently referred to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, (October 22, 1974) to the two main centres of gravity with which Canadians hoped to strengthen their relations in line with a policy of diversifying Canada's external relations — the European Community and Japan.

The identification of Japan as one of these centres was relatively simple. At the political level, Japan and Canada share common democratic institutions and treaty relations with the United States in support of Western security. Social life is dominated by urban institutions and approaches and all the gadgetry of modern communications. Both countries possess well-educated populations and sophisticated consumers. Although Herman Kahn's predictions (*The Emerging Japanese Superstate*) are now regarded by many Japanese as extravagant, nevertheless, barring

total disaster, it appears that Canadians will find themselves together with their Japanese friends sooner or later living in "post-industrial societies". Thus, despite important cultural differences, modern Canadians and Japanese have much in common and share similar objectives, not only about the direction of their own societies but with respect to the world at large.

Community of interest

Starting from this broad community of interest, it was not difficult to tie the cultivation of relations with Japan to Canada's own need to diversify its external relations in support of domestic economic objectives. There was a good base for this since, at the economic level, Canada and Japan are important trading partners; Japan is projected as taking some \$2 billion in 1975 in Canadian goods and Canadians are projected as buying \$1.5-billion worth from Japan.

Some Canadian objectives will be difficult to achieve, and will at the least necessitate considerable effort to improve the "mix" of Canadian exports to Japan. Much of the momentum of Canada-Japan trade is attributable to a natural development, which is the at-least-partial "complimentarity" of the Canadian and Japanese economies. Canada is resource-rich and Japan resource-poor; Japan is highly industrialized and Canada unevenly so; Canada is able efficiently to ship unprocessed or semi-processed raw materials to Japan; the Canadian consumer is sophisticated and wealthy enough to buy

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UPI Ph

Brush in hand Prime Minister Tanaka adds his signature to a document during his visit to Canada. The method of signature alone demonstrates the difference between cultures. The cordial nature of the visit demonstrated that the cultural differences can be overcome. A matter of weeks after Mr. Tanaka returned home from his travels he was forced to resign as Prime Minister.

Greatest share of processing and manufacturing sought by Canada

the incomparable products of Japanese industry. (Some 1.7 per cent of Canadian exports to Japan were manufactured products, as against some 30 per cent of Canada's exports to the U.S.A.; the bulk of Canada's imports from Japan are semi-processed and manufactured goods.) This form of trade is not unhealthy in itself, and has brought important benefits to Canadians and Canadian life. On the other hand, it does not contribute as much as it might to two important and related Canadian economic policies — that of further processing resources before their export and that of increasing the share of manufactured goods in Canadian exports. These policies are designed to bring to Canadians more of the benefits of industrialization, which would include increased employment.

For several years, the Government has sought to assist Canadian manufacturers and processors in developing markets in Japan. In 1972, Jean-Luc Pepin, Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, led a mission of Canadian businessmen and officials to Japan to tell the Japanese what manufactured goods Canada had to offer and the benefits to the Japanese consumer of looking to Canada as a source of sophisticated products. On this foundation, efforts to cultivate the Japanese market are continuing. Selec-

tivity is the watchword, and Canadian emphasis is on aerospace industries, and gas equipment, finished lumber, auto parts, under-sea equipment, food products and consumer goods. Japan is a known market for nuclear technology, in which Canada is a world leader. (There already exist an agreement and regular consultations between Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) and its Japanese counterpart.) Paralleling the Government's effort to increase the manufactured component of Canadian exports to Japan will be the role accorded to Canada-Japan trade in the implementation of the Canadian policy of encouraging further processing and upgrading of raw materials before export. At the moment, very few Canadian mineral and agricultural exports are exported to Japan at a respectable high level of processing. The success of the Government's desire to encourage more processing prior to export will depend in large part on its success *vis-à-vis* Japan.

Although economic objectives are a trade policy are important motivations, the Government's policy toward Japan they are not the sole (or even the predominant) motive. Japan, a great power before the war, has re-emerged on the world scene in a form whose magnitude would have been inconceivable to the pre-war government. Through the mobilization of 1

alents of its remarkable people, Japan has acquired the second-largest gross national product in the non-Communist world and promises to play an increasingly important world role. Economic difficulties beset Japan, as they do many countries, but most observers expect a return to real economic growth in Japan next year. Japan's world role, which differs only in scale from Canada's own dependence on world stability, renders it essential that Canadians and Japanese consult wherever and whenever possible on world trends, as well as on the more pressing bilateral interests and issues. Efforts are being made to employ existing mechanisms (such as the Canada-Japan Ministerial Committee) and devise new ones to provide a broader framework for bilateral consultations. In addition, it is the Canadian Government's aim to encourage the *habit* of consultation with Japan in the absence of the automaticity and informality in relations with other states that is fostered by membership in such institutions as the Commonwealth and the North Atlantic Council. Thus occasions for exchanging views with the Japanese must be sought, and this is being done.

Common interest

In arriving at this policy, the Canadian Government took account also of what it perceived would be of considerable benefit to Japan. Without attempting to state here what is essentially a Japanese responsibility, it might be well to touch on points of common interest. The Japanese Government, too, is committed to diversifying its external relations. In addition, it seems clear that the Japanese regard Canada as a stable country, and this counts for a great deal in the business of securing resources. Canada is receptive to foreign investment that would be of significant benefit to it. Canada is reordering its domestic economic objectives, so sooner or later will Japan. The Japanese home islands have become over-industrialized and over-populated. The Japanese Government is looking increasingly to the provision of a more comfortable life for its citizens, and this is likely to be accompanied by an increasing emphasis on "knowledge-intensive" industries and a corresponding playing down of the traditional Japanese policy of making everything in Japan. This trend has moved some way with respect to light industry and would logically extend in time to heavy industry, including refining. Should it do so, Canadian policy on further processing and upgrading would become com-

patible with Japan's own domestic policies, to the enormous benefit of both countries.

How practical is the Government's policy, expressed in a kind of shorthand, of "broadening and deepening" relations with Japan? The Prime Minister's Special Adviser, Ivan Head, wrote in a recent *Pacific Community* article:

"Of all Canada's trans-Pacific relations, that with Japan promises to be among the most rewarding in terms of mutual potential advantage in the next ten years, yet without question it contains innumerable problems which must be overcome before those advantages will be enjoyed fully by either country."

These problems are not only related to the difficulties of shifting the "mix" of our trade or, as the former Secretary of State for External Affairs put it, of "politicizing" our relations with Japan. They are inextricably linked to both Canadian and Japanese domestic economic policy and to the fundamentals of cultural differences – not to say opposites.

The possible limiting effects on trade policy of domestic economic strategy, which itself is determined by the domestic acceptability of one policy or another, could prove an important constraint and could be true of either Canada or Japan, or both. Another constraint could be the caution felt by Canadians owing to the relative imbalance between the economic strength of Canada and Japan, together with the relatively monolithic Japanese approach to activities abroad. A limiting factor could be the diffusion of responsibility in Canada between the provinces and the Federal Government. Indeed, the pursuit of a more active policy towards Japan must be accompanied by a more constant effort to "think Canadian", just as the Japanese constantly "think Japanese". Other constraints are perhaps less significant in the course of time. Cultural understanding, or at least cultural respect, can come through personal contact, which has until recently tended to be confined to Western Canada. This pattern is altering, and Japanese businessmen and tourists are gradually filtering into Central Canada and the Atlantic region. Academic centres with important facilities for Japanese studies are established or planned for Toronto and Montreal, in addition to an established centre in Vancouver. Much remains to be done, especially in practical skills such as interpretation. The Japanese market is virtually virgin territory for Canada, which is much less well understood in Japan than, say, Australia – not to mention the United States.

Economic imbalance between Canada and Japan may constrain relationship

The recent official visit to Canada of the Prime Minister of Japan took place against this background. Mr. Tanaka visited Ottawa for discussions with Prime Minister Trudeau on September 23 and 24, and proceeded on September 25 and 26 to Toronto and Vancouver, where he had a heavy program of official and private engagements. It was the first visit by a Japanese Prime Minister to Canada since the Government had embarked on its policy of broadening and deepening relations. Prior discussion had, however, taken place during contacts between the two Prime Ministers on April 7 in Paris, where they agreed that they had laid a broad framework for the further expansion and developing of relations between ministers, and through

the special visit to Japan of Mr. Head.

Ottawa discussions

The discussions in Ottawa between the two Prime Ministers highlighted the bilateral relations of Japan and Canada. The following is a paraphrase of the relevant parts of the final communiqué: The two Prime Ministers indicated satisfaction with the increasingly close relations between the two countries in recent years and agreed that Japan and Canada would make constant efforts to cultivate, expand and enrich further their co-operative relations in the political, economic, cultural, scientific and technological and other fields, thereby putting the relations on an even broader and deeper basis. The

Perspective on Takeo Miki

By Eduardo Lachica

TOKYO: — A Japanese newspaper columnist has likened the new Prime Minister, Mr. Takeo Miki, to a pitcher sent to the mound with the game already lost. There is some aptness — but only so much — to this cynical observation.

The previous Prime Minister, Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, was shelled out of office by public criticism of his big-spending ways and of the still-questioned connections between his private business and his politics. Neither of the two strongest candidates for succession, Mr. Masayoshi Ohira and Mr. Takeo Fukuda, could have taken power without the risk of splitting the Liberal Democratic Party wide open. So, in the end, the party elders settled for a less controversial man in the hope that he could come up with a late-inning miracle.

If the job is simply to restore confidence in the scandal-ridden LDP, Mr. Miki has the best of credentials. He is a genuine liberal, who stood for friendship with the U.S. while Japan was girding for the Second World War

and urged diplomatic ties with China before it became fashionable to do so. And he is the closest thing to a "Mr. Clean" in conservative politics, with no "Black Mist" on his record. He ran three times for the party presidency, each time without success because he had neither the factional "clout" nor the desire to buy out his opponents.

At 67, Miki is a cerebral, low-key politician who prefers dialogue and reconciliation as a way of getting things done. He speaks in such a rambling, professorial way that some journalists have a hard time keeping awake at his press conferences; but behind that benign, grandfatherly facade, the reporters say, is a shrewd political brain. He is something of a Tory maverick. He was expelled from high school for leading a student strike and went off to study in a small California university to broaden his outlook. From this and subsequent overseas contacts, he acquired a Western-style liberalism rarely found among members of the Conservative Party. Though he was born to a family of modest means in Shikoku, he married into the Mori clan, which had substantial interests in one of the pre-war Zaibatsu (business conglomerates). He is connected by marriage to the Crown Princess Michiko and to many prominent figures in business. He lives quietly, "like an English gentleman", as one

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agreed to continue close consultations between the two countries and expressed the belief that such consultations would play an even greater role in the future. Specifically mentioned were consultations in the Japan-Canada Ministerial Committee, as well as on the problems confronting the Asian-Pacific region and on United Nations affairs. Furthermore, in the context of broadening and deepening Japan-Canada relations, the two Prime Ministers affirmed that it was important for the two countries to exchange their views and information frequently at all levels and noted the existence of such official-level forums as the Sub-Committee on Minerals and Energy and meetings on agricultural matters. In response to Mr. Trudeau's reference to the

preponderance of raw materials in Canadian exports and Canada's interest in expanding sales of fabricated products, including high-technology goods, Mr. Tanaka indicated that scope existed for the expansion of Canadian exports of these products through intensified efforts. The two Prime Ministers agreed that there was ample scope, within the framework of each country's domestic economic objectives, for the furthering of economic relations, to the benefit of both countries. In order to improve communications, the two Prime Ministers announced their intention to initiate matching and complementary programs of approximately \$1 million each for promoting academic relations. These funds will be used primarily for the development

Economic goals leave scope for closer ties

newspaper described it. He is often photographed these days wearing the traditional Japanese kimono.

Mr. Miki cannot, however, be dismissed as a mere middleweight, an idealist who can't get down to earth. He has been a full-time parliamentarian since he ran for his first Diet seat in 1937, and insiders credit him with more deftness in the game than many of his peers who had earlier careers in the bureaucracy or in business before entering politics.

But, now that he is no longer the LDP's resident critic and he has Japan's problems to solve, everyone is watching how he will translate his principles into action. His recent Cabinet appointments still reflect the reality of the party's power structure. The powerful Tory leaders and their followers are well-placed in proportion to their strength. Mr. Miki is initially taking the role of mediator and reconciler of party views. The Cabinet has visible strength in the management of economic affairs, with the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Fukuda, co-ordinating anti-inflation policies.

Some weaknesses in this "unity" Cabinet are already evident, however. Contrary to previous practice, Mr. Miki gave the crucial post of LDP Secretary-General not to a member of his own faction but to the leader of another faction, the ambitious former MITI

Minister, Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone. Mr. Nakasone was reported to be differing with the Prime Minister in his views about how to put more teeth into the anti-monopoly law.

In his first three weeks, Mr. Miki and his men did little more than talk — this was going to be a government-by-dialogue. Some critics were disappointed not to see faster action, but in Japan there is virtue in consensus and in not overstepping the bounds of public understanding. "Mr. Tanaka failed because he was too active and didn't listen to other people," a Tokyo industrialist observed. "What Japan needs is a leader whom people can trust, and the country can do the rest."

Mr. Miki's big test is whether he can persuade unionists to moderate their wage demands next spring. This would be needed to put inflation under control and go on from there to gradual economic recovery. In its dialogue with labour leaders, the Government exacted a promise to abide by an objective settlement provided some public rates were frozen and the distribution system was improved.

Mr. Miki started out with a public support of 47 per cent — still high by Tory standards — but he could begin to slip like his predecessors if he does not demonstrate some success in beating inflation and cleaning up the party image.

of Japanese studies in Canada and of Canadian studies in Japan. They also agreed that it would be desirable to conclude a cultural agreement in order to expand further the cultural exchanges between Japan and Canada. Finally, the two Prime Ministers looked forward to an increasing momentum for developing Japan-Canada relations, to be sustained through the next meeting of the Ministerial Committee and Prime Minister Trudeau's subsequent visit to Japan.

Major constraints

The essential object for both governments is to ensure the implementation of this venture. As suggested above, there are important constraints. The major one will be the extent to which a framework for the satisfaction of mutual requirements can be achieved. This is emerging. Even at this stage it is clear that the Canadian Government dismisses the notion of a "division of labour" between Japan and Canada whereby Canada would serve as a primary resource hinterland and consumer of Japanese manufactured and high-technology products. For example, the Canadian Government's domestic economic strategy allocates an important place to the Japan-

*Canada rejects
division of labour
relationship*

ese market for Canadian manufactured goods. In addition, in time, the Government expects Japan to become not only a continuing purchaser of raw materials but increasingly of processed and semi-processed agricultural and mineral resources in cases where it made economic sense for this to take place in Canada.

Before this particular stage can be reached, however, it will be necessary for the Government to complete the determination of its industrial objectives, co-operation with the provinces and the private sector. Pending this, and parallel to it, the Government is already moving ahead by encouraging contacts and consultation with the Japanese across a much wider spectrum. These are directed not only toward ensuring that the respective positions of the two countries are well understood but, where possible and appropriate, to harmonizing action. In so doing, the Government is developing the Pacific element of Canadian foreign policy as a major potential contribution to the diversification of Canada's foreign relations in the interest of the prosperity and well-being of the Canadian, and it is hoped the Japanese people.

The economics and politics of Japanese growth to 1980

By Keith A. J. Hay

This has been a turbulent year for Japan. The gradual economic recovery under way at the end of 1973 received a body-blow from the international oil crisis. The Japanese were shocked when prices started suddenly to rise at annual rates in excess of 30 per cent, while tissue paper, soya beans and fuel oil disappeared from the shelves of suppliers. Were the days of high growth ended forever? Was this a return

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to the austerity and penny-pinching of the late 1940s? Then Vice-Premier Takeo Miki hurried off to the Middle East with promises to repair the Suez, build steel-mills and assemble petrochemical complexes. Nevertheless, the popularity of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party continued to wane and in the summer elections Mr. Tanaka received a considerable political setback with the loss of his majority in the upper house of Parliament. Within weeks, Japan found itself entangled in a rapidly-escalating political row with South Korea. Taking to the airways, Mr. Tanaka used the classic political manoeuvre of visiting neighbours and trade partners when things get hot at home. His reception in Thailand and Indonesia had sounded a distinctly hostile note early in the year, but his visits to Brazil, Canada and Australasia went off smoothly. Inter-

national diplomacy was crowned with the visit of President Ford to Japan in September 1974 — the first time an American president in office had paid such a call. But Mr. Tanaka's domestic political difficulties were mounting. A rapid Cabinet shuffle could not reverse the impact of a highly-damaging exposure of his financial dealings, which was immediately seized upon by the international press. Mr. Tanaka's resignation was inevitable. After much behind-the-scenes negotiating, Mr. Sasaki, who had disassociated himself from the Cabinet in June 1974, emerged as Prime Minister. He must now grapple with the problems of abating inflation while fostering economic recovery.

End of the boom

The Sixties was the decade of vigorous expansion of secondary industry in Japan. There was an upsurge of transportation-equipment production, headed by motorcycles, automobiles and trucks. Alongside these, another range of consumer durables poured forth from the electrical industries — television and stereo sets, tape decks, radios — and a few years later came electronic desk calculators and various cassette-operated entertainment devices. The output of the transport and electrical industries rose from 17.0 per cent to 22.5 per cent of total manufacturing production between 1963 and 1973. Meanwhile general machinery, metals, including iron and steel, retained a constant share. The declining sector included chemicals and light industry, especially foods and textiles.

Housing and civil-engineering endeavours involving railway extension, road-building, port construction, and sewerage and water-transmission services were developed at rates somewhat below the general Japanese growth-rate during the Sixties. Nevertheless, the construction industry prospered and assumed an increasingly important role in the economy. Substantial growth was also apparent in the service sector, with Japan devoting an increasing share of its resources to finance, commerce, real estate, communications, leisure and government services. In this trend Japan was following hard on the heels of other industrialized states that have witnessed the slow shift in their economic centres of gravity towards tertiary-service activities and away from primary processing and the manufacture of machinery, equipment, chemicals and consumer items. This tendency toward a service-oriented society, in which the public sector plays an increasingly important role, has sown the seeds among Western nations of structurally-induced inflation.

It is much more difficult to promote productivity improvements in the labour-using service sector than among the manufacturing industries. Whereas production processes readily lend themselves to the continued introduction and up-grading of machinery — so increasing the output of individual workers — such techniques are less easy to invoke rapidly in the service sector. Widespread use of telecommunications, advanced electronic systems and massive electronic computational installations promises future breakthroughs, but for the moment productivity improvements are hard-won in a variety of labour-intensive activities. As a consequence, the cost of services continues to spiral upward, as workers in all sectors strive to maintain wage differentials and to improve their income shares, regardless of the output performance of their industries. Until 1973, productivity gains of between 15 and 20 per cent *per annum* permitted Japanese manufacturers to grant wage hikes of over 20 per cent, with only a very small portion of the cost passed on in the form of higher prices. This allowed them to maintain competitive export prices for such lines as cars, colour television sets, steel pipes, plates and rods, fertilizers, synthetic fabrics, etc. This performance contrasted with domestic inflation derived from cost-push in the less-productive primary and service sectors, which, fuelled by easy money, often ran at or above 7 per cent annually over the past ten years. Japan could live with inflation of this magnitude provided real incomes generally rose even faster and there were sustained and perceptible improvements in the general standard of living.

Double-digit inflation

These long-run expectations of high growth with single-digit inflation evaporated in 1974. The October annual gain represented a surge of 28.7 per cent, but this was an improvement over earlier 1974 results, which were registering in excess of 30 percent gains in wholesale prices as Japan struggled to absorb higher costs of oil, food, transport, producer goods and services. Concomitantly, the economy turned in its worst performance in the postwar period by actually slicing up to 1 per cent off previous levels of real income. Admittedly, most of the inflation was imported and a direct consequence of global price jumps in fuel costs, food prices and the bill for many metallic minerals. To offset these effects, the Government had employed a noxious mixture of price controls and tight money that greatly diminished corporate liquidity, dampened domestic

Inflation creates problems for maintenance of growth

demand and aggravated the local recessionary impact. To a considerable extent, then, the 1974 record of breakaway prices and declining output is a *cyclical* outcome of current disequilibria in international commodity and money markets. But looking ahead to 1980 and beyond, there is mounting evidence that Japan's performance will be adjusted *secularly*, not only in response to forces of international commerce but also by domestic policy design. The days of high growth and manageable inflation may be long in returning.

The immediate picture up to 1976 poses the most difficult problems of reactivating the local economy while bringing inflation within tolerable bounds and ensuring that Japan can maintain its international-payments position. All this must be achieved by a new Government under Prime Minister Takeo Miki, who has until now headed a comparatively small faction within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Although Mr. Miki has not had very much experience at formulating economic policy, he has singled out inflation as the paramount issue and promised to consolidate the Government's attack upon it. The trick here will be to throttle-back prices while gearing-up output. The usual Japanese recovery device has been a quick burst of relaxed monetary policy. Indeed, business circles and some Japanese academics have been calling for the easing of the Bank of Japan's stringent monetary growth-rate of 11 per cent at annual rates, which obtained in November 1974. Even central bankers have admitted that this expansion could be boosted two to five points in the spring of 1975 to stimulate production. The key issue in all this is the outcome of the spring "Labour offensive", in which management and unions will bargain forthcoming wage increases. Several large unions have already indicated that they are looking for 30 percent wage gains in 1975 to follow the 27 percent average obtained last year. Government and management are hoping to settle for a 15 percent wage increase.

With production sagging and domestic sales low, excess capacity is widespread in many of Japan's leading industrial sectors. Since workers in large firms enjoy "life-time" employment, they are fixed costs whose wages must be paid whether they are producing or enjoying extended holidays, shorter work weeks, or doing gardening and painting chores round the plant. In these circumstances, productivity gains not only plummet — they may even be negative. Thus the whole of any wage increase would exert cost-push and result in higher prices for the product. Besides

being highly inflationary at home, a high wage settlement could easily undercut Japan's already seriously jeopardized international competitiveness. The Tanaka Government pledged in the fall of 1974 to hold the yen relatively steady at 300 to the American dollar. If, however, wage hikes are added to the already inflated material costs, Japan will have serious problems maintaining the export drive that has helped sustain its employment and eased the problem of paying for oil in 1974. A downward float of the yen would become inevitable (in essence a managed devaluation), a side effect of which would be eventually to increase the costs of food, fuel and material imports.

From all this, it is obvious that Prime Minister Miki must achieve a wage bargain in the 10-20 percent range in 1975 or his economic difficulties will multiply. His chances of success are definitely higher than those of his predecessor. Mr. Miki's political manifesto includes a call to reform the organization and financing of the Government party, aims at more participatory democracy, and seeks to "consolidate social justice". On this platform, he may be able to persuade Japan's increasingly powerful union leaders to give him a chance, and not to enmesh him in the daily horrors of 20 percent plus inflation.

International payments

At the beginning of 1974, Japan's international-payments outlook was bleak. Oil provided three-quarters of the energy consumed in Japan, and of this more than nine-tenths was imported, principally from the Middle East. Vulnerability was further heightened by industrial consumption of oil in Japan, which was double the level of private consumption. This ratio is the reverse of that in North America, and means that cut-backs in Japanese oil consumption must inevitably mean reductions in industrial use. In fact, fuel rationing was tolerable and short-lived, but can be expected again in the summer of 1975. Far less tolerable, and likely to be long-lived, has been the enormous strain on the balance of payments of a \$12-billion increase in the oil-import bill. The monthly oil bill was \$0.47 billion in June 1973, and \$1.68 billion in June 1974 for approximately the same quantity.

After several years of healthy surpluses, the doomsayers predicted that Japan would finish 1974 with a \$9-billion international-payments deficit. The actual trade results have been spectacularly positive. An export drive was so successful that it more than covered the increases in oil costs, so that for the month of Sep-

ember 1974 Japan's trade account showed a surplus of almost \$700 million, and this plus figure continued to increase until the end of the year. By October 1974, exports were up 64 per cent and imports by 44 per cent over the previous year. Arranging loans from Saudi Arabia, negotiating funds from the "Euro-dollar" market, and curtailed overseas capital dispersals have allowed Japan to swing the international capital account also in its favour. The 1974 balance of payments will probably show a \$4-billion deficit, albeit one that has greatly receded since mid-year. But greatly increased shipping and insurance costs have added substantially to the deficit and no quick solution to the problem of improving invisible earnings is in sight.

economic resilience

These international trade results emphasize the extraordinary resilience of the Japanese economy. On the one hand, the depression in Japanese heavy industry has set back oil consumption but, on the other hand, the excess capacity has challenged many Japanese firms to take up the slack through exports. Availability of quick cash earnings from overseas and the exemption of government incentives have so spurred the selling effort. However, with world trade in manufactured commodities slowing down and a recessionary trend now enveloping most of the industrialized nations, there are serious questions whether Japan's customers will permit it to continue selling at such a furious pace. Already automobile-producers have encountered the antipathy of Australian dock workers to their imports, and even Britain is uneasy at seeing a Japanese maker outsell the combined production of two of its domestic car-producers in October 1974. To retain good trade relations voluntary export cut-backs may be in order. Meanwhile, Japan continues to increase car shipments to North America, even though sales are lagging. Similar problems have cropped up with other consumer durable exports such as television sets, stereo sets, cameras and snowmobiles. There has been no lack of customers for iron and steel products, as world-wide shortages continued for the first half of 1974. But making the running have been machinery and equipment, complete factories, refineries and other turn-key projects destined for the Middle East, Brazil and China. If Japan can continue to reap sizeable gains in these markets, then the balance of payments should not prove a deterrent to restoring long-run economic growth.

Looking ahead for 1975-76, the forecast must be reasonably optimistic. If Mr. Miki is able to persuade labour to accept a 15 percent wage settlement, conditions will be conducive to a resumption of real economic growth. The actual performance of the economy can be forecast at 6.5 to 7 percent real expansion for fiscal year 1975. This would reflect a Government policy of easier money coupled with continued spending restraints. By making more cash available, business-capital expenditure would be revived from the slump into which it fell at the outset of the oil crisis. With investment rejuvenated, the Government hopes to restore labour productivity and employment, indirectly leading to renewed levels of consumption expenditure. These are the keys to bringing the Japanese economy gradually back on to a growth path starting from the summer of 1975.

The longer term

Once Japan has recovered from the current cyclical downturn, the questions concerning its long-run economic performance will come back into sharp focus. These all turn on the central issue of achieving a transition from a quantitatively-oriented economy to one stressing quality of life and a more egalitarian distribution of the benefits of high income in an advanced society. These concerns echo those of many other industrialized nations, but they are critical in the crowded, environmentally-endangered islands of Japan.

To achieve "genuine affluence", Japan must divert private and public resources to the prolonged process of cleaning up the air and the water, while reducing congestion and noise. Environmental objectives will not be achieved if industry is allowed to grow without check in the favoured Pacific Coast corridor between Tokyo and Osaka. Indeed, the search for local industrial sites has become a nightmare for refiners, smelters and paper-millers. Furthermore, the economic rationale for retaining such heavy industries within Japan has waned with rising wages and oil costs, plus the difficulty of securing overseas supplies. On both economic and environmental grounds, heavy industrial growth must be diverted to offshore locations. These factors are in Canada's favour, if we wish to promote Japanese investment in mining, metal refining, petrochemicals, and pulp and paper. For the most part, Japan will seek locations around the "Pacific Rim" for such energy-using activities — being careful not to put too many eggs in one basket. Japanese over-dependence on the Middle East for oil and the U.S. for soya

Environment and growth need balancing

beans, re-emphasized by recent embargoes, has underscored the necessity to have many independent suppliers. Furthermore, Japan has no wish to be branded with the stigma of economic imperialism through seeking too great a share of neighbouring Asian resources.

Offshore investment

Estimates of proposed offshore investment are substantial. In 1970 Japan had an outstanding balance of overseas investments, amounting to \$3.5 billion. This value could rise fourteenfold, to \$48 billion by 1980, according to Mitsui Bank forecasts. The "mix" of investments at the beginning of the decade was roughly one-third in natural-resource development, one-quarter in manufacturing and two-fifths in banking and services. By 1980 these proportions should be two-fifths in both resources and manufacturing and one-fifth in banking, etc. Looked at another way, Japan is preparing to invest abroad almost \$20 billion in both resources and production, and this will be placed 42 per cent in industrialized nations, 55 per cent in developing nations (including the Middle East), and 3 per cent in the Communist nations. Chemicals should lead the way at \$4 billion in offshore investments, iron and steel \$3 billion, machinery \$2.8 billion, and pulp and paper \$2.7 billion.

Over the next five years, policies will be promoted to improve and extend the stock of social overhead capital. Although the labour force is expected to grow at only 0.8 per cent *per annum*, the desire to increase the already high proportion of young Japanese attending university implies heavy educational investment. An impetus to the offshore location of labour-intensive production activities will also be provided by the growing shortage of blue-collar workers. These effects are likely to be felt even in such "glamour" industries as automobiles, electronics and shipping. Hand-in-hand with the rise of knowledge — intensive activities such as computer assembly, high-compound chemistry, aerospace, electrical and numeric controlled machinery — must come the research and development to support them and the social systems for health, leisure, environmental integrity and cultural development to provide a living environment. Japan must intensify its technological base, seek methods to recycle non-ferrous metals, find new protein sources in waste treatment, and shift its energy dependence gradually towards nuclear power and away from oil. In 1973, oil provided 75 per cent of energy. This will be reduced to 67 per cent in 1980 and, with

luck, to 61 per cent in 1985. Nuclear power will provide 1 per cent, 6 per cent and 11 per cent over the same period.

These goals look fine on paper, but can they be achieved in reality? Almost all the plans involve increased public and private spending. This is possible only if private savings and government taxes continue to flow in at very high rates. Even though the Japanese propensity to save is almost double that of some Western nations, the funds will not be there unless income growth is revived. Japan cannot achieve the "quality-of-life" objectives, the restructuring of industrial base, or even inflation control, unless real economic progress returns to annual rates of 7-8 per cent between 1976 and 1980. Simulation experiments show very clearly that, without the restoration of fairly high growth, Japan will not be able to afford better welfare measures, clean water or housing space at European standards. Prime Minister Miki's position on social justice suggests that these policies will have high priority.

Behind the growth prognostication lies a key assumption that world trade will continue to expand at the historically-high rates of the late Sixties and early Seventies. Japan is, therefore vitally interested in finding global solutions to the "petro-dollar" recycling problem, the food-reserve question, and an international approach to the rise of commodity cartels in bauxite, copper, etc. Canada, as a trader with a strong interest in the health of the Japanese market and a long-time supporter of trade multilateralism, has very similar interests. Unless the oil dollars can be successfully recycled, not only to the rich nations but also the poor, prospects are bleak for balanced world development. Transfer of real resources to the owners of oil has to be affected in orderly stages or the world will continue to flounder in recession. With food at a premium, Canada and Japan should seize the opportunity to lay the groundwork of a program that maintains farm income, improves distribution and contributes to monetary and trade stability. At the forthcoming "Tokyo Round" of trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Canada and Japan should argue for conditions that will expand trade, not only through tariff cuts and barrier dissolution but by seeking to prevent the unilateral use of import and export embargos. Success in international economic diplomacy will keep the trade-routes open and ensure that both countries grow, not least through the continued enlargement of commercial ties with one another.

*Heavy investment
in education
foreseen*

The delicate condition of Japanese-Korean relations

by Klaus H. Pringsheim

Two recent events, the abduction of Kim Jong Il from Japan to Korea on August 1973, and the accidental death of Mrs. Park during an attempt on the life of President Park Chung Hee on August 15, 1974, have created successive crises in Japanese-Korean relations. This has been the cause for much anxiety in Washington, Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei, where it is generally believed that the continuation of friendly and co-operative relations between Tokyo and Seoul is in their mutual interest. It is also believed that such relations are essential to the preservation of the delicate balance of forces in Northeast Asia that has emerged since the American withdrawal from Vietnam and the proclamation of the Nixon Doctrine.

Japan and Korea, close neighbours that they are, have repeatedly collided. During the last 1,600 years, Japan usually playing the role of aggressor or intruder to the Korean peninsula. While some Japanese have described Korea as "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan", the Koreans have come to regard Japan as a dangerous, powerful, troublesome neighbour who has repeatedly brought them grief, death, humiliation, exploitation and enslavement and who is not to be trusted. Like Poland, which is surrounded by the Germans, Swedes and Russians, Korea is hemmed in between the Chinese, the Russians and the Japanese. These powerful and occasionally aggressive neighbours have not made life easy for the Koreans, and probably never will.

Korea was one of the first victims of Japanese imperial expansion, becoming a Japanese colony in 1910 and remaining so until 1945. During this period, much anti-Japanese sentiment was encouraged by the ruthless suppression of the Korean independence movement and the economic exploitation of Koreans in Korea as well as in Japan. Hundreds of thousands of Koreans came to Japan during the 1920s and 1930s, their number increasing to approximately 700,000 by the end of 1936 and to 2.4 million by the end of the war in the Pacific. These worked for the most part in Korean labour battalions in mines,

harbours and construction projects and, while some came voluntarily, the majority were drafted under a wartime ordinance. Both the labour conditions and the treatment and status accorded to Koreans in Japanese society served further to aggravate resentment between Koreans and Japanese. The Japanese stereotype for Koreans sees them as disreputable, unattractive, uneducated, thieving, lazy and conniving people, whom they would not care to see married to their daughters — an image somewhat reminiscent of the earlier stereotypes of Negroes in American society.

As the war ended in 1945, Korea regained its independence. The Japanese living in Korea were repatriated to Japan, their property being confiscated by the Korean Government. Koreans also returned home in large numbers but, because of the unsettled political and economic conditions on the peninsula, some 600,000 elected to remain in Japan. The status of this substantial minority, initially under the U.S. occupation and since 1952 under the sovereign Japanese Government, has been the subject of prolonged and bitter dispute. For example, under an agreement reached between the Government of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and the Government of North Korea in February 1959, 100,000 Korean residents of Japan have so far been repatriated voluntarily to North Korea. This action was deeply resented by the Government of South Korea, which characterized it as sending the Koreans in Japan "into slavery". It is a fact, however, that of the two major associations of Ko-

Low esteem of Koreans in Japan

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rean residents the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Chosoren), which favours North Korea, rather than the Community of Korean Residents in Japan (Mindan), which favours the South, has the greater number of supporters. Similarly, when, in 1960, the Japanese Government required Korean residents to register, 444,586 registered as citizens of North Korea, whereas 162,871 registered as citizens of South Korea. Only about 25,000 had become Japanese citizens.

Japanese-Korean relations did not develop well during the tenure of President Syngman Rhee, who came to power in Seoul at the end of the Pacific war. Rhee's Government was strongly anti-Japanese and uncompromising in its attitude towards Tokyo. Korea, for example, proclaimed the "Rhee Line" in the Sea of Japan, which extended Korean territorial water to some 60 miles off the coast and well into traditional Japanese fishing-grounds. When Japanese fishing vessels crossed this line they were confiscated, escorted to Korea, and their crews imprisoned. Rhee also demanded the payment of reparations for Japanese colonial rule in Korea.

Although trade was not encouraged by the Rhee Government, Japan did derive considerable economic benefits by serving as a staging area and transfer point for the American forces during the Korean War. The economic upswing thus generated proved to be the take-off point for Japan's postwar economic recovery. Relations between Japan and South Korea, however, did not come to the stage of serious negotiations until President Syngman Rhee had passed from the scene and new leadership emerged in both countries.

After less than a year of relative political freedom under an amended constitution, a military coup in May 1961 put a junta, headed by General Park Chung Hee, in power in Seoul. Once again revising the constitution, General Park resigned from the army and was narrowly elected President in October 1963. In Japan, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato came to power in 1964 and made one of his priority concerns the early establishment of normal Japanese-Korean relations. It took another full year of negotiations and difficult manoeuvres to achieve ratification before the Japan-South Korea Basic Treaty normalizing their relations finally came into effect on December 18, 1965.

That it took 14 years from the end of the U.S. occupation to normalize relations between Japan and South Korea is a measure of the seriousness of the alienation that had existed. The United States,

meanwhile, had become deeply involved in Vietnam and used its influence to urge both countries to compose their differences in the interest of presenting a common front towards the Communist threat in Northeast Asia, an argument acceptable to both Prime Minister Sato and President Park.

Though he may have felt uneasy that his country was being handed over to the Japanese by the Americans, Park particularly saw the pragmatic advantages South Korea would derive from normalization in the form of trade and aid. Indeed, economic assistance rendered gratis, loans and investments from Japan have been moving into South Korea by the hundreds of millions of dollars since normalization (a total of \$1.44 billion between 1965 and 1974) and have contributed vitally to the economic upswing that has occurred. At the same time, some elements of the population of South Korea see the rising profile of the Japanese in South Korea (almost half its trade is with Japan) as a re-intrusion of Japanese imperialism, humiliating to Koreans, and they denounce President Park for permitting this to happen.

Others feel that South Korea is being increasingly drawn into the military orbit of Japan. It is the strict policy of the Japanese Government not to send its "Self-Defence Forces" outside Japan. While this policy is unlikely to be changed, military assistance to the armed forces of South Korea cannot be ruled out should it ever be needed. If there were to be an armaments and preparedness race between North and South Korea, in the event of the ultimate failure of the North-South negotiations Japanese weapons could be supplied to South Korea, and South Korean military personnel could be trained in various technical and scientific skills in Japan. In the 1969 Sato-Nixon communique, Korea was designated (with Taiwan) as an area of special security interest for Japan, though no specific overt measures were announced. Meanwhile, 38,000 U.S. troops remain along the demilitarized zone to give continued evidence of America's commitment.

Kim Dae Jung

We come now to the events that may well have set the stage for the Kim Dae Jung incident and the deterioration of Japanese-Korean relations. Seen in the broadest possible terms, these would be the Nixon Doctrine, the *rapprochement* between Washington and Peking initiated by President Nixon's visit to Peking in December 1971, President Park's invocation of a national state of emergency in



UPI Photo

ollowing the death of Madame Park, South Korean students demonstrated outside the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. In this picture police wearing gas masks push back the crowd after using tear gas to disperse them. Incidents of this nature were repeated on several occasions.

Korea at roughly the same time, the rise of Kim Dae Jung of the New Democratic Party as a formidable political opponent to Park in the Korean elections of 1971 (he obtained 44 per cent of the vote), the "reunification dialogue" commenced with the Government of North Korea in August 1971, and the successive moves by Park to make himself a virtual dictator beginning with the amendment of the South Korean Constitution in the autumn of 1969 to permit him to be re-elected for a third consecutive term. As the American commitment to South Korea seemed to be fading (the Nixon Doctrine, the Peking visit, troop withdrawals from both Vietnam and Korea, the Sato-Nixon communique, U.S.-Soviet *détente*), South Korea saw itself pushed into accepting growing Japanese influence and getting some sort of dialogue started with North Korea.

President Park obviously regarded all these events as a threat to the continued security of his nation and consequently

moved to strengthen his own political control with little concern for the preservation of democratic liberties and civil rights. He seems to have regarded Kim Dae Jung as a dangerous radical, whose ideas on reunification of Korea without external interference and the desirability of U.S. withdrawal were counsels of disaster. On October 17, 1972, Park proclaimed martial law, dissolved the National Assembly and banned all political activities. Another revision of the constitution gave him an indefinite term as President and vastly enhanced his power. Park declared that it was necessary for him to have these additional powers to deal with North Korea more effectively in the process of reunification.

Kim Dae Jung happened to be in Japan when Park's October blitz occurred. He decided not to return to Korea, but instead embarked on a campaign of denouncing Park as a military dictator and tyrant. As a result, highly unfavorable

publicity for the Park regime began to develop in the two countries on whom South Korea depended most, the United States and Japan. Clearly Kim Dae Jung and his like had to go.

Abduction

On August 8, 1973, Kim Dae Jung was kidnapped by five men in his hotel room in Tokyo and taken to South Korea, where he was eventually put under house arrest. While the South Korean Government initially denied any involvement in the affair, the Japanese found the fingerprints of Kim Dong Woon, First Secretary of the South Korean Embassy in Tokyo, at the site of the kidnapping and were convinced that the South Korean Government was indeed responsible. The case caused a great furore in Japan as a violation of sovereignty and the Government applied various pressures upon the Park regime to release Kim Dae Jung. When the Korean Government refused, Japan suspended aid to South Korea and postponed the Korea-Japan ministerial conference scheduled for September of 1973, thereby delaying the expected offer of \$200 million in economic assistance and a possible commitment for \$3 billion in Japanese credits for Korea's eight-year economic plan.

These and other pressures (it is probable that the Americans urged South Korea to straighten things out with Tokyo) eventually led to the visit of Premier Kim Jong-p'il to Tokyo on November 2, 1973, a "political settlement" of the dispute that made it clear that neither Tokyo nor Seoul thought it in its best interests to continue the squabble. Kim Jong-p'il expressed "deep regret" over the serious trouble caused the Japanese Government and people by the abduction. He acknowledged that First Secretary Kim Dong Woon had been involved as a "private person", thus maintaining the fiction that his Government had not been involved, but also promised that South Korea would continue its "investigation" and report the results to the Japanese Government. The Premier also stated that Kim Dae Jung had been "restored to freedom", could apply for departure from Korea as an ordinary citizen and would not be held accountable for his anti-state activities abroad prior to his abduction. Kim Dong Woon resigned his position in Tokyo simultaneously, and was expelled from Japan as *persona non grata*.

In return for these "concessions", Japan rescheduled the ministerial talks for the end of the year, and resumed economic aid; Prime Minister Tanaka stated that the diplomatic settlement of the case had

Deterioration
led to cutback
in economic
assistance

been complete. Two days later there were reports that South Korea was about to ask Japan for \$423 million in new loans for major industrial projects. In Japan, the opposition complained that hundreds of millions of dollars was too much to pay for a mere expression of regret with no guarantee that the South Korean Government would really punish Kim Dong Woon or release Kim Dae Jung. Meanwhile, in Korea the opposition complained that Premier Kim's Tokyo visit had been a humiliating mission of apology and begging Japanese money.

The matter then receded from the headlines both in Seoul and Tokyo until nine months later, when the Korean Government announced that it was discontinuing its investigation into the Kim Dae Jung abduction. The investigation to date, they said, had failed to produce any clues leading to the identification of the abductors or enough evidence to hold Kim Dong Woon. There would be no further negotiations with Japan on the matter and moreover, Kim Dae Jung's application for a passport to go abroad would not be granted until he was tried for alleged election law violations in 1967 and 1971.

Assassination

Ironically, the South Korean retreat from the November "concessions" came on August 15, 1974. That very day an assassin's bullet missed President Park and killed his wife instead. The assassination took place in Korea at a meeting in Seoul's National Theatre to mark the twenty-ninth anniversary of South Korea's liberation from Japan. But Japan was in the embarrassing position of having provided the gun, the passport and the locale for the conspiracy.

Initial reports identified the assassin as Yukie Yoshii, a Japanese of Korean ancestry, causing the Japanese Ambassador formally to apologize to the Korean Government for an assassination attempt by a Japanese national. It later turned out that Yoshii's wife was a highschool classmate of the real assassin Mun Se Kwang and had apparently given Mun copies of her husband's family register and a resident's card, supposedly to help him obtain a loan. Mun used these documents to obtain a false Japanese passport and on August 6, 1974, used the passport to go to Korea for the assassination attempt. Mun was born in Japan in 1951, the son of permanent Korean resident who had been living there since before the Second World War. Apparently he had pro-Communist sympathies and was an admirer of Ma Tse-tung and Kim Il Sung. He had, more

er, joined the Osaka chapter of the committee to Rescue Mr. Kim Dae Sung", an anti-Park civil group in Japan.

It was charged by Korean authorities that the pro-North-Korean Chosoren had organized and financed the assassination attempt, though this was immediately denied by Chosoren officials in Osaka. Japanese policy, meanwhile, felt that under Japanese law it would be difficult to confirm the connection between Chosoren and the assassination plot of Mun Se Kwang. On August 19, four days after the assassination, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shio Kimura, indicated that the Japanese Government had no intention of cracking down on activities against the South Korean Government. He added that Japan and South Korea had different political systems and that freedom of thought and speech was guaranteed in Japan. "No activities will be subject to controls unless they run counter to Japanese law," he declared. Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka travelled to Seoul on the same day to attend the state funeral for Mrs. Park. After the funeral, he visited President Park and extended Japan's condolences. In response to a request, Tanaka urged Japanese police co-operation in investigating the assassination plot, but added that it would have to be within the framework of Japanese laws.

Then the tensions between Japan and South Korea started to escalate. A statement was issued by Japanese Foreign Ministry officials that Japan was neither legally nor morally responsible for the assassination. Premier Kim Jong-p'il countered on August 21 that Japan could not reasonably claim no responsibility, in view of the known facts of the case. At the same time, anti-Japanese demonstrations occurred in Seoul and Pusan.

Foreign Minister Kimura further aggravated Korean sensibilities when he stated on August 29 that the Japanese government did not consider that South Korea faced a military threat from North Korea. He added that it would be almost impossible to hold a joint ministerial meeting in 1974 because of the strained relations between the two countries. Meanwhile, South Korean authorities announced that they had established that the order for the assassination had come from Premier Kim Il Sung of North Korea. It was also announced that Mun Se Kwang had admitted being instructed by Kim Ho Kyong, an official of Chosoren in Osaka, to meet aboard a ship from North Korea in Osaka Harbour an unnamed North Korean who explained to him that the only way to bring Communism to South Korea was to



UPI Photo

Mrs. Park Chung-hee, first lady of South Korea, was killed during an assassination attempt on her husband. Her assassin was linked with Japan and as a result Japanese-Korean relations reached a new low last year.

assassinate President Park. Mun also admitted receiving large sums of money for expenses and hospitalization in a Tokyo hospital affiliated with Chosoren, where he received a one-month indoctrination course while pretending to suffer from an intestinal disorder. (Mun Se Kwang pleaded guilty to all charges brought against him and was sentenced to death on October 19, 1974; this he appealed, but was turned down, and hanged on December 20, 1974.)

On August 30, President Park warned Japan that it would be difficult to expect friendly ties to continue between Japan and South Korea unless subversive activities in Japan against his Government were thoroughly controlled. Summoning the Japanese Ambassador in Seoul, Park appears to have made it clear that Japan must act to get relations back on track and that something needed to be done about Chosoren. Although Foreign Minister Kimura modified his statement on North Korea to mean that there was no immediate danger of an all-out armed conflict on the Korean peninsula, Japanese authorities continued to take the view that they were unable to control the Chosoren's activities unless there was concrete evidence of subversion. The continuing deterioration of relations at this point appears to have disturbed the U.S. Government sufficiently to cause President Ford to dispatch a letter to President Park expressing his concern both over the

Curtailment of subversion as condition of restoring ties


Japanese-South Korean dispute and over the continuation of repressive measures by President Park within South Korea.

The situation did not improve. A statement by Foreign Minister Kimura that he did not think that the Republic of Korea was the only lawful government in the Korean peninsula touched off new anti-Japanese demonstrations in Seoul and Tokyo on September 7. Japan protested the violence and Korea demanded a personal letter from Prime Minister Tanaka apologizing for the assassination attempt and retracting some of Kimura's controversial statements. It was suggested that the letter be brought to Korea by a prominent Japanese such as former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato. While Tanaka was on his state visit to Mexico *en route* to Canada, the contents of the proposed letter to Park became the subject of contentious negotiations between the two governments, with the United States attempting to mediate.

A text was agreed on, and special envoy Etsusaburo Shiina, a former Japanese Foreign Minister, arrived in Seoul on September 19 to hand over the letter. Although the contents of the letter were not made public, Shiina's oral elaboration was. Japan pledged that it would severely control any "criminal acts" designed to overthrow President Park Chung Hee's Government; expressed again its profound condolences over the death of Mrs. Park and the fact that the assassination attempt had been prepared in Japan; and would make every effort to prevent a recurrence of such incidents. Park in turn indicated that the worst crisis in Japanese-South Korean relations had been averted, adding that friendly relations were not only of concern to the two countries but greatly influenced peace and security in Asia. He added, wisely I believe, that the two countries must co-operate on the basis of "mutual confidence".

The major problems in the confrontation were thus resolved (the formula was probably devised by the U.S.) and it can be assumed that Japanese-South Korean relations are now at last headed for better days.

Japanese-South Korean relations, however, have been gravely traumatized by these events. An always delicate relationship has been rendered even more touchy. Serious mistakes were made on both sides, further aggravating the situation. Speak-



UPI Photo

Following the assassination attempt on his life and the fatal shooting of his wife South Korean President Park Chung-Hee continued his speech at the National Theatre in Seoul.

ing pragmatically, Japan and South Korea need each other to maintain that delicate balance of forces in East Asia that makes both countries less vulnerable to pressures from China, North Korea or the Soviet Union. A peaceful reunification of Korea would be a great blessing to Japan, and to world peace.

But that does not seem likely in the Seventies. The restoration of democratic rights to the people of South Korea would be a big help and would lessen the likelihood of future frictions between South Korea and Japan. Yet Japan too must exercise great care not to offend the sensibilities of Koreans, who so often feel wronged by the Japanese. One hopes that some of the statements from Tokyo will be a little less blunt in the coming year, so that Japanese-South Korean relations may have a chance to heal and improve. The wounds are still raw on both sides. Perhaps a new Government in Tokyo will achieve the much-needed reconciliation. In the meantime, credit for the resolution of the most recent crisis belongs, at least in part, to American diplomatic efforts.

Peacekeeping and peacemaking should be reviewed together

Alex I. Inglis

In his first address to the General Assembly of the United Nations as Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen declared that he "would be less than candid if I did not admit that Canadians are today less inclined to accept in unquestioning way the burdens of participation" in peacekeeping operations. This new hesitancy on the part of Canadians, Mr. MacEachen suggested, "springs from the fact that peacekeeping endeavours can seem to do no more than perpetuate an uneasy status quo".

The statement is not an isolated comment but rather the expression of a growing uneasiness on the part of Canadians and of the Canadian Government that their commitment to peacekeeping has developed a certain futility. The situation is complicated by the strictures placed on the defence budget by inflation. With the growth of defence expenditures limited to what does not offset the inflationary erosion, the Department of National Defence is bound to seek to identify areas where programs can be reduced or eliminated. It is, of course, most unlikely that Canada will abandon its peacekeeping role altogether. There is, however, a strong possibility that its participation will be reduced in the months ahead.

Changes in the level of participation in peacekeeping operations are in the nature of things: crises come and go; situations stabilize and deteriorate; the need for forces increases and decreases. Even while maintaining a full commitment to participation in peace-keeping, the Canadian Government is duty-bound to be constantly vigilant for the opportunity to reduce the level of that participation as situations permit. A change in acceptance of the idea of peace-keeping is, however, of a different order. Even a change in the degree of acceptance would have repercussions not only for Canada but for the international community as a whole. Canada is probably the world's most active peace-keeper and by and large has proved itself acceptable to both sides of many conflicts.

It is not particularly easy to catalogue the peacekeeping operations in which Canada has participated. The dif-

ficulty arises out of the range of operations to which Canada has sent forces and the problem of whether or not some of these can truly be called "peacekeeping" operations. Two, in particular, that have often been included in the catalogue come to mind. If the Korean War in the 1950s was a peacekeeping operation, it was by far the largest in the Canadian experience. At its peak, some 8,000 Canadians formed part of the United Nations force, and, in all, 27,000 Canadian officers and men served in Korea between 1950 and 1953. But the Korea episode has more of the attributes of a war than of a peacekeeping mission. It is true that the Government of the day never wavered in its insistence that it only participated in the Korean conflict because it was under the aegis of the UN. But in Korea the UN was not coming between two belligerents. The world organization was itself a party to the conflict.

Similarly, one can express severe doubt about whether Canadian participation in the International Commission for Control and Supervision in Vietnam following the American withdrawal should be graced with the title "peace-keeping". It was a useful contribution in allowing U.S. withdrawal, and that has its own validity, but beyond that there has hardly been even a brief illusion of peace in Indochina and Canada beat a hasty retreat at an early date. Even excluding these operations from a peacekeeping catalogue, the range of Canadian participation is still broad. It includes the prominent and ongoing participation in Cyprus and the Middle East, the latter incorporating the United Nations Emergency Force, the United Nations Disengagement Observation Force and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. It also includes Kashmir, West New Guinea, Yemen, Nigeria, Lebanon and the Congo.

Obviously, any re-examination of its commitment by a nation that has partic-

Broad range of participation in peacekeeping

Mr. Inglis is Editor of International Perspectives. The views expressed in this article are purely his own, however, and are not intended to reflect the policy of the Department or to state an editorial position for this magazine.

ipated to this extent in more than a dozen peacekeeping missions must be done in the full awareness of the implications for the world community. It is sometimes argued that other countries could be doing more in the area of peace-keeping. That might be true; it is also irrelevant. Canadian participation in peace-keeping cannot be decided on the basis of what others are or are not doing. It can only be decided on the basis of Canadian interests, broadly defined.

Search for order

One of the few true advances in the search for world order that have come about in the second half of the twentieth century has been the emergence of the capacity for the international system to move between parties to a conflict and, if not establish peace, at least make a cessation of hostilities possible and provide an opportunity for the negotiating of the political issues underlying the conflict. Today, with the UN itself undergoing public reappraisal in the Western world, as evidenced by the pessimistic news reports and media comment forecasting the organization's doom, it could be disastrous if this major advance of peace-keeping were to be retarded. Canadian judgment has perhaps been coloured in the past by a feeling of being the world's peace-keepers *par excellence*. It is well to abandon such an attitude, for it can lead into perilous situations with little prospect for peace. It could be even more disastrous, however, if Canadians were to remove peace-keeping from its position as fourth in the list of defence priorities. Canadians have only four defence priorities.

The danger in listing priorities is that the individual items will be considered as separate units, which can be abandoned or altered at will. The classification of defence priorities is an arbitrary device that is a useful tool for purposes of thought and discussion. Each item, however, is an integral part of a whole. That whole is not fixed for all time, of course, but it is essential to recognize that a change in one part has implications for the others. This interrelation is obvious for the first three priorities. These are the defence of the sovereignty of Canada, participation in the joint defence of North America and participation in the collective defence of the North Atlantic Treaty area. An attack on the North American continent or war in the Atlantic or Western Europe would obviously create a threat to the security and ultimately the sovereignty of Canada. But does internecine slaughter on Cyprus have the same effect? Would a fifth war in

the Middle East? And what about a showdown between the black African countries and South Africa or Rhodesia?

On the surface these conflicts seem far removed, but in all of them there is contained the seed of general conflagration. In an interdependent world, the sovereignty of Canada, the defence of North America and peace in the Atlantic may depend very much on the avoidance of such conflict, or at least its containment and early solution. The key question, therefore, for any re-examination of Canada's commitment to peace-keeping is not whether Canadians wish to continue their participation or how long they should remain in a given area without a permanent solution being found. Rather, the question is of the effectiveness of such operations in contributing to the avoidance of general war. That is a matter of grand strategy and high politics and not of budgetary consideration and program planning.

There are also, however, mundane arguments in favour of continuing Canada's peacekeeping operations. Anyone who visits Canadian forces serving overseas on peacekeeping operations cannot but be struck by their thoroughgoing professionalism. Morale has always been of prime importance to those who command men in arms, and it has never been easy to maintain morale of soldiers in peacetime. If one accepts the assumption that there are sound reasons of national interest for the maintenance of armed forces by Canada, it is an easy step to argue that those forces are made more efficient by their participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Not only is this so because of the higher morale of the troops but it is also so because of the battle experience or near battle experience the men acquire. To put it cynically, the only other way the Canadian Armed Forces could receive comparable experience would be by Canada's going to war with some other country. Peace-keeping is much cheaper.

War conditions

Canadian members of UNEF have learned to implement some of the methods of wartime logistics operations. Instead of taking two weeks to requisition, say, new tires for a jeep or a truck as in normal peacetime operations, it now takes up to six months — a situation that might well be duplicated under war conditions of material shortages and disrupted communications. Keeping as many vehicles as possible on the road by interchanging tires or other parts can be learned in theory at home. There is now a group of Canadian personnel who know how to do it effectively in practice. What



Minister James Richardson toured Canadian peacekeeping operations in Cyprus and the Middle East in November, 1974. During the tour representatives of the Canadian press who accompanied the Minister had the opportunity to interview a number of foreign dignitaries. Here they surround Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash in Nicosia following his meeting with Mr. Richardson.

ture of jeeps and trucks is true of hundreds of other items, from field hospitals to troop accommodation to water supply and telecommunications.

Sometimes the battle experience goes even deeper. For the most part, Canadian peacekeeping units are under orders to use as much force as is necessary for their own protection. Occasionally, as at the airport in Nicosia during fighting, they are under orders to defend the airport from falling under the control of either side. In the heat of battle, they were armed with a 106-mm. anti-tank gun, and even today they are sitting with a loaded 12.7-calibre machine-gun installation on the terminal roof. The airport may be unusable, but it is also neutralized.

Indeed, just being able to see, from the roof of a terminal building, the mistakes that other people are making in initiating a battle provides insight for those who may some day be called upon to fight in a Canadian battle. Such a view will not be popular. To express it runs the risk of being labelled a warmonger. But it is realistic and it is implicit in the very fact that Canada maintains a force at all. Only if Canada is willing to risk unilateral disarmament is this view (the value of battle experience) challenged.

Peacekeeping criteria

When all this is said, however, one must point out that what is being advocated is not a wholesale acceptance of a role in every peacekeeping operation that comes along. The Canadian Government is becoming more critical in examining the individual operations it is asked to participate in or renew its commitment to. In again accepting a part for Canada in the United Nations Emergency Force when it was re-established in 1973, the then Secretary of State for External Affairs laid down the criteria that had to "be constantly reiterated and promoted if peace-keeping is to be made a more effective instrument rather than a source of disillusionment to a world community hungry for peace". Mr. Sharp told the House of Commons: "The criteria Canada seeks to apply when considering participation in a peacekeeping operation include certain points of a political nature, as well as others of a more technical kind. A fundamental point is the existence of a threat to international peace and security. There is no doubt of that in this case. Ideally, peace-keeping should be directly linked to agreement on a political settlement among the parties to the conflict. At least there should be reasonable expecta-

tions that the parties will negotiate a settlement. The peacekeeping force must be responsible to a political authority, and preferably that authority should be the United Nations. The sponsoring authority should receive reports and have adequate power to supervise the mandate of the force. The parties to the conflict must accept the peacekeeping force and Canadian participation in it must be acceptable to all concerned. Further considerations are that the peacekeeping force must have a clear mandate, including such things as freedom of movement, and that there must be an agreed and equitable method of financing the operation."

Of course, the application of criteria is not a simple matter. You cannot, for example, assign points to the desire of the participants to find a political solution. But the constant application of these or similar criteria for peacekeeping operations holds out the possibility that the UN can become an even more effective force in ending hostilities and thereby providing opportunities to find solutions to underlying problems.

Peacemaking

It is a truism that peace-keeping is not peacemaking. Yet, at least in part, it is because this is forgotten that there is a growing disillusionment with our peace-keeping role. Peace-keeping is essentially a military task. Peacemaking, on the other hand, is a political and diplomatic function calling for the application of resources to the creation of an atmosphere that lends itself to the growth of good will, the reconciliation of differences, the growth of flexibility in the minds and attitudes of leaders of parties to a conflict, and the careful acquisition of credibility for those who would seek to encourage the pacific settlement of differences.

There is a view that countries involved in peacekeeping operations are duty-bound to remain neutral. Any effort by such countries, it is argued, in the area of peacemaking might well jeopardize their effectiveness in the area of peace-keeping. There is undoubtedly a certain validity to this position. But, in re-examining the Canadian commitment to peace-keeping, we should also re-examine our commitment to peacemaking and the limits we have imposed on our efforts in that regard. It might well be concluded that, before we curtail our peacekeeping efforts, we should first accept the risks of a more active peacemaking role. It would be absurd to appoint a diplomatic or trade or aid operative for every military man as-

Application of criteria enhances UN effectiveness



United Nation/Y. Na

Turkish and U.N. Flags fly over a shared observation post in Cyprus. The vehicle in the photograph is a Canadian Armed Forces Lynx.

signed to a peacekeeping mission. To do so would be to commit our efforts to a bureaucratic labyrinth. But perhaps it is equally absurd to have 1,000 troops in Cyprus and no resident high commissioner or trade commissioner — and then complain about the lack of a settlement.

It is easy to conclude that only great powers can enforce settlements. To do so is to wash one's hands of responsibility of a middle power in the international community. There are benefits from peace that even a country like Canada can help promote and make available. Perhaps we would not be able to influence the Cypriots or the Syrians or the Israelis or any of the other people in conflict towards peace even if we were more active and more imaginative in regard. Perhaps not, but we certainly should not influence them if we are not more active.

In the re-examination of peace-keeping, a decision to withdraw must be made in the full light of the Canadian interest in world peace and the effect of our decision in the world community. A decision to continue should be made in the light of our ability to increase our capacity to influence other powers in the process of peacemaking.

U Thant as Secretary-General: private qualities in public life

by George Ignatieff

The last news of U Thant — that his mortal remains had been seized in Rangoon by 4,000 students and Buddhist monks fearful that he would be denied by the present Burmese regime under Ne Win a funeral worthy of his contribution to Burma and to the world — seemed to me singularly inappropriate. It was a spontaneous response in his homeland to the need to give recognition to those qualities that made U Thant not only a world statesman but a distinguished Burmese educator. Destiny had placed him in a highly political role, but the students and the monks who sought to honour him with a student-built mausoleum were claiming him as one of their own — a sage, an educator, and a devout Buddhist. U Thant would have deplored the rioting that followed, when the government of Ne Win took away the body for burial at the Shwedagon pagoda in central Rangoon.

I had learnt a good deal about U Thant from a Burmese friend of mine in Belgrade before I met him in New York in my appointment as Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations in 1965. I knew that he had been born in Pantanaw, a village not far from Rangoon, where he had received his education and to which he returned as senior teacher and later as headmaster. At university, which he had to leave in order to help support his family, he had met Thakin Nu (later U Nu), who was to become the First Prime Minister of Burma after liberation. It was U Nu who persuaded U Thant to enter the Government services as Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. It was not until 1952-1953 that he was included in the Burmese delegation to the United Nations, and in 1957 became Burma's Permanent Representative.

It was Dag Hammarskjold's sudden death in a plane crash in the Congo on September 18, 1961, that led to U Thant's equally-unexpected propulsion on to the world stage when he was elected acting Secretary-General on November 3, 1961,



U THANT

initially for the unexpired term of his predecessor (later to be extended to two full terms). This made U Thant the first and only non-European to hold the post of Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the incumbent who lasted the longest in what has rightly been described as "the most impossible job in the world". For it was not until December 22, 1971, that the United Nations bade farewell in an outpouring of the highest tribute to this man who, like his predecessor, had given his

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life to his duties by unsparing dedication beyond the bounds of physical endurance.

Selfless dedication

I often wondered how this kind of selfless dedication was possible — those endless hours of listening to the torrent of speeches pouring out day after day in public, or to endless complaints and unsought advice from the representatives or visiting foreign ministers. Ten years seemed to me too long for the world to expect any man to carry such a burden. The Secretary-General, who personifies the United Nations, must, among other things, bear the largest share of the brick-bats, rather than the bouquets, that are directed towards the world organization these days. For he is the symbol upon which governments deflect the blame for their own mistakes and disappointments in trying to make international co-operation work in an increasingly inter-dependent world. In a sense, the Secretary-General is like a lightning-conductor on the top floor of the Turtle Bay headquarters of the United Nations, which shields its members from the sense of guilt that must assail them when they reflect on the inadequacy of their response to the necessities of a co-operative approach to the contemporary issues of survival.

In this role, U Thant applied the personal disciplines of detachment and concentration of his Buddhist upbringing and training. When one went to see him, he was all attention — full of friendly concern. He never had any of his staff present at these interviews and never, in my recollection, took any notes. My experience led me to the conclusion that I was communing with a mystic who, by constant self-discipline, had attained a degree of self-control that I rarely encountered among friends or acquaintances without his Asian background.

His sincerity in the application of his religious convictions and self-discipline to the problems of the United Nations was demonstrated when he agreed to record a statement of his beliefs for a "teach-in" being organized by my son at the University of Toronto. In this statement he spoke with strong conviction of the reasons for his rejection of the use of violence in the settlement of disputes among nations, as among individuals; of the value and dignity of every member of the human race, and the consequent necessity of recognizing the urgency of the task of uplifting the countless millions of human beings still living under conditions of poverty, ignorance and ill health; of the need to be unrelenting in working for justice, equality and peace in the world.

Secretary-General personifies United Nations

Violence rejected in settlement of disputes

Neutralist by practice and inclination he clearly associated himself with the non-aligned nations, castigating equally the U.S.A. over Vietnam, the U.S.S.R. for its actions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the French over Algeria, and the British over Rhodesia. While he was able to act as an intermediary between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cuban missile crisis, he was frustrated in his efforts to offer his good offices to Washington and Hanoi to stop the escalation of the war in Vietnam. Like Hammarskjold, U Thant considered the United Nations to be primarily a world instrument for sustained negotiations. But, unlike his predecessor, he interpreted the Charter obligation with greater caution as to the role of the Secretary-General, believing that the initiative fell first and foremost on the parties in dispute to seek accommodation.

This shade of difference between U Thant's conception of the role of the Secretary-General and that of Dag Hammarskjold is perhaps best demonstrated by a comparison between the Middle East crisis of 1967 and the Suez crisis, or the events in the Congo a decade earlier. U Thant proceeded with caution, keeping his ears well attuned to the views of the Afro-Asian majority in the United Nations rather than plunging into the kind of activist roles that Hammarskjold had assumed, both in the Congo and the Middle East. It is an interesting matter for speculation whether, in fact, the United Nations would have accepted, or even tolerated, an activist role on the part of its Secretary-General on the scale that U Thant's predecessor had assumed, especially in the Congo, without breaking apart.

UNEF withdrawal

Perhaps the most illuminating test case came over the controversial position taken by U Thant in May 1967, when President Nasser demanded the withdrawal of UNEF. I do not propose to discuss in detail what happened during the whole complex sequence of events leading to the outbreak of the Six-Day War but, since there have been conflicting interpretations about the position taken by Canada (and by myself personally) when U Thant referred the question of withdrawal of UN to the UNEF Advisory Committee, I think I should make it clear why Canadians, as a whole, did not join those who shifted the blame on U Thant for the withdrawal.

Canada was in 1967 a member of the Security Council. Some weeks before Nasser took the initiative to remove UN (while I was, in fact, President of the Council for the month of April), sto-

been circulating alleging that Israel was concentrating invasion forces on its border with Syria. These stories had been checked and reported to the Council as founded. Whether encouraged by Soviet support, or a desire to restore Egypt's fading prestige in the Arab world, Nasser began moving his troops through Sinai to Gaza in mid-May 1967. The first specific information came from U Thant at 4.00 p.m. on May 17, 1967, when he informed

UNEF Advisory Committee, summoned hurriedly into an informal session, that the Commander of UNEF (General Rikhye) had received a message from General Fawzy at 10.00 p.m. (Gaza time) on May 16 stating that he had given instructions "to all U.A.R. Armed Forces to be ready for action against Israel the moment it might carry out any aggressive action against any Arab country". "Due to these instructions," the message went on, "our troops are already concentrated in Sinai on our eastern borders. For the sake of complete security of all UN Troops, which install [sic] Observation Posts along our borders, I request that you issue your orders to withdraw all these troops immediately. Inform back the fulfilment of this request." General Rikhye correctly reported that he would immediately report to the Secretary-General and that he had no authority to withdraw any posts except on instructions from the Secretary-General.

U Thant reacted, in the first instance, by summoning the U.A.R. Permanent Representative and telling him that the message should not have been sent through military channels, since UNEF took orders from the Secretary-General. U Thant went on to request Ambassador El Kony to seek immediate clarification of the message from his government. He emphasized that there could be no question of any temporary withdrawal of UNEF. The force could not stand aside, or move away from the line it was patrolling; that would mean confrontation between the two sides. The primary purpose of UNEF was to prevent a direct clash between the two sides," he went on to say. "If UNEF has to move away from the line, that will permit the resumption of fighting. Therefore, the general withdrawal of UNEF was not contemplated or requested or intended, the proper channel would be for the U.A.R. Government to make a request to that effect to the Secretary-General, here in New York."

It was the last part of U Thant's statement that was to be exploited by Nasser as a justification of his subsequent actions, which were, in any case, already based on confrontation with Israel. When

queried by me in the Advisory Committee (supported by my Brazilian, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish colleagues), U Thant explained that the agreement for the presence of UNEF forces in the area was based on an agreement between the then Secretary-General (Hammarskjold) and President Nasser. UNEF was there with the consent of the U.A.R. Government. If it was to be withdrawn, it was his duty and obligation to comply with that request. He added that it was not for the General Assembly to act, since it was not in its competence but in the competence of the Secretary-General.

In terms of history and jurisdiction, U Thant was, of course, correct. U Thant's legal adviser recalled that the agreement on the presence of UNEF on U.A.R. territory was indeed concluded between Hammarskjold and Fawzi Bey (then Egyptian Foreign Minister). That agreement was, he conceded, a "little loose". It was accompanied by the so-called "good faith" agreement, which reads as follows:

"The Government of Egypt and the Secretary-General of the United Nations have stated their understanding on the basic points for the presence and functioning of UNEF as follows:

"The Government of Egypt declares that, when exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, it will be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance of General Assembly resolution 1000 (ES 1) of Nov. 5, 1956." [That was the resolution initiated by Canada, represented at the time by Mr. L. B. Pearson.]

"The United Nations takes note of this declaration of the Government of Egypt and declares that the activities of UNEF will be guided, in good faith, by the task established for the Force in the aforementioned resolution; in particular, the United Nations, understanding this to correspond to the wishes of the Government of Egypt, reaffirms its willingness to maintain UNEF until its task is completed."

It was evident that the Government of Egypt had changed its mind. Neither I, nor anyone else, questioned the legal aspect of the issue before us. Basing myself on the last part of the "good faith" agreement, I pointed out, however, that the fulfilment of the UNEF's task was being put in jeopardy *de facto*, and that this would precipitate a train of events resulting in hostilities. I therefore urged the Secretary-General to appeal to President

*Legality of
Egyptian demand
not questioned*

Nasser, while consultations about the consequences of Egypt's request could take place among the parties directly affected. U Thant agreed to appeal to the Egyptian Government to reconsider its decision at the meeting of the Advisory Committee on May 17, 1967.

On the next day — May 18 — the United Nations was faced with a *fait accompli* by the Egyptian Government. Not only was there an official demand to withdraw UNEF from the territory of the U.A.R. and the Gaza Strip but the Secretary-General informed the Advisory Committee that U.A.R. troops were already occupying positions where UNEF forces were supposed to be acting as a barrier between the Egyptians and the forces of Israel. The Secretary-General, in reply to the Egyptian Ambassador's formal request, had already informed him that "since the consent of his Government has been withdrawn, the Force will be withdrawn".

At the same time, U Thant had told the Ambassador of his "serious misgivings about this action in view of the grave implications it may have for peace in the area". He also told the Committee that he would be reporting to the General Assembly and to the Security Council. Some commentators have criticized the Advisory Committee for not determining that the matter be brought to the General Assembly, then in special session, or to the Security Council. Since the Secretary-General had told the Committee that he himself was going to inform the Assembly and the Security Council, this would have been an act of supererogation on the part of its members, and would have been interpreted as a lack of confidence in the Secretary-General.

What I did emphasize was the gravity of the *de facto* situation that had arisen, and the urgent need for further discussion with the Government of the U.A.R. I stressed, on instructions, that I did not question the "proposition that the host country can inform the United Nations or the contributors of contingents, through the Secretary-General, of the withdrawal of its consent to the presence of the Force", but that the implications, as U Thant had said, were so grave "to the peace and security of the area" that the ultimate responsibility for the consequences was bound to rest on the United Nations, acting through the Security Council and the General Assembly. Moreover, I specifically mentioned the dangers that would follow if the control of Sharm el-Sheik was surrendered willingly or unwillingly to U.A.R. forces, and again urged the Secretary-General for immediate consultations,

especially with the Egyptian Government and to urge upon it "the consideration of the implications of what it is asking [the United Nations] to do".

I was supported in this position by the Ambassadors of Brazil, Norway and Denmark. The representatives of India, Pakistan and Yugoslavia, whose forces were actually carrying out the patrols at the time (while Canada was providing the "A and Q" support), took the position that there should be an unconditional acceptance of Nasser's demands by the Secretary-General. In this they were supported by U Thant's advisers.

U Thant, for his part, acted in good faith. He reported to the General Assembly and to the Security Council, naturally playing down the divisions among the governments involved. The failure of these efforts to prevent the drift to war is to be found in the official records of the General Assembly and of the Security Council at the time. For those who prefer a more effortless source, Andrew Boyd, an assistant editor of *The Economist*, has provided a well-informed account of the events as viewed from the Press Gallery of the Security Council in his book *Fifteen Minutes on a Powder Keg*, published by Methuen in 1971.

Drift to war

As one of the unfortunates occupying the unenviable posture on the "powder keg", I tried to persuade the Security Council that it was up to them, in the first instance, to stop the drift to war. The Secretary-General had gone off to Cairo to try to persuade Nasser at least to accept a substantial observer force to substitute for UNEF on the Israel-Egypt border. But while U Thant was on his way to Cairo, Cairo radio was already broadcasting a belligerent oration by Nasser to his troops in the Sinai, claiming that a world-wide campaign has begun, led by "America, Britain and Canada, opposing the withdrawal from Egypt". "Thus," Nasser said, "we felt that there were attempts to turn UNEF into a force serving neo-imperialism." As Andrew Boyd reported (p. 192, 200); "The really fatal words came out a little later in Nasser's broadcast [of May 22]. He announced that Egypt was immediately imposing a blockade on Israel's trade through its port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba, using for this purpose the narrow position of Sharm el-Sheikh at the gulf's narrow mouth. . . . His announcement of the Aqaba blockade amounted to climbing out on a limb. . . . Nobody at the time expected Israel to tolerate the resumption of the blockade of its trade from Eilat in

Indian Ocean. 'Israel will fight' was generally agreed; the question in dispute was whether 'Israel will be right'. On May 15 the Security Council at last creaked into life. George Ignatief of Canada and P. Tabor of Denmark had been trying to coax it out of its slumbers."

In my opening statement to the Council I went out of my way to stress that there was no disagreement with the Secretary-General and that, on the contrary, I was asking the Council to back him up. This is precisely what I said (PV 1341, p. 11): "In calling for this Security Council meeting, we are suggesting that this Council should exercise its responsibilities under the Charter to deal with the kind of threatening situation which the Secretary-General has not only reported to the Security Council but has regarded as sufficiently serious to require us to assume the responsibility for undertaking a personal mission to the area."

The division among governments, which had manifested itself in private at the meeting of the Advisory Committee, surfaced in the Security Council. Those siding with Nasser, led by Federenko (Soviet Representative), complained that the meeting was quite unnecessary since I was over-dramatizing the situation.

Federenko, a Soviet expert on China, recited an oriental proverb at me: "He looks at the moon, but sees his own nose." At least it enabled Lord Caradon of Britain, who, together with Arthur Golding of the U.S., had given Canada and Denmark full support, to reply to Federenko: "His motives are as transparent as proverbs are obscure." When U Thant came back from Cairo, he issued an appeal for restraint stronger than that contained in the resolution I had presented on May 15. U Thant's appeal was supported by Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Britain, China, Ethiopia, India, Japan, Nigeria, and the U.S.A. But still Federenko, for the Soviet Union, questioned whether the Council could do anything, and France proposed a great-power conference, to be called by President de Gaulle.

Even the unhappy ending of UNEF, which must have brought particular un-

happiness for the then Prime Minister, Mr. Pearson (especially when Nasser demanded that the Canadians go first because of their alleged association with the U.S. and Britain in opposing the withdrawal from Egypt), caused him only to react with restraint in the House of Commons, saying: "I am not critical of the Secretary-General." While the Arabs manoeuvred, aided by the Soviet Union, and the Council procrastinated, Israel and Egypt were facing off for the fight that finally broke out on June 5.

It was a sad and sickening story. U Thant's efforts to persuade the Egyptians to reconsider and modify their stand before it was too late were repeatedly rebuffed, both in Cairo and in New York. He never showed impatience, still less complained of the overwhelming fatigue that overcame even the youngest among the "Fifteen Men on the Powder Keg" between June 5 and June 10, when we met night and day to stop the fighting and secure a cease-fire. The last session, I recall, started at 2.00 a.m., Saturday June 10, and adjourned at 2.30 a.m. Sunday June 11, with the cease-fire finally secured.

Human survival

I mention all this because U Thant, like his more activist predecessor, ultimately gave his life for his belief in the ideals of international co-operation, rendered ever more essential in an increasingly inter-dependent world. The values that sustained U Thant are the values needed for the survival of the human race. They are the values preached by the prophets and sages since the beginning of history: respect for human dignity, equality, justice, self-control, honesty and moderation. He was opposed to the contemporary values of a competitive, rather than co-operative, society, based on individualism, blind nationalism, self-sufficiency, infinite growth and resort ultimately to military power and violence to determine the destiny of people. In taking leave of U Thant, it is worth reflecting how essential it is that his values and that his work for peace and justice among mankind be continued if our species is to survive.

U Thant's values needed for survival of human race



A very different perspective on Canada's role in Vietnam

By John A. Munro

Charles Taylor, *Snow Job: Canada, the United States and Vietnam (1954-1973)*. Toronto, Anansi, 1974.

Charles Taylor's book raises a fundamental question concerning Canada and the world that is at once a question of both theory and practice: What is the role of a small power in an international conflict in which it is not directly involved itself but in which a super-power ally and neighbour is involved? Mr. Taylor's charges of Canadian "complicity" in the American war in Vietnam stand or fall not on an endless repetition of the charge but on a realistic appreciation of the limitations of small-power diplomacy within the Canadian experience.

If Canada had not been the friend and ally of the United States, could it have expected in all but the most extraordinary of circumstances to influence American policy in Southeast Asia? The answer suggests itself. However, the opposite conclusion does not automatically suggest itself, given friendship and formal alliance. In brief, Canada's experience suggested that, in situations of international crisis, it had no guaranteed influence in Washington; that, in order to exercise any influence, at all, it had to be in the right place at the right time with the right credentials. These were the fundamental lessons of that golden postwar decade of Canadian diplomacy. Of course, one may ask why Canada should want to influence American policy. One may venture, perhaps without prompting anguished cries, to suggest that, by the middle 1960s, the fate of the various Asian parties to the conflict in Vietnam was a relatively academic consideration and that the prin-

cipal motivation of the Canadian Government was to help its American friend and ally extricate itself from a hopeless situation and that this was not an ignoble ambition.

Canada's first involvement in Vietnam came in 1954 with its participation in the International Control Commission. Canadian "acceptance of the invitation to participate in the supervision of the cease fire agreements was dictated simply by the Government's desire to contribute by this kind of service to the establishment of peace and security in Southeast Asia". See read the letter of instruction dated 21 August 1954 from Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, L. B. Pearson, to Sherwood Lett, the Canadian Commissioner-designate. It is well to remember that the 1954 context was the Cold War and that "peace and security in Southeast Asia" were to be achieved in major part by containing the Soviet Union and Communist China, wherein were perceived threats to peace and security. That we know more in 1974 that we did in 1954 about Southeast Asia in general, and Indochina in particular, does not necessitate or even excuse a moralistic misconstrual of the earlier situation by Mr. Taylor. The subsequent history of the ICC does not find analysis in the volume under review; we are treated simply to the author's opinion.

Central to Taylor's thesis regarding Canadian complicity in Vietnam is his documentation and analysis of a meeting in New York on May 28, 1964, between President Johnson and Canada's Prime Minister Pearson. This portion of Taylor's book has already received much publicity and one may suggest that, without this record of wilful immorality, the book would never have been written. Briefly, it is suggested that, in a 30-minute talk in the Hilton New Yorker Hotel, Johnson presented his plan to bomb North Vietnam and that Pearson granted this scheme of aggression his approval. Taylor has as his evidence a report of this meeting contained in a cable to United States Ambassador

Influence dependent on being in right place at right time

Mr. Munro is a freelance historian and writer who specializes in Canadian foreign policy. He is joint editor of the Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

try Cabot Lodge in Saigon. This cable, issued by Acting Secretary of State George and based on a memorandum of the Johnson-Pearson meeting by McGeorge Bundy, is to be found in the *Pentagon Papers*. One is forced, in the total absence of other documentation, to accept the depiction of the Johnson-Pearson meeting as possible, as distinct from probable, interpretation of what actually took place. One might suggest, however, that this single third-person account has to be placed in context. Taylor refuses to ask some obvious and fundamental questions here, almost every place else in his book, for example, since when does a president of a super-power seek the approval of a minister of a small power for unilateral actions not affecting the small power and designed to advance the vital interests of the super-power? This writer is aware of any other single instance. What would have happened if President Johnson had mentioned the possible bombing of North Vietnam and Pearson had reacted? Would the course of American action have been different? What else was discussed at the meeting? How many of the 30 minutes were devoted to Vietnam? What was the usual pattern of any discussion with President Johnson? Is it not reasonably well established that Johnson had an almost incredible capacity for "letting it all hang out" in the discussions he had with Pearson? Is it possible that the prospect of bombing North Vietnam was dropped in a barrage of Presidential obfuscation and that the telegram in question was even more selective in its reporting than Taylor's book? Why is it that there was no Canadian official present and, further, that Pearson himself did not so much make a note on this meeting and merely mention it in passing when discussing his personal relations with President Johnson? Why is it that Johnson, in taking such exception to Prime Minister Pearson's 1965 Temple University speech (a speech that Taylor disparages) in their Camp David meeting the next day, made no mention of Pearson's prior approval of United States bombing plans? Is it not reasonable to expect that he would have? Was a meeting so stormy that Pearson had to write in a memorandum for file that on his way back to Ottawa he felt like "Hitler [sic] returning from Berchtesgaden". These questions Mr. Taylor does not design to ask. Are they not necessary to a rigorous analysis of the Pearson position?

In terms of Taylor's assessment of the

role of Blair Seaborn and the International Control Commission, it appears that he is attempting to give a sinister connotation to the word "interlocutor". This reader fails to grasp the point of Taylor's moral outrage at the opening of a Canadian channel of communication between Washington and Hanoi and further fails to see the point of any suggestion that this was not in keeping with the peacekeeping role of the ICC, especially when Taylor goes to so much trouble to assert the non-existence of that peacekeeping role. So far as the factual evidence concerning Seaborn's activities is concerned, it could be used to support an entirely opposite editorialization. And surely the same can be said of the Ronning missions. Interestingly, in dealing with Ronning's role, Taylor disputes the authenticity of the *Pentagon Papers* in their assertions concerning Ronning's son-in-law, Seymour Topping (p. 99). He should heed his own admonition that "critics of Canada's Vietnam policy must beware of trying to have it both ways" (p. 182). As to Canada's latest venture in Vietnam, Taylor's ranting against Messrs Trudeau and Sharp for their decision to help the Americans get out of Vietnam and their success not only in achieving their objective but in withdrawing Canada from membership on the ICCS as soon as their mission was successful leaves Taylor trapped in his own snare. He reminds one of *Peace-Maker or Powder Monkey?* by James M. Minifie, except that Minifie's book was more compelling reading.

One may assume that Mr. Taylor did not intend *Snow Job* to be a pretentious little book not even proving the advantages of hindsight over 20/20 vision. Nor, one must assume, did he intend to demonstrate the relentless course of gratuitous moralizing in its effect on the reader — from irritation through distress to utter boredom. One might suggest that not many readers will see this tiresome polemic through.

Factual evidence could support opposite conclusions

Editor's note

The July-August issue of *International Perspectives* contained an article by Luc Duhamel on *détente* written originally in French. In translation the term "bourgeoisie" was rendered "middle class". Mr. Duhamel has asked us to express his view that "middle class" does not reflect his meaning in using the word "bourgeoisie".

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A new approach to the discussion of Canadian-American relations

by Alex I. Inglis

here have been, in recent times, a number of important developments in the elaboration of a new Canada-U.S. relationship. As important parts of them were presented in the form of speeches, we are, with some trepidation, including in this issue substantial portions of some texts. The material presented below indicates something of the difference between the Canadian and American perspectives on the state of the relationship and the problems that beset it. U.S. Ambassador W. J. Porter gave an after-dinner speech to the Winnipeg branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in September 1974. In the course of that speech he dealt in particular with the differences that had arisen between the two countries over the question of beef imports into Canada and oil exports to the U.S. Then, in December 1974, Prime Minister Trudeau went to Washington. Following his meetings with President Ford, he held a press conference in the course of which these two subjects were among the topics discussed. Then, late in January, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen, addressed the Winnipeg branch of the CIIA on the subject of Canadian-American relations. Since Mr. MacEachen accompanied Mr. Trudeau to Washington, it is reasonable to assume that the Winnipeg speech reflects something of the December meetings.

The two speeches in particular reveal something of a new approach to the public conduct of Canadian-American relations. Many Canadian figures and a few of their American counterparts have for decades flinched at the pattern of after-dinner speeches dealing with relations between the two countries. They may have flinched, but until recently the content of their speeches did not much change. In musical terms it could be called the 3,000-miles-of-undefended-border rhapsody or the International-Joint-Commission concerto. In all, 1,001 variations on a theme by William Lyon Mackenzie King.

Only occasionally was a discordant note struck. In 1951, on the very night of the dismissal of General MacArthur as Commander of the UN forces in the Pacific, Lester Pearson, concerned over the lack of control of MacArthur by Washington, proclaimed that the days of an easy relationship between Canada and the U.S. were over. MacArthur was fired and the next day the U.S. press seized on the Pearson speech. Pearson wrote to *Hume Wrong* that, had he known what was about to happen, he would not have spoken as he did. The song went on.

Then came 1972 and two important events. In April, President Nixon visited Ottawa and enunciated the "Nixon Doctrine", as it applied to Canada, to a joint session of both Houses of Parliament. He said:

"... It is time for Canadians and Americans to move beyond the sentimental rhetoric of the past. It is time for us to recognize:

- that we have very separate identities; - that we have significant differences; and - that nobody's interests are furthered when these realities are obscure....

"Our policy toward Canada reflects the new approach we are taking in all of our foreign relations - an approach which has been called the 'Nixon Doctrine'. That doctrine rests on the premise that mature

partners must have autonomous independent policies:

- Each nation must define the nature of its own interests;
- each nation must decide the requirements of its own security;
- each nation must determine the path of its own progress."

Mr. Inglis is Editor of International Perspectives. The views expressed in this article are purely his own, however, and are not intended to reflect the policy of the Department or to state an editorial position for this magazine.

Changing pattern of after-dinner speeches

The other event was the Fall publication of the Canadian paper on Canada-U.S. relations. The document presented three options for the future of the relationship and accepted the third as the one that would be acted on. The options were:

- Canada can seek to maintain more or less its present relationship with the United States with a minimum of policy adjustments;
- Canada can move deliberately toward closer integration with the United States;
- Canada can pursue a comprehensive long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of its national life and in the process to reduce the present Canadian vulnerability.

Many dismissed the paper with but cursory attention. There were a number of factors which contributed to this lack of reaction. First, the paper was presented in a special issue of this magazine sans the customary editorial acknowledgements on the cover. Second, it appeared during an election campaign. Third, the first two options appeared to be little more than the setting-up of straw men. Fourth, the wording of the third option was such that few could disagree with it. Finally, it was not clear whether the paper had been before the full Cabinet or approved by it. All of this combined to leave the impression that the paper was more a political tract than a serious policy statement.

In retrospect, it seems more likely that the paper was something of a trial balloon. Whether that is the case or not, it has become obvious since 1972 that Option 3 must be taken seriously, for it is apparent that the Canadian Government is indeed acting upon it. In a speech before a distinguished New York audience in September 1973, Mr. Sharp warned: "As our policy develops, it will give rise to abrasions." In the intervening period, that prophecy has become increasingly fulfilled. Not only that but the third option seems to have undergone a redefinition during the intervening two and a half years. As Mr. MacEachen defined it in his Winnipeg speech, the purpose of the third option's strengthening of the economy and other aspects of national life is "in order to secure our independence". This is a much stronger statement than that which appears as the original third option. There it is stated that, "in the process" of strengthening the economy and other aspects of national life, we should "reduce the present Canadian vulnerability".

It has not been, and is not, the practice of *International Perspectives* to devote many pages to official statements and speeches. To turn these pages into a repository for such material would be contrary to the aims and objectives of the journal. No rule, however, should bind so rigorously that in the end it defeats its own purpose.

The Porter and MacEachen speeches are good examples of the new approach adopted to the new state of Canadian-American relations. In addition, because one was given by the American Ambassador and the other by the Canadian Minister, it can be assumed that each reflects the thinking of the respective governments. Extracts are presented here for their information value. They are also presented in the hope that they will stimulate discussion.

Having spoken of the uniqueness of Canadian-American trade in its dimensions and variety and the comparative balance in trade between the two countries, Mr. Porter went on to talk about the "imbalances, if such they are, which currently have our attention and which, in our view, need adjustment in order to head off possible trends toward restrictive trade policies". This, he said, was where consultations in advance of action fitted in, in that such consultations provided each country with an opportunity to minimize damage caused by the actions of the other. He then went on to discuss agricultural trade, beginning with the recently-imposed "severe quota limitations" on imports into Canada of U.S. cattle and beef. He said:

"These restrictions reduce our market opportunities by as much as 65 per cent under last year's trade level. We believe, in this case, that much could have been done to lessen the shock to our beef exporters, while also meeting your Government's legitimate concern for the welfare of your own beef-raising industry. I am not referring to the D.E.S. problem which for five months from April to September had cut off entirely shipments of American beef to Canada. We satisfied your Government's requirements on that score, but no

sooner had we done so than quotas were imposed that cut our shipments by that percentage. This leads me to mention the fact that substantial Canadian beef exports to the United States are still continuing but, as you can imagine, the action of your Government has given rise to strong pressure on the U.S. Government to reply in kind.

"To balance matters somewhat in the agricultural area, I may say that one recent Canadian export decision no doubt gratified U.S. egg-consumers, though per-

*Abrasive aspect
of Canadian policy
foreseen*

*Consultations
in advance
of action
emphasized*

ps not our producers. We have been receiving more than a half million dozen your eggs during every week the past weeks, sometimes at prices as low as cents per dozen. U.S. consumers, either individuals or commercial bakers, probably feel that without these Canadian eggs the price of our own eggs would have been pushed somewhat higher. U.S. producers, on the other hand, may not be quite so satisfied. They know that under international trading rules, as well as under domestic law in both the U.S. and Canada, selling products abroad at lower prices than they bring in the home markets — a practice known as dumping — can trigger counteraction. They have asked our Treasury Department to con-

sider the application of anti-dumping measures to Canadian eggs.

"In world markets for agricultural products, our two countries, with their efficient methods and enormous potential, have a mutual interest in liberal agricultural trade policies. Lately, it has not seemed that you are as convinced as we are about this. We have been confronted by decisions in food and energy without opportunity for effective consultation. This is not consistent with the usual practice of mutual consultation which has marked our economic relationship. Please remember President Ford's words at the General Assembly on September 17: 'A world of economic confrontation cannot be a world of political co-operation'."

Common interest in liberal agricultural trade policies

From agriculture Mr. Porter went on to the topic which dominated the international arena in 1974 — the energy crisis. Placing this in the context of Canadian-American relations, he said:

'Another matter of considerable interest to us is the cost of Canadian oil exports. We understand your motive in freezing prices at the well-head below world levels and imposing a substantial tax on exports: Canada wishes to insulate Canadian consumers from world oil market prices and ensure that the cost of foreign oil supplies to your Eastern provinces will be covered

revenues accruing from the sale of western Canadian oil to the United States. We are also aware that Canada neither sponsored nor encouraged the first oil price increases last year which provided so much impetus to worldwide inflation. Having said all that, however, I will add that your tax looks discriminatory in nature to us because it applies a double pricing to a commodity which is exported only to the United States.

"When your oil appears on the Chicago market, for example, at prices among the most expensive in the world, and sometimes higher by as much as two dollars a barrel than sources of alternative supply, you should be able to more than cover the cost of your Eastern oil imports — if you can sell your oil. But the present cost of Canadian oil is generating resistance in the market and buyers have been seeking and finding lower prices elsewhere. Canada is taking measures to support the high price level, such as cutting back production, but it appears that a more effective means of staying in the market might be to let the oil find its natural price level and rely on normal sources to meet your tax needs. It is not in our interest to see Canadian oil priced out of the market, but that is what is happening.

"The oil-price freeze on Canadian producers and various industry tax proposals also have the effect of shifting oil exploration to the U.S. and even to other overseas locations. The movement of drilling rigs and geophysical crews from Western Canada is reportedly substantial; and the reason is that they can now obtain better dollar realization across the border. Such an exodus, particularly in the case of geophysical crews, cannot easily be reversed and this fact has important considerations for the development of future Canadian oil reserves.

"Other basic commodities and industrial products are responding to the price squeeze by moving to higher levels. The sharply higher cost of fertilizer, which exacerbates the problems to be considered at the World Food Conference, is an example of the kind of problem that develops when oil is made more expensive. Farmers in the U.S. and Canada are already extremely conscious of that fact.

"Many, but not all, of the producing countries talk about further price increases for oil, the idea being that if there is, say, 14 percent inflation this year they should be compensated to that extent. It is, of course, possible that some producers may seek to compound by that formula the problems that already exist. We'll get through all right, but every such increase would add to the difficulties of bringing inflation under control and the less-developed countries would be hit with particular severity. Some of them have but one or two commodities to market which

Higher levels for commodities and products in response to price squeeze

bring in foreign exchange and their problem merits special attention.

"Our own experience a year ago during the period of shortages, plus the uncertain future, naturally strengthens the determination of my Government to progress toward the goals of project independence. Developments in this program proceed quietly but inexorably toward our goal of cutting down dependence on foreign supplies. Oil and gas exploration in the U.S. continues to increase apace, and every installation converted to the use of coal makes a contribution toward the achievement of our goals. Other aspects of the

program, such as research in the extraction of shale oil and the use of solar energy, indicate progress as compared to a year ago. We're going to get there, you believe it. President Ford has made that clear. Of course we shall remain interested in whatever supplies of oil and gas Canada may make available in the future; and I appreciated Prime Minister Trudeau's assurances of some months ago that exports to the United States would continue after Canadian needs are met. He said at that time: 'We are friends and friends care about each other's needs.'

Energy, a two-way street between U.S. and Canada

Before leaving the energy question, the Ambassador went on to say that the energy situation between Canada and the U.S. was a two-way street. He said that some Canadians were surprised to learn that, while the Americans were importing Canadian oil and gas in millions of tons of high-grade energy-packed material moved into Canada from the U.S. every year:

"There is high-grade coking coal for the furnaces of your heavy industry, which employs 105,000 Canadians. Their product is absolutely necessary to keep on the job 250,000 Canadians employed by metal-using industries; and there is steam coal, which provides the basis for a significant proportion of electric power generation in Ontario.

"The price of this coal has risen as increased demand and inflated costs have had their effect. It is obvious that coal-miners, like factory workers, must provide for themselves and their families. If the present oil-burning inflationary spiral continues its upward climb with sudden new price rises for natural gas contributing to the pressures, who would predict how high

the price of coal will go? It should be noted, however, that despite rapidly rising domestic needs the U.S. Government has restricted exports or imposed special taxes on the sale of coal to Canada; and in cases where the U.S. exports gas to Canada our government has taken the position that, in the event of any curtailment, Canadian customers would be treated differently from U.S. customers.

"In New York on September 17, President Ford declared: 'Now is the time for oil-producers to define their conception of a global policy on energy to meet the growing need — and to do this without imposing unacceptable burdens on the international monetary and trade system.'

Touching briefly on a number of other topics — the Garrison Diversion Plan, Western Canadian coal-mining operations with possible "non-felicitous" effects on neighboring U.S. territory, the two-way flow of investment, the free flow of people between the countries and the \$100-a-person customs exemption for returning U.S. tourists —, Porter concluded:

"In short, we try to act constructively and in an accommodating spirit. We think our record is good, and we are entirely willing to discuss our shortcomings as Canadians see them. We approach our Canadian friends well aware that Canada has arrived as a great economic power and our foremost idea is to achieve accommodation if that is at all possible or at a

minimum to limit the damage that a lateral action by one or the other could bring about. That is what our predecessors did to make us the world's greatest trading partners. In full understanding of the meaning that we are neighbors for better or worse, they made the U.S./Canada relationship something special in the world; it's up to us to keep it that way.

At his Washington press conference Mr. Trudeau, reflecting the range of his discussions with Mr. Ford, touched on a much wider variety of subjects. In the course of his remarks, however, he dealt with the Canadian position on both beef imports and exports. Of his discussion with the President on beef, the Prime Minister said:

"We referred to the meeting of officials which took place a week or two ago, the

consultations which are taking place under GATT provides for such consultations.

at both of us expressed the hope that quickly we should solve this difference of opinion. I didn't have to go into the details — the President seemed to be well aware of the reality from our point of view; but I think it might be worth while just to remind you here of the figures. We have a beef-stabilization system in Canada; we are trying to ensure that the agriculture producers have some stability so that they don't go up and down like yo-yos in their markets and in their production. We have to know in general terms what is going to come from abroad in any given year. Traditionally, our imports of heads of cattle from the United States have been something in the area of 60,000, considerably less. Just in the last year, 1973, that figure of some 60,000 suddenly went up to something like 215,000 head of cattle. You know it has more than tripled from one year to the other, so we said we can't run the market on this basis, that from year to year we have these huge variations, so what we will do is apply a quota system, not discriminating against the United States, but to all countries (it applied to Australia and New Zealand in particular) saying we will put you at the five-year average. In the case of the Uni-

ted States, this means 83,000 head of cattle. This five-year average is way above any figure that the United States had exported to us in the past — I guess ten, 20 years, or forever, I am not sure — but way above that, with the exception of last year, 1973, where I repeat your exports to Canada had more than tripled. So obviously you can't run an agricultural economy that way . . . I think, put that way, it sounds to us very reasonable. I can understand the reaction of the American people saying, and the American Administration, if they are going to do that to us we are going to do something back. But you know that's how trade wars begin and neither the President nor I want to begin a trade war. Certainly not me, because I think we would lose a trade war with the United States hands down. So I am saying look, let's try and understand it, let's have our officials discuss, let's work out some kind of compromise. It's important that the agriculture industries in Canada and the United States be harmonized and that we know what each other is doing and that's what our officials are talking about now, and hopefully we will find a solution very soon."

Canadian justification of agricultural policy

On the oil question, Mr. Trudeau outlined the Canadian policy of gradually phasing out Canadian exports to the U.S. and the reasons behind the policy. He said:

"The President was speaking on behalf of many Americans who are concerned, I think, that Canada, which is a traditional source of supply of petroleum for them, has had to look down the road and realize that we won't have enough for ourselves in five or seven years from now. And that means some hard choices both for us and for the Americans. We could continue supplying at last year's level and then suddenly turn off the spigot when there is no more, or we could tell the Americans, as we thought preferable, that over a period of years we will phase down the amount of petroleum that we can supply to the United States. Put this way, I found no preference — on the contrary — on the part of the American Administration to say, well, give us all you can now and turn us off suddenly a couple of years down the road. I think the phasing-down policy that we announced is best for the two countries. Certainly, in the case of Canada, no one would expect us to continue exporting abroad to any country,

energy or any other product, when we were in short supply for ourselves. And, from the point of view of the American Government, I think it's better that they know that this phasing-down will be gradual so that they can readjust their own internal policies — supply policies — so that they will meet this shortening of supply from a source which we thought was richer, and which they thought was richer, but which is, as I say, going to be insufficient for Canadians themselves by around 1982. These explanations were put and I can't comment on behalf of what the President thought of my answers. He still remained extremely pleasant and he said he was going to accept my invitation to visit Canada some day. I suppose he is realistic, he realizes that the United States itself has a 'Project Independence', that the United States wants to be self-sufficient in energy some day, and on that basis it's not surprising that Canada is attempting to be self-sufficient also."

U.S. forewarned of phasing-down of Canadian energy exports

On oil-pricing Mr. Trudeau was asked to respond to suggestions emanating from some U.S. Senators that, in retaliation to Canadian pricing policy, the U.S. might divert

or tax imported oil flowing to Canada through the Portland pipeline. The Prime Minister replied:

"Well, quite honestly, I did not take this proposal seriously. I hope I am not being offensive to anyone, but I think the reference was made to the oil which comes from Montreal from the Portland, Maine, pipeline. So either it's diverted from that pipeline, and I suppose you call that highjacking, which I don't think the Americans want to practice, or, as you say, they put some high transit taxes on it and I don't see what they would gain because all we have to do is to put an equivalent tax, an added tax, to the oil that we export to the United States. Surely this

is not the kind of thing we want to embark upon. I just explained earlier that we are selling oil to the United States at the same price that we are paying for it when it comes through the Portland pipeline, and no American would expect us to pay \$11.00 for oil coming from the Middle East or Venezuela, as we do, and to sell it at \$6.00 when we ship it to the Mid-West. So, you know, that's why I don't think this is a serious threat; it may have been the kind of thing which was said by way of hyperbole."

Special relationship no longer a factor

When Mr. MacEachen spoke in Winnipeg in January, the burden of his speech was that Canadian-American relations had entered a new era. The days of "special relationship" had come to an end. They had been replaced by the practice of each nation defining its own national interest and proceeding, in a spirit of co-operation with the other country, to pursue that interest. Getting into the heart of his speech, Mr. MacEachen said:

"What we have witnessed since the early Seventies has been the ending of one era and the beginning of a new period in Canada-United States relations. This change involved the ending of the 'special

And later:

"The fact is that, in both Canada and the United States, there has been a growing awareness that the special relationship no longer serves either of our best interests. What is being developed is a more mature relationship. It is one which permits us to maintain close ties, to co-operate fully on bilateral and multilateral matters, is of mutual benefit and yet leaves each country free to pursue its national interest consistent with its international

relationship' between Canada and the United States. What are the factors that produced this change and what are the distinguishing characteristics of these two phases in Canada-United States relations?" obligations.

"It is plain that Canada and the United States have entered upon a new period in their bilateral relations. It is one in which the emphasis is on a clear-eyed appreciation of the national interest and in which there is no room for false assumptions or illusions. Each government will have to make hard decisions in line with its own perception of the national interest, decisions with which the other may find it difficult to concur."

The era of "special relationship", as Mr. MacEachen saw it, began with the Second World War and continued to the early Seventies:

"The earlier period began with the Second World War and continued to the early Seventies. It saw the United States and Canada thrust to the forefront of the world stage — the former as the leader of the West and the latter as an important military and political ally and economic power. This was a period of close political and military co-operation and increasing economic and cultural interaction. Co-operation in defence was marked by a series of agreements running from the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement, which established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, to the 1958 North American Air Defence Command Agreement, which established an integrated anti-bomber system in re-

sponse to the Soviet threat. In the economic field, the pull of continentalism was magnetic. There occurred that phenomenon with which we are all familiar — the rapid expansion in United States control and development of Canadian industry, particularly in the extractive industries like mining and petroleum. The cultural penetration of Canada through television, radio, films and publishing during this period was also heavy.

"But while United States influence on so many aspects of Canadian life was growing during this period, changes in the international environment, within Canada and the Canadians' perceptions of the

national identity and independence were also occurring. These developments were

eventually to lead to a change in relations with the United States."

Mr. MacEachen went on to spell out the changes in four areas of the relationship: economy, culture, defence and foreign affairs. He said:

"This new feeling of being Canadian is reflected very sharply in the economic field. The issue is our economic independence. I have already cited figures showing the degree to which we are dependent on the United States in trade and investment. A cross-section of various polls taken

in 1972 indicated that 88.5 per cent of Canadians thought it important to have more control over our economy and that two out of every three Canadians considered the then level of American investment in Canada as being too high. This growing preoccupation with the economic vulnerability of Canada was greatly increased with the introduction of the United States economic measures of August 1971. Although global in impact, the effect in Canada was great, in part because of the high concentration of our trade with the United States and the affiliated structure of our industry. Clearly, no country, concerned with its independence, could accept passively a situation in which it found itself exposed to a major and unexpected change in terms of its economic relations with a powerful neighbour.

"In the cultural field, there emerged a renewed concern for the development and preservation of our national cultural identity. Canadians became increasingly disturbed by the pervasive influence of American cultural penetration. At the same time, we witnessed a burgeoning of activity in all the arts — theatre, literature, ballet, painting, and sculpture, films

But, he continued, the changes have not all been on the northern side of the 49th parallel. In both domestic and foreign affairs, changes south of the border since 1970 have also affected the Canada-U.S. relationship:

"The early Seventies witnessed a major change in United States foreign policy, a shift from global leadership to a more diminished role in the international community. President Nixon's address to Congress in May 1973 on United States foreign policy for the 1970s took note of this change. He said:

"The American people had supported the burdens of global leadership with enthusiasm and generosity into the 1960s. But after almost three decades our enthusiasm was waning and the results of our generosity were being questioned. Our policies needed change,

and music — that has been unparalleled in our national history. Winnipeg is one of the leaders in these cultural developments. They are a marvellous manifestation of the 'Canadian fact', and of our determination to establish our cultural identity and independence.

"In the defence field, continuing improvements and technological changes in nuclear missile and radar detection systems tended to cause the Soviet bomber threat to North America to recede. Consequently, the momentum towards more closely integrated and structured defence arrangements abated and the relative importance of the Canada-United States defence relationship levelled off in the late Sixties. Although circumstances are changing, Canada remains committed to co-operation with the United States and to our NATO obligations and to the policy of collective security.

"In the field of foreign affairs, Canada launched certain new initiatives. We moved to recognize China. In the new atmosphere of *détente*, we extended the range of our relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As I have already indicated, we sought new openings to Japan and Western Europe. We also took fresh initiatives in dealing with such global problems as marine pollution and the law of the sea. In those various ways Canada responded to new realities in the international environment and to new perceptions of our national interest."

not only to meet new realities in the world but also to meet a new mood in America. Many Americans were no longer willing to support the sweeping range of our postwar role. It had drained our financial and especially our psychological reserves.'

In short, President Nixon indicated that the time had come for others to share a greater portion of world leadership.

"His statement also reflected the growing feeling of Americans that United States policies should serve more immediate and domestic interests. This feeling applies to Canada as well as to other nations. In the United States, a view has

Defence ties levelled off with decrease in bomber threat

Nixon position reflected demand for domestic policy

been taking hold that the 'special relationship' has worked too often to Canada's advantage. They maintain that it has involved accommodations favourable to Canada that are no longer tenable in the light of current economic realities and in the light of the changing United States leadership role.

"Linked with this change in external posture are changes in the domestic scene. There is increasing public concern with domestic issues as opposed to foreign problems. The long preoccupation with Watergate has passed and the United States Administration and Congress have begun to concentrate upon a broad range of domestic problems. Their priorities seem to lie in the direction of reinvigorating the economy, combating inflation, and re-establishing a new sense of purpose and direction in the country. Faced with

serious economic problems at home, it is almost inevitable that the Americans will tend to calculate their national interests more narrowly in their foreign economic relations. The economic measures of August 1971 furnished one notable manifestation of this attitude. In addition, Canadians cannot forget that certain of the American domestic problems have, in our increasingly interdependent world, Canadian dimensions. Energy, natural resources and the environment are but three areas in which American efforts to meet their own needs can obviously impinge on Canadian interests. Consequently, the American preoccupation with their own domestic difficulties has important implications for Canada, particularly at a time when we are defining our industrial and foreign investment policies."

As examples of where divergent interests between the two countries led to different policies the Minister cited oil-export and mineral-resources development:

"On the oil-export issue, we feel we have demonstrated our willingness to assist the United States as far as possible consistent with our own national needs. There were strong objections from some quarters in the United States that American interests were being abused. But we could not be expected to sacrifice our own needs to meet the oil-consumption requirements of the United States. I might add here that, at least with respect to the oil-pricing

issue, recent United States action would appear to have gone a long way towards removing this irritant. Similarly, Canada's desire to develop mineral resources at its own pace and to encourage further processing before export is not necessarily in accord with American interests, which appear to tend towards the rapid exploitation of known resources, accelerated exploration of new resources and increased imports of resources in their raw form.

A particular problem for Canada in recent times has been the question of the responsibility of Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. corporations with respect to U.S. laws. On this Mr. MacEachen said:

"Another kind of issue on which some progress has to be made with the United States is the problem posed by the United States Trading with the Enemy Act, and in particular the United States Cuban Assets Control Regulations administered under the Act. This Act, which serves to deter Canadian companies which are subsidiaries of United States firms from conducting normal export business with Cuba, clearly has extraterritorial effect. You will be aware of the recent cases illustrating this problem.

"Although Canada is not the only country affected, the extent of United States business interests in Canada makes it a particular factor in Canada-United States relations. Clearly Canada cannot accept extraterritorial application of the laws of any other nation.

"This problem has been discussed periodically by successive Canadian and

United States governments without a resolution satisfactory to Canada. If consultation is to be used in this instance, as I think it should be, it would be our objective that the outcome would be that the companies doing business in Canada would not be deterred by the United States laws or by corporate policy made in the United States from doing normal export business. Indeed, I have initiated discussions with the United States authorities with a view to finding a satisfactory solution to this problem.

"You will be aware that amendments to the Combines Investigation Act are currently before the House of Commons. When passed, these amendments will enable the Restrictive Business Practices Commission to issue directives prohibiting Canadian companies from obeying foreign laws and orders.

"It is our hope that this will solve

ge part of the problem. What is needed, in addition, is a change in United States policy and practice so that Canadian companies

will be able to pursue normal export business in a manner consistent with Canadian law and policy."

Divergent interests and policies could be expected to lead to difficult relations. But, as Mr. Porter, Mr. MacEachen maintained that the key to handling these difficulties is "advance consultation". He said:

"Yet the two countries are becoming increasingly interdependent and the issues between them accordingly greater in number and complexity. In these circumstances, relations are likely to become more, if not less, difficult. As interaction increases, conflicts of interest and differences of view are bound to develop. Both governments are becoming increasingly involved in a wide range of domestic social and economic activities many of which turn out to have foreign policy implications. Two years ago federal financial assistance was extended under the DREE program to the Michelin Tire Corporation to locate in Nova Scotia. This was regarded by many in the United States as an attempt to subsidize an export industry, and as a consequence the United States applied countervailing duties on this Canadian export. This is a striking example of how a domestic program, in this instance one designed to remedy regional economic disparities, can become an issue in our relations with the United States.

"Although this new period in our relations with the United States will be complex and at times difficult, our approach to it should be positive. The fact is that fundamentally the relationship is a healthy one. We must remember that Canada and the United States continue to share similar views, and co-operate closely, on a whole range of important international issues. Our perceptions of what the new political and economic international environment requires have many elements in common. Also we are each other's best friend by choice and circumstance and will remain so.

"To respond to this new situation there is a new pattern developing in the management of our relationship, which, in my view, will help to promote harmony and

is in keeping with the new character of that relationship. It consists of analysis of the particular national interest to be served, followed by consultation, discussion or negotiation with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable settlement of the particular problem. One of the most important ingredients in this process is that of regular consultation and discussion.

"In this connection, I want to emphasize the importance of advance consultation. It seems to me that the sensible way of doing business is to notify the United States whenever possible of our intentions in advance of our taking major decisions on matters affecting United States interests and where appropriate to provide an opportunity for advance consultations. Naturally, we would expect the United States authorities to treat us in the same way whenever they are about to take action which would affect our interests. This practice corresponds to the more mature and complex stage that our relationship has now reached. It would help to diminish fears and misunderstandings on both sides. In short, it is an important way of keeping our relations with the United States in a healthy condition"

"To sum up, we are in a new stage in our relations with the United States. These relations are fundamentally sound but there can be no doubt that this new phase will be more difficult and complex. Hence the need for careful management of our relations by both parties is greater than ever. It is for this reason that I want to conclude with a strong plea for the merits of the consultative approach. For Canada, it is, after all, the only sensible way to conduct business with the United States, the first among all our partners."

*Reciprocity
in advance
consultations
emphasized*

These speeches exemplify the abandonment of bromides in the discussion of Canadian-American relations which has been a growing characteristic of the Seventies. The implications of this new approach and of the political realities that lie behind it will continue to be weighed and measured in days ahead. The two following articles contribute to this process. The first is a commentary on the Porter and MacEachen speeches and a review of Canadian-American relations by Christopher Young. Mr. Young is Editor of the *Ottawa Citizen* and a long-serving Canadian journalist. The second article is by Professor Richard Wilbur of Concordia University. It takes a historical look at the traditional difficulties of the 1930s – the relationship has not always been an easy one in the past. Future issues will further examine and comment on various aspects of this subject.

End of an era or a constant in political vocabulary?

By Christopher Young

"The days of relatively easy and automatic political relations with our neighbor are, I think, over. They are over because, on our side, we are more important in the continental and international scheme of things, and we loom more largely now as an important element in United States and in free world plans for defence and development Our preoccupation is no longer *whether* the United States will discharge her international responsibilities, but how she will do it and whether the rest of us will be involved."

— Lester B. Pearson, April 10, 1951.

"What we have witnessed since the early Seventies has been the ending of one era and the beginning of a new period in Canada-United States relations. This change involved the ending of the 'special relationship' between Canada and the United States. . . .

"It is plain that Canada and the United States have entered upon a new period in their bilateral relations. It is one in which the emphasis is on a clear-eyed appreciation of the national interest and in which there is no room for false assumptions or illusions. . . .

"In these circumstances, relations are likely to become more, not less, difficult"

— Allan J. MacEachen, January 23, 1975.

As a journalist, I can sympathize with the temptation of politicians to declare new eras open at the drop of a flattering

introduction. Newspapers excel in this line. I recently had occasion to check my own staff for announcing the end of the "Benoit era" in Ottawa. The 35-year-retiring Mayor, I thought, still had the probability of a substantial career ahead of him, but in any case his two-year regime was too short to qualify as an era.

"A thousand ages in Thy sight / Like an evening gone," according to the old hymn by Isaac Watts, who lifted this idea from Psalm 90. But it all depends where Thou sittest.

The 24 years between Mr. Pearson's speech and Mr. MacEachen's is at least a respectable lapse as earthly eras go, but the interesting point is that the new Secretary of State for External Affairs has snipped the ribbon on an era that was officially opened by his former chief a generation ago. For that matter, although I have not searched *Hansard* or the newspapers, I should be surprised if one couldn't find some similar epochal curtain raiser a generation before that. What was so easy about living with the Hawley-Smoot Tariff? Take it back another just and ask Laurier and Borden how they enjoyed the easy and automatic U.S.-Canadian relationship that produced the 1911 election campaign.

If there is one thing that comes most naturally to a political leader than the inauguration of eras, it is the discovery that the problems he faces are of a greater number and complexity than those dreamed of by his predecessors. Thus when Mr. MacEachen tolerantly implies that the national interest could have been viewed with some myopia or astigmatism in former days, when there was room for false assumptions and illusions, the enfeebled allowed to Mitchell Sharp, Paul Martin, Howard Green, Sidney Smith, Lester Pearson and Louis St. Laurent would simply not be possible for him. Mr. Sharp and Mr. Trudeau issued a comparable stern challenge to themselves in 1968 when, in a White Paper announcing that Canadians now had a foreign policy, th



Mr. Young has been editor of *The Citizen*, Ottawa, since 1961. Before that he worked on newspapers in Winnipeg and Hamilton and in the Parliamentary Press Gallery. He has reported to *The Citizen* and the *Southam* newspapers from China, the Soviet Union, Japan, India and other countries. Mr. Young has won a Bowater Award for journalism and a Wilderness Award for television documentary, and was co-editor of *A Century of Reporting: the National Press Club Anthology*. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

sealed that this policy would be shaped by the national interest. Such pursuits as the prevention of global holocaust, while interesting, would no longer divert them from the real requirements of their people.

The White Paper of 1970 was criticized for its failure to grapple with the major theme of our relations with the United States. The reply was that these relations were so all-pervasive that they could not be isolated for separate discussion. Two years later, however, the impossible was attempted in a paper under the *imprimatur* of Mitchell Sharp. The choices for Canada, so far as relations with the United States were concerned, were found to be three. We could maintain the *tutus quo*, but that had been generally regarded as unsatisfactory for some time and had been proved to be unsatisfactory by the Nixon economic measures of August 1971. Secondly, we could seek closer integration with the United States, a policy that would guarantee defeat for any Canadian leader who proposed it — particularly in that bitter period in the winding-down of the Vietnam war. Finally, there was a choice that could not readily be summarized in a word or two and was therefore called the Third Option (decisively capitalized by External Affairs, as Graham Greene capitalized the *Third Man*).

Third Option

It was the Third Option policy that Mr. MacEachen was developing in his January speech to the Winnipeg branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. He defined the Third Option as the strengthening of the economy and other aspects of international life in order to secure our independence". He added: "We have chosen to develop a comprehensive, long-term strategy intended to give direction to specific policies and programs which will reduce Canadian vulnerability to the magnetic pull of the United States." He then went on to discuss the implications and results of that policy decision.

Mr. MacEachen's January speech was previously drafted as a direct response to address before the same Winnipeg audience last September by the American ambassador, William J. Porter. In a general sense, the two speeches are more interesting for the ways in which they approach their common ground than for their differences of substance. But on one fundamental point they are in total disagreement. Mr. Porter ended his speech with the statement that our predecessors made, and we must maintain, a U.S.-Canadian relationship that is "something special in this world". Replying four

months later, Mr. MacEachen, as noted above, said that the "special relationship" was no more. This was the news that caught the headlines and impressed the newspapers, including my own. But, on reading the two texts and reflecting on their meaning, I am disposed to think there is a good deal less here than met the eye originally.

In fact, while claiming a normal degree of loyalty to flag and country and a willingness to stand on guard if necessary, I have to express the view that Mr. MacEachen is quite wrong about this and that Mr. Porter is right. It seems to me obvious that there is a special relationship and, if that is so, I fail to see how it can be a useful contribution to foreign policy to go around claiming otherwise. Special relationships, I might add, need not always be warm and friendly ones — though that has usually been the state of this one. India and Pakistan, I take it, have a special relationship. So do France and Germany, Belgium and Holland, Malaysia and Singapore, and many other pairs that might be mentioned. A man and wife have a special relationship, as do a parent and child, and this is true whether they love, hate, or merely tolerate each other. It seems idle to pretend that such relationships, whether one is happy in them or not, are just like relationships with friends, acquaintances or distant relatives. To pursue the anthropomorphic analogy one more step, this pretence smacks of a childish effort to assert an independence that ought to be taken for granted.

Relationship special

Our relationship with the United States will always be special because that is the only country with which we have a land frontier. Canada and Mexico are the two countries that border the United States, and there is a special relationship between the United States and Mexico as well. If the geographical facts are considered irrelevant for this discussion, consider the man-made relationships that exist and continue to multiply. We share the power generated by falls and rivers across the continent in a way that gives each nation a vital stake in the energy decisions of the other. We have an elaborate agreement on defence-production sharing. We operate a combined North American Air Defence Command, which is up for renewal and evidently will be renewed this spring. We have an International Joint Commission to deal with border problems, recently including pollution. Neither country can do an adequate job of cleaning up its environment without the co-operation of the other

*Special relations
not always
warm and friendly*

if the problem is along the St. Lawrence/Great Lakes waterway, on the Atlantic or Pacific coast, or in the Arctic. We have developed in the Auto Pact a most unusual, if not a unique, industrial relationship. And the cultural intercourse, mostly one-way south-to-north, through television, films, books and magazines, is unparalleled in the world.

Canadians may and certainly do argue constantly about whether these results of the relationship are helpful or harmful, but to deny that they add up to "something special in this world" is to deny reality. Ministers might as well go around declaring in their speeches that this is the warmest country in the world, hoping that if they say it often enough the people will come to believe it and will cease spending foreign exchange in Florida, the Caribbean and Hawaii.

In another part of his speech, Mr. MacEachen said that "the special relationship no longer serves either of our best interests". This at least makes sense, so far as Canada is concerned. If it is true, the answer is to change the relationship or its effects where it is in our power to do that. For instance, it was good news to hear in Mr. MacEachen's speech that Canada "cannot accept" the extraterritorial application of American laws. However, a Canadian is entitled to ask his own Government why we accepted so many affronts to our independence by the application of the U.S. Trading With the Enemy Act all through the Sixties and halfway through the Seventies.

On the oil-export issue, it is clear that the interests of the two nations clash, and this cannot be avoided. It is the proper job of each government to get the best deal it can for its own citizens; but, since Canadians have the oil that Americans want, we should expect our Government to make the most of a strong hand, regardless of the ownership of multinational oil companies. One sees the clash of these interests quite clearly in the two speeches, and to my mind Mr. MacEachen has the best of it. On the other hand, I suspect Mr. Porter had the stronger case on the beef controversy, a suspicion strengthened by the fact that Mr. MacEachen avoided the subject entirely.

Cultural barriers

Our Government is moving also to raise some barriers to American cultural penetration, and the indications at the time of writing are that Washington will return a soft answer. In this field it seems to me primarily a question of what Canadians ought to accept in the way of government

control over the content of publications, broadcasting and films. If nationalist policies encourage Canadian creativity and improve the quality of Canadian publications, wonderful. If such policies limit the flow of information and ideas from a single source, foreign or domestic, cry havoc. The policies do both things, we shall have to examine the bargain with grave suspicion.

Standard battle

The two orators engaged in the standard statistical battle over trans-border investment, with Mr. Porter taking the prize for the most ingenious argument. "Canadian investment in the United States is now substantially exceeds that of the United States investment in Canada on a *per capita* basis," said he, saving the whole cracker for the last five words. For all know this may be true of Panama as well, but Panamanians could put all their moneys in American stocks and cause hardly a ripple on Wall Street, whereas Americans could buy out the country in a day — they don't own it all already. *Per capita* investment has nothing to do with the problem. The issue is the degree of control. Yet, when that is said, the fact remains that we are not going to do much about foreign ownership anyway. The practical challenge for us is to exercise a rational control over foreign companies and investors operating in Canada.

(Incidentally, Mr. Porter trotted out an intriguing, if somewhat obscure, suggestion that Canadians travelling in the United States "try putting a few bottles of Labatt, Molson or O'Keefe on a roadside table with labels showing. The results may astonish you." I think his point was that the United States is teeming with Canadians, who will pop out of the woods in amazing numbers to gape at the sight of home-grown beer. The story, however, also makes an inadvertent point about the one-way traffic in communications. What is famous in the United States is famous in Canada. What is famous in Canada is famous only in Canada. Two years ago the American Society of Cartoonists held its convention in Ottawa and was entertained at a dinner by the Carling O'Keefe Brewery. The president of the association made a gracious speech thanking his Canadian hosts, ending with "a special word of thanks to Mr. Carling O'Keefe".)

Perhaps the most serious passages in Mr. MacEachen's speech were his pleadings for consultation. This is an old Canadian song, but no less important for being old. The root origins of this speech, and the conception of the Third Option, occur

August 1971 when President Nixon announced measures of tremendous danger to Canadian trade without advance consultation. The Canadian Government, its cabinet ministers and senior bureaucrats, were traumatized by that event. They determined at that time to protect themselves from a repetition of the "Nixonomics" affair. That is the real meaning of these declarations of an end to the special relationship, and any Canadian would empathize. My argument, however, has been that we cannot ever protect ourselves entirely from the effects of American policy. A thoughtless and ignorant President like Nixon, who did not even know that Canada was America's largest trading partner, can always do us damage. So can a rough and ruthless Secretary of the Treasury like John Connally, who was allegedly told "to go piss up a rope" by a senior Canadian public servant, but who nevertheless might have reached the White House had he not been caught on a bribery charge. So, likewise, can a protectionist Congress like that of 1930, which passed the Hawley-Smoot Tariff.

Of course, no country is immune to the effects of unpredictable economic decisions in other countries. The United States itself has been even more seriously affected than Canada by the decisions of the Middle East oil-producers since 1973. We owe the Americans some sympathetic understanding on that account, and we owe them full consultation on decisions of ours that will affect them. So far as I am aware, we are usually punctilious about this, if only in the hope that it will eventually become a two-way habit. We now have Ambassador Porter's word that the Americans intend "to limit the damage that unilateral action by one or the other may bring about". Perhaps Washington is more conscious of what such damage can do after its experience at the hands of the oil-producers. Canada cannot count on that, but we can hope for the best and plan for the worst.

The worst, if we want to be alarmist, could make 1930 and 1971 look like the good old days. The Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, supported by President Ford, has said that the United States might use force if its oil supplies were threatened. He was talking about the Middle East oil supplies, but the principle, that is what it is, could just as well be applied to Canada.

The Third Option requires attempts to build stronger bridges from Canada to Europe and from Canada to Japan, for both political and economic reasons. So, however, this strategy to reduce our

dependence on the United States has amounted to little more than sweet talk and gropings in the dark. Two-thirds of our exports still flow south across the border, which is a pretty special situation any way you look at it. Prime Minister Diefenbaker once announced his intention to swing a large percentage of this trade away from the United States, but nothing happened. One is bound to wonder whether Mr. MacEachen's announcement of the end of the special relationship will really mean anything more in practical terms.

Two-thirds of exports flow south

Potent nationalism

There is no denying the political potency of current Canadian nationalism. Mr. Porter recognized it in the phrase "unnecessary nationalism", and Mr. MacEachen candidly referred to recent polls that had obviously impressed the Government. The Minister's speech doubtless was designed to please the majority opinion that American control of the Canadian economy was too high and to send some messages to Washington. Whether it also presaged significant action remains to be demonstrated.

"Foreign policy, after all, is merely 'domestic policy with its hat on.' The donning of some head-gear, and going outside, doesn't itself alter our nature, our strength, and our quality very much. If we are weak and timid and disunited and jumpy at home, we will be the same away from home. Canada's foreign policy, in so far as it is Canadian policy at all, is, in fact, largely the consequence of domestic factors, some of which remain constant and others which are not easily altered."

That was Mr. Pearson again, speaking to the Vancouver branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in January 1948. He was still a civil servant then, which may explain his restraint in not designating these thoughts as the heralds of a new era.

Please write...

The months ahead hold forth the promise of a lively discussion of Canadian-American relations. The Editors of *International Perspectives* would like to invite readers of the magazine to participate in that debate. To that end we would welcome letters from our readers expressing their points of view for incorporation in a "Letters to the Editor" section.

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Canadian-American trade war during the Great Depression

By J. R. H. Wilbur

Canadian-American trade relations in this century have frequently produced some brief and bitter clashes, but the lowest point certainly must have been the first four years of the Great Depression. What follows is a short analysis of the deteriorating trade relations in the stormy and confusing years after President Hoover raised his nation's tariff barriers to their highest point. Some might call it a prolonged quarrel between two well-established trading partners. A quarrel there certainly was, but not between partners.

Even though, by 1929, Canada was the United States' largest single market for many of its manufactured goods and its major supplier for some key industrial resources, the two nations had no understanding as to their tariff structures. In fact, Canada had never been given the most-favoured-nation category the United States had extended to others of far less importance to its trade. Rather, the United States continued to regard Canada as a member of the British Empire trading bloc and throughout the 1920s and early 1930s looked first to London for trade trends, choosing to ignore the increasingly-independent political stance taken by Canadian Governments *vis à vis* Britain. What was even more important, American offi-

cials, politicians and many journalists seemed unaware, publicly at least, of the dominant role American investment and trading goods had assumed in the Canadian economy.

Part of the explanation for this blind eye towards Canada is provided by the regional nature of the American economy and the resulting protectionist lobbies notably in the farm states of the mid-West. Of course, this same phenomenon existed in Canada, but the northern nation, because of its minor political and economic influence in world affairs, was much more conscious of the American presence and of American decisions — decisions made in a global context but affecting Canada, in fact, more than any other nation.

Familiar ring

The foregoing may have a familiar ring because of the present state of the world and in particular of the North American economy. Once again, as in 1929, we seem to be on a downward path, led as before by the American bell-wether, the giant automobile industry. But historical parallels are full of inaccuracies; instead of searching for them, this analysis will argue that the 1929-1933 trade war established or strengthened new economic and diplomatic patterns in the relations between Canada and the United States, which have remained to the present day.

Predictably, the initiative for tariff changes was taken early in 1929 by the United States, and specifically by "two fervent protectionists", as one American historian has described them — Senator Reed Smoot of Utah and Congressman William Hawley of Oregon. With President Hoover's blessing, they introduced in January 1929 a bill that, for the next 17 months, was the centre of one of the most prolonged and divisive debates in Congressional history. In Ottawa, Prime Minister King was quick to warn American Legation officials of the dire effect a frankly protectionist tariff would have on Canadian farm products. Vincent Massey, the

U.S. continued to see Canada as belonging to Empire bloc

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Canadian Minister to Washington, suggested to King that, while "the practice of Canadian interests appearing before a Congressional Committee had little value because of the danger of loose statements in public settings which might produce a prejudicial effect upon our tariff interests in general", formal representation should be made. He noted a basic weakness in the Canadian case: "The United States treats all countries alike, giving only a one-rate tariff." The cautious Liberal leader, hoping against hope that the Hawley-Smoot bill would be tempered so far as Canada was concerned, decided to use informal channels rather than lodge a protest against "a so-called menace which has not yet materialized".

Meanwhile, Massey got his message across to the American press. After an interview in February 1929, a report in the *Washington Star* noted: "While habit leads Washington to spend its time looking distantly at Europe and at Latin America, the fact is... the biggest clouds in our international affairs are right across the border northward from us in Canada."

April 1930, as the controversial tariff measure was in its final stages of debate, the U.S. Under-Secretary of State wrote Senator Smoot requesting that Canada be given some protection. He noted, in what might have been considered a warning, that "not less than 80 per cent of our total importations which would be affected by the countervailing duty provisos come" from Canada, which had "no treaty with the United States guaranteeing most-favored-nation treatment in customs matters". The Senator adamantly refused to consider any concessions. Well before the final vote on June 14, 1930, Norman McLeod Rogers, in a note to Prime Minister King, urged Canadian countermeasures: "Congress having indicated their legislation, it is then the duty of the Canadian Government to take whatever action may be deemed necessary in order to advance and promote Canadian interests."

Canadian budget

The May 1, 1930, budget was Canada's answer. "Canada will not engage in a tariff war with any country," Finance Minister Charles Dunning told the Commons. He explained that the decision to make the most extensive upward tariff revisions since 1907 had been taken so that other countries, through reciprocal action, might make it possible for Canada "to avoid extremes in schedules". A total of 10 items, from farm products to cast-iron pipe, would be affected, including 216 products added to the free list under a

British preferential tariff. According to one estimate, from \$175 million to \$225 million in American exports would be affected by the new Canadian tariff wall. As the *New York World* saw it: "Canada's new tariff is her answer to the Hawley-Smoot Bill. She plans to repay us in kind not only by imposing retaliatory duties on American goods, but by granting new trade favors to British rivals of American exports."

Mackenzie King embarrassed

For his part, Prime Minister King was plainly embarrassed by his decision to violate the Liberal Party's low-tariff policy — a reversal gleefully noted by Conservative opposition leader R. B. Bennett: "It must be a source of satisfaction to the free traders of the West to have heard the brick-for-a-brick announcement made today." The president of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Sir J. H. Woods, had no illusions about the budget's effects. Shortly after returning from a speaking engagement in Washington, he informed a Halifax audience: "Canada is on the eve of a trade war with the United States and Canada will win."

The subsequent month-by-month decline in both Canadian imports and exports suggested that there could be no victor. In April and May 1930, Canadian exports dropped by \$45.2 million, while imports fell by \$50 million, compared to the same period a year earlier. In the United States, the automobile industry led the decline; production in April 1930 was down 40 per cent. Commented the *Baltimore Sun*: "There could scarcely be a worse time for the United States to embark on a trade war."

Not surprisingly, in the 1930 Canadian general election campaign of June and July, the tariff question dominated all other issues. Bennett's attacks on the Liberal tariff revisions were described as "savage and unrelenting". He was especially critical of Mr. King's alleged tenderness towards the United States "even when the whole machinery of trade is smashed by an alien hand". The Tory leader's solution was Canada first, the Empire second (perhaps). "Tell me," he asked his Winnipeg audience on the opening night of his campaign, "when did free trade fight for you? You say tariffs are for the manufacturers. I will make them fight for you as well. I will use them to blast a way into the markets that have been closed to you." In Brantford, King admitted that, while the Dunning budget had been in retaliation against the American tariff changes, it was also an attempt to cope with British reductions of Cana-

Confidence
that Canada
could win
trade war

dian wheat imports. The concessions to British goods were intended to divert Canadian imports from the United States to Britain, so that the latter would buy more Canadian products.

The not-unexpected victory of R. B. Bennett and his Conservatives brought a dire prediction from one American Senator, who had recently met with two prominent Canadian Tory businessmen. The temporary Canadian tariff law in effect since May would be abandoned for higher tariffs, to be imposed "against all countries alike". British preferences would not be maintained because of the huge American investments in Canada since 1920 and because Canadians increasingly had turned to New York for financial assistance rather than to London. For their part, the British were said to be disappointed at the likely disappearance of their short-lived trading advantages. Wall Street observers predicted that higher Canadian tariffs, as promised by Bennett, would hurt some American firms, but they foresaw another result: more U.S. branch plants being established in Canada.

During the special Parliamentary session called in September 1930, Prime Minister Bennett declared that "the time was ripe in which to carry forward a great campaign on behalf of Canadian-made goods". Over the next 12 months, duty rates were increased on many items, including bituminous coal, agricultural products and machinery, boots and shoes, tin-plate, mining machinery and the schedules for textiles, iron and steel. British preferential rates were also raised, but Bennett emphasized that the measures were primarily directed against the United States and its dumping policies. Even though Bennett and the Tories had long been regarded as strong Empire traders, the new Prime Minister indicated that he considered British preferences too one-sided. However, his attempts at the 1930 London Imperial Conference to improve the Canadian position were rejected by the new Government of Ramsay MacDonald.

Branch plants

By June 1931, Canada had become the twenty-sixth nation to raise its tariff rates to counter the Hawley-Smoot Tariff. Since the American bill had gone into effect, 87 new American branch plants had been built in Canada, bringing the total to over 600, a figure greater than that for any other country and surpassed only by the combined total of American plants in the whole of Europe. Notwithstanding this sign of further Canadian-American economic integration, the trade figures for the

12-month period ending 31 March 1931 showed the continuing effects of the trade war. Canadian imports from the United States had declined by \$263 million, a trend that was to continue for the next two years. On the export side, agricultural products were hard hit; food exports dropped from \$58.5 million in 1929 to \$3.5 million in 1933. The pulp-and-paper industry saw its exports go from \$235.6 million to \$94 million. The total export figure for Canada's trade with the United States declined from \$429.7 million to \$197.4 million in 1933. Canadian imports from the United States slipped from \$868 million in 1929 to \$232.5 million four years later, with iron and its products, including automobiles, registering the largest single decline — from \$317 million to \$43.9 million.

The Bennett Government's retaliatory measures against the Hawley-Smoot Tariff gave Canadian manufacturers a greater share of the home-market, but largely at the expense of farmers and workers engaged in the export industries. The latter's share of the national income fell from 23 per cent in 1929 to 12 per cent in 1932, whereas that of workers in protected industries rose from 14 to 18 per cent. Furthermore, as the economic historian A. E. Safarian points out, the tariff "was unable to prevent large decreases in output, employment and investment in protected industries". In short, the trade war with the United States was not the solution; it only compounded the problems posed by the world-wide depression.

Of course, there was a strong body of opinion in the United States, notably among Democratic Congressmen, categorically opposed to Hoover's economic policies. As late as May 1932, however, the President was still against any lowering of the U.S. tariff wall, arguing that to do so "would start our country upon the road of a system of preferential tariffs between nations with all the trade wars, international entanglements, etc., which our country has sought to avoid by extending equal treatment to all of them". So far as he was aware of Canada, Hoover, like many of his countrymen, had difficulty disassociating the Dominion from the Empire trading bloc, as they saw it. The 1932 Ottawa Imperial Conference did little to correct this impression, despite the bitter and well-publicized clashes between Bennett and the British delegation, especially Neville Chamberlain. British preferential rates formed the basis of a series of bilateral treaties designed to last for a minimum of five years, after which time the British Government reserved the right to

Bennett directed tariff increases against U.S. dumping policies

consider its own interests and review the basis of preference.

By the end of the fiscal year 1933, Canada's trade with the British Commonwealth had increased a full 9 per cent over 1931, for a total of 29.6 per cent of Canadian trade as a whole. During the same period, Canada's trade with the United States declined from 64.5 per cent to 57.2 per cent. However, two events would soon signal the beginning of the end of the Canadian-American trade war: the election of Franklin Roosevelt to the American presidency and the failure of the world monetary and economic conference held in London in June 1933. The Democrat Roosevelt and his economic advisers, including the new Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, were as determined to lower the United States tariff wall as the Hoover administration had been to maintain it. Equally determined, by the summer of 1933, to improve trade relations was Prime Minister Bennett, who held a series of frank discussions in the spring of 1933 with Pierre Boal, the American chargé d'affaires in Ottawa.

Writing to his Washington superiors on the eve of Bennett's first official meeting with the new American President, Boal said that the Canadian Prime Minister had stressed three things: Canada's present economic problems, its continued dependence on some tariff protection, and the desirability of an economic agreement with the United States. "If they only knew," Bennett had confided, referring to the House of Commons, "there are few men in that House more reluctant to bring in high tariffs than myself, but I have had to do so as a matter of necessity — the necessity of preserving Canada." He warned Boal, "if far-reaching international solutions are not arrived at this year between the principal governments of the world", then the orthodox line of action which had been at the basis of his practice of government in Canada must be abandoned. Boal surmised that this would involve inflation and the abandonment of Canada's present policy of paying its foreign obligations. Bennett also said that the five-year limit to the Ottawa agreement had been his insistence and that he would be in favour of expanding it to help American goods enter the British market.

Conversion

Critics of Bennett and his administration were almost as vociferous today as during the Depression — would argue that this was the desperate death-bed conversion of a traditional high-tariff Tory, looking for election gimmicks. A conversion it

may have been, though another interpretation would present Bennett not as a politician but as an experienced businessman, used to making difficult and sometimes contrary decisions. In any case, over the next few months, key individuals on both sides of the Forty-ninth Parallel were at work preparing the way for the resumption of closer Canadian-American trade relations. The Canadian group was roughly the same as the one Bennett took with him as advisers to the London economic conference. These included his executive assistant, R. K. Finlayson, Clifford Clark, the Deputy Minister of Finance, Dana Wilgress, Director of Commercial Intelligence for the Department of Trade and Commerce, and Norman Robertson from the Department of External Affairs. While occupying the fringes of that unsuccessful international gathering, they established important contacts, notably with Cordell Hull. According to Finlayson, Bennett had vigorously supported Hull during a bitter debate with the French delegation, and Hull "never forgot R.B.'s intervention and never failed thereafter to call on him when opportunity offered".

It is owing to such personal contacts as these that world problems are alleviated and sometimes compounded. In the case of the Canadian-American trade relations, personalities played a large and positive role. Both Bennett and Roosevelt had publicly committed themselves to a reduction of their countries' trade barriers — Bennett, for example, having told the House of Commons in February 1933 that he favoured reciprocity with the United States. Bennett's brother-in-law, William D. Herridge, had been Canada's Minister to Washington since 1931, quickly gaining the confidence of the Roosevelt "brain-trust". Indeed, according to J. B. Brebner, regarded at the time as *the* authority on Canadian-American and British trade relations:

"Both before and after the debacle in London that summer the Roosevelt administration treated the Canadian Minister at Washington, Mr. W. D. Herridge, almost as one of the official family. They tried out their ideas on him wholesale in return for his neutral but understanding North American comment."

Some of those ideas found their way to Bennett and appeared very publicly in January 1935, when the Canadian leader, in a series of radio talks, outlined some radical proposals to cure Canada's social and economic ills. They reflected, in part, Herridge's preoccupation with unorthodox ideas, somewhat at the expense of a reciprocity treaty; he clearly lost interest in the

Personal contacts can alleviate or compound world problems

latter in 1934, but other less personal factors moved the two nations toward an economic *rapprochement*. Declining markets, currency devaluations and crop failures served as obvious spurs for political leaders and their advisers in the search for solutions.

Critical effects

Translated into political terms, the depression rejected Herbert Hoover in favour of F. D. Roosevelt. In due course, the same fate awaited R. B Bennett, but not before the two governments had begun negotiations that ultimately led to the 1935 reciprocity agreement, signed by Mackenzie King in November, just a month after Bennett had been defeated. The initiative for the negotiations, as in the case of the start of the trade war, rested with Canada's giant neighbour. Prodded by its own stagnant economy, its increasingly restive electorate and Congress and the failure of world conferences at London and Geneva, the United States finally did take that initiative.

In retrospect, what did the trade war mean to Canada? Despite its major role as the United States' principal customer

and supplier of strategic industrial goods, Canada's subsidiary position in world fairs remained. In economic terms, Canada moved further within the American orbit as more U.S. firms established branch plants and the two economies became even more closely integrated. According to one estimate, 26 per cent of all American controlled or affiliated companies in 1934 had been established or acquired since 1929. These were mostly situated in southern Ontario and Quebec, thus helping to increase the regional diversity and, in the case of the Prairies and the Atlantic provinces, the economic disparity.

Although, towards the end of the decade, other factors accelerated the continental integration of the two national economies, the trade war seemed to resolve a basic difference between the two major Canadian political parties — in practical terms, the tariff could no longer be used as an ideological distinction. R. B. Bennett, as well as Mackenzie King, had admitted the feasibility of closer economic ties with the United States and, in characteristic fashion, the Tory leader acted. The Reciprocity Treaty of 1935 was the result.

"With all the advantages of hindsight, it seems regrettable that Canada has so long neglected to seek out an equilibrium level of integration with the United States (and indeed with its other major overseas economic partners) that would optimize the net benefits of these relations. Whereas there has been much inventiveness in public policy making in Canada, this has not, with some notable exceptions, applied to international economic relations. One of the reasons has been the deep commitment of some substantial economic interests and of the central Canadian political power bloc to a national policy now sadly outdated. Another reason lies in the commitment of Canada to multilateral institutions and approaches. This is not in itself undesirable, but it should not be permitted to stand in the way of bilateral arrangements that serve Canada's economic and political interests, especially where bilateral approaches can be made compatible with the aims of the multilateral institutions to which Canada is committed.

"Probably Canada's most regrettable missed opportunity was the failure to negotiate a free-trade arrangement with the United States in 1948. At that juncture, when industry was faced with

the need for postwar reorganization in any case, and when the massive inflows of foreign capital of the early 1950s had not yet occurred, a policy program of free trade with our major trading partner and of clearly-stated priorities backed by whatever controls might have been necessary to control foreign investment might have resulted in the capture of many economic gains from interdependence that Canadians subsequently measured as the costs of protection. Since foreign-accumulated investment under these circumstances would probably have been substantially less, some of the costs to Canada that accompany capital flows might also have been avoided. There is little doubt that the transition problems of that period would have been much more manageable at that time, both economically and politically. Finally, it seems probable that Canada would have been better prepared to meet the competitive challenges subsequently posed by the emerging European Economic Community and the recovered Japan."

(From H. Edward English "The political economy of international economic integration: a brief synthesis", in *Continental Community? Independence and Integration in North America.*)

Trade and detente challenge uniformity in Eastern Europe

Stanislav J. Kirschbaum

ce August 1974, Eastern Europe has in marking the thirtieth anniversary of events that were to become the beginning of the socialist revolution. Even the most loyal Soviet supporters could not have imagined the extent of the economic, social and political transformations, dictated by the Kremlin, which that revolution ended. Few indeed could have imagined the suffering that was also to go with it. The dialectic of repression and the directives from Moscow gave rise to a national movement that today appears to have been the driving force behind the changes introduced by the Eastern European countries since the beginning of the revolution. In other words, Eastern Europe has been changed not only by the socialist revolution but also by the changes brought in by various governments. Such initiatives have proved very costly. The history of the past 30 years provides lessons, and enables us to pose some questions regarding the future of the Eastern European countries.

Western predominance

When the Soviet Union took the necessary action to ensure its predominance in Eastern Europe — through military uprisings (Warsaw and central Slovakia), takeovers either by indigenous Communists (Belgrade and Tirana) or by Communists assisted by the Red Army (Berlin, Budapest and Sofia) —, the political regimes planned to set up were to be entirely under its authority. However, it took three years and the expulsion of a recidivist state — Yugoslavia — in June 1948 before the goal of the Soviets became a reality. With the single exception of Albania, this situation has not changed, and the events of 1956, 1964 and 1968 in Eastern Europe leave no room for doubt on this point.

The events of October 1956 in Poland and the Hungarian revolution of the same year both showed, in very different ways and under very dissimilar circumstances, the limits of independent action that the U.S.S.R. would tolerate. Although Moscow

was adopting radical changes (symbolized in the rejection of Stalinism at the twentieth Congress of the CPSU), there was nothing to indicate that Eastern Europe could do likewise. Its actions therefore caught the Kremlin off guard. Soviet policy was governed by the nature and scope of the proposed changes. Imre Nagy's statement that Hungary was withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact and that a multi-party system was being introduced demonstrated that Hungary had gone beyond the acceptable limits. The Soviet Union could not allow a state to escape from its authority; through brutal but effective military intervention, it put an end to the Hungarian revolution and made that country fall in line. Thus Moscow made it clear, on the one hand, that only the Communist Party could be in power and, on the other, that the Kremlin would not permit the defection of a state it considered vital to its interests. Albania is the exception that proves the latter rule.

While the Hungarian revolution established that independent action of this sort would not be tolerated, the events of October in Poland, which occurred just before, showed the extent to which the U.S.S.R. would allow change. The changes involved new leadership of the party by Wladislaw Gomulka, who took over from the Stalinists, and the liberalization policy he subsequently implemented. We should add here that at this time a new factor came into play that was to become even more important in a few years — the Sino-Soviet conflict. At the time there was simply a difference of opinion — which

States vital to Soviet interest not permitted to defect

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proved, however, most advantageous to the Poles.

In the following years, the Eastern Europe regimes adapted to the changes that came with the era of Nikita Khrushchov in 1956. Celebrations were also held to mark achievements, notably in Czechoslovakia in 1960, on the occasion of the promulgation of a new socialist constitution. Just when everything seemed to be going well, the symptoms of future problems appeared and once again the strength of the Kremlin was put to the test.

In 1963, a movement of opposition and reform began in Czechoslovakia, the aim of which was the transformation of the political system. According to the Czech author Antonin Liehm, writing in 1964 in *Literarni noviny*, the initial idea was to replace the "caricature of socialism" represented by the Stalinist regime of Antonin Novotny. When the latter was replaced in January 1968 by the Slovak Alexander Dubcek as First Secretary of the party, the Czechs and Slovaks, led by the party, intended to go much beyond the elimination of Novotny's brand of Stalinism. It then became clear to the Soviets (and to such Eastern European Communist leaders as Walter Ulbricht of Eastern Germany and Wladislaw Gomulka of Poland) that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia seemed to have lost control and that, despite its declarations of loyalty to the U.S.S.R. and to the Communist ideal, the Czechoslovakian reforms would destroy the principles established 20 years earlier in the Prague *coup*. Consequently, the Soviet Union put an end to Czechoslovakia's liberalization experiment through a military invasion in August, in which all the other members of the Warsaw Pact except Romania participated. Once again, the limits of acceptable action were defined.

The fact that Romania did not participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated, however, that the Soviet Union would allow a state to pursue its own policy provided the limits established in 1956 and renewed in 1968 were not violated. Since its "declaration of independence" in April 1964, Romania has been on its own as far as foreign policy is concerned, yet has been a model of Communist orthodoxy in domestic policy. The Sino-Soviet conflict and, more recently, the Kremlin's policy of *détente* were of great assistance to Romania in its policy, which can henceforth be described as "nationalist-oriented".

Thus, in the last 30 years of Communist rule, we can detect two characteristics in the behaviour of the Eastern

European countries: on the one hand recognition of the fact that the Soviet Union is remaining firm in its desire to control the activities of these countries and, on the other, a strong desire for change, which is generally evident in only a few countries while most of the others remain fairly orthodox.

Détente

Despite the events that occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union has begun a policy of *détente* with the West the repercussions of which must necessarily be dangerous to Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union is, therefore, maintaining strict ideological control over the Eastern European countries. Moreover the ideological rigidity now observable in those countries is very similar to that which prevailed during the Stalinist period. In Hungary, the sociologist Andras Hegedus and the philosophers Mihaly Vajda and Janos Kis were expelled from the party in May 1973 because of the unacceptable political opinions contained in their work. In its campaign to eradicate any traces of the 1968 movement in Czechoslovakia, the party — for political reasons — stripped 500 graduates of the Party's Political School of their degrees, while in Bulgaria it centralized all cultural activities under the Arts and Culture Committee.

The fear that the atmosphere of *détente* might threaten the ideology was not felt in the Soviet Union alone. In March 1972, the Polish newspaper *Wojsko Ludowe* published an article in which the author said that East-West contacts were dangerous ideologically. Many Eastern European magazines subsequently echoed this opinion and stressed the necessity for greater ideological rigidity. Furthermore, in 1973, ten bilateral co-operation agreements on ideology and propaganda were signed between the various Eastern European states with the exception of Romania. In May 1974 a conference of representatives of writers' unions was held in Prague and one month later the editors of the parties' historical magazines met in Warsaw. In both cases, ideological firmness and cohesion were the themes of the discussions.

Further evidence of the tightening of control can be seen in Moscow's proposal for a European conference of Communist parties to settle the question of China. Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Sofia in September 1973 revealed that the Soviets were hoping that Bulgaria would play the same role that it had played in 1966 at the ninth Communist Party Congress; at that time the Bulgarian leaders had launched a cam-

Dubcek planned to go beyond elimination of Stalinism



World Wide Photos

Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev is greeted by East German Communist Leader Erich Honecker during one of his visits to East Berlin. Re-establishment of friendly relations between East and West Germany signalled the advance of détente between East and West in general.

ng for a world congress, which was held in June 1969. Nine days after Brezhnev and Enrico Berlinguer, the Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party, went to Sofia. Since the ICP did not favour organizational measures against a communist party, Berlinguer's visit to Bulgaria could be seen as an attempt by the Hungarians to make the Italians accept the Soviet stand. In addition, Romania was the only Eastern European country that did not initially accept the idea of a European conference. It was not until March 1974 that Mr. Ceausescu accepted in principle the idea of such a conference. At the eleventh Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in November, he reiterated that he agreed to the idea, provided that the resolutions adopted by the conference were not binding.

Thus, to forestall the possibility that détente might lead an East European country on a path unacceptable to the U.S.S.R., the Kremlin has imposed discipline in the areas of ideology and the relationship between Communist parties. Yet, in other areas, especially in foreign policy and economic relations, Moscow tolerates an initiative while stressing the need for

integration and unity in the Soviet bloc. In fact, Radoslav Selucky points out, in his article in this issue, the degree to which a country can be forced to submit to Moscow and the means used to achieve this objective.

In the area of foreign policy, the most important event in the last two years was the signing in December 1973 of an agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia. This was followed by an exchange of diplomatic missions between Bonn and three Eastern European capitals — Prague, Budapest and Sofia — in March 1974, and an exchange of "permanent representations" between East and West Germany. In addition, the economic corollary of the détente was intensified and, in December 1973, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Olszowski, went to Bonn to obtain the credits Poland needed so badly. In exchange, he promised to repatriate 50,000 German nationals in 1974. Since the beginning of 1974, however, relations between Bonn and Warsaw have worsened, and there is reason to believe that it was not only because the Germans refused to provide Poland with all the credits it requested (the Poles re-

quested three billion DM, whereas the Germans were prepared to supply only one billion) but also because Moscow and Pankow were putting pressure on Warsaw not to become too attached to the West.

As far as economic matters are concerned, the situation is rather contradictory. The theme of the integration of socialist economies put forward in the Integration Program passed in July 1971 was brought up again at the twenty-seventh meeting of Comecon in Prague in June 1974; however, it does not appear to have achieved any significant results. No unanimous opinion was reached at the third annual meeting of the Communist leaders of the U.S.S.R., the Eastern European countries and Mongolia, held in the Crimea in July. Moreover, the Eastern countries are turning more and more toward Western Europe for their trade. In an interview on Finnish radio and television in September, Janos Kadar said that relations between the EEC and Comecon should facilitate contacts rather than direct economic exchanges. Hungary was admitted to GATT in September 1973. For its part, Bulgaria asked to join the EEC's trade preference system, while the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Olszowski, went to London in May and the Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme, paid a visit to Warsaw; in both cases, the topic of discussion was possible economic agreements.

It is necessary to conclude, however, that, in general, the East European states are governed by a policy of unity and integration consistent with both the ideological imperatives and the need for protection against the dangers created by the Soviet policy of *détente*. As a result, it causes some equivocal situations. Although the Soviet bloc recognizes the need for trade with the West, it is, nevertheless, trying to prevent the infiltration of Western values and customs. The policy of socialist economic integration also conflicts with the desire for independent economic development, which the West is in a better position to provide. Furthermore, some countries favour changes that exceed the limits of the U.S.S.R.'s current policy position, which has been accepted by most members of the Soviet bloc. Both Romania and Hungary, in their separate ways, have chosen a path of independence and reform that indicates new possibilities for the future as well as new problems. Then there is Yugoslavia, which has been on its own since 1948 and is now preparing for the post-Tito period. The trial of 12 members of the party accused of anti-Tito (i.e., pro-Moscow) activities was announced by

Tito himself last September, the day after Edvard Kardelj returned from his visit to Moscow. The announcement indicates that the problem of a successor is as urgent as ever. Disregarding Yugoslavia, it is the Hungarian experiment and Romania's independent route that must be considered in order to get an idea of the possibilities of change in Eastern Europe.

Hungarian experiment

In 1968, the Hungarian party introduced a plan for economic reform entitled the "new economic system". It was designed to create a society that would be both affluent and socialistic. In 1971, an economic crisis was barely averted, and in November 1972 the Central Committee studied the economic plan in an effort to resolve some of its problems. Like other Eastern European countries, Hungary is trying to ensure its own economic development but, at the same time, is faced with world economic problems such as inflation. Consequently, in March 1973, the party increased the salary of over a million workers in large industrial and building firms. Furthermore, a demographic policy was announced in an effort to establish better family-planning services. Other changes were introduced in industrial relations; the unions were given a much more important role in the economic life of the country, becoming a driving force rather than a transmission-belt in the economic process. Moreover, the regime recognized the diversity of interests at work in Hungary. In the November 1973 issue of *Partelet*, Miklos Ovari said: "We cannot create a world without contradictions and tensions, but we must take care that the contradictions do not become more serious than necessary and do not lead to useless complications." In other words, a socialist society is composed of conflicts and tensions that can enable it to develop further. Moreover, national, group and personal interests were the subject of several programs televised in October and November 1973.

Through this economic plan, the Communist party of Hungary is both fighting off the threat of middle-class ideology (though some persons accuse the plan of fostering it) and, at the same time, taking an original approach that the socialist world is following with great interest. Any comment made by the leaders of the other Communist countries is reported in the Hungarian press; for example, there was Brezhnev's speech to the tenth Congress of the Hungarian party in November 1970, which appeared in *Nepszabadsag*, and the statement by Konstantin Katouchev, the



UPI Photo

The chasm between Russia and Yugoslavia is demonstrated by the fact that it was only in 1973, 9 years after he became Soviet Premier, that Alexei Kosygin managed a visit to Belgrade. Here he is pictured with Yugoslav Premier Dzemal Bijedic on his arrival at the airport in Belgrade.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in April 1972 in which he said that "the economic reforms promote the process of building socialism".

While Hungary is trying out its new experiment in socialism, Romania is continuing to lead the way in independent foreign policy, which it undertook more than ten years ago.

Romania's policy

making deliberate use of the Sino-Soviet conflict and refusing to submit to the international socialist division of labour under Comecon, Romania is continuing to ensure the development of its own economy and to assume an independent role in foreign policy. It has managed to maintain good relations with other socialist countries and at the same time to increase its contacts abroad (it has diplomatic relations with 116 countries and trade relations with 130). After Mr. Ceausescu's visit to Western Europe, during which he became the first Eastern European leader to go to Bonn, the Presidents of the People's Republic of the Congo and of the Central African Republic were received in Bucharest in 1973. Shortly thereafter, Ceausescu left for South America on a

trip similar to the one he had made to Africa the year before.

In June 1973, the Common Market allowed Romania to join its trade-preference system, while trade agreements with Italy were being prepared at the same time. The Arab-Israeli war gave rise to a diplomatic offensive by Romania in the Middle East. The Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abba Eban, visited Bucharest in November, while Romanian representatives visited the Arab countries. Ceausescu himself stopped in Algiers on his way to Washington, where the oil crisis was one of the topics of discussion. He was also trying to intensify Romania's contacts with the United States and, even though no specific agreement was signed, he did not leave completely empty-handed.

In March 1974, Ceausescu introduced several changes in the Government and the Party. He took the title "President of the Socialist Republic of Romania" and increased his powers in the Government. At the party level, the Presidium was replaced by a Bureau that was henceforward responsible to the Party's Executive Committee rather than to the Central Committee, as are the Politbureaus of the other Communist parties of Eastern Europe. The

Ceausescu did not leave Washington empty-handed

Executive Committee, introduced in 1965, was another of Ceausescu's innovations. Thus the President, who is also the Secretary-General of the Party, increased his personal power, while Premier Ion Gheorge Maurer retired for health reasons and was replaced by Manea Manescu.

Finally, it is disagreement that characterizes relations between Romania and the U.S.S.R. Romania would like to see more consultation within the Warsaw Pact, but at the same time favours selective co-operation in Comecon. It has already expressed its reservations on the European Communist Conference and refused to sign the bilateral co-operation agreements on ideology and propaganda with the other Eastern European states. Furthermore, the Romanian delegations to Vienna and Helsinki did not share the views of the U.S.S.R. on European security and co-operation or on disarmament.

"Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose" seems to be an apt comment on

Eastern European politics. More than ever before, the Soviet Union is trying to strengthen the ties between the Eastern European countries during this period of *détente* with the West and Sino-Soviet conflict. In keeping with a tradition that has existed since the end of the war, Hungary and Romania have struck out on their individual paths, and the other regimes are following their actions with great interest. Barring sudden outbreaks (which are not impossible, because a great many serious problems are arising in Eastern Europe and threaten to destroy the current stability), the elements of change will come from these two countries. Despite past failures, these socialist countries, which are becoming increasingly modernized, now have options that may be more consistent with their needs than the Soviet model imposed upon them from the start. What they do in the future will depend not only on their governments but also on circumstances and how they use them.

Canada and Poland

Unique chance for co-operation in second century of relationships

By Adam Bromke

Canada and Poland are separated by the facts of geography and history. Their present political and economic systems are different and they participate in different alliances. And yet the ties between the two nations have at times been very close and in the past few years, in the climate of international *détente*, have once again been

strengthened. Indeed, in some respects a unique relation has already developed between them.

One of the reasons for the close links between the two countries has been the presence of a Polish community in Canada for more than a century. Sir Kazimierz Gzowski, who left Poland after participation in the abortive insurrection against Russia in 1830, constructed the International Bridge at Niagara Falls and later became the Administrator of Ontario. The Globensky family played a prominent role in Quebec as early as the first part of the nineteenth century. The first Polish settlement in the Madawaska Valley, centred on Wilno, goes back to 1844.

Polish emigration to Canada continued in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and persisted even after Poland regained its independence in the inter-war period. After the Second World War, many Polish political refugees found haven in Canada. At present



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Polish-Canadian community is over 300,000 strong, and Polish-Canadians occupy prominent positions in virtually every sphere of life. They are a fairly closely-knit group, who have preserved their language and many of their traditions. In the Wilno area, the original Kasubian dialect of Polish is still spoken.

Strong interest in Canada already existed in Poland in the inter-war years. The image of the country, in the eyes of the Poles, was, however, somewhat romanticized. Polish youth learned about the Canadian North from the novels of James Oliver Curwood and a comic strip depicting the adventures of Sergeant MacKenzie of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. A travelogue by Polish writer Arkady Fiedler, which became quite popular, appeared under the title *Canada Smells of Resin*. With increased contacts between the two countries, a more accurate image of Canada, as an advanced and prosperous country, emerged in Poland. Indeed, during the war the expression "Canada" was widely used in Polish to denote the height of well-being and abundance.

The Second World War brought the two countries closer together. It was in reaction against the German attack on Poland that Canada entered the war in 1939, and Canadian and Polish troops fought side by side in many battles. During the invasion of Europe, the Polish Armoured Division was a part of the Canadian Army and participated in its victorious march all the way from Normandy to the North Sea. General Georges Vanier was at that time the Canadian representative to the Polish government-in-exile in London. When the war was over, and it became apparent that Poland was to be ruled by the Communists, many thousands of Polish veterans, among them General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, a commander-in-chief of the Polish Armed Forces, chose Canada as their home.

Cold War deterioration

With the rise of the Cold War, relations between the two countries rapidly deteriorated. The Polish People's Republic, Communist-ruled and heavily dependent on Moscow, became part of the Soviet bloc, while Canada joined the Atlantic Alliance. Diplomatic relations between the two governments were maintained at a low level. They were complicated by the *cause célèbre* of the Polish art treasures, which had been evacuated from Poland early in the war and brought to Canada for safekeeping. At the end of the war, the Polish government-in-exile, with the support of Quebec's Premier Maurice Duplessis, re-

fused to return them to Communist-ruled Poland. The federal authorities took a different position, but since most of the treasures were stored in Quebec there was little they could do about it.

The Polish-Canadian community took an adamantly anti-Communist stand, refusing to acknowledge the Communist Government in Warsaw as legitimate and supporting the Polish government-in-exile, which, in protest against the imposition of Communist rule over Poland, continued its activities from London. They strongly opposed the returning of the art treasures, and maintained virtually no contact with their native land. In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, few foreigners were admitted into Poland and no Poles were permitted to travel abroad. Poland became sealed off from the outside world.

At the height of the Cold War, relations between Canada and Poland came to a virtual standstill. The two nations were separated by the ideological barrier dividing the world. There was no question about the continued warmth of the Polish people towards Canadians, but whatever contacts existed between the Canadian authorities in Ottawa and the Polish Communist Government in Warsaw were marked by reserve, if not outright hostility. In the United Nations and at various international conferences, the diplomats from the two countries were on opposite sides. For the Canadians, serving together with the Poles on the Indochina Commissions was often a difficult experience.

Relations improved

An improvement in Canadian-Polish relations took place only in the latter part of the 1950s. After the popular upheaval in Poland in 1956, which brought to power Wladyslaw Gomulka, the policies of the Communist Government both at home and abroad changed considerably. Contacts with the Polish community in Canada were re-established. Poles who had relatives in Canada were permitted to visit them, and, in some cases, even to emigrate. At the same time, restrictions on visits to Poland by Polish-Canadians were eased and soon a regular service between Gdynia and Montreal by the Polish liner *Batory* was launched.

Progress in diplomatic relations was hindered by the wrangle over the art treasures but, with the death of Premier Duplessis in 1959 and the subsequent change of government in Quebec, the dispute was resolved and the treasures were returned to Wawel Castle in Cracow. This paved the way for an exchange of ambassadors between the two countries. The

Polish-Canadian community adamantly anti-Communist

Restrictions on visits to Poland eased

first Canadian Ambassador in Poland, G. Hamilton Southam, became an extremely popular figure in Warsaw and won the respect and friendship of many Poles. Zygfryd Wolniak, a seasoned diplomat, was appointed the first Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic to Ottawa.

Throughout the 1960s relations between the two countries were steadily expanded. In 1966 the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, visited Poland, and in 1970 the Polish Foreign Minister, Stefan Jedrychowski, paid a visit to Ottawa. A good working relationship developed between the Canadian and Polish diplomats engaged in disarmament negotiations in Geneva. The first Canadian-Polish Round Table Conference, organized by the two Institutes of International Affairs, was held in Toronto in 1967 and was followed by a similar meeting in Radziejowice in 1969. Negotiations over the difficult problem of indemnities to Canadian citizens whose property had been confiscated in Poland advanced step by step and were finally brought to a satisfactory conclusion in 1971. Trade between the two countries increased, though it remained seriously unbalanced. The bulk of Canadian exports to Poland consisted of grain, while Polish exports to Canada, consisting mainly of manufactured goods, lagged behind.

Considerable progress was also made in scientific and cultural co-operation. A small group of Polish scientists was regularly invited by the National Research Council to conduct research in Ottawa. Direct contacts were established between several Canadian and Polish universities. Polish professors visited Canada as guest lecturers. At the same time, a good many Canadian professors, especially those of Polish background, for whom the language posed no barrier, lectured at various universities in Poland. Polish films were shown on Canadian television, particularly on the French-language network. The Polish Section of the International Service of the CBC developed co-operation with the Polish Radio.

In the autumn of 1969, a prominent Polish Catholic writer, Dr. Jacek Wozniakowski, came to Canada on a lecture tour that extended from the Atlantic Provinces to British Columbia. On his return, he wrote *A Canadian Notebook*, of which 10,000 copies were sold in no time. The reviews were enthusiastic, and the book won the author a literary prize. Wozniakowski did much to correct Fiedler's image of Canada as a pioneering country. He pictured Canada as a thoroughly modern society, not devoid of problems but entering

the technotronic age with vigour and imagination.

All in all, throughout the Sixties Canadian-Polish relations underwent considerable improvement, though their potential was far from being exhausted. The residue of the Cold War was still too strong, preventing mutual trust between Ottawa and Warsaw, and the continued ideological differences often hindered effective communications between the two governments. Indeed, towards the end of the Sixties, as the internal political situation in Poland deteriorated, and especially after the Polish troops took part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, relations between Canada and the Polish People's Republic cooled off once again.

Gomulka resigns

At the end of 1970, another popular upheaval took place in Poland; in protest against deteriorating living conditions, shipyard workers in Gdansk and Szczecin took to the streets. Wladyslaw Gomulka resigned and was replaced by Edward Gierek. The new Communist government led by Gierek has shown greater concern for the welfare of the people and the standard of living in Poland in the last few years has improved markedly. At the same time, the Communist authorities have generally avoided aggravating controversial internal issues and a measure of political stability has been attained in the country.

Poland under Gierek has remained closely tied to the Soviet Union. On all major international issues the Poles have firmly sided with the Russians. At the same time, taking the advantage of international *détente*, the Poles have vigorously striven to expand their contacts with the West. Poland's relations with various Western European countries have undergone a marked improvement. In 1973 Gierek visited Paris and Brussels. There was also a dramatic change in Polish-American relations; contacts at various levels were developed – in 1972 President Nixon visited Poland and in 1974 Gierek paid a visit to the United States. Poland's trade with the West rose sharply.

The climate of international *détente* has contributed to the expansion of diplomatic contacts between Canada and Poland within a multilateral context. Representatives of both countries have participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and in the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. Although at these meetings the Poles have generally shown less initiative of their own than the Canadians had hoped for, relations between the

two sides have been good, and occasionally even constructive. The short-lived experiment of Canadian participation side by side with the Poles in the ICCS in Vietnam was not a happy one, but both sides did their best to prevent any frictions there from adversely affecting their bilateral relations. The most recent Canadian-Polish joint experience in peace-keeping, i.e. their participation in the UNEF in the Middle East, has gone smoothly.

Since 1971, Canadian-Polish bilateral relations have shown considerable improvement. In that year a new Polish Ambassador, Jozef Czesak, an experienced and dynamic diplomat, arrived in Ottawa. Relations between the two countries soon acquired a new momentum. Various high-level contacts between government officials have taken place. Although the political situation in Canada in 1972-73 prevented a visit by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to Poland, Mitchell Sharp and the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stefan Olszowski, held talks in Helsinki and New York. These were supplemented by an exchange of visits at the deputy minister level. In October 1973, the Polish Deputy Premier, Jan Mitrega, visited Canada. Two more Round Table Conferences were held, in Toronto in 1972 and in Nieborow in 1974, and both were conducted in a constructive and friendly atmosphere.

Trade in 1970-73 rose by 80 per cent. It remained, however, weighted in Canada's favour, and its structure has not been satisfactory. The main Canadian export to Poland is still grain. In April 1973, the Canadian Minister responsible for the Wheat Board, Otto Lang, visited Poland and in June 1973 the Polish Minister of Food, Emil Kolodziej, paid a visit to Canada. In December, during the Canada-Poland trade consultations in Ottawa, a three-year agreement was signed providing for the purchase of up to one million tons of Canadian grain by Poland.

Search for trade

However, the search for a more satisfactory pattern of trading has been undertaken. The prospects of Canada's acquiring Poland's coal-mining technology (which is reputedly one of the most advanced in the world) were discussed in 1973 during the visits to Poland by the Deputy Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, Jack Austin, and to Canada by Jan Mitrega, who, in addition to being Deputy Premier, was also Minister of Mining and Power. In turn, the Polish Minister of Forestry and Timberland came to Canada in September 1973 to examine the possibilities of Poland's using Canadian technology in

lumbering. Prospects of co-operation in the fishing industry have also been explored. Evidently, economic relations have entered into a stage of working consultations aimed at delineating concrete areas for co-operation. In the first half of 1974, trade continued to climb and, of particular significance, there was a marked increase in Canadian exports to Poland in commodities other than grain.

Continued progress has been registered in the scientific and cultural spheres. Some reciprocal arrangement for Canadian scholars to do research in Poland in exchange for visits to Canada by the Polish scientists sponsored by the National Research Council is apparently being prepared by the Polish Academy of Sciences. There have been numerous visits by academics in both directions. In 1973 a special issue of the *Canadian Slavonic Papers* was devoted to Poland, including several articles by noted Polish scholars. A preliminary agreement between the Canadian and Polish Institutes of International Affairs to publish a similar book in Poland on Canada has been concluded. In 1973, the Royal Society of Canada, at a special session, celebrated the five-hundredth anniversary of the birth of the famous Polish astronomer Nicolas Copernicus.

Movement increased

The movement of persons between the two countries has increased. Since 1970, the issuance of both entry and exit visas by the Polish authorities has been eased; in 1974 the Canadian visa regulations were also streamlined. As a result, in 1973 twelve thousand Canadians visited Poland and seven thousand Poles came to this country. Polish Government officials, notably Gierek himself, have publicly emphasized that, in all contacts with people of Polish origin who are citizens of Western countries, their status as foreign nationals will be fully respected.

Last but not least, the attitude of the Polish-Canadians towards their country of origin has undergone a significant change. The Polish Canadian Congress has adhered to the strict anti-Communist line and has continued to maintain connections with the Polish émigré circles in London. Some other groups, however, such as the powerful Polish Alliance and the influential Polish Engineers Association, have adopted more pragmatic attitudes. While in no way approving of the Communist political system, they have come out in favour of expanding personal contacts and cultural exchanges with Poland. The Reymont Foundation, affiliated with the Polish

Consultations aimed at finding areas for trade expansion

Pragmatism developing in Polish-Canadian attitudes

Alliance, has developed a regular program for young Polish-Canadians to study in Poland.

The year 1973 in many respects marked a watershed in relations between Canada and Poland. The contacts between the two countries in virtually all fields have been expanding. The old mistrust and even enmity have been replaced by a spirit of co-operation not devoid of some cordiality. Clearly, since the Second World War Canadian-Polish relations were never so good.

New possibilities

Though in recent years very considerable progress has been made in relations between the two countries, this does not mean that all problems between them have been resolved and all opportunities for co-operation exhausted. Indeed, in the climate of international *détente*, many new possibilities for strengthening their bonds have developed. Canada and Poland still have a long way to go before a levelling-off in their relations.

Some of the difficulties are rooted in the traditionally different views of international politics held by the two peoples, which are often complicated by the present differences in their political and economic systems. On the one hand, Poles, who have been conditioned in the hard school of political realism, do not always appreciate Canadian idealism and at times even look on it as sheer hypocrisy. On the other hand, Canadians often fail to perceive the subtle relationship in Poland's foreign policy between national interests and ideology and tend to dismiss it all as Communist propaganda.

Their diplomatic styles are also different. The Poles are more legalistic in their negotiations, stressing formal visits and declarations. The Canadians, influenced by the British traditions, are more reserved in the diplomatic social activities. As a result, there have been misunderstandings and disappointments on both sides. The Canadians have been somewhat disillusioned by Polish lack of candour at the CSCE, while the Poles feel that the Canadians are not sufficiently interested in developing bilateral consultations with them. Slow progress in negotiating an air agreement and difficulties in expanding their diplomatic staff in Canada have been sore points on the Polish side. At the same time, the Canadians note that assurances that Polish-Canadians will be treated as foreign nationals have not always been strictly observed by the Polish authorities.

The Poles at times feel that in cultural

co-operation the Canadians tend to over-emphasize exchanges with the U.S.S.R. to the detriment of Poland, while Canadians think that, in economic relations, the Poles are excessively impressed by American technology and underestimate the opportunities in this sphere in Canada. The conservative attitude of Canadian businessmen, who are reluctant to move into strange markets, poses an obstacle in developing trade between the two countries; at the same time, Canadian traders are frequently baffled by the intricate workings of the Polish Communist bureaucracy. Canadian universities suffer from a serious shortage of the funds necessary to develop viable exchanges with Poland, while Polish scholars are occasionally prevented by political interference from taking advantage of the opportunities to visit Canada.

The differences between political and economic systems in the two countries are, of course, substantial, and they will continue to complicate Canadian-Polish relations in the future. In the climate of international *détente*, however, the major obstacles separating the two nations have largely been overcome and, with good will and imagination on both sides, there is no reason why those that remain should not also be tackled. Indeed, it seems that Canadian-Polish relations have reached the stage where a new major initiative to advance them would be timely. An early visit to Warsaw by the new Secretary of State for External Affairs, possibly paving the way for an exchange of visits by the chief executives, could well accomplish this purpose.

Continued progress in relations between Canada and Poland is important not only for the two countries but also in a broader international context. For the most effective contribution to international *détente* by the middle powers, supplementing the efforts of the two super-powers, is precisely to develop bonds of co-operation among themselves across the ideological line dividing the world. By maintaining and even consolidating their old friendships, while at the same time superimposing on them the new ties of co-operation between countries participating in different alliances, they would lessen the division of the world into the opposed blocs and strengthen the foundations of peace. It would seem that Canada and Poland, each occupying an important place in its respective alliance and yet linked by traditional bonds of friendship, have a unique opportunity to make a significant contribution to this international process.

Détente provides opportunity to strengthen existing ties

Czechs respond to normalization with consumption and apathy

By Radoslav Selucky

While thousands of articles and hundreds of books have been written about the dramatic Czechoslovakian events between January 1968 and April 1969, only a few observers have dealt with the post-Dubcek era in a comprehensive manner. This is not to say that the outside world was left without any news from the country. It has been kept informed of arrests and purges of the most prominent reformers, of the regime's ideological rigidity and of the sad atmosphere in the occupied cities. Such information, interesting though it could be, failed, however, to give a clear picture of contemporary Czechoslovakia. The outside world does not know enough about the state of Czechoslovak political, economic and cultural affairs. Moreover, it knows even less about possible alternatives for the country's development.

Shortly after replacing Mr. Dubcek as the party leader in April 1969, Mr. Gustav Husak announced his five-point normalization program: (1) revival of the party's unity; (2) strengthening of its leading role; (3) reinforcement of the authority of state organs; (4) consolidation of the national economy; (5) restoration of the brotherly relations with other Communist parties and socialist countries. Reading these five points of the normalization program as they were intended by Mr. Husak, one should interpret the term "normalization" as the return to the neo-Stalinist system which prevailed in the late 1950s.

Thus the "unity of the ruling party" could not be achieved without purging about half a million of the reform-oriented Communists. The "strengthening of the party's leading role" had to be preceded by a purge whose sole object was the leading reformers at all the levels of government: 44 cabinet ministers of the federal and the two republican governments lost their positions; no fewer than 270 members of the federal and the two republican parliaments were dismissed; about 12,700 elected members of regional, district and municipal governments were purged; at least 900 leading elected officials of trade unions were recalled; 64 members of the Communist Party's Central Committee were ex-

peled, and some 14,000 party, trade union and governmental bureaucrats were fired. Approximately 200,000 white collars, including civil servants, managers, economists, technicians, lawyers, professors, teachers, actors, diplomats, police and army officers, journalists, writers, judges and scientists, were either demoted or deprived of their jobs. If we add to the victims of the normalization another 100,000 people who emigrated to the West, we may conclude that the country lost most of its élite. For a nation of 15 million people, such a sudden loss was equal to what the famous French Communist author Louis Aragon called metaphorically "the intellectual Biafra" and the Nobel Prize winner Heinrich Boll "a perfect cultural cemetery".

The "reinforcing of the authority of state organs" was just a euphemistic expression for the restoration of censorship and for tough administrative control over art, science and culture. Books of several hundred authors have been discarded by all public libraries; the mass media were provided with a list of people who must not be published; even in the scholarly

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World Wide Photo

At the height of the 1968 crisis Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders meet in confrontation in Cierna. Identifiable at left from foreground are Soviet Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and Soviet Presidium member Mikhail Suslov. At right from foreground are Alexander Dubcek, Czech Communist Party leader, Czech President Ludvik Svoboda and President of the Czechoslovakian Parliament Josef Smrkovsky.

journals, all prospective authors should be screened in advance by the authorities; the police were given the authority to search private homes and retain people without a warrant; the rights of defence attorneys were substantially restricted.

The "consolidation of the national economy" meant that economic reforms, introduced as early as 1965-66 and substantially developed in 1968, were abandoned. The old centralized command planning was reintroduced in all economic branches but agriculture, and the mere notion of a future economic reform is now considered to be politically subversive. (The fact that living standards are better than originally expected will be dealt with in another context.)

As to the "brotherly relations with other socialist countries", the regime signed the new Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty in May 1970, long before the old one expired. This new treaty is unique even by East European standards. It includes the Brezhnev doctrine as a foundation of the Czechoslovak-Soviet relations.

Skilful politician

Though all five objectives of the normalization program have been achieved in this rather un-normal manner, any unbiased observer must admit that Mr. Husak has proved to be a skilful politician. He has accomplished what had been believed to be impossible. He cooled down emotions, par-

alyzed the pro-Dubcek mass support, and was able to create a sufficient social base for his own regime.

In his first period in power (April 1969-May 1971), Mr. Husak was forced by the pro-Moscow party faction to purge some of his friends and allies who had helped him to get out of prison in the early 1960s, reintroduced him to active political life in 1968 and supported his candidacy for party leadership in April 1969, when Dubcek's position became untenable. (The most prominent of them, Professor Milan Hrubl, had been sentenced to six and a half years in prison, and had not yet been granted amnesty.) By the end of 1969, the Czech political base of Mr. Husak's power was rather narrow, consisting of a handful of those reformers and centrists who found it opportune to switch sides and suddenly recognized the new political reality. In the Slovak Republic, this base was only a little wider. On the one hand, Mr. Husak was considered a consistent federalist, which enabled him to retain the support of many Slovak nationalists; on the other, the Slovak party was then led by the ultras, who tried to undermine his popularity in Slovakia. Since both the Czech and Slovak hard-liners went after him, Mr. Husak had to rely mainly on the support of Mr. Brezhnev. From the Kremlin's point of view, Husak was the most acceptable man for the forthcoming normalization. As a victim of Stalinism, a notorious anti-

votnyist and a modest reformer, the new First Secretary of the Czechoslovak communist Party could have been presented to the public as a realistic politician capable enough to lead the nation out of a deep political crisis. Even more, his reputation as an experienced and strong administrator was appealing to those Russians and leaders who insisted on mass purges without the politically undesirable mass terror.

ases widened

In order to meet the goals of his normalization program, Mr. Husak had to widen both the political and the social base of his power. As the purges went on, it became necessary to fill vacancies in the party apparatus, the civil service, the mass media and economic management. Since the federal arrangement created dozens of new republican ministries and other agencies both in Bohemia and Slovakia, thousands of highly-paid jobs were offered to those who were willing to back the new party boss and his policies. The reformers, as a rule, had no access to the lucrative positions. The pro-Moscow ultras were in a negligible minority. Thus a chance had to be given to the career-oriented people who were either politically passive or indifferent during the Dubcek era. To make them conformist, the regime substantially extended material and social privileges to all who were ready to serve. While in 1968 only 2.4 per cent of all employees earned more than 3400 Kcs (about \$600) a month, in 1973 it was 8.7 per cent. In 1968, only 9 per cent earned more than 4000 Kcs (\$700) a month, while in 1973 it was 3.5 per cent. This economic corruption obviously widened the social base of the regime in general and that of Mr. Husak in particular.

Thus, while the reformers were punished and the hardliners retained their positions, the politically indifferent were rewarded. They are no doubt much less competitive than their reform-oriented predecessors. Their performance is sufficient, however, for the routine functioning of the system. Except for art, literature, science and journalism, where talent is required, the new establishment is able to control the machinery of the state.

Up to this point, we have dealt with the élites. Now we should look at the behaviour of ordinary men. During the Prague Spring and immediately after the Soviet invasion, the masses were extremely active politically. This high degree of political involvement could be best described as a sort of euphoria, which, in the summer of 1969, finally came to an end. As a result, political romanticism has given

way to political realism. Violently deprived of the right to pursue political self-determination, the nation switched to a more prosaic value; consumerism became the substitute for civil self-fulfilment. Instead of searching for political emancipation, people care about their cars, cottages and country homes, fashion and appliances, good food and drink.

While officially criticized, consumerism has been unofficially welcome by Husak's Government. Annoyed and frustrated by the regime imposed upon it, the nation escaped to privacy. Unable to change the political reality, it became apolitical. Since the regime knows it is impossible to win the people's active support, it realistically prefers indifference to opposition. The more politically-alienated and passive the people are, the less the danger of their actively opposing the system.

Indifference preferred to opposition

Economic weapon

Consumerism has provided the regime with a new tool of political control. In order to consume, one must earn enough money to buy desired products and services. In order to make more money, one has to work harder and better. Those holding higher positions or having better work earn far more than those who, for whatever reason, are allowed to take only the second-rate jobs. It pays off, under the circumstances, to be loyal to the regime. Thus passive loyalty to the regime is secured by economic rather than political inducements.

The defeated reformers who represent the underground socialist opposition have no interest in extending the negative political consequences of the invasion into the economic sphere. They realize that a decent standard of living may at least partly offset the political hopelessness of the masses. That is why they encourage their fellow citizens to contribute to improving the every day material life. This attitude is shared by the political Communist emigration which represents the Prague Spring abroad.

This is just one reason why living standards are better than could originally be expected. Another reason is that the investments initiated by reformers in the mid 1960s started to yield benefits in the early 1970s. Some additional factors are also relevant: few elements of the reform have been retained in agriculture (higher procurement prices and a degree of decentralized decision-making); several credits Czechoslovakia had granted in the Fifties and Sixties to other countries became due and were paid off during the process of normalization; the Government changed investment priorities from heavy industry

Standard of living seen as offset to political hopelessness



World Wide Photos

Following the overthrow of Alexander Dubcek, Soviet officials worked at restoring relations between Russia and Czechoslovakia. By 1973 Leonid Brezhnev was able to receive the Order of the White Lion from Czechoslovak President Ludvik Svoboda.

to housing and infrastructure and import priorities from capital to consumer goods.

Despite these positive achievements, however, the normalization left intact all the basic problems of the Czechoslovak economy. While a decline in the productivity of capital, as well as the waste of raw material and energy, was stopped by the economic reforms in the second half of the 1960s, the reversal of this positive trend is signalled by recent official statistics. The shortage of manpower in trade and services is due to declining productivity of labour in industry. The trade balance with the West is marked by a growing deficit. Czechoslovak consumption of steel and energy per unit of GNP is twice as high as in developed Western economies. All these factors remind one of the situation preceding the recession in 1962-63 that finally forced the Government of Mr. Novotny to accept the reform program. The worst is yet ahead: as of January 1, 1976, the price of Soviet oil, gas and other raw materials is expected to rise to the world-market level.

Nor is the political situation too stable. Half a million people expelled from the party were deprived of jobs commensurate with their qualifications and their children are admitted to neither secondary schools nor to universities and colleges. These "second-rate" citizens do not keep

quiet, since they have nothing to lose. A kind of national reconciliation is already overdue. It is being delayed because any reconciliation would threaten the position both of the ultras and those who recently replaced the purged reformers. In this respect, Mr. Husak is not eager to follow the patterns set by Mr. Kadar.

For the Czechs, the Prague Spring has been a net political loss — they were thrown back to the late Fifties. The Slovaks gained, however. Only one objective of the 1968 reform — the federal arrangement — survived the Soviet invasion. To be sure, the federation has been curtailed by the reintroduction of the old centralized system. Nevertheless, the Slovaks (with 30 per cent of the population) for the first time in the history of Czechoslovakia were given full political parity with the Czech majority. Even more — in addition to the joint federal organs and institutions in which the Slovaks and Czechs are equally represented, they have their own national institutions, associations and organs. For instance, along with the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, there is the Communist Party of Slovakia with its own central committee, secretariat, presidium, etc. The Czechs, however, have been denied the right to establish their own Czech Communist Party. They are

*Growing deficit
in trade balance
with West*

directly controlled and ruled by the federal party organs. The same principle has been applied to many other political, social and professional organizations, unions and associations.

Slovak domination

No wonder the Czechs feel bitter. The following joke reflects their mood: What is the composition of the population in the Czech republic? First, the Slovak representatives in federal organs. Second, the Soviet troops "temporarily" present in the country. Third, hundreds of thousands of East German tourists. And finally, the Czech minority.

If we add to this that Mr. Husak himself is a Slovak, that the supervisor of the Czech ideology, art and culture is Mr. Silak, a Ukrainian; that many of the large Czech firms (for instance, the department stores) are managed from Bratislava — then we can better understand the recent rise of Czech nationalism that does not contribute to the political stability of the system. Some Czech politicians — among them the ambitious President of the Federal Assembly, Mr. Indra — are reportedly trying to make political use of Czech nationalism by attempting to undermine Mr. Husak's position. In addition, the elderly president Svoboda is fatally ill. When he dies or resigns, the complex and sensitive problem of distribution of the top four federal offices among the Czechs and the Slovaks might cause an inter-party fight for power. A leading Czech politician proposing to pardon the purged reformers would win popularity and turn Mr. Husak's normalization into a real one.

There is yet a more serious political problem. Since 1969, Czechoslovakia has been consistently sovietized. Because the regime derives its power not from the nation but from Moscow, it is, unlike other East European regimes, unable to resist the continuous Soviet pressures aimed at the gradual incorporation of Eastern Europe into the Soviet economic and political empire. Czechoslovak-Soviet relations are intended to serve as a pattern for the relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as a whole. While the subservience of the Czechoslovak estab-

lishment to the Kremlin is more and more disliked by some East European capitals, the fear of a possible "estonization" of Czechoslovakia is growing, not only among some Czech dissenters but even among some moderates within the establishment.

Despite this most pessimistic alternative, some brighter alternatives are still open. In a sense, contemporary Czechoslovakia is unique among the European nations. In Hungary and Poland, the political systems are incomparably more relaxed and tolerant. In Romania, there is a degree of independence of the U.S.S.R. In East Germany and Bulgaria, the purge of some 500,000 Communists would be inconceivable. In Yugoslavia, most of those recently purged were deprived of neither professional self-realization nor civil rights. Dictatorial regimes came to an end in Portugal and Greece and the Spanish system is becoming more relaxed. It is an anachronism to keep the Czechoslovak culture oppressed, its best talents silenced, its most capable people robbed of basic civil and human rights. This situation cannot be called normal even by the standards of authoritarian regimes. It must be considered yet less normal in the context of East-West *détente* and normalization of inter-European relations. Should the *détente* continue, the present Czechoslovak regime *might* become dysfunctional for its Soviet sponsors. There are some recent indications from Prague that the Kremlin might be open to a more appropriate normalization of the Czechoslovak situation. Soviet representatives unofficially and individually approached several dozen leading Czechoslovak reformers, asking them, among other things, if they would be willing to forget the invasion and go back into politics, whether they thought Mr. Husak could survive another political switch, and under what circumstances the nation would be likely to discontinue its passive political resistance. It remains to be seen what this careful diplomatic probing actually meant.

While a new Prague Spring is out of the question in the foreseeable future, a wide range of alternatives is open. It depends more on Moscow than on Prague which ones will take place.

Leading reformers approached to return to politics

Dr. G. A. Arbatov, Head of the Soviet Institute for United States and Canadian Studies, visited Canada in January 1975, dined with the Prime Minister and met with leaders of business, politics and education. On his return, TASS quoted him as saying that his welcome signified "that Canada is greatly interested in developing good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet

Union in various fields — policy and economy, science and culture". "The Soviet Union, too, is giving great attention to organizing serious research work to study the policy, economy and culture of Canada," the quotation went on. "Our Institute . . . (has) started a serious study of Canadian problems."

Nationalism comes of age with discovery of North Sea oil

By Greig Macleod and Robert Boardman

The two British general elections of February and October 1974 left many uncertainties in their wake. Harold Wilson has to work with the slimmest of Parliament majorities; the Conservative Party almost immediately after the second lunched into a leadership crisis; and Britain's seemingly perennial economic difficulties showed few signs of abating. Behind each election lay the question of Britain's offshore-oil resources. Apart from the issue of the royalties that ought to accrue to the Government, this was not a major question for the country as a whole. Yet both Labour and Conservative Party strategists were reported to be viewing the prolonged 1974 contest as having a long-term significance. By 1980, Britain will, by current forecasts, be heading towards self-sufficiency in oil. So whichever party is governing when the benefits begin to be felt by the electorate will clearly be in a favourable position for fighting elections during that decade.

More immediately, the question of oil was not lost on Scottish voters. The existence of large, exploitable resources off the Scottish coast has now lent credibility to the argument of the Scottish National Party that an independent Scotland would be economically viable. In the October election, the party gained a total of 11

Commons seats, and won 30 per cent of the Scottish vote. Its electoral successes in recent years seem to correspond perfectly with offshore-oil developments. Between the elections of 1959 and 1966, its share of the Scottish vote increased from only 0.8 per cent to 5 per cent. In 1970, it doubled this to 10 per cent; by the February 1974 election, the SNP vote was more than 20 per cent of the Scottish electorate. Its gains in October were predominantly at the expense of the Scottish Tories. In one case, the constituency of Perth and East Perthshire, the SNP overturned a Conservative majority of nearly 9,000. It came within 53 votes — after two recounts — of taking the old Commons seat of former Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home. For a majority of Scottish constituencies, the SNP fielded either the winning or the second candidate in the last election. It is now the main party opposing Labour in Scotland.


Still, this does not represent the decisive breakthrough that some SNP supporters had been hoping for. The party still has to show that in a general election, as opposed to a by-election, it can break Labour's hold over Scotland's central industrial belt. Its strength still seems to lie in the rural areas and smaller towns, particularly in the North. Despite its victories, it still holds only 15 per cent of the Scottish seats at Westminster. Yet, if the SNP continues to break fresh ground in parallel with offshore-oil developments, the present Commons balance can be expected to change considerably between now and 1980. What, then, are its objectives?

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Recent revival

Though the SNP was founded in 1928, the present revival of its fortunes dates back only as far as the late 1960s. Scottish nationalism has been an unattractive option for most Scots in times of economic hardship. The late nineteenth century, for example, was a time of Scottish pressure for "Home Rule"; support for the idea



sted on the industrial prosperity being ushered in by the expansion of the Clyde shipbuilding industry from the 1880s. The historical background is interesting if only for the lack of attention paid to it in English commentary, which has tended to interpret the recent upswing in SNP fortunes as essentially temporary and novel. In fact, both the Liberal and Labour Parties made commitments to the principle of Scottish Home Rule during the time of Irish agitation for separation from the United Kingdom. A separate Scottish Parliament was part of Labour's platform at least until 1945. Scottish MPs at Westminster often functioned as a group vigor-

ously pressing for greater autonomy. One result was the introduction of more than a dozen Home Rule bills into Parliament in the first three decades of this century.

Economic circumstances, war, the integration of Scottish and English élites, and other factors, produced a decline in the dynamism with which this Scottish cause was presented. Until the late Sixties, Scottish nationalism remained a joke or an anachronism for English observers. As John Mackintosh pointed out recently in the *New Statesman*, nationalists were oddities — the poet Hugh MacDiarmid, famous for listing “Anglophobia” as his hobby in *Who's Who*, or the people who stole the

Stone of Scone from Westminster Abbey, and objected to the present monarch's taking the title of Queen Elizabeth II on the grounds that Scotland was a separate country at the time of the first Elizabeth. But, at the same time, a more sober basis was being established. It consisted, for the most part, of small businessmen concerned about the twin evils of big business and organized labour, and academics in Edinburgh and other universities. The significant feature of the last five years is that this group, hardly representative of Scottish society, has nevertheless been able to appeal to voters with many kinds of interest, even, in the case of the Govan by-election of 1973, to the Glasgow working-class. Oil was one factor in this revival. The other was a general background of dissatisfaction about the running of Scotland's affairs. A survey conducted by national opinion polls in 1969 indicated that 80 per cent of Scottish electors felt that too many decisions affecting them were being taken outside Scotland; as many as 67 per cent were in favour of the establishment of a Scottish parliament.

The goal of the SNP is thus quite simple: to establish, or return Scotland to its original status as, an independent, sovereign state. Traditional links are recognized; there has been examination of models like Canada's or Australia's position within the Commonwealth, or the Scandinavian states, as a guide to what a reformed United Kingdom could look like. In evidence to the Kilbrandon Commission on the Constitution in 1969, the SNP stated that it was "a political body having as its purpose the restoration of Scottish sovereignty and the defence and furtherance of all Scottish interests". It was "the only political party in Scotland which is preparing comprehensive policies for the development of an independent Scotland". Even without oil, Scotland was suffering economically because of its links with England: "We are in the situation of being in relative health, but, by reason of living with a chronic invalid, we are compelled to swallow unnecessary medicine, which has, in fact, damaged us. Incidentally, the patient does not appear to be recovering."

Impact of oil

There is at least some agreement between the SNP and the British Government about the magnitude of the oil finds at stake. The Ekofisk strikes in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea in 1970 first confirmed the existence of potentially huge reserves of oil on Scotland's continental shelf. It has since been estimated that, by 1980, the fields in the British sector of the

North Sea will be producing 100 million tons a year. At that kind of rate, self-sufficiency would be reached — taking into account increases in consumption — around 1984. And, meanwhile, fresh discoveries continue to be made as oil-company consortia move the search further north and over to the west of Scotland. Heady comparisons have been made with California and Kuwait. There have been references — mostly, but not entirely, in jest — to an independent Scotland joining Venezuela and the Arab states in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Direct air-links have been established already between Aberdeen and Texas.

The SNP has obviously been able to accommodate this upsurge of activity within its general program. In April 1974 a Scottish National MP argued that an independent Scotland's continental-shelf area would be about 62,000 square miles or slightly less than double that of England. Oil revenue from fields in the Scottish sector of the North Sea, he added, would bring in, eventually, up to £2,000 million *per annum*. Control over refining sites would presumably be an added dimension to the powers of an independent government, both in terms of the prices obtained for exported oil and of a Scottish government's bargaining power with a British Government faced with the prospect of English oil-refinery closings. One recent Aberdeen University forecast is 25,000 jobs created by oil by 1980. The SNP itself has argued that, in an independent Scotland, the figure would be nearer 90,000 — a figure which still does not take into account the effect of oil-related activity on the rest of Scottish industry.

The SNP's strength lies in the simple fact that no other Scottish political party can promise voters more — either in terms of Scottish control over the pace of oil developments or of Scottish benefits from the revenues. But there are weaknesses too. One is the danger of the SNP's becoming too closely identified with the oil bonanza. A stress on the environmental costs of oil, particularly in the Highlands and islands, could be an important card for Scottish Tories to play in any determined effort to win back rural support.

The problem is acute for the west of Scotland, and has been highlighted most recently by the fierce arguments over the future of Dumbarton. Oil-company consortia are increasingly turning their attention to the west. Extraction there, however, would require tools capable of operating to depths of more than 1,000 feet — either very large platforms or one of the seabed production complexes currently under research and

Independent, sovereign status seen as goal

development. But, in either case, the west coast of Scotland would be unable to support the kind of growth that has taken place in Aberdeen and other centres on the east. The necessary infrastructure of roads, communications, ancillary and service industries, and so on, is simply not there. To create it would mean a radical transformation of the environment and traditional economy and culture of the region. Specific development decisions by local councils have already touched off politically explosive clashes between pro- and anti-development forces. Central to the debate is the issue of compulsory purchase of land needed for oil-related development purposes, particularly land occupied by crofters, which still accounts for one-quarter of all land in the Scottish Highlands.

In this kind of situation, the SNP has to tread warily. Its program calls for controlled development of the offshore-oil industry, due allowance being made for the demands of environmentalists.

Solid gains made

After the October 1974 general election, then, the SNP finds itself in a moderately strong position. It has made solid gains at Westminster, though without making significant inroads into the Scottish Labour vote. Moreover, being the second party in Scotland means that it has managed to overcome the obstacles that third parties traditionally have in the British electoral system. Apart from oil developments themselves, a number of other factors are likely to influence the party's fortunes in the next few years.

First, Scotland remains a part of the United Kingdom. Its economy is therefore affected by the general pattern, which in 1975 means inflation and the threat of higher rates of unemployment. This will be the crucial test for the SNP. If it continues to grow in electoral strength, it could justifiably claim that the historical pattern of support for Scottish nationalism being spiced only in times of relative prosperity has been broken; and so far (except in the northwest, the region most affected by oil at date) support for the SNP has been based on rising expectations rather than contemporary realities. Secondly, the SNP has, for historical reasons, not been clearly identified with a particular social creed, apart from a nationalism centred on a vague kind of small-entrepreneur conservatism. This has allowed it to tap support from many sections of Scottish society. Oil, however, raises complex issues. It is not evident that the SNP could espouse the point of view that would be acceptable

to all interests affected by oil developments in Scotland. One possibility, though admittedly not apparent as yet, is, therefore, of the party fragmenting under the pressures of trying to hammer out a coherent planned-development program for offshore oil.

Finally, there is the impact of a future Scottish assembly. The Labour Government, following the recommendations of the Kilbrandon Commission, has a commitment in principle to establish some form of assembly. It is not clear, however, what such a body would look like. The SNP group of MPs have demanded a "gilt-edged" commitment from the Government to establish a Parliament, and set out a time-table for the holding of elections to it. Furthermore, they have insisted that the assembly be one with real powers over the nationalized industries in Scotland, government ministries, unemployment and social services, and, crucially, the extraction of oil. On the one hand, there is a possibility that the provision of such a forum for the expression of Scottish grievances would serve to defuse nationalist sentiment. It has been argued, for example, that an important element in voting support for the SNP consists of demands for the betterment of Scotland's condition that could in fact be accommodated within the constitutional framework of a reformed United Kingdom. On the other hand, such an assembly could, depending on circumstances and the Government's handling of development decisions, generate more support for the nationalist case by sheer momentum. Much would depend on the precise nature of the assembly's powers, and whether or not it could be construed by the SNP as a tool of London.

In 1973, the Kilbrandon Commission on the Constitution reported that: "To an unknown extent..., North Sea oil would be a point in favour of Scotland's economic viability. But we see no reason to doubt that an independent Scotland... would be viable even without oil." However, this question was "anyway of secondary importance". Separation of Scotland, and Wales, from the rest of the United Kingdom "would come about only if there existed an overwhelming political desire for it on the part of the Scottish and Welsh people". "In that event," the Commission said, "arguments would hardly be relevant; viability would take care of itself." The Scottish National Party has now put a considerable distance between itself and the lunatic fringe of British politics, but it cannot — at least not yet — be said to reflect the "overwhelming political desire" of the Scottish people.

Control of oil crucial to devolution

Extradition treaties abound but unlawful seizures continue

By C. V. Cole

When an individual is wanted in a country other than the one in which he is located either because he is an escaped criminal or for prosecution for an offence, the recourse is normally to seek his return through well-established extradition procedures governed by a large network of treaties. Canada has at present extradition treaties with 41 other countries. In addition, there is the fugitive-offender legislation providing for the return of offenders between Commonwealth countries. Even in the absence of such treaties, certain countries, including Canada (subject to proclamation in specific cases), have legislation on their statute books providing for the extradition of certain offenders.

Many of the Canadian extradition treaties were entered into by Britain during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and made applicable to other parts of the then British Empire. Thus the series of extradition treaties with the United States dates back to the offences specified in Article X of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 — perhaps the most famous of Canada's extradition arrangements. The list of extraditable offences specified in that treaty has been added to by the supplementary conventions with the U.S.A. of July 12, 1889, December 13, 1900, April 12, 1905, May 15, 1922, January 8, 1925, and October 26, 1951. A new Canada-U.S. Extradition Treaty was signed in Washington on December 3, 1971, but has yet to be ratified and is therefore not in force. Article 18(2)

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of the new treaty provides that it "shall terminate and replace any extradition agreements and provisions on extradition in any other agreement in force between the United States and Canada; except that the crimes listed in such agreements and committed prior to entry into force of this Treaty shall be subject to extradition pursuant to the provisions of such agreements". The new treaty is designed to consolidate the existing arrangements between Canada and the United States in a single instrument and at the same time revise and update the list of extraditable crimes.

Unlawful seizure

From the standpoint of international law, the extradition treaties and fugitive offender legislation in force in various Commonwealth countries provide the correct processes for interstate rendition of criminals and fugitive offenders. However there are numerous instances in which police and other authorities have not made use of these procedures. Instead, they have resorted to unlawful seizure and return of wanted persons by agents or unauthorized persons on the territory of another state. Perhaps the most famous of these cases in recent years is that of Adolf Eichmann, for whom certain survivors of concentration camps had been searching for years. When he was discovered living in Argentina under an assumed name, he was seized by Israeli agents and taken to Israel where he was tried and executed. Argentina protested and the Security Council of the United Nations criticized Israel for Eichmann's kidnapping.

There have been a number of cases reported in which individuals have been seized on Canadian or U.S. territory and returned without use of extradition procedures to the other country. Hackworth's *Digest of International Law* describes the case of Adelard Lafond, who, while in jail in Winnipeg in 1908, complained to the U.S. consulate in that city that he had been kidnapped in Illinois and taken to

Extradition
dates back
to Empire
treaties

nada. Subsequently, upon the request of the U.S. consul, Lafond was released by order of the Attorney-General of Canada, the charges against him were dropped and he was provided with free transportation back to Illinois.

Another case described by Hackworth is that of a man named Marker who, in September 1909, was apprehended on the United States side of the border by two Indians in plain clothes, one of whom alleged that he was a constable of the North West Mounted Police. Marker was brought back to Canada. After the matter was taken up with the British Ambassador in Washington, as the official channel of communication with the Canadian Government, he wrote to the Acting Secretary of State of the United States as follows:

"I beg to enclose copy of a report on the circumstances of the case by Commissioner A. Bowen-Perry of the Royal North-West Mounted Police, Regina, Canada.

"This report was enclosed in a letter from the Deputy Attorney-General of the Province of Saskatchewan to the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.

"The Deputy Attorney-General, in his letter, states that the Attorney-General has come to the conclusion, in view of the advice of the Minister of Justice, to enter a stay in the case against Marker and release him, giving him an opportunity to leave the country. He further points out that it required the services of a surveyor to fix the boundary line at the point in question between the United States and Canada, which circumstance he contends will be considered a sufficient excuse for the action of the Police Officer in returning Marker at the point in question."

the St. Clair

More recently, two Canadian Indians, Edward and Howard Kohosed, were removed on June 28, 1960, from a work-boat on the St. Clair River by Michigan State Police and placed under arrest. These two Canadian citizens, who were wanted in Michigan for breaking, entering and theft, had been employed on a joint project between Canada and the United States involving the construction of a new shipping channel in the St. Clair River. The arrest took place shortly after midnight, in darkness made it extremely difficult to establish conclusively whether the arrest took place in Canadian or United States waters. In representations made to the United States by the Canadian Government, it was emphasized that there was evidence to the effect that the arrest was made in Canadian waters and that, even though the two Indians were physically within

the United States at the time of the arrest, they would have been there involuntarily and that this would have been only in the course of their duties. It was also stated that the arrest had been made possible because of collaboration extended to the Michigan State Police by an officer of the United States Army Corps of Engineers who was in Canada on duty pursuant to an international agreement and not in a personal capacity. Subsequently the two Indians pleaded guilty to the charges against them in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Michigan. This action was taken without the concurrence of the Canadian Government, which continued to hold the view that, in the light of the circumstances of the arrest, the two men should have been released and immediately returned to Canada. Although the validity of the arrest was apparently not raised in the court, the circumstances of the arrest may have been taken into account by the Court in sentencing them on August 1, 1960, to five years' probation. In addition, Howard Kohosed was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of \$791.78 and court costs in the amount of \$210, with the provision that, if restitution was paid during the probationary period, the costs would be waived. Edward Kohosed was sentenced to 60 days in jail from June 29, 1960, and ordered to pay court costs of \$200. Money to cover the latter was raised among Edward's fellow Indians on Walpole Island and Edward was released as soon as payment had been made on August 10.

Circumstances of arrest not raised but probably considered

No sovereignty violation

In replying to the Canadian representations, a U.S. note stated that there would appear to have been no violation of Canadian sovereignty although the United States Government expressed its sincere regret about any misunderstanding that may have occurred and its regret if the manner of the arrest was in any way offensive to the Canadian Government. The note indicated that the State Department had written to the governors of every state bordering on Canada in an effort to ensure that state authorities would pay the most scrupulous regard to any action that could in any way affect Canadian sovereignty in the matter of law enforcement. However, it made no reference to the Canadian Government's request for compensation for the material consequences of the "improper" arrest of the two Canadian citizens. This latter question was not pressed further by the Canadian Government.

A number of other cases came to the

*Canada urged
U.S. authorities
to avoid
repetition*

attention of the Canadian Government in 1974. The first involved Chris Ozga, a resident of Spencerville, Ontario, who, while returning from Ogdensburg, New York, on September 16, 1973, was intercepted by a patrol car approximately 100 yards from the end of the International Bridge on the Canadian side of the border, but before he had reached the Canadian border-control point. He was forcibly removed from his vehicle, put into the U.S. police car and returned to Ogdensburg, where he was subsequently released on bail. The Canadian Government considered that the action of the U.S. police officers, if the material facts were as reported, constituted a clear breach of international law and an infringement of Canadian territorial sovereignty. Accordingly, the Canadian Embassy in Washington, on instructions, brought the incident to the attention of the U.S. State Department, with a request that the American authorities take whatever measures were necessary to ensure that similar incidents did not occur in the future. The Canadian authorities have been subsequently informed on a number of occasions by the State Department that the U.S. authorities were looking into the matter, particularly the allegations as to the arrest of Mr. Ozga on the Canadian side of the International Bridge.

Another recent case is that of Ronald James Anderson. On August 24, 1974, Anderson and his wife sought entry to the U.S. by automobile at Bellingham, Washington. U.S. customs officials identified Anderson as a U.S. Army deserter and asked him to come inside for further examination. Anderson immediately left his car and ran back across the border. He was pursued by U.S. officials, apprehended a short distance beyond the border on Canadian territory at Douglas, British Columbia, and forcibly taken back across the border and turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Following a formal request by the Canadian Government to the U.S. authorities, Anderson was returned to Canadian jurisdiction on August 30. The Canadian authorities maintained that Anderson's apprehension was clearly incompatible with Canadian sovereignty and contrary to international law and practice.

An even more recent case is that of Edward Gross of Glen Bain, Saskatchewan, who landed his aircraft on September 29, 1974, on an airstrip operated by the State of North Dakota near Noonan, N.D., and was fined \$25 by a U.S. border-patrol official for landing at the airport without proper permission. According to

Gross, he had landed on the grass landing strip that ran along both sides of the 49th Parallel. After landing, a U.S. border official "ordered" him to taxi his aircraft over to U.S. territory. Subsequently the Department of External Affairs delivered a note to the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa that requested the U.S. authorities to investigate this matter further. The note stated the view of Canadian authorities that U.S. regulations cannot be applied to a Canadian aircraft piloted by a Canadian and landing in Canadian territory. It also suggested that the U.S. authorities provide redress to Gross for the fine levied, should further investigations confirm that he had, as alleged, landed on Canadian territory.

No hot pursuit

These cases of unlawful seizure of persons on the territory of another state raise some interesting questions of international law. In contrast to the position under the international law of the sea, where the doctrine of "hot pursuit" is well established and is, in fact, embodied in Article 23 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, no similar doctrine has been established in international law with regard to pursuit over land boundaries. As has been explained by D. P. O'Connell, in his work on international law, "where jurisdiction would be properly exercised internationally, it is unreasonable that it should abruptly terminate the moment the line of demarcation between territory and high seas is reached. . . . Where an offender escapes into neighbouring territory the situation is different because to follow him involves an offence to the neighbouring sovereignty".

It is interesting to note that, from time to time, certain states have threatened to resort to what they consider to be a right of "hot pursuit" on land. Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa made a statement to that effect a few years ago with regard to alleged infiltrators or terrorists. However, the legality of any such action could not be upheld. It is clear that only in the case of agreement between the two states concerned giving specific consent to such pursuit of wrongdoers would pursuit be permissible under international law. Thus, a number of treaties between the U.S.A. and Mexico during the latter part of the nineteenth century provided, on the basis of reciprocity, for pursuit of bands of marauding Indians across the common border of the two countries. (Negotiations following the Pancho Villa raid in 1916 did not culminate in a treaty.)

It should be noted also that, if a person is wrongfully seized in one country

and brought back to another, the apprehended person may have a legal cause of action against the persons who took him into custody. The persons who arrested him may also be liable to charges of kidnapping. Charles Cheney Hyde, in his treatise entitled *International Law* (chiefly interpreted and applied by the United States), notes that, where a fugitive is turned by means of abduction to the state where the offence has taken place, the state whose territory has been invaded may demand the return of the individual, or the extradition of those who moved him from its domain".

Another interesting aspect is the attitude taken by domestic courts when claims of unlawful apprehension are raised before them. In the case of *King vs. Walton* at the turn of the century, the facts were that the accused was arrested in Buffalo, New York, by the Buffalo police on the basis of a telegram from Toronto. On the same day, custody of the accused was given to a detective of the Toronto police force, who brought him back to Toronto. Walton was not taken before any judicial body in the United States competent to order his return to Canada and no information was laid before any United States judicial body that he had committed an extraditable offence. The accused applied for a writ of habeas corpus in Canada. The Ontario Court of Appeal, Mr. Justice Osler, observed: "We cannot enquire into the circumstances under which he was brought into this country . . . The remedy for the illegal arrest and the kidnapping of the prisoner is by proceedings at the instance of the government of the foreign country whose lands have been violated or at the suit of the party injured against the trespasser. If he is found in this country charged with a crime committed against its laws, it is the duty of our courts to take care that he is amenable to justice." A similar attitude has been adopted by the courts of other common law countries, including Britain.

Courts of other countries, such as France, have adopted a different approach, holding the arrest null and void and annulling the subsequent proceedings. Moreover, a recent (1974) decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case of *United States vs. Toscanino* may herald a rethinking of U.S. judicial attitudes to unlawful seizure cases. Toscanino was convicted on narcotics charges by a U.S. District Court and sentenced to 20 years in prison and fined \$60,000. On appeal, the Circuit Court remanded the case to the District Court and required the U.S. Government to respond

to his allegations that the Court acquired jurisdiction over him unlawfully through the conduct of American agents who kidnapped him in Uruguay, used illegal electronic surveillance, tortured him and abducted him to the United States. The Circuit Court specifically directed that its remand required an evidentiary hearing only if in response to the Government's denial. Toscanino offers some credible supporting evidence, including specifically evidence that the action was taken by or at the direction of United States officials. If he failed, it would be at the discretion of the District Court whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. This decision of the Circuit Court, which is technical and qualified, appears to have been influenced by a much wider approach to the conception of due process and the "sharp increase in kidnapping activities both here and abroad". The Court stated that "we view due process as now requiring a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant where it has been acquired as the result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights". It will be interesting to see whether the U.S. Supreme Court eventually confirms this more liberal approach to the rights of an abducted person.

In January of this year, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals in New York turned down the petition for release of Julio Juventino Lujan, who alleged U.S. agents had lured him from Argentina to Bolivia, where arrangements had been made with Bolivian police to seize him and have him placed aboard a plane to New York, where he was arrested. The Court apparently distinguished the Toscanino case on the grounds that the "cruel, inhuman and outrageous treatment allegedly suffered" by Toscanino demanded his release if he could prove it at a subsequent hearing. "But the same cannot be said of Lujan."

In summary, it could be said that it is contrary to international law for agents of a foreign state to seize individuals in violation of the territorial sovereignty of another state and to return them to the state where they are wanted. Whatever may be the position under municipal law, however, it is not a violation of international law when agents of the state of refuge surrender a fugitive to the state where he is wanted without resort to extradition proceedings. As pointed out in an article by Morgenstern in the 1952 *British Year Book of International Law*: "The state which received the fugitive for prosecution has not exercised any force on the territory of the state of refuge and

Increase in kidnapping affects decision

has in no way violated its territorial sovereignty." It is also clear that there is no right of "hot pursuit" of such offenders into the territory of another state. In the case of seizures in violation of international law, there is an obligation at the request of the country affected to free the person apprehended and to return him to that country. This is shown by the 1860 case of one Lawler, a convict who had escaped from penal custody in Gibraltar. He was apprehended by a British jail official in Spanish territory, and was removed from there without his consent to British territory. According to a legal opinion given by the law officers of the Crown at that time, a plain breach of international law had occurred and the proper remedy was *restitutio in integrum*, i.e. it was the duty of the state whose officials had illegally seized the fugitive to restore as far as possible the aggrieved state to its original position. In this particular case, it was recommended that Lawler be returned into Spain to be set at liberty immediately. (It is to be noted that the state from which

Lawler had escaped had another proper means by which it could have sought to recover him, e.g. extradition.) However, modern British practice probably differs from the Lawler case unless the state from which the fugitive is kidnapped makes protest.

It seems inevitable that these cases of unlawful seizure will continue to arise and continue to pose needless and disproportionate friction in relations between members of the international community. Perhaps a solution to the problem might be found if it were possible for municipal courts to adopt a universal practice of refusing jurisdiction over persons brought before them by unlawful means from other states. Support for the development of such a practice can be found in the position endorsed by the Court in the Toscanino case that the expanded conception of due process in the United States now protects the accused against pre-trial illegality by denying to the government the fruits of any deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness on its part.

From Colombo to CIDA

Aid policies as a reflection of Canadian domestic concerns

By Gregory Armstrong

The most obvious point about Canadian assistance to the Third World is that it is a direct reflection of Canada's domestic political priorities. There has long been a debate between those, on the one hand, who believe that aid should (or does)

come out of a philanthropic desire to help the less fortunate (or, on the same side of the argument, to repay the debt the Western world owes the Third World for the exploitation of resources) and those who believe, on the other hand, that international aid can and does serve the economic interests of the donors, as those of the recipients. But, whatever the merits of these viewpoints, and whatever the truth about the morality of the motives of Canadian international assistance, it is clear from the record of Canadian aid allocations that Canada's relations with the developing countries have changed direction and emphasis with a changing domestic balance of power.

Although Canada's commitment to the United Nations and its relations with the United States have both to some extent influenced the general direction



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Canadian assistance policies, by far the most obvious factors influencing these policies have been Canada's Commonwealth ties and the growing recognition of the country's "French fact". While English-speaking Canadians dominated the political and economic life of the country, Canada's economic assistance went to English-speaking parts of the Third World. During this period of *anglophone* domination, aid to the *francophone* Third World was non-existent. But as both Quebec and Canada awoke to the need for increased *francophone* influence in Canadian domestic life, there occurred simultaneously a dramatic increase in "aid" allocations to the French-speaking developing world.

This pattern has been most obvious and most traceable in the period between the beginning of a real Canadian assistance program in 1950 and the creation of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in 1968. The effects of domestic considerations can still be discerned in CIDA's programs since 1968, but the trends have become more ambiguous, and, one might hope, the policies have attained a more objective basis.

Commonwealth commitments

The most important factor in the early development of Canadian policy towards the developing world was the Canadian commitment to the Commonwealth. Before the initiation of the Colombo Plan in January 1950, Canadian aid policy had been largely without focus. The Plan, embracing the Commonwealth countries of Asia, was aimed in its early days not just at the promotion of development but at stopping the spread of Communism in Asia. Initially, the Indian Government's desire to see Western recognition of the recently-victorious Communist government in China brought an apparently positive response from External Affairs Minister Pearson, the head of the Canadian delegation to the Colombo Conference. At the tide of anti-Communism in North America, particularly as expressed by the Conservative leader, George Drew, appears to have altered the attitude of the Canadian Government. On his return from the Colombo Conference in February 1950, Pearson commented in the House of Commons:

"Communist expansionism may now spill over into Southeast Asia as well as into the Middle East.... It seemed to all of us at the Conference that, if the tide of totalitarian expansion should flow over this general area, not only will the new nations lose the

national independence which they have secured so recently but the forces of the free world will have been driven off all but a relatively small bit of the great Eurasian land-mass.... If Southeast Asia and South Asia are not to be conquered by Communism, we of the free democratic world... must demonstrate that it is we and not the Russians who stand for national liberation and economic and social progress."

Recognition of China was put off, of course, with the beginning of the Korean War. But anti-Communism alone did not dominate early Canadian aid policy.

There were obvious advantages to a concentration of Canadian aid through the Colombo Plan in the years when aid policy was getting started. For a country with a relatively modest aid budget, concentration on a few recipients for maximum effect was a necessity. The Commonwealth provided Canada with an opportunity to direct its aid to countries with which it had a common historical link, which had inherited administrative systems and planning organizations of supposedly reliable stability, and which, on the basis of the British connection, could command the emotional support of English-speaking Canadians, who might be ambivalent about aid in general.

Until Ghana received its independence in 1957, Africa was all there was of the non-white Commonwealth and that continent monopolized Canadian aid in the early years.

Canada was able to play an important role in the Commonwealth aid program in Asia because it was regarded as a senior member, the first to get Dominion status, yet not an imperial power. Canada's close relations with India dominated Canadian Asian policy for several years. It was the prodding of Nehru that looked for a while as if it might help Pearson convince Prime Minister St. Laurent of the need for recognition of China, although the Korean War eliminated the political wisdom of such a move. When St. Laurent in 1954 made the first world tour ever made by a Canadian Prime Minister, India was his main stop. When Nehru considered leaving the Commonwealth after the Suez crisis, Canadian representations helped to dissuade him. Canada has been able, on the whole, to play a mediating and strengthening role within the Commonwealth, right up to the 1971 Singapore conference, where the Canadian Prime Minister apparently helped to avoid a split over the issue of arms sales to South Africa.

The concentration of Canadian aid on

Advantages seen to concentration of Canadian aid through Colombo

Asia has continued, with the Colombo Plan expanding to include many non-Commonwealth countries, but the area lost its monopoly with the emergence of the English-speaking countries of Africa and the Caribbean. Canada extended its aid program to include the West Indies Federation after its formation in 1958. Although the Federation itself folded shortly thereafter, Canadian aid did not. Through the Commonwealth Technical Assistance Program, introduced in 1958, members of the Federation and other Caribbean countries received both technical and capital assistance. Earlier suggestions that Canada assume responsibility for the social and economic development of the countries of the region after the British withdrawal, or that the Caribbean countries be invited to join Canada as new provinces, elicited no enthusiasm in Ottawa, but some sense of obligation obviously developed. Caribbean countries now receive the highest *per capita* Canadian aid allocations of any area, though aggregate disbursements and allocations for Asia still remain the highest.

Following the 1960 Commonwealth prime ministers' conference, the Special Commonwealth Africa Assistance Plan (SCAAP), the English-speaking African counterpart of the Colombo Plan, was initiated. In 1960, the Canadian Government pledged \$10.5 million to the Plan and in 1964 and 1965 the commitments were substantially raised. In the first ten years of the Plan, Canadian commitments rose from an average of \$3.5 million a year to \$35.8 million. By 1973-74, this had risen to \$62.67 million.

Anglophone reflection

These three programs and the absence of programs for the *francophone* developing world reflected what was, until the early 1960s, the almost total dominance within Canada of the English-speaking population. But, with the election of the Liberal Government of Jean Lesage in Quebec and the coming of the "quiet revolution", interest increased in the "French fact" in Canada and therefore also in Canada's foreign policy. Canada's relations with the *francophone* Third World have not grown up slowly, as have relations with the Commonwealth. Before 1960, in fact, Canadian relations with these countries consisted primarily of missionary contacts between Quebec and a few French-speaking African countries. But the Lesage influence and the visit to Canada in 1960 by Patrice Lumumba led to pressure for more active relations with *francophone* developing countries.

Idea of provinces in Caribbean not received enthusiastically

The apparent failure of the Diefenbaker Government to recognize both the justification and intensity of Quebec political and cultural desires was reflected in the grudging attention given to *francophone* Africa until the Government's defeat in the 1963 election. Between 1960 and 1963, Canadian aid allocations to French Africa amounted to \$300,000 annually. The Pearson Government boosted this to \$4 million on a non-lapsing basis in the 1964-65 allocations and the *francophone* African assistance budget has since grown more dramatically than that for any other area.

French resistance

Interestingly enough, the new Canadian participation in *francophone* economic assistance initially met resistance in former French colonies from the still-strong French presence. The most important Canadian project in the year 1963-64 was significantly, assistance in the establishment of the University of Butare in Rwanda, a former Belgian protectorate.

It is certainly no mere coincidence that Pearson's concern over the unrest in Quebec paralleled a dramatic increase in aid to *francophone* Africa. The most obvious connection between Canada's domestic linguistic battles and Canadian aid allocations can be seen in the events following President De Gaulle's explosive visit to Quebec. Following the visit and hints that Quebec was preparing a diplomatic coup in the form of the prevention of Ottawa's attendance at the 1968 Libreville meeting of education ministers, Prime Minister Pearson dispatched Pierre Trudeau to Africa as his personal emissary in an attempt to obtain an invitation to the meeting. But, despite this move and Pearson's offer to Quebec of the chairmanship of a Canadian delegation to the conference, no invitation to the Libreville meeting, or the next one in Paris, was forthcoming. It was at this time that Pearson sent the Chevrier Mission to Africa to appraise the availability of good development projects for Canadian financing. The massive jump (from the \$12-million allocation of 1967-68 and the \$22.1-million allocation of 1968-69) in aid to *francophone* Africa can probably be attributed, therefore, to the very real political necessity of making Ottawa rather than Quebec the focus for development assistance in *francophone* areas.

Canada received an invitation to the next conference, held in Kinshasa, though an unseemly squabble between the federal and provincial representatives over protocol lent a rather farcical air to the negotiations.

eral presence. But the growing federal program seemed to make a difference Canada's status. At Niamey in March '70, there was only one federal presence, though the French Government lobbied hard for separate Quebec representation. The refusal of African delegates to support the French position is perhaps one indication of their desire to see an alternative to France in the African development assistance arena. Canada agreed to cover 25 per cent of the initial costs of the newly-established Agence de Co-opération Culturelle et Technique and a Quebec nationalist who had previously advocated Quebec's own participation in development assistance was named the first Secretary-General of the organization.

ar link

is in the case of Canada's relations with *francophone* Africa that we can most easily see the link between domestic political priorities and external policy. The growth in Canadian ties to *francophone* Africa matches almost exactly the rising demands of Quebec within Canada. The use of aid allocations as a weapon in domestic political battles does not give the usual observer much hope for the objectivity of Canadian policy. It does appear, however, that, for the time being at least, Ottawa's use of this weapon, beginning in '74, has retrieved the initiative from Quebec in relations with the *francophone* developing world.

The fact that domestic political priorities have until very recently had a considerable effect on the direction of Canadian aid allocations is demonstrated, not only by the development of large Commonwealth and *francophone* programs but the relatively small Latin American program that existed during the past ten years. The United States had been interested since the late 1950s in getting Canada to join regional American organizations. President Kennedy suggested during his 1961 visit to Canada that the time was ripe for Canadian entry to the OAS, but Prime Minister Diefenbaker had away from what he considered American intrusion in Canadian affairs. In 1964 Canada made a promising beginning in Latin American aid allocations, providing an annual average of \$10 million to the Inter-American Development Bank. Although Canada had no formal bilateral program for Latin America at that time, its allocation through the multilateral agency was considerably in excess of the \$10 million set aside in 1964 for the *francophone* African program. But, while the latter grew at a rather astonishing rate

(from \$4 million to \$50.78 million in allocations in the first eight years of a serious *francophone* program), the Latin American allocations averaged out over the same period at the same \$10 million.

Enthusiasm for the Latin American program seemed to wane as Canada's federal-provincial battles developed during the Sixties, and as *francophone* aid took on more immediate importance. In 1968, at the height of the Ottawa-Quebec fight for representation in Africa, Prime Minister Trudeau sent a high-level mission to Latin America. But, a year later, while Canada opened new diplomatic missions in *francophone* Africa and even in the Vatican, three missions in Latin America were closed down for reasons of "economy". Latin America simply did not hold as much interest for Canadians and thus had less political merit than did the other aid programs. But, in the year 1972-73, with Quebec feeling more secure in its own position, and with less open rancour between that government and Ottawa, federal authorities could afford to give more attention to Latin America. A real bilateral program was started for the first time and Canada became a full member of the Inter-American Development Bank. Bilateral allocations reached \$7 million by 1974, and Canada was in the process of contributing \$100 million over three years to the IADB. We must, nevertheless, continue to wonder what will become of the Latin American program should relations between Quebec and Ottawa deteriorate.

Recent growth in Canadian aid to Latin America

Pattern stabilized

Since the creation of CIDA in 1968, the pattern of aid allocations and disbursements seems on the whole to have stabilized. The allocations for the most part continue to increase, with the exception of those to the Caribbean, which have levelled off. But, political points having been made in the past decade on whether or not to establish programs in different areas, the increases may now be seen to have less political significance and more relevance to some of the "objective" criteria currently being promoted in the field of international assistance.

There are several trends and a couple of questions that arise out of a retrospective look at the Canadian international assistance record since 1950. Canadian aid policy is obviously to a great extent a function of domestic political priorities and pressures. Between 1950 and 1969, roughly 80 per cent of total Canadian official development assistance (ODA) was channelled through the Colombo

Plan, an organization which was attractive to English-speaking Canada. But, as *francophone* influence within Canada grew, so too did the development-assistance budget for *francophone* countries. At the moments of greatest strain between Ottawa and Quebec came the greatest percentage budgetary leaps in the *francophone* African assistance program. Within ten years, the *francophone* assistance program jumped from non-existence to a level where it was in *per capita* terms second only to the Caribbean program (though a distant second), four times as great as the Asian program and 50 percent higher than the Commonwealth African program in budgetary allocations. Even in aggregate terms, it is second only to the Asian program in both allocations and disbursements. It is clear that the growth of assistance to *francophone* Africa is the most outstanding feature of Canadian development policy in the past decade.

A look at some trends in the growth of Canadian official development assistance from 1960-1972 illustrates fairly clearly the development of Canadian international assistance policies through three governments. Aid allocations in the aggregate and as a percentage of GNP declined rapidly during the last three years of the Diefenbaker Government, years characterized by incipient recession and wide unemployment. The doubling of the aid allocations in the first year of the new Pearson Government, and again in the 1965-66 period, reflect Mr. Pearson's concern over

the problems of international development. Although there was a drop in aid allocations during the first year of the Trudeau Government, allocations were up substantially in 1973 over the last year of the Pearson Government; but it does appear that the pattern of rapid percentage growth in aid budgets has ended.

With the rapid increase in Canadian aid budgets over the past decade has gone a corresponding decrease in the average of Development Assistance Committee members as a group, so Canada's record has improved in both absolute and relative terms. ODA has, in fact, grown roughly twice as fast as the total Canadian budget in recent years, increasing by more than 40 per cent in 1969-70 alone.

While Canada has not been able to bring its ODA up to the .7 per cent of GNP by the initial target date of 1975 set by the UN, it has already reached the recommended levels for aid to be channelled through multilateral agencies. The quality of Canadian aid, too, compares favourably with that of other DAC members, though there remains room for improvement in the extent of tied Canadian aid.

Canada's aid record has improved dramatically, particularly within the past 15 years. With recent public opinion polls showing surprisingly strong support among the Canadian population for increased aid, there is no reason the record should not show further improvement in the future.

Book review

From hatred to confederation

By Richard Gwyn

Documents on relations between Canada and Newfoundland. Volume I, 1935-1949. Edited by Paul Bridle. Ottawa, Information Canada, 1974.

No human means exist to review a book — “tome” is a better word — of 1,446 pages (not counting a 74-page introduction) of government memoranda, reports, telegrams, official letters and minutes of com-

mittee meetings, most of which are couched either in the you-won't-catch-me-stickin-my-neck-out tone of “This note is merely an attempt to list as a basis for discussion some of...” or the impersonal, don't-blame-me-it's-the-system tone of “With reference to your S400-10 and S400-12 of 12 Dec I am directed to inform you...”.

Yet, and this was the first surprise, this tome is alive. A Newfoundland friend stayed at our house recently, found in

new copy lying about and the next morning confessed she had stayed up until 4 reading it, or at any rate skimming through. She was discovering, of course, history, and therefore herself.

During the Second World War, Canadians discovered Newfoundland and individual Canadians discovered, to their chagrin, that they were hated by Newfoundlanders. Equally disconcerting to Canadians was the realization that Newfoundlanders, though co-members of what was then the British Empire, adored and liked Americans.

No better insight into the causes and course of the collapse of relations between the two sister Dominions — sisters, that is, however disparate their respective backgrounds — can be found than to quote two of the pieces of official correspondence contained in this volume.

In April 1943, an official of the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board arrived in St. John's and then reported his findings. All the banks in Newfoundland, he observed, were Canadian and, except for the Bank of Nova Scotia, the senior officials were all Canadians . . .: "The Canadians are no doubt instructed not to show distaste at their appointments publicly but in most cases, from the manager down, they feel they are bearing the white man's burden and are living in hopes of a transfer. Newfoundland being what it is, such an attitude is unavoidable; nevertheless it has a rather unfortunate effect." The other witness for the prosecution was a report by an official of Canada's War

Information Board to his general manager, A. Davidson Dunton. Written in April 1944, the report deals with the difficult issue of Newfoundland resentment against French-Canadian Home Defence members. The main cause of resentment, he the official, "comes from the relative positions of pay and allowances of Canadian and Newfoundland troops". Equally troubling: "With regard to the behaviour of the Canadian sailors and soldiers, the fact that almost every restaurant on Water Street has had its plateglass front window broken and now has it boarded up is perhaps sufficient comment. . . . American troops do relatively little downtown wandering."

A core problem, described in an excellent introduction by R. A. MacKay, was that Newfoundland was so easy to over-run. At the first meeting of the Canadian-Permanent Joint Board on Defence, just after the August 1940 Ogdensburg meeting between Mackenzie King and Franklin D. Roosevelt, the two countries had divided up North American de-

fence, placing Newfoundland in Canada's defence sphere.

Newfoundland was then under Commission of Government, a curious status that bedevilled all diplomatic discussions. Britain acted as both judge and jury for Newfoundland, yet, as these papers make clear, was more sensitive to local opinion than Newfoundlanders realized. Within a month of the Ogdensburg meeting, the British-appointed Governor of Newfoundland had twice protested to Ottawa at decisions taken without Newfoundland representatives being consulted. Finally, Sir Edward Emmerson, one of the native Newfoundland Commissioners (who emerges here as a major personality), was allowed to attend Board meetings whenever Newfoundland affairs were discussed.

Britain sensitive to local opinion in Newfoundland

Goose Bay base

The Canadian air-base at Goose Bay, Labrador, provides a perfect test of the difficulties — near impossibilities at times — of diplomatic dealings between the two countries. Discussions began in September 1941, and within a month the Governor of Newfoundland, in a note to the Dominions Secretary in London, was suggesting — with an eye on possible postwar commercial use — that Newfoundland should not grant the 99-year lease Canada demanded.

Construction went ahead anyway. In September 1942, the Minister of Munitions and Supply, C. D. Howe, wrote briskly: "I can hardly believe Newfoundland would ever challenge possession of a base in Labrador built by Canada with Canadian money".

Newfoundland, assisted by Britain (in one memorandum there is a delightful suggestion that "the Beaver" was behind the whole thing) did all it could to challenge possession. In November 1942, the

Mr. Gwyn is nationally syndicated Ottawa columnist for the Toronto Star. Born in England he was educated at Stoneyhurst College and Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, emigrating to Canada in 1954. As a journalist he has worked for United Press International, Maclean Hunter, Time Magazine and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. In 1968 he was appointed Executive Assistant to Postmaster General Eric Kearns and from 1970-75 was Director General of Socio-economic Planning, Department of Communications. He is the author of two books, The Shape of Scandal (1965) and Smallwood (1968). The views expressed in this article are those of Mr. Gwyn.

Canadian High Commissioner wrote home to warn that Newfoundlanders were demanding to know why Canada wanted so large an area as 160 square miles, four times as large as that of all the U.S. bases.

By February 1943, the Canadian demand had dropped to 120 square miles. Still nothing moved. Norman Robertson, then Under-Secretary of State, wrote in June 1943: "It would be highly embarrassing for the Canadian Government to be required to admit that Canada possesses no title of any nature." A year later, in February 1944, the Canadian High Commissioner reported that "the situation here is deteriorating"; the local press had finally realized that the U.S. had built bases in Canada with no 99-year lease in return, while Canada was making this demand from a fellow Dominion. The matter was eventually settled, late that same year; the issue of postwar, non-military use was simply dodged.

The final item in the long section devoted to Goose Bay is a memorandum by the External Affairs Legal Adviser to the Under-Secretary's Special Counsellor. Newfoundland, he felt, had a good case over Goose Bay.

"Personally," he wrote, "I am unable to see how any practical solution can be worked out for the Newfoundland problem without confederation." He suggested that confederation be "given some serious consideration".

The Special Counsellor was R. MacKay. Three years later he was assigned by the Department to chaperone round-table an unknown Newfoundland politician, Joey Smallwood, who had come to promote confederation. Those events will be covered in Volume II. I hope that that tome will include the memorandum from the High Commissioner in St. John's advising his office that Smallwood was a politician of no importance who should be kept as far away as possible from anyone of consequence. Smallwood slipped past MacKay to see Pickersgill and St. Laurent, and the rest is recent history.

Volume II will obviously cover more interesting ground. The quality of the volume — comprehensive, balanced and well-indexed — makes it essential that a shorter, more popular version of the two volumes be published to reach out to schools and private citizens as well as scholars.

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"Having regard to the terms of operative paragraph 3 of Resolution 2777 (XXVI) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 29 November, 1971, the Government of Canada hereby declares that it will recognize as binding, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the decision of a Claims Commission concerning any dispute in which Canada may become a party under the terms of the Convention on Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects, opened for signature in Washington, London and Moscow on March 29, 1972."

Unless otherwise indicated, date of entry into force is also date of entry into force for Canada.

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"1. The Government of Canada interprets the phrase 'scientific purposes' in Article III, paragraph 1(a) as including scientific 'research' and scientific 'management' and considers that the term 'taking' in Article III, paragraph 1, includes the capturing and killing of polar bears by the use of various means, including 'aircraft'.

and large motorized vessels', in order to meet the requirements of Article VII, despite the general prohibition of such means contained in Article IV.

2. As regards the hunting rights of local people, protected under Article III, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (d) and (e), Canadian practice is based on the following considerations:

- (a) Research data, compiled annually by the Federal Provincial Polar Bear Technical Committee, indicate that there is, in Canada, a harvestable quantity of polar bears. On the basis of these biological data the Committee recommends annual management quotas for each sub-population.
- (b) The polar bear hunt in Canada is an important traditional right and cultural element of the Inuit (Eskimo) and Indian peoples. In certain cases this hunt may extend some distance seaward. Traditional methods are followed in this hunt.
- (c) In the exercise of these traditional polar bear hunting

rights, and based on the clause 'in accordance with the laws of that Party', the local people in a settlement may authorize the selling of a polar bear permit from the sub-population quota to a non-Inuit or non-Indian hunter, but with additional restrictions providing that the hunt be conducted under the guidance of a native hunter and by using a dog team and be conducted within Canadian jurisdiction.

The Government of Canada therefore interprets Article III, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) as permitting a token sports hunt based on scientifically sound settlement quotas as an exercise of the traditional rights of the local people.

3. The Government of Canada interprets the requirement to 'consult' in Article VII as applying only when any other Party requests such consultation, not as imposing a requirement to hold consultations annually."

Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.

Done at New York, January 14, 1975.
Canada signed February 14, 1975.

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
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Behind-the-scenes negotiation of treaty to protect diplomats

by Edward G. Lee and Serge April

In October 1970, James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner in Montreal, was kidnapped. The Tupamaros had set the example in Uruguay during the Sixties. More than a dozen crimes against diplomats had been committed in the western hemisphere before the Cross kidnapping took place. Some of the incidents had paid off for the terrorists, and "political prisoners" were liberated in exchange for the lives of kidnapped diplomats. Other incidents ended in bloodshed.

Shots were fired into the apartment of a Soviet diplomatic representative to the United Nations. Embassies round the world received letter-bombs. In March 1973, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Khartoum was giving a cocktail party, which was suddenly interrupted by a guerrilla team. Two American diplomats and one Belgian were held hostage and later killed.

In 1974, the United States Ambassador to Cyprus was killed, apparently by a bullet, during a violent demonstration against his chancery in Nicosia; the French Ambassador in The Hague was held hostage by Japanese terrorists; and an American diplomat and several Venezuelan consular officers were held hostage in the Venezuelan Consulate in Santo Domingo.

Within the space of a few years, diplomacy has become a perilous career. For all sorts of reasons and in all sorts of places, a bloody method of solving disputes was developing. Something had to be done at the international level. As regards hijacking, as soon as countries realized that no air-line was immune from air piracy, the international community found the will to do something. This led to the conventions in Montreal and at The Hague.

As for international terrorism, the United Nations has so far done nothing really effective, though representatives have often talked emotionally about it. The reason is easy to understand. Acts of international terrorism are intimately linked with certain political struggles, and

it appears impossible to define such terrorism without making reference to these political factors. It has proved impossible to find an objective legal foundation that would rally all points of view in the international community and form the basis for some meaningful action against this threat.

Protection of diplomats

So far, however, as diplomats were concerned, something was done, and done quickly. Two years after the matter was first raised in the UN General Assembly, on December 14, 1973, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents was adopted by consensus in the Assembly. This article will describe how this convention was negotiated in the Legal (or Sixth) Committee of the UN Assembly in the autumn of 1973.

There exists a legal foundation for the convention, accepted by all and independent of political considerations; it is the ancient principle of inviolability of diplomatic agents. The convention is based on that universally-recognized principle.

Those few countries that opposed the idea of a convention or had misgivings about it in the first place based their opposition on the claim that the convention was not necessary and that the existing rules of international law, as codified, for example, in the Vienna Convention on

Legal foundation independent of political considerations

Mr. Lee is the Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs and Director-General of the Bureau of Legal Affairs. He joined the Department in 1956 after serving for five years in the Royal Canadian Air Force. In addition to serving in various divisions in Ottawa, he has been posted to Djakarta and London. He has published articles in Canadian legal journals. Mr. April joined the Department in 1968 and has served in Rome. He is now with the Department's Legal Advisory Division.

Diplomatic Relations, were sufficient to cope with the problem. Fortunately that negative position was not to prevail.

The Canadian Government considered, on the basis of its experience, that a new convention, supplementing the existing relevant principles of international law, was needed. It was necessary to have a new regime of law that would guide international-law advisers in cases of kidnapping and other crimes against diplomats. From a strictly legal point of view, it was difficult, at the time of the Cross kidnapping, to determine exactly what action had to be taken.

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations merely says, in Article 29, that "the receiving State (...) shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on the (diplomatic agent's) person, freedom or dignity". Obviously, that rule is not meant for kidnapping situations. It might be construed to mean that the receiving state must save the diplomat's life at all costs, and the sending state might insist that the host state live up to that obligation. But when the liberation of a kidnapped diplomat means that the security and safety of the host state is to be put in jeopardy, one is faced with a dilemma: on the one hand, whether the Vienna Convention obligations should be considered as absolute and all necessary measures, including giving in to all the kidnappers' demands, taken to save the diplomat's life, or, on the other hand, whether state security should be paramount to all other considerations and all measures taken to preserve it even if it means death for the kidnapped diplomat. Fortunately, in the Cross situation, Britain did not exert that kind of pressure, and the drama had a happy ending — Mr. Cross's life was saved and no demands regarding ransom or liberation of so-called political prisoners were met.

Mechanisms of the convention

The next question was what kind of mechanism should be established in the convention to deal with the problem. The hijacking conventions had been adopted after difficult and delicate negotiations, and a consensus had emerged on the basis of the rule that, when an alleged offender was found on one's territory, one either extradited him or prosecuted him. It was therefore agreed that this procedure should also form the core of the convention on the protection of diplomats.

For example, let us suppose that a French citizen kills an Italian diplomat in the United States, makes his way to Canada, and is arrested here. The United

States, because the crime took place in its territory, could seek his extradition; Italy could also seek his extradition because it was an Italian diplomat who was murdered; and France, because the alleged offender was of French nationality. Canada could accept any of those extradition requests. If Canada refused to extradite and it had the option to do so — or if an extradition request was received, the Canada would, to quote Article 7 of the Convention, "submit (...) the case to competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution".

Crimes covered

Instead of listing specific crimes, the International Law Commission, in its draft articles, had devised a general phrase: "violent attacks upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person". The main reason for this was that specific crimes are defined differently in various criminal codes, and it would have been impossible to reconcile these definitions in an international convention. However, the Legal Committee considered that such a general phrase could be interpreted to cover different infractions in the implementing legislation of each state party; that this would pose even greater problems for extradition proceedings. Moreover, the Legal Committee agreed that the complex mechanism of the convention should be triggered only when grave crimes such as murder and kidnapping were committed and not when minor ones occur, such as slapping a diplomatic face down. A heated discussion, which might be considered by some authorities as a "violent attack".

In the end, a compromise solution was found: the convention as adopted refers to "murder, kidnapping or other attacks upon the person", without defining these crimes. Under normal rules of construction, the words "other attacks" are to comprise infractions that are not or less of the same gravity as the listed crimes of murder and kidnapping. The Legal Committee did not attempt to define murders and kidnappings in the convention; and, in any event, these are usually not defined in extradition treaties.

Canada signed the convention on June 26, 1974, and intends to ratify it. To do so will clearly require implementing legislation, which will presumably take the form of amendments to the Criminal Code, allowing essentially for prosecution in Canada of alleged authors of crimes against diplomats perpetrated outside of Canada. When the time comes to draft these amendments, it will have to be kept in mind



UPI Photo

umerous events in recent years have underscored the need for new international arrangements to safeguard diplomats. In August 1974, U.S. Ambassador Rodger B. Davies was slain by Greek Cypriot gunmen when they invaded the American Embassy in Nicosia. Pictured above the Ambassador is seen being carried from the Embassy after the incident. Following the stretcher bearer on the right is Greek Cypriot Leader Glafkos Clerides, who during the absence of Archbishop Makarios from the island acted as president.

that some of the infractions covered in the convention are not at present crimes or infractions under the Canadian Criminal Code. So any bill that will soon be introduced in the House of Commons will probably have to involve the creation of new crimes in Canada embracing the ideas, first, of threatening to commit a murder, kidnapping or violent attack against an internationally-protected person and, secondly, of committing an attack upon the official premises of an internationally-protected person likely to endanger his life and liberty.

Persons covered

The Legal Committee also had to choose between an all-embracing general phrase and a listing of the persons to be covered. The former solution was adopted. Article 1(1)(b) essentially defines an "internationally-protected person" as an official who, at the time when and in the place where a crime against him is committed, is entitled pursuant to international law to special protection from any attack on his person, freedom or dignity. The main reason for this is that it was impossible to draw up a complete list of all conventions, present and future, regional or universal, under which individuals might be granted personal inviolability or special protection.

Having agreed on which persons and what crimes should be covered and having

decided to borrow the extradition-or-prosecution procedures from the hijacking conventions, the Legal Committee was still faced with a Latin American amendment on asylum and an Arab-African one on self-determination.

Asylum

The Latin American amendment was the object of corridor negotiations for more than a month. As first introduced by a group of 11 Latin American countries, led by Mexico, the amendment read: "None of the provisions of this convention shall be construed as modifying the Treaties on Asylum". From the beginning, the Canadian delegation strongly opposed this amendment on the grounds that it would have created a loophole of such magnitude as to nullify the purpose of the convention.

The Latin Americans wished, in essence, to safeguard an institution, peculiar to their continent, that had saved so many human lives. It was, for them, a matter of principle. Their purpose was not to create an escape clause, yet they recognized that to a great extent their amendment would have had such an effect.

While the Canadian delegation was of the opinion that we were better off with no convention at all than with a convention containing a loophole of such magnitude as almost to nullify it, other Western delegations, such as the British and Amer-

Latin Americans saw asylum as matter of principle

ican, which were ready to go quite far in order to achieve a convention, thought that half a loaf was better than none. It also appeared that the other regional groups, while ill at ease with the asylum amendment, were not ready to oppose the Latin Americans on the floor of the committee.

Complicated and delicate negotiations took place. Eventually, the Latin Americans agreed to modify the text of their original amendment so that the Asylum Treaties referred to would only be those in force at the date of the convention, so as to prevent other groups from hastily adopting similar treaties. They also agreed that the treaties could not be invoked against countries that were not parties to them. Article 12 of the convention reflects these changes.

While the asylum clause still represents a loophole as between the Latin Americans (and, if they wish it that way, after all it is their own business), if the perpetrator of a crime against a Canadian diplomat in a Latin American country were granted asylum by another Latin American country, that country could not refuse extradition of the alleged offender to Canada on the basis of the asylum treaties. Consequently, the accused could not, in spite of the asylum clause, escape justice.

Self-determination

A last-minute African self-determination amendment almost prevented adoption of the convention. At a time when the informal negotiations on the asylum proposal had borne fruit, and a few minutes before the expiration of the deadline that had been set for tabling amendments, the representative of Mali announced in the Legal Committee that he had just tabled, on behalf of the African group, the text of a new article on self-determination. That text, co-sponsored by some 40 delegations, read as follows: "No provision of these articles shall be applicable to peoples struggling against colonialism, foreign occupation, racial discrimination and apartheid in the exercise of their legitimate rights to self-determination and independence".

This is one of the usual self-determination clauses, which are increasingly appearing in international conventions. But this time the context was different — we were actually dealing with the universally-recognized rule of diplomatic inviolability — and the clause would have had more far-reaching consequences than usual. In the opinion of most of the non-African delegations, it would enable any assailant

of persons covered by the convention to escape the application of the convention by invoking a higher cause such as a struggle for self-determination. It could have been easily interpreted as declaring an open season on diplomats.

The chairman of the Legal Committee formed a small informal working group that sought a compromise. The first compromise proposal of the working group was that the provision on self-determination should not be included in the convention itself but instead be embodied in the covering resolution of the Assembly; that the wording of the provision should be modified so that the exercise of the legitimate rights to self-determination would be reserved to those rights accorded by the Charter and the Friendly Relations Declaration; and that a new "balancing article" should be included in the convention precluding states parties from making reservations on certain of the articles considered essential to the purpose of the convention.

The compromise was referred to the Drafting Committee, and certain African delegations then insisted that, if their proposal was to be only part of the covering resolution and not included in the convention, the resolution should be published together with the convention in the United Nations treaty series. This would have been an entirely new procedure.

Since the wording of the main provision had been revised in a satisfactory manner, and since it was not part of the convention itself, the Western group agreed in a spirit of compromise to accept publication of the covering resolution in the United Nations treaty series with the convention, even though the proposed balancing article was not added to the convention. In return, the Western delegations insisted that, if the proposed balancing article was to be deleted, the chairman of the Legal Committee should read into the record a statement that would reflect the contention that certain articles were so fundamental to the purposes of the convention that they should not be the subject of reservations by adhering states.

On December 14, 1973, the working package was adopted by consensus in the General Assembly, with many delegations making statements in explanation of their vote. The Canadian delegate, in clear deference to the African self-determination provision, insisted that nothing could be invoked to undermine the well-recognized principle of diplomatic inviolability.

The final result is obviously not a perfect convention. When a text is not

ated by more than 130 delegations, it is impossible to avoid some imperfections. However, the Convention on Protection of Diplomats, together with the hijacking

conventions, is a further small advance in the development of a body of international law devised to combat international terrorism.

The nature of terrorism and the effective response

by Jean Pierre Derriennic

In 1972 there was a controversy between Israeli and English journalists over the use of the word "terrorist". The Israelis protested against the fact that the English used the term "guerrillas" to describe the Palestinian commandos who had taken hostages in Munich, while they applied the word "terrorists" to members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) who planted bombs. This dispute over words illustrates one of the major difficulties involved in an analysis of terrorism: in current usage, the word "terrorist" is not used to describe a specific, clearly-defined type of combat; the term is invariably pejorative, and is applied to any violent activity to which the writer is opposed. In simplified terms, terrorism is always the violence of others, and "legitimate violence" is that which defends a "just" social order or furthers a "good" revolution.

Types of terrorism

If we are to arrive at an accurate idea of the true nature and scope of terrorism, we have to try to get beyond such purely normative thinking. All existing authorities, who by definition consider themselves legitimate, tend to apply the word "terrorist" to all who oppose them by violent means. This is a propaganda device that is understandable and often effective. However, terrorist activities are not restricted exclusively to those who are seeking to overthrow an established regime. Ruling authorities have used the most typical methods of terrorism — such as the taking of hostages or the indiscriminate murder of civilians to impress the rest of the population — for purposes of repression much longer and on a much larger scale than revolutionaries or insurgents have ever done.

Besides insurrectional terrorism, which is used to overthrow or change an established power, and which too often is the only type considered in discussions of the subject, there is also repressive terrorism, which is used by those in power to strengthen their grip on the subject population. Historically, the word terrorism came into the French language during the Great Terror of 1794, which was a period of repressive terrorism used by the established regime against its political enemies. The word had no pejorative connotations at the time, and the revolutionaries took pride in calling themselves "vrais terroristes".

There is a third type of terrorism that has assumed particular importance in the twentieth century: terrorism by a state not against its own people as a means of maintaining order but against the people of another state in order to impose its will on the latter. From the bombing of London in 1917 to the bombing of Hanoi in 1972, air attacks have been the preferred in-

No pejorative connotations in original use of 'terrorism'

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strument of interstate terrorism, and the present nuclear balance based on threats of mutual retaliation against population centres corresponds, at least potentially, to the use of terrorist strategy in international conflicts. An analysis of terrorism must, therefore, consider its three possible forms: repressive terrorism, which is directed downwards; insurrectional terrorism, which is directed upwards; and interstate terrorism, which operates horizontally, between political units.

This distinction is useful in analysing terrorism, but in itself is not adequate to define the unique characteristics of the phenomenon. Not all insurrections, repressions and international wars are, or necessarily become, terrorist activities. We live in societies that have not so far removed violence from human relations, and there is nothing to indicate that this will be achieved within the foreseeable future. Consequently, the various forms of violence should not be lumped together and censured indiscriminately. Even if it is thought that all acts of violence are to be condemned (a position that is held, and whose consequences are accepted, by almost no one), it must not therefore be concluded that all forms of violence have the same characteristics and the same effects.

Psychological gains

Terrorist activities are characterized by their use of violence in order to achieve psychological and symbolic effects rather than physical and material gains. In classical strategy — as described by Clausewitz, for example —, the purpose of war is to disarm the adversary, to remove his means of action in order to control his will. A strategy can be described as terrorist when it seeks to reduce activities directed against the adversary's resources and tends to act directly upon his will — in most cases by instilling a fear that paralyzes him. One of the most typical examples of such a strategy is the "Baedeker raids" carried out in 1942 by the German air force in retaliation for Allied bombing of German cities. These raids were directed against small English towns that possessed considerable historical and artistic importance but were not economically or strategically significant. Since the Germans could not prevent the English bombers from flying over their territory and destroying the bases out of which they were operating, they tried (unsuccessfully) to persuade the English to discontinue their attacks by striking not at their means of conducting aerial warfare but at symbols that were important to the British people.

It is possible to distinguish degrees of terrorism in the use of violence in conflict. Here we have both a useful analytical tool and one of the basic choices facing the men engaged in armed conflict: whether these are the rulers of a country at war, the heads of a force responsible for keeping order or the leaders of an insurrectional movement. In the Second World War, England's strategy of bombing the German civilian population at night was much more of a terrorist activity than the United States' bombing of factories by day. The *coup d'état* in Athens in 1967 was less terrorist than the one in Santarém in 1973. The latter was an exceptionally brutal coup for a South American country; the brutality was designed to prevent the organization of a resistance movement by terrifying the potential popular base of any such movement. The British Army's use of terrorism in Northern Ireland may be less than the French Army did in Algeria, but the French approach was based on collective responsibility and indiscriminate arrests and executions. One of the controversies that divided the French resistance movement during the German occupation concerned the advisability of a terrorist strategy of individual attacks on German soldiers. The Front de National Libération (FLN) in Algeria adopted a progressively more terrorist strategy; in 1954, its members had strict orders to avoid causing casualties among the European civilian population, whereas in 1957 they were planting bombs in cafés in Algiers.

Effectiveness

It is impossible to lay down general rules about the effectiveness of terrorism because this type of strategy must be evaluated in the light of the objectives those who use it. However, it is probable that terrorism is less effective the better organized or more highly motivated the adversary is. The terrorist bombings of German cities did not remove the need for Allied penetration to the very heart of Germany, and studies conducted after the war showed that the contribution of these attacks to the final victory had been very slight, in comparison with the quantity of resources deployed for them. On the other hand, when the Americans bombed Japanese cities — a tactic they had criticized the English for using —, the capitulation of Japan was hastened; the Japanese were much less prepared than the Germans to endure the bombing without panic and disorganization.

The repressive terrorism used by the French Army in Algeria proved counterproductive; not only did it not 'de-

establish order", it actually increased the disorder in Algeria. The principle of collective responsibility strengthened the solidarity between the people and the FLN. The terrorism of the Secret Army Organization (OAS) did not succeed in changing the policy of the Government in Paris but rather strengthened the latter's desire to get out of the Algerian hornet's nest and hastened the exodus of the European population.

The escalation of violence or the provocation of retaliatory terrorism is one of the risks inherent in any terrorist strategy, but this is not always inevitable. The IRA bombings gave rise to counter-terrorism by underground Protestant organizations, but individual attacks on British soldiers did not produce a terrorist reaction (the massacre of January 30, 1972, in Londonderry was an isolated event). The terrorist activities of the Palestinians in Israel and elsewhere prompted terrorist bombings of the refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria, but so far they have not produced a terrorist reaction by the Israeli authorities' population against the Arab people in the occupied territories. One of the objects of the Palestinian leaders is doubtless to provoke such a reaction; evidently they fail to realize what this would mean for the Arab "hostages" in Israeli prisons and the people living on the West Bank of the Jordan.

Repressive terrorism

Repressive terrorism is older than the other two forms; it has a place in history and is still the most important form because of its consequences. In addition, it is certainly the form that is most often effective. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, it is much easier to use violence to obtain a negative result — that is, as a preventive mechanism for maintaining the status quo — than to obtain a positive result. In the second place, there was for a long time a serious imbalance between the organizational ability of governments and that of subject populations. The latter were powerless to resist repressive terrorism because they could not organize themselves. The development of revolutions, resistance movements and "peoples' wars" in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was largely the result of political and organizational factors rather than technical factors. The difference between the weapons of the regular armies in the eighteenth century and those easily available to the peasants of that period was much less significant than that which existed in Vietnam between the American Army and the Viet Cong.

But repressive terrorism is not in itself an international problem. Whether we like it or not, violence by states is tolerated by the international system provided it is kept within national borders. England and France did not declare war on Hitler because he was persecuting the Jews but because he had invaded Poland. It was not Pakistan's brutal repression in Bengal that led to India's involvement in the war; it was rather the problem created by the influx of refugees into its own territory and the opportunity to weaken an adversary decisively.

Inter-state terrorism is, by definition, an international problem. The nuclear "balance of terror" makes it the most serious threat facing the world today. And we should not rule out the possibility — at least as a hypothesis — that the contradiction that exists for some countries between their verbal condemnation of terrorism and their adoption of the latter as the *ultima ratio* of their foreign policy is one of the reasons for their inability to control insurrectional terrorism. In the last few years, this has increasingly become an international problem — partly, though not exclusively, because of the Middle East conflict. These two forms of terrorism are more recent, in historical terms, than repressive terrorism, and their development has been linked with the transformation of Western political societies that followed the revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century.

State violence tolerated in international system

Terrorism and democracy

The development of terrorism is linked with the development of democracy. Instilling fear into an adversary the better to impose one's will on him has always been one of the tactics of war or political combat. But, in societies in which the legitimacy of political power was not based on popular support, the only possible targets for inter-state or insurrectional terrorism were the leaders themselves. A strategy of placing bombs indiscriminately in Paris in the seventeenth century to put pressure on Louis XIV would have been meaningless. Similarly, Russian terrorists in the nineteenth century directed their attacks at the Czars and their agents of repression, not at the Russian people as a whole. On the other hand, civilian populations become potential objectives for war or insurrectional activities once the leaders have come to rely on their support — at least in theory and at least in part — to stay in power.

The development of terrorism is also linked with the growth of industrialization, which has increased the state's economic role and its dependence on economic

Development of terrorism outgrowth of democracy

variables. England's air strategy against Germany was not based on the democratic illusion that Hitler's power depended on the German people; rather, it was designed to destroy the country's productive machinery by terrorizing and disorganizing its labour force. Furthermore, industrialization goes hand in hand with the development of the division of labour and greater interdependence between the various segments of society. The more complex a social organization is, the more extensive the repercussions caused by the destruction of one of its elements.

Finally, the development of terrorism is linked with the development of the information media. The choice of a terrorist strategy is very often related to an exaggerated conception of the importance of the psychological aspects of conflicts. Terrorism is a form of expression and demonstration as well as a means of rational action, and societies in which information is disseminated widely and rapidly are a particularly favourable environment for it.

International control

This brief analysis gives an indication of the problems faced, if not by the international community as a whole at least by a part of it, as a result of the development of international insurrectional terrorism. We noted earlier that the ability of a society to resist terrorism depends to a large extent on the cohesiveness of its organization. The existence of numerous jurisdictions is in itself a cause of division and lack of cohesiveness. The existence of sanctuary states, the diversity of legislations, the contradiction that may exist for some states between their long-term interest in combating terrorism and their short-term interest in extricating themselves from difficult situations at the smallest possible expense are all elements that tend to favour the development of international terrorism. The struggle against terrorism, like the struggle against inflation or pollution, has become "an internal world policy problem" that tends to defy solution because the world is divided into states.

Not all states are equally susceptible to terrorism. The most susceptible are the most highly-industrialized countries. These possess the most complex societies, and their governments exert only incomplete control over the opinions and movements of their nationals and over the dissemination of information. If a group of Lettish nationalists took some hostages in Riga to put pressure on the Soviet Government, it is very likely that no one in the U.S.S.R. or

elsewhere would ever hear anything about it; this effectively discourages any such action. On the other hand, the economically-advanced and politically-pluralist countries of the West are also those that carry out the largest exchange of goods among people among themselves and with the rest of the world. This increases the problem of the discrepancy between interdependence of societies and the independence of states.

In order to explain the development of international terrorism, and possibly find a solution to it, it is more important to analyse the factors that foster it in certain societies than to investigate the specific causes of a particular terrorist campaign. Terrorism as a method of combat is not restricted to any one type of political objective. The recent history of Northern Ireland has shown that the Protestants can be as effective at terrorism as the Catholics. If the Middle East conflict were to end with the demands of the Palestinians being met — that is, with the disappearance of Israel as a state —, we can be sure that the population of that country would reveal a sufficiently high potential for political fanaticism and enough military know-how to replace the current anti-Israeli terrorism with an anti-Palestinian terrorism that would represent at least as great a danger and would operate in roughly the same areas.

The problem of the struggle against international terrorism is one of dissuasion. It is not a question of eliminating terrorism either by destroying the terrorists or by meeting their demands. For developing pluralist societies, the answer lies in equipping themselves with the means of controlling this phenomenon to make it so difficult and unprofitable that its practitioners will resort to other courses of action.

If the states concerned succeed in defining a common policy, it will be possible to achieve such control at the lowest possible cost to political pluralism. If, on the other hand, international terrorist actions multiply and no coherent policy is available to cope with the situation, the state could turn to reckless methods of repressive terrorism. If the latter are accompanied by a deterioration in the international economic situation, this could lead to a profound transformation of pluralist political regimes in the direction of authoritarianism. One thing is certain about the outcome of such a change: it would not be consistent with the hopes either of those who would like to see a more effective campaign against terrorism or of those who find some revolutionary virtues in it.

Arafat's PLO adopts new look for the Palestinian movement

Fawaz Turki

The initial response to the emergence of revolutionary movements and national liberation struggles round the world has traditionally been one of hostility and abnegance. Perhaps this is neither surprising nor unpredictable. Such movements and struggles have a proclaimed aim of stabilizing, restructuring or overthrowing the status quo.

To the French, in the Fifties, the vision of Algerian nationalism was one of the work of deranged terrorists — for who would contend that Algeria was not a département of France and that its indigenous population were not loyal French citizens? Mahatma Gandhi was a “mendicant ascending the stairs of the Chancellery” with no legitimate claims to make behalf of the Indian people’s struggle for independence. The National Liberation Front in Vietnam, in those rare moments in the early Sixties when anyone dignified by the use of its name, consisted of “peasants in black pajamas”, tools of the communists in the North, bent on overthrowing the regime of the freedom-loving people of the South. The Palestine Liberation Organization, with their outrageous vision of a secular democratic state in Palestine, are a group of terrorists who do not really represent the Palestinians and whose goal is the destruction of Israel and its people. And so it is with other movements, in Africa, South America and Asia, round which it has always been found necessary to create a whole body of alternative mythology as a way of interacting with forces threatening revolutionary and fundamental change.

If we begin with the premise that the status quo in Palestine is equitable — it is, if we believe in the territorial and constitutional integrity of Israel, its borders, the Law of Return, its arguments against the repatriation of Palestinians to their land, or its military occupation — then the existence and platform of the PLO is a dangerous political heresy. If we believe, conversely, that the Palestinian people have suffered injustice — that, as a con-

sequence of decisions taken over their heads and their pleas, they have been denied the basic right of national self-determination in their country —, then the phenomenon of the PLO is natural political orthodoxy.

Who or what the Palestine Liberation Organization is cannot be separated from its relation to the accumulated political and emotional experiences of the Palestinians over the past 26, or indeed 60, years.

Having failed in their 1936-1939 revolt in Palestine against the British mandate authorities (from whom they wanted to wrest independence and a limitation on the influx of Jewish settlers into the country), the Palestinians found themselves leaderless and in disarray. Further weakened by their fragmentation in host countries following the events of 1948, they were unable to become a determining force in their destiny or to deflect happenings from their preordained course. And, before they could begin to regain their voice, a lot had happened. Jewish settlers had created Israel out of their country. The three-quarters of a million refugees who had sought refuge in the neighbouring

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countries were not allowed to return to their towns, villages and farms. The two remnants of Palestine not taken over by the Israelis, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, were annexed by Jordan and governed by Egypt respectively. And the Palestinian problem, in both its human and political ramifications, was taken custody of by the Arab governments. In the West it was projected not as a political issue having to do with a people's aspirations for nationhood but rather as a refugee problem, to be solved in the context of settling or resettling groups of refugees in underpopulated regions of the Arab world or elsewhere. Abstracted thus, the Arab-Israel conflict became one purely between the nation states in the area — namely Israel and the Arab countries.

Indeed this oversimplified view of the struggle for Palestine was given credence at the time, in the middle Fifties, by no less a personage than the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. While on an official visit to Lebanon, he gave a speech at the American University of Beirut in which he asserted that the Palestinian problem would be solved only when a new generation of Palestinians had grown up in their respective host countries with no attachment to the land and none

of the passion or the intangible links of older generation.

Palestinian nationalism

For a meaningful grasp of Palestinian nationalism, and an equally meaningful grasp of the reciprocal links that bind past to the future vision and ideological construct of the PLO, it is crucial to take into account at least two important factors. From the outset, long before their emergence in 1967 as an organized group, the Palestinians themselves were the ones to be in violent opposition to schemes aimed at integrating them into host countries. This writer recalls graphic images from his days in a refugee camp in Beirut when manifestos would be issued and spontaneous demonstrations by Palestinians would erupt to denounce attempts to delay, impede or block their return to their homeland. This passion, sustained to this day, can be ascribed to many factors, not the least of which is that the Palestinians looked upon themselves as a nation in exile whose essential repertoire of consciousness was derived from Palestine. The notion of the "ancestral land" (as in Vietnam) always exercised fierce exigencies on the metaphor, the myths and the idiom.



UPI

As leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat was recognized as spokesman for the Palestinian people when the PLO was granted permanent observer status at the UN in November. The PLO leader's speech was given wide coverage. He said, "I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun." Other photographs revealed that this was not a figure of speech, as he was carrying a gun at his right hip.

third World peoples. In the meantime, various Arab governments, in an effort to co-opt the Palestine cause, encouraged an "independent" Palestinian voice and helped in the formation of political organizations to give outer shape to the Palestinian people's aspirations or discontent. The creation of these entities, however, always remained an instrument to further the policy of the sponsoring government in the inter-Arab feuding that characterized the Arab cold war of the late Fifties and early Sixties. The Palestinians remained, in effect, unrepresented.

Concurrent with this, young Palestinian nationalists, ideologues and activists in Gaza, in Lebanon, in Kuwait and at universities round the Arab capitals, were becoming increasingly convinced that their problem was not on the verge of being solved, that they alone could hasten or bring about a solution by regaining custody of their cause from the Arab governments, the UN and the big powers.

Algerian model

The Algerian struggle, which they had viewed as a model, had culminated in triumph for the Algerian nationalist movement, and innumerable Palestinians were able to go to Algeria for training and support. By the late Sixties, El Fatah had already become a fact and members of its underground cells were already mounting commando attacks against Israel.

Following the defeat of the Arab armies in the June war of 1967, a vacuum occurred in the Arab world that the Palestinian movement, now emboldened above ground, came to fill. El Fatah, virtually the only viable politico-military organization at the time, was the first to do so. This was followed by other groups such as the PFLP and the PDFLP, whose political influence on radically-oriented Palestinians derived from their sophisticated ideology rather than their military or numerical significance. Marxism and Maoist tactics, hitherto alien or taboo in a generally conservative Arab world, were openly espoused by the leadership of the Popular and the Democratic Fronts.

Integrated under the umbrella of the PLO, with its 12-member Executive Committee, the moderate faction, as exemplified by El Fatah, remained fearful of alienating the conservative elements in Palestinian society with radical views, while the left wing proclaimed a rigorously and consistently Marxist platform dedicated to socialist revolution in the Arab world along with the struggle against Zionism in Palestine.

Since the Fifties, a debate had gone on among many of these Palestinian leaders over a common vision that would appeal to a consensus of Palestinians and yet depart from folk rhetoric, i.e. return to the cloudless summers of Palestine as it had existed before 1948 and as it had become petrified in the consciousness of the Palestinian masses. By 1968, this was articulated in the Palestine Covenant, which was passed by the Palestine National Council. It proposed, briefly, that Palestine be reunified, along with its two peoples, into a secular democratic state; that the existence of Israel as an entity carved out of Palestine exclusively for the Jews at the cost of the Palestinian Arabs was "null and void"; that the institutions, laws and ideology of Israel constituted a negation of the human and national rights of the Palestinian people. Zionist *apartheid*, the Covenant argued, must be dismantled before peace could be achieved in Palestine and the Middle East as a whole. This political platform (often criticized by some Palestinians themselves as hardly defining the movement or authoritatively formulating a set of principles to guide it once its goal was achieved) nevertheless has been undergoing a great deal of evolutionary change. Not fully discarded or officially dropped from PLO literature, the idea of a secular, democratic state in the whole of Palestine is regarded rather as "a dream" (in Yasser Arafat's speech at the UN) or a philosophical vision. The accent now in the PLO is on what is called the "national authority," a euphemism for the separate state on the West Bank and Gaza. This, Palestinian leaders feel, would be followed inevitably by political, socio-economic and ideological competition with Israel, as opposed to a purely military confrontation. Convinced that time is on their side, they contend that Israel, a type of garrison state allied to the West and existing in the heart of the Arab world, cannot endure or sustain the stress and strain of isolation from the mainstream of events around it. Sooner or later, the Israelis, the argument goes, will realize their place in the geopolitics of the region. The realization of "the secular, democratic state" will be the result of a peaceful and predictable progression of events.

Secular democratic state proposed in Covenant

Palestinians contend Israel cannot endure

Three phases

The evolutionary continuum in the PLO's aims and methods has seen three distinct phases. Following the guerilla movement's appearance in 1967-1968, the Palestinians seemed to concentrate on military operations across the border and resistance

activities on the West Bank and in Gaza. The events in Jordan in 1970-1971, creating as they did schisms, disarray and recriminations within the PLO itself, were followed by spectacular acts of terror and adventurist violence ("political shock tactics", in the words of one Organization representative, "to thwart implementation of a settlement over the revolution's head") in Europe and the Middle East. With the rise of the PLO into a position of power and prestige after the Rabat Conference and the UN debate on Palestine, the Palestinian movement seems to have entered a phase of *political* struggle, consolidating its diplomatic triumphs and eschewing terror. The transformation of the PLO's platform into one that envisages short-range aims and its concerted efforts to be integrated into the diplomatic arena have not been arrived at without a price. The Marxist faction in the Organization (the so-called "rejection front") has officially pulled out of the Executive Committee and disavowed any connection with Arafat's present manoeuvres, thereby weakening the political and tactical resources of the movement and polarizing the Palestinians themselves. They accuse Arafat of having become "a 'groupie' of the Egyptian and other conservative or reactionary Arab regimes", of having made contacts with "imperialist elements" and, above all of truncating the historical process by accepting "a puppet state" on the West Bank and in Gaza as a terminus of the Palestinian struggle.

The "rejection front", headed by George Habbash, leader of the PFLP, is adopting the position that the moderate faction of the PLO, now in ascendancy, will fail (as the Arab governments will fail) to extract concessions from Israel. Discredited by the masses and the PNC, Arafat's "acceptance front" will lose con-

trol to Habbash's group. Beyond setting the political tone and asserting the direction of the national struggle, there is the pervasive role that the Palestine Liberation Organization plays in the social and cultural life of the average Palestinian. Apart from being answerable to the Palestine National Council, whose members are drawn from the diaspora and under occupation, the PLO influences, and is in turn influenced by, various popular organizations such as the Palestinian Workers' Union, the General Union of Palestinian Women and the innumerable societies of writers, students, teachers, professors and artists. Along with that, the PLO is responsible for the Palestine National Fund, the Red Crescent, the Palestine Research Centre (a Palestinian "think tank" studying problems from the economy to the postage stamps of a possible separate state), the Institute for Palestine Studies and various national councils and committees that oversee the social and political work of Palestinians.

It has always been self-deluding and self-defeating for analysts in the West to question the claim of the PLO as representative of the Palestinians or to give credence, at any time, to the notion that King Hussein of Jordan — a traditional enemy of the Palestinians — could have negotiated the Palestine problem on behalf of its people.

To continue clinging to the proposition that the PLO will somehow go away or to the fiction that the Palestinian problem will somehow be solved in the context of a "refugee" issue will be to offer another contribution to that body of active mythology with which the Palestinian people are already shrouded. It will be to plant the seed for further conflict in an area that has seen sustained conflict for the last 60 years.

The PLO chameleons

So much for smiling Yasser Arafat's olive branch....

The terrorists who shot their way into Tel Aviv to murder civilians with bullets and bombs were not from any of the breakaway factions of Palestinian guerrillas who reject the Arafat claim to leadership. They were Arafat men, members of Al Fatah, the strongest of the PLO guerrilla organizations, still Mr. Arafat's personal power base and still under his personal command.

Mr. Arafat is nothing if not flexible. Last fall, during his campaign to persuade the United Nations that he had become a peaceloving statesman, his killer squads did not hesitate to shoot PLO militants who rejected the switch

from terror to diplomacy. But now that he has failed, in spite of UN recognition, to transfer a series of terrorist raids across the Lebanese border into a war of "national liberation", he has not hesitated to swing back openly to massive terror against civilians by guerrillas with whom he is directly identified....

Meanwhile smiling delegates of the PLO relish their new status as observers at the United Nations, admitted at last to the world club. These delegates, we are told, are not terrorists; they are diplomats. But, to the PLO, diplomacy is merely the continuation of terrorism by other means. (From an editorial in *The Globe and Mail*, March 7, 1975, following a terrorist raid on Tel Aviv.)

Defining a new place for Canada in the hierarchy of world power

By James Eayrs

It is the argument of this essay that the term "middle power" no longer does justice to Canada's role in world affairs. Canada has become instead a "foremost power" — foremost in the dictionary definition of "most notable or prominent". I hope to show that this assertion is no chauvinistic trumpery, no Laurier-like extravaganza ("the twenty-first century belongs to Canada"), but rather a realistic assessment of Canadian capabilities in a world where the substance, and hence the distribution, of power have undergone swift and radical change.

"Power" is the master-concept of politics. As life is to biology, space to astronomy, deity to theology, so is power to relations among individuals, groups and nations. Its very centrality in its field has caused theorists to take power for granted, to take power as given. But in politics nothing should be taken for granted, nothing taken as given.

Let us review, therefore, the properties of power, of which three are basic. Power is *pervasive*; power is *elusive*; and power is *relative*. (Never dismiss platitudes: they often express essential truths.)

Pervasiveness of power

What prose was for M. Jourdain ("Gracious me! For the last 40 years I have been speaking prose without knowing it."), power is for all of us. We may know power as its manipulators, we may know it as its victims, we may, like Jourdain, not know we know. But power is pervasive in our lives. Power is the ecology of politics. To talk of "power politics" is otiose, for there is no other kind.

Resistance to the notion of the pervasiveness of power is as pervasive as power itself. Saints, mystics, gurus of the hour or of the ages are often proclaimed by themselves and their disciples to be beyond the power principle, outside the power nexus.

Gandhi is widely cited as an example of a profoundly significant figure who refused to play the power game. Certainly the "half-naked, seditious fakir" (as

Churchill once described him) appeared to dwell in a kind of power counter-culture — at loggerheads with power, at the antipodes from power. Certainly the saintly figure of the Mahatma in its ascetic's garb seemed even to his fellow Indians on first meeting to be (in Pandit Nehru's words) "very distant and different and unpolitical". How much more so must it have seemed to those worldly British politicians who — their exasperation rising as he remained beyond reach of the sort of argument to which politicians normally respond — tried to negotiate with him about the future of his country!

Gandhi's *satyagraha* — "clinging to truth" — demanded everything that power normally abhors. The shunning of duplicity. The turning of one's cheek. The avoiding of force even in the presence of a weaker adversary. No — the avoiding of force especially in the presence of a weaker adversary. And in the presence of a stronger? "I will come out into the open, and let the pilot see I have not a trace of evil against him [sic]". Such was Gandhi's bomber-defence system.

The strategy invites at worst derision, at best the comment made by Henry Kissinger about the only kind of pacifist he has the time of day for — "those who bear the consequences of non-violence to the end". "But," Kissinger adds, "even to them I will talk willingly merely to tell them that they will be crushed by the will of those that are strong, and that their pacifism can lead to nothing but horrible suffering."

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Such an assessment gravely underrates the power of the Mahatma, which, skilfully deployed, made him the most influential politician – arguably – of our time. To interpret non-violent resistance as the rejection of power is to misunderstand the nature of power. The attraction of *satyagraha*, as of later strategies derived from it (notably Martin Luther King's), is precisely the expectation of potency. Gandhi never doubted it. "Working under this new law of non-violence," he wrote in 1920, "it is possible for a single individual to defy the whole might of an unjust empire." So it proved. Gandhi exaggerated only the novelty of *satyagraha*, which a Judean freedom-fighter had no less skilfully employed against the Romans 2,000 years before him.

Pervasion denied

Nations as well as individuals deny that power pervades. Especially newly-independent nations, which are characteristically reluctant to accept the fact that their hard-won freedom is no more than a licence to hunt in the jungle of power. They look on themselves as above the fray, beyond the struggle, reject the cynical aphorisms of the worldly philosophers – Kautilya's definition of an enemy as the state that is on one's border and of a friend as the state that is on the border of one's enemy, Hobbes's depiction of nations "in the state and posture of gladiators". George Washington for the young United States, Leon Trotsky for the young Bolshevik Republic, Raoul Dandurand for the newly-independent Dominion of Canada alike believed that the principles of their respective policies transcended the sordid statecraft of older, debauched societies.

These attitudes are much the same as those that try to claim for a Jesus or a Gandhi an immunity to power, and rest on the same confusion. What distinguishes them is not their exemption from having to play the game of power but rather their style of play. They have not renounced power, which is no more capable of renunciation by statesmen than gravity is capable of renunciation by spacemen. Theirs is not a renunciation at all, but an enunciation of a particular method of pursuing power – the method that strives after power not by the display or resort to bruising force but by the influence that good behaviour may exert upon opinion. It may not work; but that is another matter.

Power eludes

Power pervades: there is no getting away from it. Power also eludes: there is no coming to grips with it. The elusiveness of

power is beginning to preoccupy both practitioners and theorists, and about time, too.

"Our territory is large, our people are numerous, our geographical position is good It will be intolerable if after several decades we are not the greatest nation on earth."

"If we are six feet tall, the Russians are three feet tall, and the Chinese six inches tall."

"If one's line is correct, even if one has not a single soldier at first, there will be soldiers, and even if there is no political power, power will be gained The crux of the matter is line."

"One word of truth outweighs the whole world."

These four quotations – their authors respectively, are Mao Tse-tung, U.S. Senator William Proxmire, Chou En-lai and Alexander Solzhenitsyn – are all statements about power, assessments of the constituents of power. They cannot all be correct. Those of Chou and Solzhenitsyn come close to saying the same thing, those of Chou and Mao are greatly at variance while those of Mao and Proxmire are mutually incompatible.

The formulae of Mao and Proxmire do have something in common, however. Both proceed from geopolitical assumptions.

Geopolitical assumptions hold that power is a function of a nation's might, that the might of nations may be calculated more or less precisely, and that in consequence comparisons are possible, nations can be ranked and graded. The American humourist Russell Baker wrote a column – "Let's Hear It for No. 7" – in which he argued, tongue only half-in-cheek, that "countries that are No. 11 or No. 17 (he cites Denmark and Kenya) 'don't have to spend all their income to get ready to wipe themselves out' and 'as a result are often very pleasant countries'. He does not want the United States to drop from No. 1 to No. 17, but sees distinct advantages in seventh place.

Basis for calculation

But how to tell that seventh place – or fourth or fifth or sixth? If might is amenable to calculation, what makes the mightier, what makes them mightier yet?

Geopoliticians' answers differed. Some said mighty populations – the state with the biggest battalions. Others said mighty reserves – the state with the greatest budget. Some said control of the seas, others control of the land. Some said control of the air, others control of the firmament. "If the Soviets control space, they can control earth" – thus John F. Kennedy in

960 (making his pitch for the aerospace state).

The ranking of Japan is a good example of the method, and even better of its limitations. Here power is seen to come not from the barrel of a gun but from the greatest GNP, in anticipation of which his before the higher cost of a different kind of barrel) Herman Kahn foresaw the emergence of the Japanese super-state by the year 2,000. For Edwin O. Reischauer (U.S. Ambassador to Japan during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations), there is no need to wait so long: Japan is the No. 2 power in the world."

How does he know? That being too difficult, what makes it so? If the key to Japanese power is export, the key to Japanese export is the qualities of those who make the product high in craftsmanship, low in cost — qualities once epitomized as those of the chrysanthemum and the sword: the sensibility of Japanese design, the zeal of Japanese application to the task at hand, be that overrunning Southeast Asia in the early 1940s or mass-assembling transistor television sets in the early 1970s. A *New York Times* correspondent puts it this way: "American officials and scholars have produced tomes trying to explain why the Japanese have done so well; it may be an over-simplification, but the fundamental reason is that they work like blazes." That does not explain why they work like blazes, but it may be better than no explanation at all.

Elusive as ever, power now seems to abide in the spirit of a people, in their mood and morale — aspects of might about which even neo-geopoliticians do well to baffle their peace. "Great things need no firm foundation," the father of Zionism once remarked. "An apple must be placed on a table to keep it from falling. The earth hovers in the air. Thus I can perhaps found a secure Jewish state without a firm anchorage. The secret lies in movement. Hence I believe that somewhere a guidable aircraft will be discovered." (Herzl's metaphor of "a guidable aircraft", evoked some years before the Wright brothers took flight, is almost as remarkable as his forecast, in 1896, of the State of Israel more than a half a century before its birth.) Using a similar metaphor, a commentator accounted in 1905 for the success of British power in India: "The Indian Empire is not a miracle in the rhetorician's sense but in the theologian's sense. It is a thing which exists and is alive, but cannot be accounted for by any process of reasoning founded on experience. It is a miracle, as a floating island of granite would be a miracle, or a bird of brass which flew

and sung and lived on in mid-air. It is a structure built on nothing, without foundations without buttresses [compare Herzl's "without a firm anchorage"] held in its place by some force the origin of which is undiscoverable and the nature of which has never been explained."

The modern illustration is surely Yugoslavia. Some wit once dismissed that country as a fifth-rate power. Asked for his impression of Belgrade, he replied: "Imagine a whole city illuminated with a 10-watt bulb." But the power of Yugoslavia is not to be measured by its wattage. "According to all rational calculations," A. J. P. Taylor has written, "Yugoslavia was the country most doomed to disintegrate in the storms of the twentieth century. It has few natural resources: little coal or iron and a territory largely composed of barren mountains. . . . Historical traditions, though strong, work against unity, not in its favour." Whence, then, derives its power? From defiance — from defying Stalin and succeeding. "Yugoslavia has been living on the strength of this defiance ever since."

The elusiveness of power may be seen not only in its possession by those who, on "rational calculations", have no right to it but also in its lack by those who, on calculations no less rational, have every right to it. Here is the cry of S. John Peskett in *The Times*, who, with the rest of us, has seen the assumptions of geopolitics, like so many sandcastle Gibralters, washed away by the tide: "All the Queen's horses and all the Queen's men, plus the United States of America, the United Nations, NATO, and all the paratroopers and glider troops we so busily train, cannot rescue a couple of hundred hostages and a few million pounds worth of aircraft from a handful of guerrillas half of whom are quarreling with the other

*Elusiveness
of power
defies rational
calculation*

Relative to use

Power is pervasive, power is elusive. Power is also relative — relative not least to purpose. What you have of it depends on what you want to do with it.

The relativity of power is most simply illustrated by the distinction between the power to build and the power to destroy. The power to build — to create, to innovate, to improve — is hard to come by, arduous to exercise. It derives from resourceful diplomacy and nimble statecraft, sustained as these must be by a generous and patient citizenry. Rome was not built in a day; how much longer it takes to build a world free from poverty, ignorance, disease!

The power to destroy — to wreck, to frustrate, to sabotage — is, in contrast, easy to come by, effortless to exercise. Little is required to smash some cherished project, to bring things tumbling down — only a rifle with a telescopic sight, an assassin hired by the hour. “I’m as important as the start of World War One,” bragged Arthur Bremer to his diary when in Ottawa to try to kill his President. “I just need the little opening and a second of time.”

The power exerted by these demolition experts — the Tepermans, so to speak, of the global village — can be very great. But it is the kind of power a blackmailer exerts over a wealthy victim — potent while it lasts, but of short duration and likely to end unpleasantly for both of them. It is the power wielded by a pyromaniac in a fireworks factory. It is the power displayed by the President of Libya, threatening retaliation unless the UN Security Council voted to his liking — “Otherwise we shall see what we shall see. We shall do what Samson did: destroy the temple with everyone inside it, including ourselves. Europe should look out for the catastrophe which is lying in wait for it.”

Such are the properties of power. Were they fixed clearly in the minds of those who coined the expression “middle power” to describe Canada’s place among the nations? I cannot prove it, but I doubt it.

Obscurity preferred

For all that has been written about “Canada’s role as a middle power” (and much has been written about it), its meaning remains obscure. Obscurity has, indeed, seemed preferable to clarity, Canadians resisting definition as an earlier generation resisted defining “Dominion status” for fear (as Lloyd George put it) of limiting their constitution “by too many finalities”.

“It is hard to say now precisely what a middle power is,” John Holmes confessed in 1965; but that does not bother him. On the contrary: “I am all for accepting this ambiguity rather than insisting on a logical clarification.” And again: “The more one tries to define [middle power], the more difficult and perhaps pretentious it appears to do so at all. Often it seems like describing the obvious. Definition spoils the special quality.”

The origins of the term are as obscure as its meaning. If it was not used first in 1943, it was used first in 1944, for by 1945 “middle power” had come into widespread circulation. The year 1943 is when Canadians both in and out of government first gave thought to what their place in the

Accept ambiguity rather than insist on clarification

postwar world might and ought to be. From the beginning, the prospect of divergence between that “might” and “ought” was both ominous and real. In 1943 Canada stood in the shadow of the United States and Britain. So long as a war remained to be won, such a position was intolerable, might be construed as part of the Canadian war effort — unpleasant, something to be put up with for the duration. But as a permanent stance for the postwar future it was out of the question and Canadians began to say so.

Articulation of discontent was aroused by the threat of exclusion from the ruling circles of the first of the postwar international organizations. Word that Canada, of all countries — was to be left off the governing body of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency set off shocks of anger around the foreign policy community. “We are still trying to run a democracy” (so, with notable asperity, the Government, as quoted in the Pearson memoirs, instructed its agent in Washington charged with arguing his country’s case) “and there is some historical evidence to support the thesis that democracies cannot be taxed without representation. We have tried to lead our people in a full-out effort for the war, and we have hoped that we could continue to lead them in such a way as to get their support behind the provision of relief and maintenance for battle-scarred Europe in the postwar years. We will not be able to secure their support for such a program if it, as well as the economic affairs of the world generally, are to be run as a monopoly by the four Great Powers.”

United States crucial

Of the four great powers, the United States was crucial for the Canadian case. If Washington would not offer sympathy and support for the aspirations of its friend and neighbour, who else could? But Washington’s response left much to be desired. Our status was but dimly recognized, our stature underrated.

In 1925, an eminent American professor of international politics had placed Canada in the category of “other states of subordinate or doubtful rank”. In 1939 President Franklin D. Roosevelt felt bound to telephone the Prime Minister to ascertain whether Canada was bound by the British declaration of war. In 1943, wags in Washington were saying that Canada was in the British Commonwealth Monday, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, an ally of the United States Thursdays, Fridays, Saturdays, and only on Sundays a sovereign

independent state. Canadians were not amused.

On 19 March 1943, the Prime Minister of Canada for the first time since the outbreak of the war was asked in Parliament to set forth his views on foreign policy as it might develop in the postwar world. Here was a subject on which Mackenzie King cared not at all to dilate: "The more [the] public . . . is diverted to questions about what is going to be the attitude of this country and that country at the peace table and [in] the postwar period, the less the country will be impressed with the fact that this war itself is not yet won." But something needed to be said, and what he chose to say was what he had said in the House of Commons as long ago as May 4, 1938:

"Our foreign and external policy is a policy of peace and friendliness, a policy of trying to look after our own interests and to understand the position of other governments with which we have dealings. It is a policy which takes account of our political connections and traditions, our geographical position, the limited numbers and the racial composition of our people, our stage in economic development, our own internal preoccupations and necessities — in short, a policy based on the Canadian situation. It is not and cannot be under these circumstances a spectacular headline policy; it is simply the sum of countless daily dealings with other countries, the general resultant of an effort to act decently on every issue or incident that arises, and a hope of receiving the same treatment from others."

The authors of the volume in the *Canada in World Affairs* series for 1941-44 in which this passage is quoted allow themselves a restrained but telling comment: "Mr. King did not make any modification of this five-year-old statement to conform with the revolutionary development which had taken place in Canada's war potential and industrial production."

Indeed he did not. That would have been inconsistent with his style — a style which, when he came to enunciate principles of foreign policy, chose (to adapt the lyrics of a song of that era) "to eliminate the positive, latch on to the negative".

Even in 1938 — so it seems to one fair-minded and knowledgeable observer, Nicholas Mansergh — the statement overrode the difficulties, stressing "the precariousness of Canada's export markets, but not the value of her exports; . . . regional and cultural tensions within, but not the crowning sense of unity; . . . the conflicting pulls of geography and history to which

indeed every 'settled' country is subject, but . . . not the immense strength of Canada's position in the heart of the English-speaking world". In 1943 the statement greatly underrated the country's power. Canada's uranium alone might have been used to extract from the Anglo-American partners in atomic-energy production virtually any concession on postwar status. But that is not how its leaders chose to play their hand.

Still, it was plain folly to continue to be content with lisping their hope for decent treatment in a world about to gain knowledge of the holocaust and to witness Hiroshima. Such ultra-diffident diplomacy would lose Canada's case by default. Even Mackenzie King was soon compelled to realize as much. July 1943 finds him, for the first time, striving after a postwar status commensurate with wartime stature:

"A number of new international institutions are likely to be set up as a result of the war. In the view of the Government, effective representation on these bodies should neither be restricted to the largest states nor necessarily extended to all states. Representation should be determined on a functional basis which will admit to full membership those countries, large or small, which have the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question."

Here is the germ of "the Canadian doctrine of the middle powers", for a moment's reflection upon its implications is sufficient to indicate how inadequate the "great power/small power" dichotomy had become. "The simple division of the world between great powers and the rest is unreal and even dangerous," Mackenzie King declared to Parliament in August 1944:

"The great powers are called by that name simply because they possess great power. The other states of the world possess power and, therefore, the capacity to use it for the maintenance of peace — in varying degrees ranging from almost zero in the case of the smallest and weakest states up to a military potential not far below that of the great powers."

Somewhere on this spectrum of power lay Canada.

But where? Policy-makers developed a concern with ranking. "We are moving up in the International League," L. B. Pearson told a Toronto audience in March 1944, "even though we are not yet in the first division." And, in a letter written at that time, Pearson groped closer than anyone had thus far done to the concept of the "middle power":

Ultra-diffident diplomacy would have lost Canada's case by default

Great power — small power dichotomy had become inadequate

"Canada is achieving, I think, a very considerable position as a leader, among a group of States which are important enough to be necessary to the Big Four but not important enough to be accepted as one of that quartet. As a matter of fact, the position of a 'little Big Power' or 'big little Power' is a very difficult one, especially if the 'little Big Power' is also a 'Big Dominion'. The big fellows have power and responsibility, but they also have control. We 'in-between States' sometimes get, it seems, the worst of both worlds. We are necessary but not necessary enough. I think this is being felt by countries like the Netherlands and Belgium as well as by ourselves. That is why these countries are not only looking towards the Big Powers, but are looking toward each other for support. There is, I think, an opportunity for Canada, if we desire to take it, to become the leader of this group."

Comparisons may be odious but, as time ran out on Canadian efforts to secure a position on the proposed United Nations Security Council, they became unavoidable. "Just as we are prepared to recognize the great difference in power and responsibility between Canada and the Soviet Union," Mackenzie King told the meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers on May 11, 1944, "[so] we should expect some recognition of the considerable difference between Canada and Panama." Reaffirming, against continued British opposition, its belief that powers other than the great powers should be represented on the Council, the Canadian Government repeated its conviction that their selection "should in some way be related to a dispassionate appraisal of their probable effective contribution to the maintenance of security." "You will, I am sure" — Mackenzie King thought it well to add for Churchill's benefit — "appreciate how difficult it would be for Canada, after enlisting nearly one million persons in her armed forces and trebling her national debt in order to assist in restoring peace, to accept a position of parity in this respect with the Dominican Republic or El Salvador."

Such perceptions were widely shared throughout the country. For some Canadians, indeed, their Government's disclaimer of topmost status — "Canada certainly makes no claim to be regarded as a great power" — seemed to be too bashful, too reserved. "A great world power standing beside Great Britain in the British Empire" was Howard Green's vision of our postwar future. "A country large enough to have world interests," was the assessment of the *Windsor Star*. And a

leading Canadian publicist, pondering Greater Canada among the Nations", said our role like this:

"Under the impact of war, Canada has moved up from her old status to a new stature. With her smaller population and lack of colonial possessions, she is not a major or world power like Britain or the United States or Russia. But with her natural wealth and human capacity, she is not a minor one like Mexico or Sweden. She stands between as a British Power of medium rank."

In short, a middle power. The term was officially employed for the first time in a despatch from the Department of External Affairs to heads of mission in the five capitals of the countries to which, on January 12, 1945, the Canadian Government made a final (and unavailing) appeal for representation on the Security Council; the exact phrase used was "so-called middle power". The term was officially defined for the first time in a speech by R. G. Riddell in 1947: "The Middle Powers are those which by reason of their size, their material resources, their willingness and ability to accept responsibility, their influence and stability are close to being great powers."

Promotion sought

The term "middle power" came into the vocabulary of diplomacy as part of a Canadian campaign to gain promotion from the status of a small power. But that is not the only purpose for which it may be used. It can also be an instrument of demotion. It lends itself not only to aggrandizement but to disparagement as well — as in the expression "merely a middle power".

An instance of how "middle power" may be used for the purpose of demotion and disparagement was reported from Moscow in 1955 on the occasion of Pearson's visit to the Soviet Union. At a reception at the Canadian Embassy for the diplomatic corps, the Canadian and Soviet foreign ministers exchanged some significant banter. "Mr. Molotov and I ought to understand each other," said Pearson joshingly. "We belong to the same trade union but he is a much more important member than I am." "Mr. Pearson is very modest," Molotov responded. "Canada is among the great powers." When Pearson jocularly compared Canada's position between the United States and the Soviet Union to that of the ham in a sandwich, Lazar Kaganovich chimed in to suggest that "a good bridge" was a better comparison. Nor was that the end of it. At a reception some days later, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs

ound himself (according to one of the reporters present) "in the position of arguing that Canada is a small, rather frail country, while the Russians argued that Canada is a big, important one. . . . As Mr. Pearson pursued this line that Canada is a small nation, Molotov broke in. He said the Russians do not agree with the foreign minister. In the schools of his country, said Molotov, the children are taught to regard Canada as one of the world's major powers."

Not too much should be made of this exchange (it is not reported in Pearson's memoirs except for a fleeting reference to "flattering toasts to Canada"); it bears, indeed, a close resemblance to what George Kennan recalls as the "slightly disreputable" remarks which passed ritualistically between himself and assorted Latin American presidents some years before ("You, Mr. Kennan, are an official of the government of a great country; and I am only the President of an obscure little country"; "Ah, Mr. President, that may be, but we are all aware that there is no connection between the size of a country and the amount of political wisdom it can produce.") Much more significant is the deliberately depreciating analysis of Canada's place in the world put out from the Prime Minister's office on May 29, 1968, soon after Pierre Trudeau arrived there:

"Canada's position in the world is now very different from that of the postwar years. Then we were probably the largest of the small powers. Our currency was one of the strongest. We were the fourth or fifth trading nation and our economy was much stronger than the European economies. We had one of the very strongest navy [sic] and air forces. But now Europe has regained its strength. The Third World has emerged. . . .

"These are the broad lines of the international environment in which Canada finds itself today. What are we proposing to do about it? We are going to begin with a thorough and comprehensive review of our foreign policy which embraces defence, economic and aid policies. . . ."

Without prejudging the findings of that review, it was nonetheless possible to state in a word what its objective ought to be. The word was "realism": "Realism — that should be the operative word in our definition of international aim. Realism in how we read the world barometer. Realism in how we see ourselves thriving in the climate it forecasts." And the first requirement of realism was that "we should not exaggerate the extent of our influence upon the course of world events".

In the course of public speaking over the next few months, the Prime Minister returned again and again to this opening theme. On December 18, 1968, asked by an interviewer if Canada should revert to its postwar role as a leader of the middle powers, Mr. Trudeau demurred:

"Personally I tend to discount the weight of our influence in the world. . . . I think we should be modest, much more modest than we were, I think, in the postwar years when we were an important power because of the disruption of Europe and so on. But right now we're back to our normal size as it is and I think we must realize that we have limited energy, limited resources and, as you said earlier, intellectual and [sic] manpower. Therefore, we must use modesty. . . . We shouldn't be trying to run the world."

On January 1, 1969:

". . . We're living in a world where the strategy is dominated by two powers. All we can do is talk a little bit about tactics but not much."

And on March 25, 1969 (to the National Press Club in Washington):

"I hope that we Canadians do not have an exaggerated view of our own importance. . . . We may be excused, I hope, if we fail to take too seriously the suggestions of some of our friends from time to time that our acts, or our failure to act — this or that way — will have profound international consequences or will lead to wide-scale undesirable results."

No one familiar with the role of a prime minister in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy will be surprised to learn that these ideas emerged relatively intact as the basic philosophy of the White Paper embodying the results of the foreign policy review when it appeared in 1970. Much has been written about *Foreign Policy for Canadians* — if the purpose was to spark discussion, it succeeded admirably in that purpose — to which there is no need to add. But one point must be made.

It was the Prime Minister's expectation and intention that the results of the review would endure. He believed that the review would outfit Canadians with a foreign policy that would do them for a couple of decades. "When you make a decision to review your foreign policy," Mr. Trudeau remarked in Calgary on April 12, 1969, "it will last for quite a while. . . . You only re-examine your foreign policy once in a generation. You can't switch every year, you can't switch after every election."

Here is a major error. You can switch, and you must. To stay put for so long is

Prime Minister's ideas embodied in White Paper

not just to risk being overtaken by events, it guarantees it.

Major changes

Between 1970 and 1975, three major changes have occurred within the international system that have drastically altered the pattern of power. Each is advantageous — or prospectively advantageous — to Canada.

The first is the emergence of what might be called "le défi OPEC" — that sudden accretion of wealth to the low-cost, oil-bearing countries of the Middle East

that is currently netting their treasuries enormous "petrodollar" revenue.

It remains to be seen whether the assorted sheikhdoms and emirates that are the beneficiaries of this windfall can transmute their wealth to power, even whether they will enjoy the prosperity of Croesus or suffer the fate of Midas. (Shah Pahlavi and the late King Faisal show it can go either way.) Two consequences, however, are already clear.

One is that the power of oil-dependent industrial countries — all Western Europe

Commonwealth and the Third World

The meeting in Kingston town

By any yardstick, the May meeting of Commonwealth heads of government in Kingston, Jamaica, was a success. It was attended by a record number of individual government leaders, and some difficult problems were grappled with in a friendly and constructive way. The agenda order for government leaders in executive session permitted the leaders to move from a preliminary examination of intra-Commonwealth relations and functional co-operation through an examination of world-power shifts and on to the main topic of "world trade, finance and development". In the Commonwealth context this last subject stemmed from Jamaican Prime Minister Manley's initiative at the 1973 Ottawa meeting of the heads of government. In a larger sense, of course, it followed on the active consideration of the topic at the UN in the past year. The timing of the Commonwealth heads of government meeting and of the proposed Commonwealth finance ministers meeting next August has engendered active interest in the Commonwealth discussion as an ideal bridge between the twenty-ninth General Assembly of the UN and the UN special session to be held in September 1975.

The initial days of the meeting are reported to have been marked by an undue number of the interventions by the heads of government being read into the record as prepared texts. Had this trend continued, it would have been difficult for the meeting to have reached

any valuable conclusions. By the first weekend, however, thanks in large part to Prime Minister Trudeau's informal, off-the-cuff participation, the executive sessions had become more lively and productive.

The examination of the New Economic Order was remarkable for bringing together insight from all sides into the complexity of the problem. It also brought home the fact that "confrontation" in international forums is not simply a two-sided but a multi-sided problem, which cuts across both developed and developing country groups. Specifics were examined, and there is some hope that the study group established can move ahead on one or two particular points by August, when the Commonwealth finance ministers meet. This would be in keeping with Mr. Manley's expressed hope that "some practical parts may be brought to fruition before the whole". In other words, everything should not be held up until it is possible to move forward across the board. The achievements of the meeting in this area were the result of active and constructive lobbying between the advocates of the extreme of British and Guyanese proposals and long sessions in both sub-committee and committee of the whole, with the final compromise and consensus being reached in executive session.

The importance of this item on the Commonwealth agenda is underlined by the fact that this is the first time a

ean states that lack access to North Sea sources and Japan — has been drastically reduced. The other is that the power of oil-sufficient industrial countries has been substantially increased — nowhere more so than in Canada, where oil is providentially found in conjunction with other sources of energy (notably coal).

Resource power

A second major change of the past five years is the declining capacity of technology to confer power and the growing

capacity of resources to confer it. To a world where population continues an exponential rate of climb towards demographic disaster, ultra-modern processes for the transmission and manipulation of data are more and more irrelevant and in less and less demand. Such a world requires computers, photocopiers and satellite communication systems less than it needs raw materials, minerals and — above all — food. Power is shifting from those who control the former to those who control the latter. A recent discussion of *The*

smaller group like the Commonwealth has grappled with the subject of the New Economic Order in detail. The resulting demonstration of the existence of the political will to reach solutions is, therefore, important. Whatever the long-term results, however, it would be a mistake to judge the Kingston heads of government meeting solely in terms of this item.

Another important achievement was the momentum given to intra-Commonwealth relations and functional co-operation. The heads of government initiated or approved further developments in the fields of science, youth, technical assistance and Secretariat affairs generally. Programs such as the Commonwealth Foundation and the proposed Commonwealth Investment Bank also received boosts. In these latter areas, the Canadian announcement of increased contributions was well received. The difficult items of disarmament, Cyprus, Middle East, Indian Ocean, Indochina, Southern Africa, Cuba and Belize also took up considerable time in both the executive sessions and concurrently in the meetings of the committee of the whole.

Two items that are reported to have produced particularly free and interesting discussion were the questions of the brain-drain and the role of women in public affairs. Considerable attention was also given to food production and rural development. On these questions, following on the London meeting, there was strong and positive interest in the

establishment of the new Secretariat division to handle questions in this area and in the selection of the director of the division. A restricted session of heads of government without any advisers present discussed comparative techniques of government (a Canadian item first discussed by senior officials in 1972 and by heads of government in 1974 in Ottawa). Another Canadian proposal, calling for the establishment of a "Commonwealth Day", was well received. The proposal was agreed to in principle and, after a short discussion in executive session, was referred to the Secretariat to explore a suitable day.

Other Commonwealth meetings such as finance ministers meetings have already demonstrated the usefulness of the Commonwealth forum as a testing-ground for world issues. This is in many ways the first meetings at heads-of-government level that has been put to the test. Chairman Manley, who referred publicly at the close of the meeting to the doubts that had been expressed about the Commonwealth's ability to adjust to the modern world, dubbed the meeting the "Concord of Kingston" to balance the "Spirit of Ottawa". Whether or not these descriptions prove realistic and are matched by concrete results in trade, finance and development, remains to be seen. In the meantime, they sum up the atmosphere of the closing days of a meeting that achieved consensus on all items without wrenching disagreements.

New Wealth of Nations by Charles F. Gallagher identifies this trend:

"In a world of finite and dwindling physical assets the balance of market values has shifted, at least temporarily and perhaps for a very long period, from the ability of technology to create and develop new assets to the capacity of existing assets to command considerations that will permit the purchase of technology and the procurement of power. For long technology was joined to capital in a fruitful marriage, a happy coupling that developed material resources and created new assets. Today it is resources which have alienated the affections of capital and created conditions permitting the downgrading of technology to the status of a handmaiden serving the new connubial union. In short, skills have been reduced to a position in which they are traded at a discount relative to goods. He who has the right materials is better off than he who has the right training

"Because of the revaluation and redistribution of the chips of the game, we have a rearrangement in the classification of nations today."

If this is bad news for the Science Council of Canada, it is good news for the Government of Canada. It means that Canada is exceptionally well endowed to face the worst (short of nuclear war) the future may fling at mankind, exceptionally well equipped for what has been called "the desperate misadventure we are now engaged upon", as well-prepared as any people for those dismal "human prospects" envisaged by melancholiacs who forecast global breakdown. We have what it takes, since we have all it takes.

Canada has almost sinfully bestowed upon it the sources of power, both traditional and new. The technology is there, or waiting. (We need only decide how much technology to develop for ourselves, how much to buy from others.) The manpower is there, or waiting. (We need only decide how many millions more our country needs, then pick amongst the jostling clamourers according to the criteria of our choice.) The resources are there, or waiting, too — animal, vegetable and mineral. Hardly a month elapses without the revelation of some new bonanza in our larder. (We need only decide how fast to develop them, how much to charge for them.)

Decline of U.S.

Finally — in part because of these two changes but only just in part — a third change that Peter Wiles has called "the declining self-confidence of the super-

powers". These are super-powers now by name only. The decline in self-confidence is most striking in the United States — for reasons that require no elaboration. (The most telling thing about "Watergate" is that it could not have happened in the Soviet Union.) "No nation can pretend to be a super-power," writes C. L. Sulzberger about his country's recent compound fractures, "when its foreign policy suffers such blows as that of the United States in Southeast and Southwest Asia, when its economy reels, its unemployment zooms, its currency staggers, and when its leadership, symbolized by a Chief Executive who chooses that moment to take time off for golf, faces its crises in paralyzed confusion."

For Canadians to exult in America's misfortune for its own sake would be the grossest form of *Schadenfreude*. Not for a moment do I suggest we should. I suggest only that we do so for our own sake.

It has not been good for Canada to have been obliged to exist so long in the shadow of a luminous imperial America whose achievements in whatever field measured by whatever standard, have consistently outclassed our own. On the contrary, this condition has been a prescription for crippling neurosis. America's descent from the dizzy heights of power and responsibility which under successive administrations it has occupied since the era of the Marshall Plan offers Canada a chance to stand with more assurance in the light. Only a masochist could fail to welcome such an opportunity.

The opportunity is there, or waiting. "We live in a century," the Prime Minister of Canada remarked in the presence of the Premier of China, "where, increasingly, national greatness is measured not in terms of martial grandeur or even economic accomplishment but in terms of individual welfare and human dignity. No longer military might or political hegemony the yardstick of achievement. The true test of a government is found in its ability to provide its people with a sense of worth, of accomplishment, of fulfilment." For the first time since 1945, it has become plausible to argue that Canada's chance of passing such a test is just as good as that of the United States — perhaps even better.

A recent attempt by Peter Dobell to re-rank Canada among the nations in accordance with these new realities promoted us from "middle power" to "minor great power". But such terms as "great power", whether minor or major, have, like "middle power" itself, lost all significance and meaning. I should be content with "formost power" — if we produce a foreign policy to match.

Canada
well-endowed
to face
the future

Recap of 29th General Assembly: United Nations turning-point?

By Alex I. Inglis

The twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations was both difficult and acrimonious, yet it held forth promise of revitalization. The visible coalescence of the non-aligned and developing countries into a solid bloc with numerical superiority was in many ways the most noticeable feature of the session as it had been at the sixth special session held earlier in the year. This bloc drew together sufficient voting strength to carry resolutions opposed by the Western industrialized countries — indeed, on occasion to carry resolutions over the combined opposition of the West and the Soviet-bloc countries. As a result, the Assembly, seized of some of the most contentious issues in recent international affairs, brought forward a number of solutions that were unacceptable to important elements. Indeed, some of the resolutions adopted showed little consideration for the practical problems of implementation.

Although much of the twenty-ninth Assembly's work failed to reflect the continuing realities of traditional world power, it did accurately reflect recent changes in the international scheme. The accumulation of wealth by the oil-producing countries, the availability of OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries) as a vehicle for political consultation, the concerted efforts of the preceding year to unite the non-aligned and the promise of aid from the Arab oil-producers to the developing world all combined to bring a high degree of unity to the Third World. These factors, coupled with African support for the Arab position on the Palestinian question in return for Arab support for the African campaign against the Republic of South Africa, made it possible for the non-aligned to exercise their predominant voting strength with a high degree of unity and consistency.

The session began routinely with the admission of three new members — Bangladesh, Grenada and Guinea-Bissau (the third being of special interest as the first of the former Portuguese territories to be

admitted to UN membership) — and the election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the Algerian Foreign Minister, to the Presidency of the Assembly. The opening general debate was, as usual, adorned with statements by heads of state, heads of government and foreign ministers. Included in this group for the first time were U.S. President Ford and Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen. Mr. MacEachen delivered to the Assembly a Canadian statement on the broad issues facing the international community. Later he returned to New York for the Palestinian debate and set forth Canada's views on the Middle East.

Following the routine opening of the Assembly, proceedings began to reflect the force of emergent Third World power. Among the issues and debates that highlighted the session were the Palestine question, the *de facto* suspension of South Africa from participation in the twenty-ninth Assembly, Cyprus, Korea, Cambodia, the Echeverria Charter and the concluding debate on the strengthening of the role of the UN. The most notable were the Palestine debate and the related acceptance of Yasser Arafat as spokesman for the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), and the recognition of the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinian people. On October 14, the Assembly adopted by an affirmative vote of 105, including a number of Western delegations (France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Ireland), a resolution inviting the PLO to participate in the plenary meetings of the Assembly on the Palestine question as "the representative of the Palestinian people". Canada abstained with 19 others, and explained that it preferred not to prejudge who

*Acceptance
of Arafat
as Palestinian
spokesman*

Mr. Inglis is Editor of International Perspectives. The views expressed in this article are purely his own, however, and are not intended to reflect the policy of the Department or to state an editorial position for this magazine.

should represent the Palestinians. The delegation also stressed the undesirability of modifying the previous practice whereby participation in plenary debates was reserved to delegates of sovereign states.

The substantive debate on the Palestine question began on November 13 with the dramatic appearance of Mr. Arafat delivering his "olive-branch and gun" speech. The two-week marathon that followed saw more than 100 delegates taking part. In the course of the debate, President Bouteflika made some controversial rulings that, with others, brought him considerable criticism. In particular, by restricting the rights of representatives to a single intervention — a ruling that had the effect of limiting the right of the Israeli delegation to speak to the Assembly during the Palestine debate —, he saw his impartiality as President called in question and, in the view of some observers, reduced the credibility of the debate on the Palestine question. Mr. Bouteflika had also come under fire earlier, when Arafat was accorded protocol honours virtually the same as those of a head of state.

Two resolutions

The Palestinian debate led to the adoption of two resolutions. Both had solid non-aligned support in the vote, but the breadth of the co-sponsorship was relatively modest as a Third World initiative. The first, adopted on November 22, reaffirmed the "inalienable rights of Palestinian people in Palestine", including self-determination, national independence and a return to home and property. Not only Western delegates who opposed or abstained from the Palestinian rights resolution but also a number of non-aligned who supported the resolution expressed regret that the text made no reference to Security Council Resolution 242 and did not affirm the right of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, to live in peace and security. The second resolution accorded the PLO observer status at the UN General Assembly as well as at all international conferences convened under the auspices of the UN. Canada was among the 37 nations that abstained in the vote on the Palestine rights resolution and among the 17 that voted against the resolution granting observer status to the PLO. Canadian opposition to the second resolution was based on the view that observer status should be limited to sovereign states and organizations of sovereign states.

Another highly contentious issue before the Assembly was the question of the credentials of the South African delegation. Discussion of South African

credentials has become a perennial feature at the United Nations. At previous sessions since 1970, however, the General Assembly's rejection of the credentials of the Republic of South Africa has always been effected by an amendment to the Credentials Committee report. This year, for the first time, the Credentials Committee itself rejected the South African credentials. Thus Western members like Canada, which support the conception of universality in the UN, were among the 23 states that voted against the acceptance of the Committee report. Nonetheless, the report was adopted with 98 affirmative votes from the non-aligned, plus the Soviet bloc. Immediately following the adoption of the Credentials Committee report, the African group introduced a resolution calling on the Security Council to review the relationship between the UN and South Africa. The resolution was carried by 125 votes, including that of Canada. In explaining its support, the Canadian delegation stressed that it was not condoning the expulsion or the suspension of South Africa but was voting for the resolution because it was vigorously opposed to *apartheid* and was concerned by the intransigence of the Government of South Africa *vis-à-vis* Assembly injunctions, and because the resolution did not prejudge the outcome of the Security Council's review.

The Security Council debate on the relationship between South Africa and the UN was held from October 18 to 30, and involved some 50 speakers. It culminated in an unprecedented triple veto by Britain, France and the United States of an African resolution recommending to the General Assembly the expulsion of the Republic of South Africa from the United Nations. For the remainder of the twenty-ninth Assembly these negative votes were the subject of recurrent bitter attacks by the non-aligned delegations. The vetoes also gave rise to further comment in the Third World on the continuing validity of the privileged position of permanent members of the Security Council in the UN structure and the need to redefine the veto power. This lent strength in some quarters to the demand for the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee to review the Charter.

The Security Council report to the effect that it had been unable to adopt a decision on the relationship of South Africa to the UN but remained seized of the question was introduced to the Assembly on November 12. In response, the non-aligned delegations, led by Tanzania, Guyana and India, asked President Bouteflika for his guidance on the "status" of the South African delegation. Some of the leading

*Controversial
rulings
brought criticism
on President*

*Canada
abstained
on Palestine
rights resolution*

non-aligned spokesmen argued that, although under the terms of the Charter the UN could neither suspend nor expel without a recommendation from the Security Council, under Article 29 of the Assembly's rules of procedure delegations sat provisionally until their credentials had been ruled on by the Assembly. It followed, they argued, that a delegation whose credentials were, in due course, rejected by the Assembly should then be refused the right to continue its participation in the current session. Bouteflika, in handing down his ruling, acknowledged that the question of membership was a matter for Security Council recommendation but accepted the argument about continuing participation based on Article 29 and ruled that the Republic of South Africa could not participate further in the twenty-ninth Assembly. The ruling was challenged, and Canada was among the 22 delegations that voted against the President. The Canadian delegation maintained that, under Articles 5 and 6 of the Charter, a Security Council decision was the only valid basis for excluding a member of the organization from participation in the Assembly's proceedings.

Although the exclusion of South Africa from the Assembly can be viewed as a further demonstration of the international abhorrence of *apartheid*, it also sets a precedent that may trouble UN members for the foreseeable future. The threat that unpopular positions may result in temporary expulsion by a simple majority vote of the Assembly, where no veto exists, could be self-defeating. Although such a development is most unlikely, should temporary expulsion ever be imposed on either of the super-powers it is difficult to imagine the United Nations surviving in any meaningful form. There have already been references to the possibility of using this weapon against Israel during future sessions of the Assembly; it is hard to assess the effect of such action.

Cyprus

The third major issue before the Assembly was the question of Cyprus. This subject, which is another perennial of the UN agenda, took on an added importance in the wake of the fighting that had occurred on the island during the preceding summer. The Assembly resolution called for heightened efforts on all sides to negotiate a political settlement, and by implication applied some additional pressure on Turkey to move towards a withdrawal of its forces from the island. One notable feature of the handling of the Cypriot question at the twenty-ninth Assembly

was that the resolution (which the non-aligned states played a major part in steering through) received affirmative votes from Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, the United States and the Soviet Union and, in consequence, was adopted unanimously.

On Cyprus, as on so many other issues, the unity of the non-aligned was of considerable importance. But on some questions, particularly those dealing with Asia, that unity broke down. Perhaps the most important items over which this occurred were those concerning Cambodia and Korea. On the Cambodian question, a coalition of ASEAN (Association of the Southeast Asian Nations) and Western countries with Latin American support emerged. This grouping, by a narrow margin, forestalled an Assembly decision to expel the representatives of the Khmer Republic and replace them with representatives of Sihanouk's *Grunc*. In the end, the resolution adopted called for the continuation of Khmer representation for talks among the parties concerned and for the assistance of the Secretary-General in seeking a peaceful settlement.

The non-aligned also failed to maintain their solid front on the question of Korea. The twenty-eighth Assembly's consensus on this subject had called for the resumption of dialogue between North and South Korea. This had begun in 1974, but had been unilaterally suspended by North Korea in August. Despite this, supporters of North Korea, including China and Russia, again inscribed a Korean item on the agenda and, when the question came before the First Committee, there were two conflicting resolutions. One, co-sponsored by supporters of South Korea, called for the resumption of the dialogue. It also urged the Security Council, with the parties directly concerned, to consider in due course the dissolution of the UN Command and to pursue other alternatives as means of maintaining the armistice agreement. The second resolution, co-sponsored by North Korea supporters, called for the immediate withdrawal from Korea of all foreign troops under the UN flag.

When the issue came to a vote, the South Korean resolution was carried by 61 to 42, with 32 abstentions, while the North Korean resolution was defeated in a tie vote of 48 for and 48 against. Again there were 32 abstentions. Earlier attempts by France, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Sweden and others to formulate a consensus resolution between the conflicting positions had met with failure. Some observers felt that the North Koreans and their supporters had refused consensus as a result of a growing conviction that the "numbers game"

Two Korean
resolutions
on agenda

was beginning to turn in their favour. Among the questions that were raised were the unusual nature of the UN Command, its origin and composition, the reluctance of the U.S. to submit regular Command reports to the Security Council.

Of major importance was the twenty-ninth Assembly's continuation of the work of the sixth special session, held in April 1974. This special session had been called on short notice at the request of President Boumedienne of Algeria. Though encumbered by this hasty summons, reflected in the general lack of preparation of background documentation for the delegates, the special session did manage to conclude its work on May 2, 1974, with the adoption without vote of a "Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" and a "Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order". While there was no genuine consensus on these texts (Canada, like most other Western countries, presented a number of substantive reservations on the two documents), delegations achieved some measure of agreement on the declaration and most of them supported the emergency measures set out in the Program of Action.

The special session was itself contentious, and produced rather mixed results. Nevertheless, it focused world attention at a high level upon the economic problems facing especially the most disadvantaged of the developing countries. It also brought home to governments of all member states that the balance of world economic power had shifted in the wake of the oil crisis, though perhaps not to the extent certain developing countries had thought and hoped.

Impact of special session

The impact of the special session affected both the tone and the type of resolution that came before the twenty-ninth Assembly and its Second Committee. The most important item in this regard was the discussion of the charter of economic rights and duties of states (the Echeverria Charter). The working group established two years before following the introduction of the matter by President Echeverria of Mexico at UNCTAD III (the Third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) had successfully negotiated many of the articles for inclusion in the Charter. Disagreement remained, however, on several major and important matters, notably on the rule of international law in respect to investment disputes and compensation for nationalization. In mid-session, the

Group of 77 negotiated among themselves a new text for the article on nationalization and compensation and presented it to the developed countries in the Second Committee. Fortunately, the text retained most of the language earlier agreed to and thus was able to become the working document of the Committee. A contact group was established to continue the negotiations but, since the most contentious paragraphs appeared not to be genuinely negotiable, the developed countries put forward a formal proposal to hold yet another session of the working group and at the same time presented a long list of amendments, all of which were defeated in Committee.

The Echeverria Charter was then adopted by a large majority, but most of the developed countries abstained or voted negatively. Thus, while the Charter has been called "The Crown of the twenty-ninth Assembly", for many of the developing countries it comes into being in flawed form. The Canadian delegation, in statements before the Committee and in plenary session, made clear its position that the document could not be considered as a basis for the evolution of international law in controversial areas where the Charter had failed to gain general acceptance. The statement also made it clear, however, that Canada supported the principles and goals of the Charter. Although Canada abstained in the vote on the Charter, in the paragraph-by-paragraph stage, delegates voted affirmatively on many paragraphs.

On the question of decolonization, the twenty-ninth Assembly found itself in a radically-changed context from previous years. The effect of Portuguese decolonization in southern Africa, the speed of which had only become clear during the course of the twenty-ninth Assembly, brought home the realization that, for the first time in history, recommendations related to the decolonization of southern Africa were likely to be carried into practice. Although it was not necessarily reflected in the wording of the resolutions, there was also an underlying expectation that a settlement of the Rhodesian issue could be expected in the near future, as could an end to the South African administration of Namibia. The net effect of these developments was to hold forth promise to the international community that it might soon be rid of an issue that had plagued it since the Second World War. The resolution adopted on the question of the Portuguese territories reflected the UN's wholehearted acceptance of Portuguese decolonization. Reintegration of Portugal into the activities of the UN's Specialized Agencies was assured, and the determination of the majority to insist



UN Photo/Chen

In September 1974 Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan J. MacEachen journeyed to New York to lead the Canadian delegation in the UN General Assembly. He is pictured here seated in the Assembly Hall with Ambassador Saul Rae, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United States, and Senator Harry Hays, who also was a member of the delegation.

on moral and material support for the decolonization process was also reflected.

The resolution on the relationship between the UN and the Organization of African Unity provided for regular participation by African liberation movements recognized by the OAU in the related work of the UN, its Specialized Agencies and its sponsored meetings. On this issue the African co-sponsors demonstrated their willingness to take into account real Western concerns by accepting Scandinavian-Canadian suggestions for revision of the text to delimit more carefully the present pattern of liberation movement participation.

Disarmament and proliferation

Considerable attention was paid to questions of disarmament and the dangers of proliferation at the Assembly. Evidence of the extensiveness of this attention is to be found in the fact that the First Committee handled a record 21 disarmament resolutions.

The major concern in this area was the rapidly-escalating danger of nuclear proliferation. The question was how to contain proliferation and its consequent escalation of the risk of nuclear warfare without, at the same time, inhibiting the legitimate demand that the benefits of nuclear energy be available to all states for

genuinely peaceful purposes. Underlying this debate and the negotiation of many of the resolutions were the May 1974 Indian nuclear test and its implications for proliferation. The Canadian and other delegations worked in the First Committee towards the adoption of resolutions that would demonstrate this concern and lay the groundwork for an early examination of the problems inherent in the conception of peaceful nuclear explosions that might dissuade other non-nuclear-weapon states from following the Indian example.

Supporters of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) were heartened by the fact that, while a number of delegations continued to criticize the Treaty, they did so in terms milder than had been expected. Strong support for the purposes of the NPT was reflected in the adoption of a key resolution reaffirming that, in accordance with the Treaty, peaceful nuclear explosions should be carried out not by non-nuclear-weapon states but by way of peaceful nuclear-explosion services provided by the nuclear-weapon states. The resolution, co-sponsored by Canada, was adopted in the Assembly by a vote of 115 to three with 12 abstentions.

From the Canadian point of view, this resolution was the most important of all those on disarmament. It underlined the

Criticism of non-proliferation milder than expected

concern of the vast majority of countries that the independent possession of nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear-weapon states could lead to regional and international instability and increase the risks of nuclear proliferation. It also pointed to the need for much more thorough investigation of the role of peaceful nuclear explosions.

Another item of continued interest to Canada on the Assembly's agenda was the question of peace-keeping. Unlike so many other topics before the twenty-ninth Assembly, peace-keeping was not part of the confrontation between the developed and the developing countries. Rather, the peacekeeping debate took place within the traditional parameters of East-West differences on the relative importance of the Security Council and the Secretary-General in peacekeeping operations. The U.S.S.R., the Eastern Europeans and the French continued to insist on the supremacy of the Security Council, where the veto could be exercised in peacekeeping operations. Canada, with most other Western countries, continued to stress the importance of a role for the Secretary-General in operational matters in order to ensure effective command and control, among other things to protect the security and safety of personnel.

A resolution sponsored by Canada and co-sponsored by most of the countries involved in peace-keeping authorized the continuation of the work of the Committee of 33, established in 1965 as a special committee on peace-keeping operations. The Committee's report at the twenty-ninth Assembly included alternative draft formulae for articles of peacekeeping guidelines. The Canadian delegation continued to insist on the desirability of general guidelines for peacekeeping operations being adopted.

While peace-keeping remained free from the process of confrontation that characterized the twenty-ninth Assembly, there was some indication that this would not continue to be the case. The idea of peacekeeping operations under the authorization of the General Assembly re-emerged at this session in the form of a Philippine proposal that guidelines be drafted for peacekeeping operations under the authority of the Assembly for use in the event of a Security Council veto.

On the administrative and budgetary side, the United Nations General Assembly approved a 12 percent increase in the 1974-75 biennial appropriations, amounting to \$65.5 million. Out of this increment, \$41.9 million was required to compensate for inflation and exchange-rate instability. The Assembly also approved significant in-

creases in resources required to fund peace-keeping operations in the Middle East, and decided to continue for another year the special scale of assessment developed at the preceding session to apportion appropriations among member states. At both sessions, Canada participated in negotiations leading to the adoption of the special scale. The General Assembly also activated the 15-member International Civil Service Commission by approving its statute and appointing its 15 members. The Commission has a broad mandate to regulate and co-ordinate the conditions of service of Specialized Agencies and other bodies in the UN system. One of its principal tasks is the overdue review of salaries and allowances of internationally-recruited staff. Following a Canadian initiative, the General Assembly formed a committee on conferences whose mandate included acting between sessions on behalf of the Assembly to deal with requested departures from the calendar of conferences.

Despite the cries of gloom and doom that arose from time to time in the course of the Assembly, the session did not end on a negative note. The last item on the agenda was the recurrent debate on strengthening the role of the UN. Usually treated perfunctorily, this item provided in 1974 a valuable outlet for some of the frustration that had been generated in the course of the session. For the industrialized Western countries these frustrations had been built up not so much by the emergence of a solid bloc amongst the non-aligned as by lack of willingness on the part of the non-aligned to negotiate with a view to reaching mutually-acceptable conclusions. The debate on strengthening the role of the UN allowed some Western delegates, particularly those from the United States, Britain and France, to vent these feelings when they harshly criticized the tactics pursued by the non-aligned countries in the preceding three months. The debate also provided an opportunity for a number of developing countries to voice their own frustrations about the inequities in the present international political and economic order.

Such exercises in self-examination can, of course, be painful to any organization, and this one was no exception. They can also be beneficial in clearing the air in preparation for constructive action in tackling the underlying problems. Unpleasant as the twenty-ninth Assembly may have been for some of the member states and their delegates, it was perhaps a necessary stage in the process of bringing the UN into tune with the changing world-scene. One indication that this process is under

ay may be seen in the establishment last autumn of an *ad hoc* committee to review the UN Charter. When the establishment of this committee was under discussion in the Sixth Committee, the Canadian delegation led an attempt to find common ground between the two extreme positions. On the one hand, the permanent members of the Security Council — most vigorously the Soviet Union — held that the item should be dropped, while the Latin Americans and others insisted that the Charter was in need of revision and a committee should be established. In the end, owing in part to resentment at the triple veto in the Security Council on the resolution to expel South Africa, sufficient support was gathered to establish the committee. In some ways this action by the Sixth Committee exemplifies the problem facing the world organization in the wake of the twenty-ninth session of the Assembly. The Third World has the numerical superiority to force its will in UN votes. That voting superiority, however, must be used wisely and in recognition of the interests of other parties in the organization. It also exemplifies the willingness of many to work towards finding solutions to the problem. For the United Nations or for any organization, it is by the ability to adapt to a changing situation that survival is assured.

In recapitulating the controversial events of the twenty-ninth Assembly to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, on March 11, 1975, Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan MacEachen said:

"The upshot of these various decisions, quite apart from the consequences for the parties involved, is, in our view, to undermine the credibility of the United Nations in the eyes of the minority group of states, mostly from the West, who opposed them. One might conclude that, in addition to a new economic order, the majority of members are hoping to establish a new political order, based on their ability to interpret the rules of procedure and even the Charter itself as they wish. The minority group includes those member countries which provide by far the greatest share of the United Nations budget, as well as most of the money for the United Nations Development Assistance Programs. If they were to become convinced that the organization was no longer serving legitimate purposes, the consequences could be serious."

"However, I do not believe the situation will move too far in this direction. Both the majority and the minority acknowledge that each has some justice on its side. For many years, the West was able to control the General Assembly in its own interests. We cannot complain in principle that a new majority does the same thing today. Canada agrees with those members of the minority, however, who object to practices which verge on the abuse of the rules. Nor do we see any solution in the adoption of resolutions which depend for their implementation on the co-operation of all, if the wishes of the minority are ignored. We spoke against such resolutions when we thought they were unworkable or improper, but we did not challenge the objective of the developing countries to bring about substantial change in the world economic order."

"What we must do is find new ways of making the United Nations a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations without subverting the principles of the organization itself, on the one hand, or of obstructing its capacity to facilitate change in the practices of international co-operation, on the other."

Each side sees justice of other point of view

The dilemma of nuclear power

Salvation or Armageddon?

By Geoffrey F. Bruce

In 1974, the door to the exclusive club of five countries — the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France and Britain — known to possess nuclear explosives was opened when India exploded a nuclear device and, in doing so, forced the world to recognize that other countries might soon follow suit. Now the international community — individual governments and the peoples of nations — are compelled to face

the critical dilemma of whether the development of nuclear power in a growing number of countries might not only provide the world with substantial sources of energy but, at the same time, increase the membership in the nuclear-explosives club. In this event, the world could well be but a step away from a new nuclear-arms race and the threat of nuclear war.

In stark, simple terms — are we now

*Wilful act
of the state
could lead
to Armageddon*

faced with the dilemma "nuclear power: energy salvation or Armageddon?" As one looks at the world of 1975, it is difficult not to take the view that the scales are weighted on the side of the second alternative — that further development of nuclear power could lead to the development in more countries of nuclear explosives, with all that that implies as a threat to the future health and welfare of mankind. Nuclear energy can, and probably will, contribute substantially to energy salvation — but cannot bring it about. However, the other horn of the dilemma, the wilful act of some state, could lead us to Armageddon tomorrow. Any evaluation of interest not give up much cause for optimism that are already on the road to Armageddon. Whether we continue on it is a matter of the political will of all nations working individually and together. History does national politics today indicates that we governments and the international community will behave responsibly in the future. Nevertheless, we must hope that the collective wisdom of civilization will prevail, and that we shall stop short of our own destruction.

First, however, let us look at the energy situation — our needs and resources. From 1950 to 1970, the energy consumption of the world almost trebled. Over the next 25 years — to the end of this century — it is possible that energy demand will quadruple. The principal source of energy in the 1950s was solid fuel. By the 1970s, petroleum and natural gas accounted for more than 60 per cent of our energy supplies.

Additional resources

Where do we find the additional resources to meet the increasing demand? In the years immediately ahead, no major changes in the natural sources of our energy supplies are expected. Conservation could be of great help. Other sources of energy —

*No major changes
in natural sources
of energy
expected*

Mr. Bruce, a graduate of Queen's, Columbia University and the National Defence College, joined the Department of External Affairs in 1952 and has served in Israel, Sri Lanka and Austria and in the Canadian Mission to the United Nations in New York. He was Alternate Governor for Canada on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna from 1963 to 1967. Before occupying his present position in 1973 as Minister and Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, he was Director of the Division of Scientific Relations and Environmental Problems.

geothermal, solar and wind — are being explored, but, even with major developments, these are unlikely to shift dramatically the fuel resources available to the world. In short, nuclear power appears to be the only additional, major, economically-competitive, technically-developed source of energy readily available to the world toward the end of this century.

There are now well over 500 power-generating and experimental reactors in 33 countries — and it is expected that hundreds more, in many countries, will be added in the years ahead. What this clearly indicates is that nuclear energy will be an indispensable and important source of energy in the closing years of the century. However, nuclear power is not expected to provide more than 25-30 per cent of the world's total supply in this period. Indeed, Maurice Strong, the Executive Director of the UN Environment Program, has observed:

"If the demand for energy continues to increase, as most analysts assume, by about 5 per cent a year for the rest of the century, then, if we build one large nuclear reactor a day throughout that period, when we are finished we shall still get most of our primary energy from fossil fuels, which we shall be burning twice as fast as now."

In view of what we now know about the world's resources of fossil fuels, this is not a cheerful prospect and — in the absence of effective permanent conservation measures and substantial new coal and petroleum resources that are economically exploitable — it is a picture that can only get grimmer. I may now answer the first question of the dilemma posed at the beginning of this article. As I have tried to indicate, nuclear energy can help, but is not the whole answer. It certainly cannot be regarded as the panacea that will permit us to continue the often irrational — and very wasteful — energy-consumption patterns that have grown up — particularly in the industrialized world — since the Second World War.

Threat to existence

Now to look at the other side of the question — the threat of nuclear power to our existence:

Given the probability that the industrialized countries will continue to consume energy in greater amounts (but less wastefully, one hopes, and more rationally), the essential need to continue contributing to the economic and social growth of developing countries, the expected growth of the world's population, the available knowledge of world resources

and of the technology of energy production — will the race to develop nuclear power to meet the requirements I have just mentioned end in the destruction of the human race? (I have used the term "destruction" deliberately and in its broadest sense — that is, annihilation by nuclear war or by irreparable damage to the environment on which we all depend for our livelihood.)

Before proceeding further, one should, perhaps, put the question "Why should nuclear power create such an extremely important, sensitive and complex problem for the world community?" The simple answer is that, while nuclear power is providing us with increasing supplies of competitively-priced energy, reactors not only produce plutonium (one of the most destructive explosive substances known to man), they also generate radio-active products and heat that together may alter the human environment in a way that could lead to the destruction of life on earth as we know it. I should interject at this point that I do not deal, in this article, with the possible environmental consequences of nuclear explosions; that is a serious problem but one beyond my competence and the scope of discussion in this paper.

Widespread development

At present, many countries are engaged in the development of their nuclear technology and capacity — in some, for the production of nuclear weapons, in all for peaceful purposes. However, it is precisely at this point that the line between peaceful and non-peaceful nuclear technology becomes blurred. To put it another way, any country that has a nuclear industry has the potential capacity to produce a nuclear explosion. And any country that conducts a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes can easily produce a nuclear weapon.

In short, it is an easy step from a peaceful nuclear program to the development of nuclear weapons. And governments that may decline to take this step today may do so tomorrow if they feel their fundamental national interests are seriously threatened.

Before turning to the problems of international control of nuclear energy, it may be helpful to list several basic factors that illustrate how far we have come along the road in the development of nuclear reactor programs. First, since 1945 there have been more than 900 nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, under water and underground, and further tests are likely to be conducted by China, France, the S.S.R., the U.S.A. and India.

Secondly, as I have already mentioned, there are nearly 600 power and research reactors in operation in 33 countries — and this list will continue to grow. Moreover, several of these countries have, or are expected to obtain, chemical reprocessing plants to extract plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel. It is clear, therefore, that a steadily-increasing number of countries will have the capacity to develop nuclear explosives. To put it another way, as Senator Symington of the United States recently stated in the General Assembly of the United Nations, close to one million pounds of plutonium will have been produced by 1980, and this is more than enough for over 50,000 nuclear explosions.

Thirdly, the major nuclear-weapon states already have stockpiles of nuclear weapons so large that it is impossible to conceive their sheer destructive power. To quote Senator Symington again:

"The United States stockpile of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is equivalent to 615,385 Hiroshima bombs. You will undoubtedly recall that 1 Hiroshima bomb killed 100,000 people."

It is, perhaps, reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union also has an arsenal that, if it is not equivalent in magnitude, is undoubtedly well beyond the "overkill" threshold.

Vertical proliferation

In the face of these developments, what has the international community done to control the vertical proliferation of weapons by those states that already have them and to inhibit or prohibit the horizontal proliferation of these weapons by the so-far, and so-called, non-nuclear weapons states?

A great many treaties and agreements have been negotiated to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and control the development of nuclear energy. Because of the limitations of space and because of its central importance, I shall devote the balance of this article to a discussion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which will be reviewed at an international conference in Geneva in May of this year.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty commits the nuclear powers not to help other countries acquire nuclear explosives or weapons. It contains a pledge — to which governments are asked to subscribe — not to acquire nuclear explosives or weapons. The third principal article requests states to subject themselves to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to ensure that they are keeping their commitments. There is no comparable require-

Increasing number of countries will have nuclear capacity

Many treaties negotiated to limit proliferation



ment for nuclear-weapon states to subject themselves to safeguards. The remaining sections of the treaty talk about the obligations of nuclear-weapon states to make available nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to work toward an ending of the nuclear-arms race.

So far, 106 governments of the 138 member states of the United Nations have signed the treaty, but only 84 have actually ratified it. Perhaps the most significant fact is that, among those that have not ratified the treaty, are a number that have the capacity to develop nuclear explosives or may attain it in a few years. Nearly all these countries are in areas of political — or potential political — tension and instability, and their refusal to accept the treaty is serious, both in absolute terms and in terms of the weakening of what might be called the non-proliferation system.

Why have so many of these states declined to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty? Each has its own reasons, but I shall outline and comment briefly upon

those that have been identified as the major objections to it.

It is argued that the treaty is discriminatory in that it gives to those states that already have nuclear explosives and weapons a preferred position over those states which do not have such weapons. It does not insist that the nuclear-weapon states discontinue arming themselves or testing new weapons, even now when they have clearly reached an overkill capacity.

There is considerable justice in this objection, but we have to live with the world as it is. The treaty was negotiated in a world already divided into the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon club. We cannot force the nuclear-weapon states to give up their preferred position, to give up their nuclear-weapon arsenals, and to stop developing weapons until they are satisfied that they have consolidated what they believe to be their national security and the security of those states in alliance with them. But, having acknowledged what the situation is, we can then go to work on what can be changed in order to restrict the proliferation of nuclear explosives. Failure to do so would be a step toward enlarging the number of countries capable of building nuclear weapons. And, if the number of nuclear-weapon states increases, the danger of nuclear war will be vastly increased particularly if they are developed by countries in regions of tension, hostility and instability. Because of these risks, is it not worth while attempting to control the horizontal proliferation of nuclear explosives? The Canadian Government thinks that Canada must try.

It is argued that the possession of nuclear explosives and weapons enhances the importance of a nation. Is this really true? Does it really give them additional potential military, economic and political power and prestige? It may, but to such a limited extent I find it difficult to believe it is of real importance in the world of 1975.

The critics of the treaty also observe that the existing international safeguards system is ineffective in preventing the clandestine proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the most brutally simple sense this is true. But the system we have, however imperfect, has probably deterred, or delayed, the development of nuclear explosives, and may, therefore, have given us a slight reprieve — a little time to improve the system. The explosion by India has, of course, seriously breached the line, but it may serve to warn us that time has almost run out. Certainly the Indian explosion has set forward almost to midnight the


Doomsday Clock maintained in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. But as long as there is still some time, there is still hope, and for this, as well as for the other reasons that have been mentioned here, every effort must be made to strengthen the existing safeguards system and, one hopes, inhibit, if not prohibit, the proliferation of nuclear explosions. But this very course, which we, and many others, regard as the only sane path to follow, is itself criticized as one that will result in the interference in the sovereign national interests of states. While this is no doubt true, to me the argument is a meaningless one. All states have long ago given away some measure of their sovereignty. In the international regulation of transportation, communications, health standards, trade, monetary affairs, quality control of products — in all of these and many more examples one could mention — states have accepted international controls that directly affect their freedom of action and sovereignty. It is but one further step — and for very good reasons — to accept safeguards on nuclear programs.

Many countries — particularly developing countries — argue that, by accepting the obligations of the treaty not to develop nuclear explosives, they may restrict their own economic growth and the development of a comprehensive peaceful nuclear-energy program. At this stage in the development of nuclear power for peaceful purposes this is just not true.

If nuclear explosions offered economically-sound uses for major engineering and resource-development projects and if they had no potentially or probable serious effects on the environment, it seems reasonable to assume that the nuclear powers would have used such explosives by now. So far they have not done so, and this suggests that such uses are not economically or environmentally reasonable or defensible at the present time. It seems clear that the expectations for using nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes have been exaggerated, and that, from an economic, environmental and arms-control point of view, there is unlikely to be any change within the next several years. Countries are, however, continuing to consider the practical peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, and as in the case of a river-diversion plan in the Soviet Union, they may prove economically justifiable in the years ahead. However, at present there is no persuasive evidence to suggest that, by declining to develop nuclear explosives, a nation gives up any advantage or benefit it can obtain from the development of nuclear energy for peace-

ful purposes. Canada could have been the second or third nuclear-weapon state in the world 25 years ago but has consistently decided against developing nuclear explosives. Nevertheless, this decision has not adversely affected Canada's economic development, and the country is among the world's leaders in the peaceful uses of nuclear power.

Let me now just enumerate three other important criticisms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is argued that there are no sanctions, no provisions for enforcement in the event the treaty is violated. Some governments decline to accept the treaty on the ground that they must take whatever steps they consider necessary — including the development of nuclear weapons — to protect their vital national interests. One immediately thinks here of the position of Pakistan, which may feel a very real sense of being threatened by India, and it would not be surprising to find that there is strong pressure on the Government of Pakistan, which has a well-developed nuclear-power program, to build a nuclear explosive capacity.



A final major objection comes from the Chinese. They consider that the treaty places in the hands of the two super-powers an overwhelming strategic force that gives them virtual hegemony over the world. Accordingly, China argues that it must develop its nuclear capability to the level at which it can deter American and Soviet nuclear power. We should not, and cannot, take this objection lightly.

Accelerated development

The accelerated growth in the development of nuclear-power programs in an increasing number of states, the nuclear explosion by India last May, the increasing ease with which countries can acquire and develop the technology of nuclear explosives, and the expected introduction of nuclear facilities in the Middle East have irretrievably and dramatically shattered


the complacency of the formerly exclusive nuclear-weapon club. With several other countries standing at the threshold of the club, there is possibly only one opportunity left to the world community to revive the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and time is short. It is for this reason that so much hope rests this year on the Geneva conference to review the treaty, and it is hoped that those governments that have not acceded to the treaty can be persuaded to do so. If these efforts fail, we shall almost certainly be engaged in brinkmanship with Armageddon. At that stage, the Doomsday Clock will be set within seconds of midnight. If the clock can be stopped, it should be possible to develop nuclear energy in a way that can be of inestimable help to mankind without endangering its existence.

Stormy Venezuelan oil politics paved way for creation of OPEC

By Gérald Hudon

The past year has been notable for oil controversies. The price of "black gold" has quadrupled during the last 12 months. We witnessed the consolidation of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) in spite of rumours of its imminent weakening and in spite of strong

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opposition by President Ford and the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. The first efforts of the United States to unite the Western industrial countries into a monolithic bloc against the oil-producers' union were fruitless. Towards the end of the year, the Ford Administration was forced to accept a compromise with French President Giscard d'Estaing in order to convolve a high-level tripartite conference to discuss the price of oil products; the present President of Venezuela, C. A. Perez, and his predecessor, R. Caldera, had repeatedly suggested such a move. New oil prices having been consolidated, it is evident that OPEC has won the first round in the battle. The Organization has thus demonstrated its ability to protect the interests of its affiliated members.

OPEC's success in 1974 is being emulated by other economic blocs that feel the urgent need to obtain better prices for raw materials. Countries producing coffee, bauxite, copper, tin, bananas and iron have been attempting to promote or create organizations similar to OPEC for the purpose of protecting their prices.

inally, after a decade and a half of international forums, conferences and discussions, Third World countries agreed that the best way to protect commercial exchange-rates between producing and consuming countries was to apply the old adage "unity is strength", which OPEC itself took so long to transform into an effective and operational tool.

Unionism, which originally contributed to the creation of social justice between employers and workers in the industrial world, has spread and transformed the traditional structure of international business, following the example of OPEC. As a joint founding country of OPEC (with Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia), Venezuela is aware of its oil wealth and of its responsibility towards its less-fortunate neighbours, and is also convinced that the union of oil-producers is the only guarantee of their economic future. It is, therefore, directing its efforts towards helping them to improve commercial exchange-rates with developed countries. For example, last December, Venezuela signed an agreement with the six Central American countries, financing their collective effort to limit coffee exports in order to maintain the high price of this commodity. During the first months of 1975, President Perez is scheduled to participate in a conference of Caribbean heads of state, which will discuss means of increasing revenues from bauxite (an aluminum ore). It is, therefore, evident that part of Venezuela's efforts are directed towards developing countries in order to help them increase their revenues from the export of raw materials within a co-operative framework similar to that of OPEC. Indeed, Venezuela intends to share its experience in the protection of oil prices with its neighbours so that they may profit from it and thus avoid the same misfortunes and injustices it suffered. Venezuela is not seeking to lead Latin America, but it does occupy a privileged position there because of its financial influence. Its neighbours may rely on it to answer their call without hesitation.

head of OPEC

Venezuela has acted in this manner since the creation of OPEC. It was ahead of the collective agreements of the Organization on many occasions, and has gone even further on many others. These Venezuelan initiatives have laid down a path that the Organization has followed, though not always successfully. Venezuela's role as a forerunner in the establishment and development of OPEC is best understood after a brief outline of its

evolution since the birth of its oil industry.

The history of oil began in 1859 with the drilling of the first well in Pennsylvania by Edwin Drake. Since then, oil, a non-renewable resource, has rapidly become basic to the industrial development of the world. In fact, since the era of *kerosene* – a substitute for whale lamp-oil (1859-1874) –, the era of *lubricants* (1874-1904), and then the era of *gasoline* (brought about by the appearance of the automobile, the airplane and mechanized armies), as well as other successive stages, world industry and the world economy have become dependent on oil at an alarming rate – to the point where oil is coveted as an essential good.

By the time the Zumaque well in Venezuela, owned by the Caribbean Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Group, began regular production (250 barrels a day) on July 31, 1914, industrialized Europe and the United States already constituted strong, growing markets for oil and its derivatives. The two large oil consortiums were fully organized and in direct competition for these world markets and production centres. They were Standard Oil of New Jersey, directed by John D. Rockefeller, and the Royal Dutch Shell Group, which resulted from the merger of the two large firms Royal Dutch and Shell.

This situation was soon felt in Venezuela. The companies were eager to find, exploit and control new fields. Supported by their respective governments, and owing to the lack of foresight and insatiable greed of the Venezuelan Government and its supporters, they thrust rural Venezuela into the petroleum age – without, however, any great benefit to the nation. During the first quarter of the twentieth century, the relatives and friends of General Juan Vincente Gomez grabbed oil concessions. This incredible state of affairs constituted his oil policy for the duration of his dictatorship in Venezuela, from 1908 to the time of his death in 1935. As soon as they were acquired, these concessions were usually transferred to the subsidiaries of the Royal Dutch Group, making millionaires of the first holders without any benefits whatsoever to the nation. An estimated one-third of the national territory, excluding Esequiba Guyana, was the object of that "Gomezist feast".

However, we cannot deny that Gomez's generosity permitted the exploration of the country and the subsequent development of the Venezuelan oil industry. It is another indisputable fact that, from 1917, the first year of exportation, to

Dependence has made oil an essential good

1935, the Venezuelan Government exempted the oil companies from 400 million bolivars in import duties. The amount of this favour, compared to the 476 million bolivars of total development tax levied on these same companies, speaks for itself.

The comparison of this revenue derived from the production of 1,148 million barrels from 1917 to 1935 and the 8,433 million bolivars of fiscal revenue derived in 1972 from the production of crude oil in the order of 1,170 million barrels highlights the degree of exploitation during the first period of the Venezuelan oil industry.

Negative factors

Other factors had a negative influence on the development of the oil industry, and consequently on the national development to 1935. Some are a flagrant indication of how the large companies operated the oil market for their own benefit only – for example, the installation of refineries in 1917 and 1929 on the islands of Curaçao and Aruba instead of in Venezuela, and the Achnacarry Agreement (Scotland 1928) between the large companies, which was a first cartel attempt to divide and control the world market between them.

We need not dwell on these instances. They do emphasize, however, the unfavourable conditions faced by Gumersindo Torres, General Gomez's Minister of Commerce and Industry from 1918 to 1922 and from 1929 to 1931. Torres was removed from office twice by the General at the request of the oil companies because of his advanced ideas.

Thanks to the management by Torres of the ministry in charge of oil administration, Venezuela surpassed the other exporting countries from the legal standpoint on two occasions. Most of the legal provisions established from 1917 to 1935 were countersigned by Torres. He was responsible for separate legislation for oil and mining: he first promulgated regulations on "coal, petroleum and other similar substances" in 1918 and then the first Venezuelan law on hydrocarbons in 1920. This law introduced ideas that were included in the legislation of other exporting countries only some years later, such as: the determination and limitation of lots and parcels of land for exploration and development assigned by concessions under contract; the establishment of national reserves through the implementation of a system under which a parcel must be reserved for the state for each parcel assigned, so that the state always owns land rich in hydrocarbons; and the reversion to the state of unexploited concessions, which was the

first such mention in the legislation of exporting countries. Although these innovations remained in effect only a short time because of their repeal by the tyrant who obligingly yielded to the oil companies, they were, nevertheless, an early initiative in the fight of exporting countries to dispose freely of their own wealth.

Modern age

After the death of Gomez, Venezuela entered the modern age under governments headed by General Lopez Contreras (1935-1941) who was appointed Gomez's successor by the Cabinet, and General Medina Angarita (1941-1945), appointed by the National Congress to exercise the supreme magistracy until 1946. Organized social forces confronted the unjust situation and attempted to reduce the disparities between the workers and the national treasury and the oil companies. During this period, the country adopted a labour law, a new law on hydrocarbons and an income tax law. These institutional reforms placed Venezuela ahead of its future OPEC associates, which gained from its example but only recently followed it during the Sixties.

The 1936 Labour Act was the first legal instrument of the Venezuelan Government fully to regulate employer-employee relations. Its labour standards related to the 8-hour day and 48-hour week for workers, lay-off and seniority compensations, profit-sharing, compulsory social insurance, freedom of unionization, and the special labour jurisdiction. Although it was intended for general application, the 1936 act was specially conceived to improve the labour conditions of oil-workers, who made up the largest number of workers in the history of Venezuela. Needless to say, these conditions had left a lot to be desired until then and there was a marked difference in consideration between autochthonous workers and foreign workers, the latter, naturally, being favoured. A few years later, this social progress in Venezuela encouraged the Arab member countries of OPEC to implement a policy of social protection for their own oil-workers.

With respect to oil legislation, Venezuela also leaped ahead. The 1938 Hydrocarbons Act not only introduced substantial increases in development taxes or royalties but also abolished import duty exemptions and made it possible to establish governmental bodies for the direct development of oil. This state power, however, was substantially reduced by the 1943 Hydrocarbons Act. Although state petroleum companies had already been

*Venezuela
surpassed
other exporters
on two occasions*

constituted in other countries, it was not until 1960 that Venezuela was able to take this step. It was still among the first OPEC countries to do so.

Similarly, with respect to the 1942 Income Tax Act, it should be noted that the Middle East countries adopted income tax acts only after the creation of OPEC. Needless to say, Venezuela substantially increased its oil revenues after 1943, the year of the promulgation of the act. In 1942, the Treasury had collected 7,755,000 bolivars in oil taxes; in 1944, it collected 269,388,000. From that time on, oil-taxation reforms were principally made by way of this income tax and not by way of amendments to the oil legislation.

coup and counter-coup

General Medina was overthrown by a civil-military coup on October 18, 1945. On December 14, 1947, the Revolutionary Committee directed by members of the "Acción Democrática" Party, which took power, called a direct and general election for the first time in the history of Venezuela. The writer Romulo Gallegos, "Acción Democrática" candidate, was elected President and governed for almost a year until a military coup overthrew him on November 24, 1948. Perez Jimenez next headed the military regime with a strong hand until he, too, was overthrown, by democratic forces, on January 23, 1958.

The period 1945 to 1958 was marked by an unprecedented oil growth. Seventy per cent of the oil and gas fields of Venezuela were discovered during this period and five times as much oil was extracted from 1944 to 1960 as from 1917 to 1943. Finally, oil reserves reached an unprecedented high in 1960.

It is fair to say that the 1948 coup was engineered by the large oil companies in connivance with the Venezuelan establishment to neutralize the efforts of the Venezuelan people to increase their share in oil profits. Among the efforts of this sort that became the main objects of OPEC members in 1960 should be mentioned all action to put an end to the excessive profits of oil companies and, by way of successive amendments to the Income Tax Act, to establish the principle of national participation in oil revenues according to which national oil revenues may never be less than the revenues of companies. This principle, commonly described as "50-50", was established in the 1948 income-tax reform and was neither repealed nor improved by Perez Jimenez.

Venezuela entered a new stage of economic and political development in 1958. Governments elected successively under

the sponsorship of different parties — an unprecedented development in the history of Venezuela — remained faithful to the initial directives. The democratic government established in 1958 gave new direction to oil policy. Democracy grew stronger and asserted the right to administer the principal wealth according to the interests and needs of the people.

Ironically, all this took place while most experts were of the opinion that the Venezuelan oil industry was in decline. Indeed, it seems that, even though oil-production did not decrease until 1974, its growth-rate decreased each year, and it has become increasingly difficult to maintain the country's proved reserves at their 1960 level.

The beginning of this period coincided with "discriminatory treatment" by the United States in 1959 with respect to Venezuelan oil, in the form of restrictive import measures dictated by the Eisenhower Government. This was followed in the Sixties by Venezuelan efforts to convince the Government of the United States of the suitability of a hemispheric agreement that would equalize the import quota of Venezuelan oil between the United States, Canada and Mexico.

Other factors

In addition to the restrictive U.S. policy, Venezuela faced the reopening of the Suez Canal and the introduction in world markets of Soviet crude oil. This brought about a reduction of prices below those in effect in 1956. The Venezuelan Government, having to cope, on the one hand, with debts inherited from the Perez-Jimenez dictatorship and, on the other, with a series of social problems, chose to amend the Income Tax Act in 1958 in order to improve the 50-50 principle of 1948 to a more comfortable 60-40. It also undertook to fight for the maintenance of international oil prices and created a high-level Co-ordination Board responsible for the supervision of production and tax programs. It also adopted the "no-more-concessions" policy later strengthened by the Reversion Act, according to which all concessions revert to the state upon their expiration, together with their installations and equipment, without compensation. In 1960, Venezuela also created a state enterprise called "Corporación Venezolana del Petróleo" responsible for the direct development of hydrocarbons.

Venezuelan initiatives such as the creation in 1959 of the board responsible for the protection of crude-oil prices have brought about a reconsideration of the Govern-

ment's share and of income statements of oil companies, owing to the difference between stated selling prices and those obtaining in world markets between 1957 and 1965. These claims ended in 1966, and the companies had to pay 800 million bolivars in additional taxes. From that time on, Venezuela again progressed faster than its OPEC associates. On the basis of that experience, from the fiscal point of view, the state objected to sales discounts by the companies and established standard prices on which taxes were calculated, irrespective of the actual selling price. This was accomplished by means of bilateral agreements between the Government and the companies, which first came into force in 1967. Later, Parliament ratified a law authorizing the executive to set unilaterally the standard prices of oil and its derivatives.

Finally, the fixing of maximum and minimum production levels in order to stabilize fiscal revenues by adjusting the rate when the limits were exceeded one way or the other put an end, in December 1971, to the period of domination of companies in the development of the Venezuelan oil industry, and opened the way for true nationalism.

At the international level, the efforts made by Venezuela in 1958 and 1959 to protect crude-oil prices prepared the way for the creation on September 14, 1960, of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in co-operation with four Middle East countries. There had undoubtedly been similar attempts previously by Arab countries, but it is fair to say that, without the support of Venezuela, the creation of OPEC would have been delayed.

Objects achieved

Today, OPEC is achieving its objects, but it met many obstacles along the way. Discouraged and weakened, it seemed on the brink of failure many times (Iraq in 1965 is an example). Venezuela's repeated advice to the Arabs convinced them that they would benefit greatly from their association with the Organization. Finally, other OPEC members were influenced by the results obtained by Venezuela, which were sometimes adopted as individual aims and sometimes adopted by the Organization as collective aims. A brief

*Revenues
stabilized
by fixing
production levels*

outline of OPEC resolutions reflects Venezuela's role as precursor.

On the basis of a report prepared by Venezuelan authorities on the Co-ordination Board, OPEC's fourth conference in 1962 recommended the creation in each country of a similar market-controlling organization in order to prevent price decreases. This antecedent encouraged the fifth conference in 1963 to recommend preparation for the establishment of an Inter-OPEC Board, which would be responsible for examining the price situation at regular intervals and for submitting recommendations to member countries. This Board was created in 1964, and has played a positive role in OPEC's fight for stable prices.

The eleventh conference, held in Vienna in 1966, accepted a Board recommendation presented by Venezuela, which urged member countries to enforce standard prices. It also ratified the "no-more-concessions" resolution, which abolished the granting of new concessions. This resolution on standard prices constitutes the backbone of the present rise in crude-oil prices.

Finally, the twenty-first conference, held in Caracas, ratified a resolution dealing with the setting of a minimum income-tax rate of 55 per cent and the total elimination of tax concessions granted to oil companies. These objectives had been reached by Venezuela in 1958 and 1966 respectively.

In spite of mistakes (such as the failure to carry out the production plans of the Organization and the failure of certain members to observe regulations), and in spite of its modest success during the Sixties, OPEC certainly occupies a strong position today. It is fair to say that its present success is due to Venezuela, which maintained an *avant-garde* attitude in its relations with oil companies throughout the history of its oil industry and made opportune recommendations to the other exporting countries. Had it not been so, it is doubtful whether OPEC would have been able to achieve the ambitious objectives it reached in 1971, such as the establishment of a price policy through the collective and not individual bargaining of member countries with oil companies and the acceptance by these companies of the participation of member countries in private oil company assets.

Exceptional and unique diaries of exceptional and unique man

by Saul Rae

that Charles Ritchie is a brilliant writer (the Foreign Service reference to "draftsmanship" does not cover the point) is not unknown to those who have worked with him.

During the Paris Peace Conference of 1946 — the first step in postwar peace-making — the Canadian delegation was headed by the Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, aided by Brooke Claxton and an array of the East Block's most distinguished senior public servants. Among the heterogeneous duties I, a local junior officer at the Embassy in Paris, had assumed as secretary of the delegation was the job of extracting final reports from the representatives on each of the main committees of the Conference. By Mr. King's choice (President Woodrow Wilson, General Jan Smuts, and other peacemakers had slept there in 1919), our delegation was billeted at the faded but historic Hotel Crillon. Before ensuring that the bills of the delegation were paid, it was my responsibility (and one that I took very seriously) to encourage or cajole my junior, and over-worked, colleagues to "do their stuff" on time. Lieutenant-General Maurice Pope, for example, had completed his final report, which included a dramatic reference to the fact that, on one particular issue, "Canada had shot the others down in flames".

My last holdout was Charles, who, with infinite consideration and politeness, had deferred (even as the deferred publication of the diaries that now appear in *The Siren Years*) the preparation of his final report dealing with a central issue of the Conference, the peace treaty with Italy. Postwar Paris offered many alternative pursuits. I have an imperishable memory of the last or second-last day of our stay, including a disconcerting night — sure that the delegation would depart with one of the most important reports missing. Finally a secretary was produced for Charles (very attractive and inspirational, as I recall), and a wispish figure in a faded dressing-gown asked to be left

alone and undisturbed to complete his report. In a prodigiously short time, a magnificent document of some 30 or 40 pages emerged, page by perfect page, with a structure, an introduction, a balance, an analysis of Canadian interests and efforts, and the by-play of other delegations, and a series of concise conclusions. It emerged (as Charles Ritchie finally did) in a form that needed not one iota of revision. The completed report went on to Ottawa in timely fashion, with Charles's chapter reproduced on the basis of his unedited first draft. The man is a model for old and young diplomats and others for whom precision, to use a Wolfville expression, is a *sine qua non*.

Ritchie
a model
of precision
for diplomats

Diplomatic literature

Canada's diplomats (or "Foreign Service Officers", as the current prosaic phrase goes) have produced an already considerable literature. To take only those of the generation before my own, there are the books of Vincent Massey, Maurice Pope, Dana Wilgress, Arnold Heeney, Chester Ronning and others. The first volume of *Mike* should properly be listed, as it deals with L. B. Pearson's early period in the Canadian foreign service. There are Speaight's *Vanier* and also the books of Lieutenant-General "Tommy" Burns. There are doubtless others in the mill. Among the greatest, people like Norman Robertson and Hume Wrong did not leave behind volumes on their own times

Mr. Rae is Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations. Since joining External Affairs in 1940, he has served in numerous posts at home and abroad, notably as Ambassador to Mexico, Guatemala and the UN in Geneva. He is author of The Oxford By-Election and co-author with Dr. George Gallup of The Pulse of Democracy. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr. Rae.

and experiences — which is our loss. For reasons of anonymity and proclivity, much of the work of Canada's diplomats is buried in archives that eventually, one hopes, will see the light of day and give scholars and the public a larger perspective on the varied roles and tasks of the Foreign Service.

The Siren Years by C.S.A. Ritchie is an exceptional and unique addition to this process of "going public". Like the author himself, the volume is slim, perceptive, brilliant and enormously witty. It was, as the author says, "with adolescence that the diary addiction fixed its yoke upon me". Happily for readers, it was a yoke that, for over 50 years, the author was never able to shake off, though there were, as he says, "merciful periods of abstinence". The period runs from 1937 to 1945, the locales are pre-war Washington, wartime London, the Normandy Coast, and his home province of Nova Scotia. The omissions are no doubt those due to the obligations and the reticence of a distinguished public servant true to his calling, so that only glimpses are seen of this part of a long life of professional dedication to furthering Canada's interests and interpreting the world scene to Ottawa from a variety of posts.

This book provides Canadians and everyone interested in our country with insights into an early period in the life and times of a remarkable individual, gifted with a talent for observation and description that will stand the test of time. It is mainly about his impressions of events and people he knew in wartime London. Because there are gaps in the diary, the effect is one of a kaleidoscope, which, in a curious way, always seems to present the picture of events in a pattern and in a focus.

In his entry for June 9, 1938, he reveals his love for writing, in his characteristically self-deprecating way: "And always the piece of staring white paper in front of me with a few and feeble words strung across it. Nothing could be more stubborn than my devotion, nothing more stupid than my persistence. After all, I have written nothing and I will write nothing. Twenty years have not been enough to convince me of my lack of talent."

How grateful we must be that he persisted, and how keenly we anticipate, when the time is ripe, the future extracts that we hope will cover his lengthy and distinguished service in Ottawa, Bonn, at the United Nations, Washington, NATO and London.

A talent for observation and description

We cannot quite accept the statement that 'these are not diplomatic diaries in any sense of that word'. True, they do not provide an "instant replay" of diplomatic reports (all too often with the author represented as the central and motivating figure) or seek to place these crucial years in the long context of history. They do, however, provide insights, flavour, atmosphere, illustrated by the author's penetrating and lucid judgments of these events, and of some of the men and women whose entrances and exits formed part of the fabric of his life at the time. The gap in perspective between those in pre-war Ottawa, and those in London and Canada House closer to the gathering storms, the range of judgments about Hitler and his intentions, the vignettes of the life of the Canadian forces in Britain and France, the eyewitness accounts of how life went on in London during the black-outs and the bombings, the social changes going on in Britain over the war years, make *The Siren Years* a unique personal documentary of the period.

Political realities

Hume Wrong, who was not given to exaggeration, could formally report on Charles that he had "an instinct for political realities". This is apparent throughout the diaries and, coupled with it, human qualities of compassion and understanding of the underlying social realities sometimes obscured by the goings-on that form part of the daily life of the professional diplomat. A person as observant and with antennae as long, as Ritchie, did not find it difficult to size things up whether at the Foreign Office, in an armchair in London, in meeting survivors from Dunkirk, or on his way to Normandy soon after D-Day as the sole civilian on a troopship manned by the RCN to present a message to the Canadian troops on behalf of the Prime Minister (a notion he had himself concocted). The Dunkirk episode, involving the masterly wrangling of passes and permissions to get L.E. Pearson and Charles Ritchie to Dover at the height of the evacuation, is described this way by Mike Pearson in his first volume: "Cleverer than Nazis were expected to be, we found Dover harbour though we were stopped by military police more than once, who examined our credentials with special care when they heard my transatlantic accent. Ritchie, fortunately, spoke good Oxford English!"

Throughout the book, there are references to the great or near great and the individuals and personalities whose lives crossed the author's in the Britain of the

literary award

Charles Ritchie, former Canadian diplomat and Special Adviser to the Privy Council before his recent retirement, was among six authors who recently won the Governor General's Literary Awards for 1974. *The Siren Years*, which is reviewed here, is a book of his personal recollections of the period from 1937 to 1945, when he served as a junior officer, mostly in London during the Second World War, has been described as the "undiplomatic diaries" of a diplomat and as "immensely readable".

Mr. Ritchie, states the dust-jacket of his book, "has written not so much of political events and diplomacy in themselves but of his personal response to these events and to people".

Among the most moving and sensitive passages in the book are those that deal with his long friendship with the novelist Elizabeth Bowen.

Throughout the diaries he manages with a word or a phrase to evoke a whole personality — for example, the pompous Canadian diplomat intrigued by the title "Your Excellency", who was heard to say to the chauffeur when leaving the Legation with his small son, "his little Excellency will sit in the front with you". Seeing beyond the world of the London clubs, he says on June 2, 1941, long before the event: "The common people of England deserve a few breaks and if it is socialism they want they should have it. I would trust them to make any form of government into something tolerant and tolerable."

to jokes

There are passages in the book to make the reader laugh out loud (the passage for June 15, 1945, describing a weekend break from the labours of the San Francisco Conference is hilarious). Charles Ritchie does not tell jokes, but he sees life with such wry and direct vision, and reports it with such a talent of description and characterization, that even an ordinary event takes on incisiveness and high humour. The immediate pre-war years brought us together, when, for me (a student on a Massey Fellowship), the Canada House of Vincent Massey, Lester Pearson, Georges Vanier and Charles Ritchie had a special meaning — a meaning that had also for many others of my generation of Canadians. On another occasion, in the spring of 1943, Ritchie and I were returning from London to Canada, and the only feasible way seemed to be by

military aircraft. We were told by the authorities that the flight in question was wholly taken up by a shipment of parts for Mosquito planes. Norman Robertson's intervention on our behalf solved the problem, his main observation being that, so far as he was concerned, Ritchie and this writer "were indistinguishable from Mosquito parts". (We made it to Ireland and eventually home, but with unforgettable stops *en route* in the whiskey and linen shops of Foynes and Limerick.) His many friends have never ceased to enjoy and admire Ritchie, and *The Siren Years* helps to explain why. During the period of these diaries, Ritchie was in his early thirties. As he writes in the introduction, "wartime London was a forcing-ground for love and friendship, for experiments and amusements snatched under the pressure". In the most personal aspects, the diary faithfully records frailties and foibles, beauty and boredom, in his own life as in that of others. There are confessional moments, as in the entry for November 2, 1941: "I suppose I ought to cultivate the society of solid civil servants instead of rococo Roumanian princesses and baroque dilettantes." But, at the level of his professional duties, during the "siren years" and the long period of his later service, he became part of what he admired in describing his predecessors in the Department of External Affairs in the mid-Thirties — "a handful of unusually gifted men who shared the belief that Canada had its own role to play in the world and a conception of what that role should be". These were men "who worked together without feeling for respective rank, without pomposity, with humour, despising pretence, intolerant of silliness and scathing in their contempt for self-advertisement".

A recent issue of *The New Yorker* carried a cartoon showing an affluent elderly gentleman sitting in his ornate living-room in front of a television set on which Walter Cronkite was ending one of his nightly newscasts with his sign-off "And that's the way it is". The affluent elderly gentleman is shaking his finger irritably at the set and saying "No — that's NOT the way it is, Walter!" Some who saw the war years from a different perspective may echo this. *The Siren Years* is the record of how Charles Ritchie sensed the period and of how it was for him. We must all be grateful that he did not abandon the diary addiction.

Ritchie, Charles. *The siren years: a Canadian diplomat abroad, 1937-1945*. Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, 1974. 216 pp.

Faithful record
of frailties
and foibles

Britain in Mid-East . . .

Sir,

Probably I am not the only reader of *International Perspectives* who got the distinct impression from Albert Legault's article "Cyprus — Strategic triangle formed by Athens, Ankara and Nicosia" (November/December issue) that something was left out of his interpretation of nineteenth century expansionism in the Eastern Mediterranean. It seems to me that Turkey, in this regard, comes out looking quite spotless in this coverage, and really the facts are quite different from Dr. Legault's views.

The statement that "Britain intervened in 1878, ostensibly to give assistance to the Ottoman Empire in its struggle with its neighbour to the north, and at the same time decided to make Cyprus a British protectorate", leads one to believe that not only was Britain a newcomer on the scene but British policy was one of collaboration with Turkey. This is an unthinkable interpretation of some 60 or more years of policy aimed at directly opposite objectives, and I am truly amazed at this unique and somewhat distorted point of view.

England's position as a "landholder" in the Eastern Mediterranean began after the Napoleonic Wars, in 1815, with her tenure of a number of the Ionian Islands. However, much before this time, she had been the principal European advocate of Greek independence (note Byron's wonderful poetry on this subject) and, from the 1821 revolt against the Turks at Jassy until the London Protocol of 1830, her single-mindedness in this regard is remarkable. At times, Britain, France and Russia acted in concert against Turkey; in July 1827, in the London Protocol of that year, the three powers determined to strengthen their naval forces in the Mediterranean, for the sole and express purpose of meeting the ominous threats of the defiant Ibrahim Pasha. Their success at the naval encounter known as the Battle of Navarino is well known.

After the successful Russian campaign against Turkey in 1828-29, Greece was declared an independent kingdom and a period of relative stability ensued. French and British occupation of Greece in 1854 was designed to prevent Greece from assisting Russia in the war against Turkey. In this regard, their joint efforts were a judicious form of what today might be called a peace-keeping mission.

Dr. Legault seems also to imply, if I interpret him correctly, that Greece always came off not too badly in the conflicts and campaigns against Turkey. Certainly we cannot regard the indemnity imposed upon Greece at Constantinople on December 4, 1897 (\$18,000,000), as anything but the most extreme form of punitive measure, inflicted upon a weakened and disheartened people. All in all, I think that the Athens-Ankara-Nicosia tableau presented is rather unbalanced, and that it would be impossible to gain a true perspective on the present crisis situation in Cyprus without a great deal more background information inserted by way of support.

J. Easton Godkin
Ottawa, Ontario

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No. 10 (March 4, 1975) Signature of an agreement on cultural co-operation between the Government of Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany.
No. 11 (March 6, 1975) Gulf of St. Lawrence.
No. 12 (March 12, 1975) Visit of Secretary of State for External Affairs to West Africa.
No. 13 (March 13, 1975) Canadian delegation to the third session of the Law of the Sea Conference, Geneva, March 17 — May 10, 1975.
No. 14 (March 13, 1975) Claims respecting Canadian assets in Cyprus.
No. 15 (March 13, 1975) Death of Ambassador Langille.
No. 16 (March 14, 1975) Visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the U.S.A., March 18-21, 1975.
No. 17 (March 17, 1975) Death of Ambassador Hearn.
No. 18 (March 20, 1975) Diplomatic appointments.
No. 19 (March 24, 1975) Interim report of the International Joint Commission on the Richelieu River and Lake Champlain.
No. 20 (April 4, 1975) Visit to Ottawa of UNESCO's Director-General.
No. 21 (April 4, 1975) Dr. W. David Hopper — Canada's candidate for the position of Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization.
No. 22 (April 8, 1975) Canadian exhibition in China.
No. 23 (April 11, 1975) Special mission to Angola and Mozambique.

No. 24 (April 11, 1975) Canadian participation in the world conference of the International Women's Year.

No. 26 (April 15, 1975) Round-the-world voyage by the historic Newfoundland fishing vessel *Norma & Gladys*.

No. 27 (April 21, 1975) Canada/U.S. meeting April 15 in Regina on East Poplar River power project.

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No. 75/5 In the Wake of the World Food Conference — Food Production and Rural Development. An address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, to the Commonwealth Ministerial Meeting on Food Production and Rural Development, London, England, March 4, 1975.

No. 75/6 The Contractual Link — a Canadian Contribution to the Vocabulary of Co-operation. Remarks by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau at the Mansion House, London, England, on March 13, 1975.

No. 75/7 Foreign Investment and Energy — Areas of Vital Concern to the U.S. and Canada. A speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, to the Center of Inter-American Relations, New York, March 19, 1975.

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Bogota, November 17, 1972
In force December 12, 1974

France

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Paris, May 2, 1975

Germany, Federal Republic of

Air Transport Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany

Ottawa, March 26, 1973
Provisionally in force March 26, 1973
Definitively in force February 18, 1975

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on Cultural Co-operation
Bonn, March 3, 1975

Norway

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Norway amending the Agreement of July 15, 1971, concerning Sealing and the Conservation of Seal Stocks in the Northwest Atlantic

Ottawa, April 18 and 23, 1975
In force April 23, 1975, with effect from March 15, 1975

Sweden

Memorandum of Understanding implementing the Agreement dated February 3, 1975, between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden concerning Defence Research Development and Production

Stockholm, February 26, 1975
In force February 26, 1975

U.S.A.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the U.S.A. extending the Agreement concerning Joint Participation in the Augmentor Wing Flight Test Project of November 10, 1970

Ottawa, December 5, 1974, and March 24, 1975

In force March 24, 1975

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the U.S.A. relating to the Exchange of Information on Weather Modification Activities

Washington, March 26, 1975

In force March 26, 1975

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America extending the Agreement of June 15, 1973, concerning Reciprocal Fisheries Privileges

Ottawa, April 24, 1975
In force April 24, 1975

U.S.S.R.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the U.S.S.R. extending until April 15, 1976, the Agreement on Provisional Rules of Navigation and Fisheries Safety in the Northeastern Pacific Ocean off the Coast of Canada dated January 22, 1975

Moscow, January 24, 1975
In force April 15, 1975

Multilateral

International Telecommunications Convention with Protocols and Annexes

Done at Malaga-Torremolinos, Spain, October 25, 1973

Signed by Canada October 25, 1973

Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited January 20, 1975

In force for Canada January 20, 1975

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Done at London, Washington and Moscow, April 10, 1972

Signed by Canada April 10, 1972

Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited London, Moscow and Washington September 18, 1972

Entered into force March 26, 1975*

Protocol for the Continuation in force of the International Coffee Agreement of 1968 as extended

Done at New York, September 26, 1974

Signed by Canada March 27, 1975

Agreement establishing a Financial Support Fund of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Done at Paris, April 9, 1975

Signed by Canada April 9, 1975

Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 London, October 20, 1972

London, October 20, 1972

Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited March 7, 1975, accompanied by the following declaration:

"1. The Government of Canada considers that the provisions of Rule 10, 'Traffic Separation Schemes', do not provide the compulsory use of the adopted schemes. The Government of Canada considers that the compulsory routing of ships is necessary to avoid collisions between ships and the resulting damage to the marine environment.

"2. The Government of Canada notes that there are no exceptions to Rule 10(b), (c), and (h) for vessels engaged in fishing with nets, lines, trawls, trolling lines or other apparatus, or for vessels engaged in special operations such as survey, cable, buoy, pipeline or salvage operations, and that the exceptions in

unless otherwise indicated, date of entry into force for Canada corresponds to date of entry into force.

Rule 10(e) are not broad enough to adequately provide for vessels engaged in special operations. The Government of Canada considers that the practical application of Rule 10 would be complicated without realistic exceptions for fishing vessels and for vessels engaged in special operations.

"3. The Government of Canada therefore does not consider that it is prohibited from providing for the compulsory use of traffic separation schemes or providing for such exceptions to Rule 10(b), (c), (e) and (h)."

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

Done at Washington, March 3, 1973

Signed by Canada July 2, 1974

Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited April 10, 1975, with reservations as to Appendices I and II and list of species for inclusion in Appendix III

Protocol for the further extension of the Food Aid Convention of 1971

Done at London, March 25, 1975

Signed by Canada April 14, 1975

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Done at Washington, March 25, 1975

Signed by Canada April 14, 1975

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Done at London, December 10, 1931

Signed by Canada December 10, 1931

In force December 10, 1931

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July/August 1975

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Journal of the Department of External Affairs



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Problems of security and defence

British referendum on Europe

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International Perspectives

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The problems of Asian security with a Communist Indochina

After Vietnam and Cambodia

Sheldon W. Simon

The military conquest of Indochina by communist forces (with the partial exception of Laos, currently governed by a Pathet-Lao-dominated coalition) provides the first test for the much-heralded "domino theory" of the 1950s and 1960s. Concern over that "scenario", which had so much responsibility for U.S. military involvement in Indochina in the aftermath of the first Indochina war, was based on several premises the accuracy of which in the last half of the 1970s is at least open to question. Primary among them was the belief that communist military plans were globally determined from one or two centres — Moscow and/or Peking. Closely related to this view of a monolithic adversary was the belief that Communist imperialist desires were insatiable and that any military victory in one area would serve to fuel probes elsewhere. Thus, the "free world" would gradually be eroded unless Western military counter-force was applied wherever communist forces chose to strike. A final corollary to the above was the assumption that national societies in the developing world were so weak that they would invariably collapse under the impact of internal Communist aggression and/or externally-backed subversion.

The United States began to alter this world view with President Nixon's admission on Guam in July 1969 that the United States could no longer fight the battles of Third World states for them. The economic, political and social costs to American society had simply been too great for goals that Americans had come to believe were not really "vital" U.S. interests. With the overtures to both China and the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, the Nixon Administration reduced its official estimate of the Communist threat to the Third World and raised the official estimate of the capacity of weak states to resist outside pressures. Thus the United States announced that it would rely upon the selective use of military and economic aid to contain local Communist aggression, virtually ruling out a direct combat role for U.S.

forces in local wars that were largely insurgent in nature. The reduction of American military personnel by one-third from the 1968 level and the substantial withdrawal of those forces from Asia gave concrete meaning to the lowering of the American military profile. By the mid-1970s, then, the United States probably no longer had either the capacity or interest to wage large-scale local wars, as distinguished from small-scale interventions.

Lost capacity to wage large-scale local wars

Constraints known

The Vietnamese Communists, as well as their Chinese and Soviet mentors, were as much aware of these constraints on American power as the allies of the U.S. As I have argued elsewhere, from the Vietnamese Communist perspective the purpose of the January 1973 Paris accords was *not* to shift the Indochina conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table but rather to provide the Americans a reasonably graceful exit from the hostilities, in much the same way the French had been so provided in 1954. Thereafter, North Vietnam and its Laotian and Cambodian allies could time their takeover of Indochina in accordance with their growing military and administrative capabilities. The official American position, however, refused to acknowledge that the Paris accords were, in fact, an

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admission of anti-Communist defeat in Indochina. For a time, the United States hoped to accomplish through military assistance what it had been unable to effect through the use of its own forces — a series of negotiated settlements for Indochina through which the anti-Communist political movements would have some meaningful share in government. With the partial exception of Laos, for which a coalition agreement was reached in 1974, such hopes were illusory.

When, in 1975, both South Vietnam and Cambodia collapsed so rapidly, American officials found themselves having to explain what appeared to be a profound and sudden setback for non-Communist Asia, when, in reality, that setback had occurred over two years earlier with the United States withdrawal from direct military involvement.

President Ford's first concern focused on the implications of an American ally's loss for other U.S. security commitments. In a speech delivered early in April, he averred:

"I must say with all the certainty of which I am capable: no adversaries or potential enemies of the United States should imagine that America can be safely challenged; and no allies or time-tested friends of the United States should worry or fear that our commitments to them will not be honoured because of the current confusion and changing situation in Southeast Asia."

However, both the President and his Secretary of State knew that the real issue of American reliability as an ally was not a question of Executive branch commitment but rather one of whether the locus of foreign-policy decision-making had shifted to the Congress. If so, then the real "domino" was the prospect of a collapse abroad of Presidential predictability as a result of Congressional unwillingness to support Executive policies. Secretary Kissinger articulated the dilemma in the following manner:

"The recognition that the Congress is a coequal branch of government is the dominant fact of national politics today. The Executive accepts that the Congress must have both the sense and reality of participation; foreign policy must be a shared enterprise. The question is whether the Congress will go beyond the setting of guidelines to the conduct of tactics; whether it will deprive the Executive of discretion and authority in the conduct of diplomacy while at the same time remaining institutionally incapable of formulating or carrying out a clear national policy of its own."

Setback occurred two years before collapse

Presidential predictability questioned

Documenting their case against the Congress for the military collapse of Vietnam and Cambodia, Executive branch officials cited Congressional structures that forbade the Government from meeting its supply commitments to these countries since mid-1973. Secretary Kissinger argued that such Congressional prohibitions were not only irresponsible but also, in effect, contributed to the destruction of an ally. If the United States was unwilling even to provide the aid friendly countries needed to defend themselves, "then we are likely to find a massive shift in the foreign policies of many countries and a fundamental threat over a period of time to the security of the United States".

The Ford Administration's public anguish over the collapse of Indochina is understandable because these are the first countries that America chose to defend militarily after 1945 that have succumbed to Communist military conquest. Moreover, at a time when both the Congressional and public moods in the United States reduced Washington's ability to supply its clients, no such constraint operated on either Soviet or Chinese aid to the North Vietnamese. But to picture these developments as a bellwether of U.S. foreign policy toward the Third World is once again to adhere to the belief that Indochina was of vital interest to the United States and that the Thieu and Lon Nol governments and the insurgencies they faced were prototypes for most of the non-Communist Third World. Rather, the more appropriate questions should be:

- (a) whether what happened in Indochina was *sui generis* and beyond the political capacity of the United States to alter it; a period of military disengagement and
- (b) whether the kinds of pledge the United States is prepared to keep in this era are sufficient for its Asian allies, whose own security situations must be assessed separately from developments in Indochina.

In addressing the above questions, one must first briefly examine the collapse of South Vietnam to see whether any parallel can be drawn between developments there and potential threats to other parts of Asia. Vietnamese Communist and anti-Communist adversaries have been engaged in interneicene warfare for some 30 years. Although outside intervention occurred massively, it was not a determinant, and most observers agree that the collapse of the Saigon regime and army resulted from a combination of its own poor leadership, corruption and reduced American supplies on the one hand, and a massive, all-out military offensive by the North Vietnamese army (PAVN), on the other.

Virtually the whole PAVN had moved south of the 17th Parallel by April 1975. American officials pointed out that the buildup of Communist forces in the northern part of South Vietnam for the spring 1975 offensive began soon after the August 1973 Congressional decision to forbid the use of U.S. air power, thus eliminating any penalties to the North Vietnamese for offensive operations. Once North Vietnam was able to create a position of military superiority in the South by late 1974 while U.S. military supplies to Saigon dwindled, it was merely a matter of timing for Hanoi to inaugurate its move down the peninsula. Military analysts noted that the PAVN appeared to be following Soviet military doctrine through the extensive use of field artillery and tanks to mass overwhelming Soviet-supplied fire-power before moving from one area to another. Field artillery and tanks were crucial to this strategy as the U.S.S.R. had supplied the North with hundreds of such pieces since 1974. Russian anti-aircraft weapons neutralized the South's air force, which had already been crippled through a lack of spare parts and a decentralized command system whose political purpose was to prevent an air-force coup but the negative military effect of which was to prevent the concentration of air-power in the regions where it was needed. Thieu's decision to withdraw from the central highlands was probably based on the belief that the ARVN did not possess enough supplies to hold the region until new U.S. aid should arrive after the next Congressional appropriations season (1976). The withdrawal became a rout, however, because of a total absence of military preparation, leadership and planning for civilian refugees. The North Vietnamese followed the retreating Southerners, chopping off political cadres and occupation forces as they moved down the peninsula. In the process, the Vietnamese Communists (and their Khmer Rouge counterparts in Cambodia) captured well over \$4 billion (U.S.) of American military equipment, which might well have the unintended effect of loosening Hanoi's almost total dependence on the Soviet Union for military supplies. (The parallel between the North Vietnamese acquisition of American equipment in 1975 and the Chinese Communist capture of U.S. equipment from the Nationalists between 1947 and 1950 is striking.) Hanoi's military press disseminated instructions on the collection and care of this "war booty". It was clearly destined for incorporation into the Vietnamese Communists' military inventory.

At this point, one can only speculate

about the kinds of policy the Vietminh will follow in the South. Dinh Ba Thi, the chief PRG delegate in Saigon, claimed that non-Communist "third forces" members were being given positions of responsibility in areas taken over since the March offensive. And Hanoi's military press has noted that captured ARVN personnel may be used to maintain and instruct the PAVN in the use of captured equipment.

Problems ahead

The North has overrun so much of the South so rapidly that there are bound to be serious problems of administration and population control. To attempt the immediate imposition of a North Vietnamese-style peasant-mobilization polity is probably beyond Hanoi's political capability given the current urban demographic structure of the South (almost 60 per cent of the population in cities). Therefore, the North may well prefer a Southern Communist-controlled coalition government for an indefinite transitional period, during which the population will be relocated in the countryside and the standard of life in the cities will be reduced from the artificially high, service-sector dominant style that characterized the era of American largesse.

As for external relations, the chairman of the PRG Consultative Council has announced that his government is willing to establish ties with the United States (the DRV had earlier taken a similar position) and has even hinted that foreign investment and enterprises would be invited to continue, suggesting the need for external assistance in the South during the reconstruction period. How long this proffered welcome to outsiders will last is, of course, an open question.

Relocation of population to counteract artificial life style

Asian reactions

Of major concern to both the United States and its Asian allies is the impact of a Communist victory in Indochina on the credibility of other American security commitments and on the region's general political orientation. While it is much too soon for any definitive description of these reactions, there is enough early evidence of a response to Indochinese developments for some analysis of policy choices open to three Asian states that maintain military ties with the United States but to which the importance of Indochina varies. These are Thailand, the Philippines and Japan.

A Communist Indochina might be perceived as a threat by other Asian states under any of the following conditions: (a) as a base for subversion and infiltration against its immediate neighbours;

(b) as a model for insurgencies in other states; and (c) as an indication of American inability to support its allies successfully in their hour of need.

Thailand's primary concern over Indochinese developments falls into the first category. With active insurgencies operating in north and northeast Thailand supported by many of the ethnic Laotians residing in those areas, Thai officials fear the use of Pathet Lao bases in Laos for insurgent supply and training. Speculative reports of such developments appear frequently in the Bangkok press. These northern regions have suffered from government neglect for decades, and the size of the ethnic Laotian population living there (eleven million) is some five times that in Laos itself. Because, then, of ethnic differences, rural exploitation and central government neglect, as well as more recent military repression, parts of northern Thailand appear ripe for Indochinese-based guerrilla warfare should the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao so choose.

Thai officials are painfully aware of their country's vulnerability and America's inability to help with this kind of domestic problem. Therefore, in order to assure the Vietnamese Communists that Thailand will no longer permit its territory to be used by the United States to hamper Vietminh activities in Indochina, the new Thai Government formed in March 1975 under Kukrit Pramog has called upon the United States to withdraw its forces by August 1976. The reasoning behind the decision is no idle display of nationalism but rather a recognition of the changed political coloration of mainland Southeast Asia coupled with a desire to demonstrate to the Vietnamese Communists that Thailand poses no threat to their newly-acquired status. This is the same kind of "politics of weakness" that worked so well for Sihanouk in Cambodia through most of the 1960s. And, so far as the Vietminh have no further expansionist designs (that is, so far as Hanoi views its primary goal as having been achieved through the attainment of the hegemonic position in Indochina), Thailand with its new policy may well be able to rest secure from outside threat. Foreign Minister Chatchai Chunhawan has stated that Thailand is moving away from close dependence on the United States and toward a new relationship with China to prove its adherence to regional neutrality as stated in the 1971 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) declaration.

Meanwhile, the Thai military are increasing their own operations in the northern and northeast provinces, which have

been declared under a state of emergency. Similar military measures are being taken in co-operation with Malaysian authorities in the south in the face of stepped-up Malay Communist guerrilla attacks. In sum, Thailand appears to be following two policy lines in the wake of Communist victories in Indochina: an externally conciliatory policy toward the Vietminh and their allies and a domestic policy of military pursuit and insurgent destruction. The idea behind these two policies is that so long as external insurgent aid can be neutralized, Thailand will be able to control its internal dissidents.

Philippine review

In the Philippines, a land far removed from any direct mainland Communist threat, President Marcos has called for a general review of the American security relationship. Western analysts do not believe this review will lead to an abrogation of the base treaties, particularly since the air and naval complexes at Clark and Subic Bay would be the last U.S. strongholds in Southeast Asia when the Americans leave Thailand. Rather, it appears that the Philippines is taking advantage of the increased importance of its location to negotiate new monetary compensation for the bases, which, under the current treaties, are free of any charge until 1991. Facing an expanding guerrilla war against Moslem dissidents in the south and a rapidly growing foreign-exchange deficit because of increased fuel costs, the country needs new sources of cash. Many officials believe that base rentals could be a partial answer to these needs. This mercenary explanation of Philippines motives in the base negotiations should not be taken to mean that there is no concern about the reliability of future U.S. commitments. Concern about Indochinese developments has been expressed by a number of officials who are particularly disturbed by the equivocal reaction of the American Congress. Marcos has stated that he wants the ambiguity in the Philippines-U.S. Security Treaty clarified so that Manila will know in what specific cases of aggression the United States will be obliged to come to the Philippines' assistance. Moreover, the Philippines wants to examine closely the implications of moving America's Southeast Asian defence line from Thailand back to its islands.

Perhaps the country most concerned about U.S. behaviour in Indochina is the one least susceptible to a challenge of the Indochinese type — Japan. In Japan's case, doubts about the U.S. alliance go back to the "Nixon shocks" of 1971, which demon-

trated that the United States was willing to make major East Asian political moves (Nixon's China visit) and unilateral economic policy affecting Japan (textile quotas) without consulting Tokyo. From Tokyo's perspective, the pertinent question over an American military withdrawal from East Asia is how a joint Japanese-American defence of Japan can be achieved if the Indochina debacle marks the beginning of a complete U.S. military exodus?

Effects on Japan

Japan's defence policy over the last 25 years has been premised on the maintenance of some U.S. forces in the region as well as on the Japanese islands themselves. This American presence and its attendant nuclear umbrella have permitted Japan to limit rearmament severely and devote the bulk of its efforts to economic development at home and trade and investment abroad. If U.S. forces were to leave, however, two polar tendencies would be encouraged in Japan: at one extreme, reversion to unarmed neutrality, as advocated by the Japan Socialist Party, and, at the other, interest in large-scale rearmament, including the development of nuclear weapons.

The United States opposes both these possibilities; and Secretary of Defence Schlesinger, in the 1975 annual defence report, reaffirmed the importance of the Japan-U.S. security treaty, citing the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan as indispensable to Northeast Asian security. Nevertheless, Japanese officials, like their Philippine counterparts, expressed dismay at the U.S. failure to help South Vietnam and Cambodia in their crises. And Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa visited Washington specifically for a reaffirmation of the American commitment to defend Japan and maintain the nuclear umbrella, both of which were reiterated by Kissinger and Ford.

Indonesia, as the key island state in Southeast Asia, has expressed no undue concern over Indochinese developments. Indeed, Foreign Minister Malik voiced his belief that Vietnamese Communism has its own identity and could peacefully coexist with the five ASEAN countries, thereby helping Southeast Asia to gain strength in confronting great-power influence in the region.

America's experience in Indochina over the past 20 years has demonstrated the limited applicability of conventional military force against a non-industrialized peasant state in a war in which there were no front lines and whose primary criterion of success was the allegiance and/or con-

trol of population rather than territory. Paradoxically, the use of force in unfavourable political circumstances actually led to a loss of power for the United States. The contrast between America's ability to preserve the status quo *vis-à-vis* the U.S.S.R. in the Cuban missile crisis or over Berlin and its inability to deal with North Vietnam is startling but not unlike the Soviet's inability to deal with Yugoslavia or Albania. Weak countries with a strong sense of national pride can make the use of force against themselves most unattractive because their capacity for resistance makes the price of victory too high for the outsider.

Future role

America's future role in Asian security is ambiguous. Some combination of air, naval and amphibious forces will probably remain in East Asia (Japan, the R.O.K. and the Philippines) through the remainder of the 1970s. Their purpose will be to serve as part of the global balance with the Soviet Union, to deter direct or indirect Soviet intervention in local crises and, more important, to induce Soviet co-operation in the peaceful solution of such crises if they arise. American security policy for the late 1970s must depend increasingly on a peaceful configuration of interests and power among local states rather than any direct American intervention. U.S. diplomacy, then, must depend primarily on the instruments of trade, investment and economic and military assistance.

For the remainder of non-Communist Asia, the lesson Indochina has taught is that future security arrangements will have to be indigenous and based on some combination of creating the domestic political and social conditions necessary to undermine any significant popular support for insurgencies while engaging in border-control operations with neighbours to insure that the availability of external sanctuaries is minimized. (Co-operation between Malaysia and Thailand and Malaysia and Indonesia are good examples.)

As for the Vietnamese Communist victory itself, since one American goal of involvement in Indochina in the beginning was to "contain" China, then a strong, satisfied Vietnamese-controlled Indochina on the border of the PRC might well effect a similar end. If so, then the bitterest irony of all over these past 20 years has been that America chose as its adversary the one Asian political movement that could best have achieved its China-containment policy.

U.S. inability to deal with North Vietnam similar to Soviet inability with Yugoslavia

Asian security in future must be indigenous

Dependence, independence and interdependence

US.-EEC relations

By Robin Ranger

To Canadians, familiar with the problems of maintaining their independence in the face of pressures from the United States, the emergence of the European Economic Community (EEC) into the international community should be viewed sympathetically and hopefully. Sympathetically, because Canada knows the problems the Community is experiencing in its external relations; hopefully, because the Community offers Canada a much-needed political and economic counterweight to the U.S.

The Community remains torn between the realities of its strategic dependence on the U.S. and its aspirations (while remaining economically interdependent) towards political independence from the U.S. The resulting tensions in EEC-U.S. relations should be seen as the inevitable results of a Community searching uneasily for its own political and economic identity, and the resultant relationship between a Western Europe that aspires to be more than the sum of its parts and a U.S. that remains uncertain how to treat this emergent international actor. These stresses and strains within the Atlantic Alliance become more intelligible if viewed in their appropriate context, be it strategic, political or economic.

Search
for political
and economic
identity

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Strategic dependence

The fundamental feature of NATO is that the Alliance formalized Western Europe's dependence on the U.S. for the preservation of its political and economic independence from the U.S.S.R. When NATO was founded in 1949, it was seen as a political guarantee by the U.S. that would enable a war-shattered Western Europe to recover economically, free from fears of Russian political and military threats. Indeed, it was not until the Korean War broke out in June 1950 that NATO acquired its dominant characteristic as a military alliance.

Throughout the 1950s, Western European forces were slowly built up but never became more than a trip-wire, a thin screening force, whose penetration by the Russians would set in motion the retaliatory power of the United States. The U.S. was still enjoying strategic superiority in fact, if not in the mythical realm of the "missile-gap" alleged, wrongly, to have existed in Russia's favour from 1957 to 1961. The Kennedy-Johnson Presidency saw Robert S. McNamara bring his unique combination of analytical precision, intellectual arrogance and political insensitivity to the office of Secretary of Defence from 1961 to 1967. MacNamara and his systems-analysts argued that, using any qualitative yardstick, the conventional forces of NATO as a whole, even in the crucial Central Front, were equivalent or superior to their Russian and East European opponents. The stage at which the nuclear threshold would be reached would therefore, become a matter of weeks or months rather than days. Even if this threshold were passed, it would initially be with symbolic, demonstrative strikes minimizing civilian casualties but revealing U.S. willingness to begin the process of nuclear escalation.

In its most optimistic (some would say dogmatic) form the McNamara formula envisaged a partnership of equals. Western Europe would provide the conventional forces for a prolonged conven-

onal defence, while the U.S. assisted with conventional forces and a nuclear "back-up", both tactical and strategic. The only trouble with this theory was that it was a war-fighting strategy designed to minimize U.S. casualties if war broke out whereas the Western Europeans preferred a war-preventing strategy. As far as the Western Europeans were concerned, a prolonged conventional defence of Western Europe could be nearly as devastating as an earlier tactical nuclear exchange. Most Western Europeans doubted the accuracy of McNamara's calculations of NATO parity or superiority *vis à vis* the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) and argued that, even if Western Europe could field conventional forces equal to those of the WPO, this would only create an illusion of Western European strategic partnership with the U.S. The U.S. would retain control over the tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. This control was essential both to the ultimate deterrence of a Russian threat of attack and to the use of military superiority to extract political advantages.

Paradoxically, the Western European insistence on strategic dependence on the U.S. provided a more realistic basis for assessing the strategic relationship between Western Europe and the U.S. than McNamara's theories of equality, which paralleled the Atlanticist notion of a "dumb-bell" partnership, with a united Europe sharing the American burden of being a global policeman. The dumb-bell notion has always obscured the central reality that it would be the U.S. half of the dumb-bell which would retain the strategic nuclear striking power on which the Western European half would continue to depend for its security. In addition, Kissinger himself pointed out (in *The Troubled Partnership*, McGraw-Hill, 1965), attempts to remedy this fundamental imbalance led to technological solutions, like the ill-fated Multilateral Nuclear Force, for political problems. The Western European response to the notion that NATO forces were more powerful or WPO forces less powerful or both was to cut defence spending. This trend was encouraged by the Harmel Report of 1967, which, by urging NATO to become an instrument of *détente*, belatedly formalized NATO acceptance of *détente*. Similarly, the NATO suggestion for talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) made at Reykjavik in 1968 was motivated by two desires: (1) to cut defence spending and keep U.S. forces in Western Europe; (2) to prevent U.S. unilateral force reductions. Despite subsequent developments (see articles by Legault and

Ranger in *International Perspectives*), these two motives remained the basis of Western European attitudes towards MBFR.

Ironically, considering the amount of attention Dr. Kissinger had devoted to the problems of the Western Europe-U.S. relationship in NATO before assuming office first as President Nixon's Special Assistant for National Security (1968-1973) and then as Secretary of State, he tended to take the NATO relationship for granted. Though apparently favourable towards the British and French independent nuclear deterrents, and sympathetic towards the fears of total dependence on the U.S. nuclear guarantee that had led to their construction, he made no great effort to secure greater nuclear co-operation between the three nuclear powers in the Western alliance. Ideas of French-British nuclear co-operation evident in the early 1970s fell on stony ground, leaving the EEC strategically dependent on the U.S.

This dependence was increased by domestic pressures in Western Europe (and the U.S.) for reductions in defence spending, which always meant in conventional forces. These reductions increased NATO's reliance on the early use of tactical nuclear weapons (within two to ten days of a major Soviet attack) in demonstrative strikes, and have led to pressure for the introduction of "mini-nukes" (very small tactical nuclear weapons with little radioactive fallout) to augment the fire-power of U.S. and NATO forces. But the "mini-nukes" would still be under U.S. control, as are all nuclear weapons supplied to the NATO allies. So not only was the EEC strategically dependent on the U.S. but the Community felt strategically dependent on it. Because of this feeling of dependence, the Community hated to be reminded of the realities of its strategic position. Further evidence of this strategic bipolarity, with the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. still dominant in a politically multipolar world, came with the Vladivostok Agreements of 1974.

Kissinger took NATO relationship for granted

Feeling of strategic dependency

Vladivostok Agreements

For the EEC these agreements of November 24, 1974, had two meanings. First, the super-powers had rejected technical arms control (that is, measures effectively limiting the development and deployment of new weapons systems) in favour of political arms control (that is, an agreement by the super-powers to insulate the strategic arms acquisition process from their political relations). This meant that strategic bipolarity would increase rather than

decrease as the super-powers' strategic-arms race put them on a qualitatively and quantitatively different level from the other four nuclear powers, Britain, France, China and India. Secondly, the issue of Forward-Based Systems (FBS) for the delivery of tactical nuclear weapons, which the Western Europeans regarded as important to their security, was decided by super-power bargaining, albeit favourably thanks to U.S. support of their Western European allies.

Although the Vladivostok Agreements were hailed by Kissinger as "putting a cap on the strategic arms race", they really did nothing of the sort. They imposed quantitative ceilings on a qualitative arms race, with the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. agreeing to limit themselves to 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles each, of which not more than 1,320 each were to be equipped with independently-targetable warheads (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles, MARV). These limitations seemed significant until it was realized that they represented about the maximum planned-building programs of the two super-powers. Under these, by 1982, the U.S.S.R. could have 6,000 to 9,000 independently-targetable warheads (MIRV in the megaton range), while the U.S. would have 8,000 to 10,000 independently-targetable warheads (MIRV/MARV in the kiloton range) rising to 12,000 separately-targetable warheads by 1985. The 1982 "throw-weight" — that is, the deliverable payload of the two forces — would be 1,800 tons for the U.S. and 7,000 tons for the U.S.S.R. The U.S. would go ahead with the B-1 supersonic bomber, the *Trident* Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), the development of MARV and improvements in the *Minuteman* Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), possibly including deployment of the MIRVed *Minuteman III* beyond the planned 550. The U.S.S.R. would go ahead with its major missile-replacement program. The SS-X-18 was a successor to the SS-9 "heavy" ICBM, limited to 313 under the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Accords (Salt I). The SS-X-16 was being developed as a potentially mobile ICBM, which would contravene Salt I. The SS-X-17 and -19, with 4-8 MIRVs, were successors to the 1,030 SS-II ICBMs. The older SS-7 and -8 ICBMs would be retired in favour of additional SLBMs, enabling the U.S.S.R. to build up to the Salt I limits of 950 SLBMs in 62 "modern" submarines.

The Vladivostok Agreements did nothing to remove the greatest technical threat to the balance of strategic stability,

the possibility of an effective disarming counterforce, first strike — that is, an attack by one side on the other's strategic forces. By the late 1970s, the U.S.S.R. and to a lesser extent, the U.S. would have the capability of launching such a strike, which could knock out 80 to 90 per cent of the opponent's ICBMs for an expenditure of 25 to 40 per cent of the attacker's forces. But the Vladivostok Agreements did attempt to limit the adverse effect on the political relationship of the super-powers of these potentially-destabilizing technological innovations. For the Western Europeans this meant that issues involving the two super-powers would continue to be managed by the super-powers, if necessary at the expense of third parties, including the members of the EEC.

The FBS issue underlined the Community's strategic dependence on the U.S. The Soviet Union had raised the issue of FBS in the first session of the Salt I negotiations in 1969, arguing that FBS were strategic nuclear weapons, since they could hit the U.S.S.R. on one-way missions. The Western Europeans were disturbed at the possibility of FBS being thinned out, since they symbolized the U.S. nuclear guarantee of Western Europe. The U.S., in response to these pressures, deferred discussion of FBS. In the Salt I negotiations, the U.S.S.R. repeated its demands for the thinning-out of FBS, but was finally forced to drop them in the face of a U.S. refusal to include FBS in the Vladivostok package. Although the Soviet Union introduced FBS only to exacerbate U.S.-Western European relations, an objective it achieved for a time, the main lesson for the Western Europeans was that, despite the care with which the U.S. kept them informed of progress in the Salt negotiations *via* NATO, the final decision as to what would be included rested with the super-powers.

Political independence

In contrast to these strategic realities, the Community sought to create a new political reality of independence of the U.S. in two senses. In the first place, the individual members of the EEC wished, like Canada, to be able to take political and economic positions reflecting what they perceived to be their own national interest, even if these conflicted, in whole or in part, with those of the U.S. In the second place, the Community as an organization, and significant sections of opinion within its members, wished the EEC as whole to be able to do the same. Henry Kissinger has observed that the independence of the Community should not be defined by its

degree of opposition to the U.S. Equally, the Community should not be measured, as the U.S. and Atlanticists have argued, by the degree of its alignment with the U.S. The fact that the EEC does not agree with the U.S. does not indicate that its position is self-evidently wrong, or wrong in the sense of failing to represent the interests of the Community's members.

The conflict between the Community's drive for political independence from and its strategic dependence on the U.S. was underlined by the October 1973 Middle East war, which saw Dr. Kissinger's self-proclaimed "Year of Europe" end in a greater degree of hostility between Western Europe and the U.S. than at any time since NATO's creation. The October 1973 crisis was exacerbated by the diplomatic failure of the U.S. to inform its allies in the way in which they were, as General de Gaulle so neatly put it, informed rather than consulted in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The events of October 1973 are worth analysis as typical of the tensions to be expected between the Community's interests and those of the U.S., both real and perceived.

Following the outbreak of hostilities, the Russians breached what the U.S. understood as an implicit rule of crisis management in the Middle East by resupplying their Arab allies during the conflict. This was a clear challenge to American interests in protecting Israel and a test of the U.S. willingness to take significant action in defence of a close ally. To counter what was perceived by the U.S. as a threat to its clearly-defined and long-established vital interest in protecting the physical survival of Israel, though not Israel's conquests, the U.S. reacted by resupplying Israel with arms. To protect what the Western Europeans saw as their vital national interest, namely their supply of oil from Arab producers, the Western Europeans refused to allow the U.S. to use its supplies or bases on their territory for this resupply effort, Portugal being the only, and for the U.S. the crucial, exception.

Finally, the U.S., without consulting its allies, put its conventional and strategic forces on increased alert to meet the very real possibility that the U.S.S.R. might intervene directly with airborne troops to save Egypt from defeat by Israel. The U.S. action was much criticized in Western Europe, while Dr. Kissinger was "disgusted" at the lack of Western European support. He argued, correctly, that the long-run survival of Western Europe depended on

U.S. strategic guarantee identical in kind, except for the additional commitment to aid Western Europe in the NATO

treaty, to the U.S. guarantee of Israel's physical survival. But it did not follow, as he asserted, that this long-run interest outweighed the short- and medium-term Western European interest in obtaining the Arab oil on which Western European economies depended, an interest that forced these countries to tilt towards the Arabs and away from the U.S. and Israel. The Western Europeans argued, convincingly, that the U.S. could fulfil its security guarantee to Israel on its own and, if it wanted allied support, should ask for it, not assume it.

These differences were uneasily papered over in the Ottawa Declaration of June 1974, with its vague promises of greater consultation within NATO, but the underlying problem remained. How far could the U.S., as a super-power with global responsibilities, be expected to consult with, rather than inform, its Western European allies, which had, as Dr. Kissinger bluntly observed, only regional interests? One answer was that these regional interests included the Middle East and oil supplies; the other was that, logically, Western Europe could reasonably expect to be consulted on issues affecting its members individually and the Community collectively. Nor was it good enough for Dr. Kissinger to complain that he was only informed of Community decisions after these were taken. Clearly, a consistent American diplomatic consultation with the Community as it made decisions could overcome this problem in a way that Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" could not. But the problem remained for the EEC that its members had such divergent national interests, and such divergent conceptions of how the Community should evolve, that they found it easier to define their common interests in negative terms of opposition to U.S. policies that had an adverse effect on the Community. It was much harder for the Community to think or act in terms of common interests because these were few and far between, except, ironically, for the need to keep the U.S. committed to the defence of Western Europe.

European support for U.S. policy should not be assumed

Divergent conceptions of Community evolution

Economic interdependence

Here again, in the economic field, the EEC often seemed to find it easier to express its objectives negatively, in the form of the Common External Tariff (CET), rather than positively, in the form of the economic and monetary union scheduled, optimistically, for 1980 in the Ortelli Report by the President of the Commission of the EEC. Naturally, given the view of its founders that the EEC would move

*Unlike Canada,
EEC is
economic equal
of the U.S.*

from a customs union to an economic and then to a political union, it has been in economic matters that the Community has made the most progress in formulating common policies. These have, however, frequently been a source of irritation to the U.S., especially in the area of agricultural products, but the economic relationship between the EEC and the U.S. remains fundamentally different from the strategic or political relationship. Economically, the EEC and the U.S. are as interdependent as Canada and the U.S. Their relationship is a symbiotic one, characterized by such common problems as inflation and the management of multinational corporations, whose activities transcend national boundaries. But, unlike Canada, the EEC is, at least on paper, and to a lesser extent in practice, the economic equal of the U.S. So economic issues between the U.S. and the EEC are negotiable in a way that strategic issues are not (at least for the moment). Economically, there exists something approaching a balance of power, and it is significant, in this regard, that Dr. Kissinger's vision of a pentagonal balance included among its major economic actors Western Europe. But, even if the Community can move down the long and difficult road to economic and monetary union, it may remain, like pre-Brandt West Germany, "an economic giant but a political pygmy", though this analogy should also remind us that today West Germany remains an economic giant but is also the dominant political and military member of the Community.

Canadian interests

For Canada, the problems posed by the evolution of the Community are primarily those of how to encourage the development of a centre of political and economic influence within the Western alliance to

"I have come here, Mr. Chairman, for three reasons:

"The first is to state clearly and unequivocally Canada's belief in the concept of collective security, Canada's support for NATO, and Canada's pledge to maintain a NATO force level which is accepted by our allies as being adequate in size and effective in character....

"The second reason is to urge that we at this table accept as an essential ingredient of consultation the continuous challenging of alliance tactics and strategies, because, unless we, as governments, are convinced of their worth, we shall be in no position to convince our followers in our Parliaments. . . . The strength and the

offset the obsessive dominance of the U.S. and how to develop economic links with this new force. In many ways, 1975 will be Canada's "Year of Europe", with the Prime Minister's visit to Western Europe from October 21 to 25, 1974, and the appointment of Marcel Cadieux, former Canadian Ambassador to the U.S., as Ambassador to the EEC, indicating its new importance in Canadian foreign policy, and the establishment of a Community office in Ottawa, probably accompanied by a visit from Sir Christopher Soames, Community Vice-President for External Relations. The main theme in Canadian policy toward the EEC has been the desire for some form of contractual link, some document that would set out the principles governing the relations between the two that could form the framework for a series of more specific agreements on co-operation in particular sectors, such as the forward planning of energy needs, the exploration of Canadian natural resources and the establishment of new manufacturing industries in Canada.

In an era in which Canada will increasingly have to assert the legitimacy of Canadian national interests over those of Canadian-American co-operation, as in the area of energy supplies, the Community has afforded a welcome example of the assertion that what is good for the U.S. is not necessarily good for its allies. It also offers an economic counterweight of sorts to U.S. dominance. Because Canada is free of the central Western European preoccupation with security (its security is guaranteed by the U.S., whether Canada wants it or not), it may also be possible for Canada to develop a role as an intermediary between a Community in search of an identity and an America in search of an ally.

credibility of this alliance depend upon its political, every bit as much as its military, character. We as political leaders must consider and be satisfied with the wisdom of the basic strategies and military plans of our advisers. We can best do that by more frequent consultations.

"The third reason is to urge that we so organize ourselves as to mount and sustain — perhaps through CCMS [the Committee on the Challenges to Modern Society], as suggested by President Ford, a challenge of peace and of human dignity to the Warsaw Pact."

(Extract from remarks made by Prime Minister Trudeau at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels, May 30, 1975.)

Requirements of diplomacy called for renewal of NORAD

by David Cox

Two years ago, in May 1973, the North American Air Defence Agreement (NORAD) was extended for only a two-year period on the grounds that there were a number of changing strategic factors in air defence which needed to be clarified before a longer-term commitment was made. Prior to 1973, the agreement had been made initially for ten years in 1958, and renewed for five years in 1968. By an exchange of notes in May 1975 the agreement has again been renewed for a period of five years. In the evidence recently presented before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, two points became clear. First, the strategic factors which were so uncertain in 1973 were now largely resolved. Secondly, the Government was already committed to the renewal of NORAD. The irony of the situation is that the development of strategic arguments in the last two years suggests that NORAD, as originally conceived, is of relatively little significance at the present time, while, on the other hand, the case for renewal finds few serious opponents. In short, we find a typical dilemma of Canadian defence policy: military need seems less pressing than political obligation.

At present, there are fewer ambiguities and uncertainties about the military analysis of North American defence strategy than at any time since NORAD was established in 1958. Briefly, a composite list of the tasks ascribed to NORAD in various official statements reveals the following:

- anti-bomber defence
- warning of surprise attack
- surveillance of space
- surveillance and control of air-space protection of sovereignty).

Of these tasks, the one which provided the original rationale for NORAD is anti-bomber defence. It is also the one that has been the most contentious over the years. It may be useful, therefore, to

review the changing objectives of anti-bomber defence since 1958.

In origin, NORAD belongs to the pre-missile balance of power. Its purpose was to protect the retaliatory capabilities of the United States, which, in 1958, consisted mainly of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). As General Sharp subsequently explained (in 1968) to the Standing Committee: "... SAC bomber bases, owing to the large concentration of bombers on each base, were vulnerable to an attack by a relatively small number of aircraft. Such vulnerability could serve as a temptation for the U.S.S.R. to launch a preemptive attack." The primary purpose of the defending forces, therefore, was to provide warning-time for SAC bombers to take off and, by providing some defence capability, to require a Soviet attack to be of considerable size, thereby ensuring that the attack could be detected (while one or several bombers could penetrate the radar lines undetected, the large formations necessary for a surprise attack in the face of possible active defence could not). Thus adequate warning would be given to SAC.

Stabilizing force

This original and still primary function, *detection and warning*, was and is basically stabilizing in that it decreases the likelihood of a Soviet first strike and increases the confidence of the United States in its retaliatory capabilities. To this function, General Sharp and other official witnesses added two others. In the

*Primary purpose
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Intercontinental ballistic missile replaced bomber as primary attack vehicle

event that an attack occurred, the defending air forces would be able to limit damage by destroying "as many bombers as possible". And finally, active air defences were designed to make Soviet bomber penetration more difficult and more expensive. This last argument, which one might call the case for a strategy of financial attrition, is, of course, highly questionable. While nobody can doubt the claim that penetration can be made more difficult, it is not so obvious that the relatively increased cost to the attacker is greater than the increased cost to the defender. However, this is an argument which is not central to the case for or against NORAD at the present time.

Almost immediately after the establishment of NORAD, the replacement of the bomber by the intercontinental ballistic missile as the primary attack vehicle of the two super-powers meant that the threat from the manned bomber became peripheral. Perhaps partly in response, in the early Sixties one finds that the damage-limitation function is stressed rather more than the protection of SAC. But it is also true that, throughout the early and middle Sixties, there is a developing recognition of the diminished importance of the manned bomber, and so of anti-bomber defences. The 1964 defence White Paper, for example, held out the prospect of a continuing reduction in this area.

This trend was arrested by the prospect that both the United States and the Soviet Union might deploy large-scale anti-ballistic-missile systems. Potentially, such systems gave a new lease of life to bomber defence, for two reasons. First, it was possible to see a new function for the bomber as a means to destroy the radars of anti-ballistic-missile defences. In effect, such an attack constituted a revision of the old argument of a sneak attack upon SAC bases, except that, in this case, the attack would be a small-scale, low-level attack intended to "blind" the ABM systems. Secondly in the late Sixties, when there was a real prospect that ABM defences would be deployed, inevitably there was an increased interest in maintaining and improving anti-bomber defences, because, if it became possible to defend against the missile, then obviously there was a need to be able to defend against the bomber. Moreover, these prospective changes in the strategic situation were accompanied by some major developments in the technology of anti-bomber defence. Briefly, these were the developments of over-the-horizon radar, which offered the prospect of improved detection- and warning-time against a bomber attack,

and of airborne warning and control systems, which would supplement over-the-horizon radar and, through the control of the active defence against the bomber, permit that defence to take place much further north than had previously been the case. These technological developments, of course, came with an impossibly high price tag and, together with the uncertainties of the ABM dispute, set the scene for the reluctance of the Canadian Government to commit itself to a long renewal period for NORAD in 1968 and again in 1973. Nevertheless, despite the uncertainties, in 1973 we find General Lane testifying: "Over the past 15 years, many aspects of air defence have changed drastically, but the most important of the original problems was, and continues to be, maintaining an effective defence against the manned bomber."

Recent discussions

This brief review of the development of NORAD provides the context for the recent round of discussion on the merits of continuing the agreement. In 1975, the emphasis in defining the functions of NORAD has changed noticeably. First, Mr. Richardson, in his initial presentation to the Standing Committee, noted that:

"The principal need is a greater emphasis on the peace time surveillance and control aspect, and a lessened defence against the bomber threat."

General Carr, in his testimony, acknowledged that the need for an effective anti-bomber defence has been replaced by the requirement for "a prudent minimum defensive capability against the bomber. Moreover, in subsequent testimony, General Carr indicated what that prudent minimum would be — namely, the allocation of whatever forces were otherwise required for surveillance and control of air-space.

Explaining this change in emphasis illustrates a central dilemma of Canadian policy, which is that all too often it must react to situations over which it has little control and influence. Anti-bomber defence is no longer of great importance because, individually and jointly, the United States and the Soviet Union have decreed it not to be so. They have done this in several ways. First, the strategic arms limitation agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972 entrenched the notion of mutual vulnerability. In doing that, it stabilized the ABM situation and, by removing the prospect of large-scale deployment of ABMs, removed the need for a significant anti-bomber defence, as described above. Secondly, the

cent agreements in principle at Vladivostok imposed a ceiling on the intercontinental delivery vehicles of both sides at 2,400, and this total number includes manned bombers. There is no indication in any of the official statements of the Soviet Union or the United States that the Soviet Union would seek to replace missiles with bombers in its total number of delivery vehicles. Therefore, the argument that, if there were no anti-bomber defences, there would be a temptation for the Soviet Union to increase its manned-bomber force now holds very little weight. On the contrary, it seems that, as anti-bomber defences have declined, so has the Soviet capability in strategic bomber forces. Moreover, there is no doctrine or "scenario" for the use of the manned bomber in an attack upon North America which does not produce a severe case of what Raymond Aron once called "nuclear incredulity". Finally, the United States has unilaterally downgraded anti-bomber defence in its strategic planning. United States strategic air-defence forces have been reduced by approximately 80 per cent since the early 1960s, but not until 1972 were air-defence objectives revised. Even then, the first objective was defined as a limited defence against a small-bomber attack. Last year, however, Secretary of Defence Schlesinger again reviewed air-defence planning and offered a new statement of objectives as follows:

- 1) Provide a capability to perform peacetime surveillance and control function to protect the sovereignty of U.S. air-space.
- 2) Provide warning of a bomber attack.
- 3) Provide a limited defence against a small-bomber attack when augmented by specially-trained and -equipped tactical air-defence units.

Here, then, is the direct precursor of the change in priorities recently presented by Mr. Richardson to the Standing Committee. If we now consider the primary purpose of NORAD again — namely, warning and defence against the manned bomber —, it is evident that the rationale for NORAD in its initial form no longer exists. Since the other tasks which are assigned to NORAD — passive defence against the missile, passive defence against the bomber, and the surveillance and control of air-space — are not in dispute, the question is, do they have to be performed within the framework of NORAD?

It should be clear from the foregoing analysis that the military need for NORAD is now limited. Whereas it could

be argued once that NORAD was necessary because only through the integration of the air-defence commands could an effective anti-bomber defence be conducted, it is now clear that, so long as there is little or no anticipation of such an attack, there is no need for an integrated command in peacetime.

There is still a marginal advantage to an integrated command (for this is what NORAD offers in comparison with any form of co-operative but separate defence commands) in a war situation. In short, in the event that a nuclear war actually started, and so far as anybody, at that point, would be concerned to minimize damage, then the most effective military arrangement would be an integrated command. However, if this were the only factor to be considered in assessing the merits of NORAD, it would not weigh heavily in the analysis. Therefore, one must look elsewhere, to the political circumstances in which Canada finds itself, to understand the Government's commitment to NORAD.

Political difficulties

Over the years, a number of political difficulties have arisen from Canada's participation in the alliance. First, there is always the prospect, or fear, that involvement in a joint command creates incentives or pressure to buy unnecessarily sophisticated equipment. At various times, developments in ABMs, in AWACs, and in improved manned interceptors, have all raised the prospect of enormous expenditures for dubious returns.

Secondly, although there have been only two cases of crisis (the Cuban missile crisis and the U.S. alert of October 1973), these have suggested that there are inherent difficulties in the process of political consultation called for in the NORAD Agreement. Although assurances have been given that political consultation can take place at very short notice, and that the Canadian component of NORAD responds to a national command system, explanations as to how this works in practice have always been evasive. Whether such difficulties on consultation will in any way be solved or removed by separate defence command structures is an open question. Certainly, there is no evidence that they will. For example, one can readily imagine a situation in which, without NORAD or its equivalent, an American decision to go into a state of alert might produce numerous overflights of Canadian territory. In such a situation, the framework of NORAD may be a more acceptable means of conceding that the United States will

Consultation difficult to implement

always, in the last resort, act unilaterally to defend itself than the absence of an agreement in which the violation of air-space is flagrant.

Thirdly, there is a certain fear, voiced more frequently in the past than at the present time, that Canadian military officers serving in a joint command with the Americans tend to lose their national identity and to adopt a common perspective on the military problems facing the two countries which ignores the difference in political perspectives. The most frequent illustration of this point is the tendency of military officers to talk about "our" defences, "our" interceptor squadrons, and so on, when they are actually referring to American forces.

These considerations, which at various times have been important factors in the political discussion of NORAD, seemed to weigh lightly on the present Government. They did so, apparently, because the difficulties or dangers of co-operation with the United States at the present time are less salient than the need to show willingness to co-operate in a political environment where there are many basic disagreements between the two governments. Mr. Richardson alluded to this in his statement to the Standing Committee when he said that to withdraw from NORAD would be to strain Canadian-American relations, not simply in the defence field but in a number of other areas. Mr. MacEachen commented on the point even more emphatically:

"... defence is an important element of our overall relationship, which can be affected for better or worse by our own willingness to regard positively issues which we know to be of deep concern to the United States.

I think it is clear to everyone that in the period ahead there will be a number of areas in our bilateral relations where differences are likely to arise. We must attempt to keep these areas of difference as limited as possible"

This is the key to the 1975 renewal of NORAD. It provided the Government with an area of co-operation at relatively little cost, which may offset, in some measure, areas of disagreement with the United States in matters such as trade, the environment, and resource policy. Moreover, if Canada's experience in partially withdrawing from NATO by reducing the forces committed counts at all, then we should know that the act of withdrawal may be more significant diplomatically than the weight of Canada's presence within an alliance. Since the

Government indicated that the United States was anxious to continue the NORAD agreement, the same reasoning presumably applied.

Financial benefits

Finally, at a time when the Canadian defence budget is severely stretched, the Government was anxious to continue an arrangement in which it obtained the financial benefits that derived from the American contribution to the surveillance of Canadian air-space. Although no detailed figures have been made public, Mr. Richardson suggested that it would cost Canada twice as much to conduct the necessary surveillance, control and interception functions, which are now performed under the auspices of NORAD.

Such reasoning is a long way from strict military need. Hence the paradox that, at a time when the military arguments were least significant, the case against renewing NORAD appeared to be at its weakest, for few, if any, argument had been made to counter the position described above. Allowing the Government's case, however, it would nevertheless be a pity if some broader considerations in defence policy were allowed to pass by in the present discussion. The most obvious one is that the cost of re-equipping Canada's air-defence forces assumes considerable proportions. General Carr has indicated that an all-purpose advanced fighter of the F-15 or YF-104 type to replace the *Voodoo*, the CF104 and the CF5 might involve procurement of about 100 aircraft. Although no firm cost figures are available, there is little doubt that this item alone could exhaust the present equipment funds of the defence budget for many years to come. Therefore, it is imperative that, in renewing its commitments to air-defence, the Government consider the choices which must be made between, for example, buying new tanks, coastal surveillance vessels, new long-range patrol aircraft and an advanced manned interceptor. Secondly, such an appraisal, placing NORAD in the broad context of defence policy, would logically lead to an assessment of Canada's present defence priorities as they are defined in the 1971 defence White Paper. It is evident to anybody who has considered the implications of these tasks that they cannot be performed within the confines of the existing defence budget. The danger of the NORAD decision, therefore, is that it may bring in its wake a commitment to equipment procurement which, inevitably, will be at the expense of other military

requirements. The discussion itself, however, illustrates Canada's difficulty in rationalizing its defence policy, particularly in regard to decisions on equipment, for the critical variables are political, not military. This is a matter of good fortune

for the citizenry, but not for defence planners, who are required to translate the intangibles of diplomatic calculation into ships and aircraft, and then to justify the value of such weapon systems in military terms.

By an exchange of notes on May 8, 1975, Canada and the United States agreed to continue their co-operation in NORAD for another five years. The Canadian note listed a number of "principles" that would govern the relationship. These include:

1. The Commander-in-Chief, NORAD (CINCNORAD), and his Deputy in CINCNORAD's absence, will be responsible to the Chief of Defence Staff of Canada and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, who, in turn, are responsible to their respective Governments. They will operate within a concept of surveillance, warning, control and defence approved by the appropriate authorities of our two Governments, who will bear in mind their objectives in the defence of the Canada-United States Region of the NATO area.
2. The North American Air Defence Command will include such combat units and individuals as are specifically allocated to it by the two Governments. The jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief, NORAD, over those units and individuals is limited to operational control as hereinafter defined.
3. "Operational Control" is the power to direct, co-ordinate, and control the operational activities of forces assigned, attached, or otherwise made available. No permanent changes of station would be made without approval of the higher national authority concerned. Temporary reinforcement from one area to another, including the crossing of the international boundary, to meet operational re- quirements will be within the authority of commanders having operational control. The basic command organization for the defence forces of the two countries, including administration, discipline, internal organization and unit training, shall be exercised by national commanders responsible to their national authorities.
4. The appointment of CINCNORAD and his Deputy must be approved by the Canadian and United States Governments. They will not be from the same country, and the CINCNORAD staff shall be an integrated joint staff composed of officers of both countries. During the absence of CINCNORAD, command will pass to the Deputy Commander.
5. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will continue to be kept informed through the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group of arrangements for the air defence of North America.
6. The plans and procedures to be followed by NORAD in wartime shall be formulated and approved by appropriate national authorities and shall be capable of rapid implementation in an emergency. Any plans or procedures recommended by NORAD which bear on the responsibilities of civilian departments or agencies of the two Governments shall be referred for decision by the appropriate military authorities to those agencies and departments and may be the subject of inter-governmental co-ordination through an appropriate medium such as the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, Canada-United States.

Britain and the EEC: analysis of the referendum's 'yes' vote

By W. L. Luetkens

The British referendum firmly supporting membership of Britain in the Common Market proved in the upshot to be a more positive and constructive event than anyone had had any right to expect. Though it was conceived of originally for transparently tactical reasons, and though the level of the campaign arguments was no better than it ought to have been, the result provided evidence that some of the clichés of doom lately lavished upon the country were not really justified. The 2 to 1 majority for staying in the Common Market, which included varying majorities within all the three national political parties, demonstrated that, after all, there is a potentially strong political consensus in Britain; and the affirmative votes, albeit less pronounced, in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, show that Britain is not in immediate danger of disintegration; the size of the majority and its distribution can hardly be reconciled with the taunt that the country has become ungovernable. Far from it; one is left with the impression that there is a solid majority of moderate opinion, distributed through the three national parties — Conservative, Labour and Liberal — that wants to be governed more effectively than has often been the case of late.

That reading of the referendum, perhaps, is even more important than the immediate effect of the vote, which is to keep Britain within the European Community. Yet the vote was, of course, a

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historic event, marking the conclusion of a long evolution. The first milestone along that road was Winston Churchill's encouragement, in his 1946 Zürich speech, of unity in continental Western Europe, to be smiled upon but not joined by the British. When the EEC of the Six had become a fact, Britain, with the Scandinavians, the Irish and the European neutrals, sought to arrive at a trading relationship with it in a free-trade area, providing for tariff-free trade but no common economic or other policies. That overture was rebuffed by France, as were two attempts made in the 1960s during the prime ministerships of Harold Macmillan and Harold Wilson, by Britain to join the EEC. Only when General de Gaulle was out of the way did the third attempt, made by Edward Heath as Prime Minister, finally achieve success. It is noteworthy that governments of both the big British political parties in turn attempted to gain entry, though, when in opposition, Labour was always more critical, whereas Mr. Wilson's endeavours did have Conservative support. Nonetheless, the historic evidence supports the results of the referendum: that in spite of the arguments and the debates there is a national consensus in Britain in favour of EEC membership.

Its existence, however, was at times obscured by the electoral system, which, the existence of the Liberal Party notwithstanding, has developed into what is really a two-party pattern. It used to be argued that it was the great merit of the British electoral system (which is identical with the Canadian) that the extremists of each party inevitably became the captives of the moderates. Increasingly, that has not been the case in the Labour Party, within which the left has exercised more influence than its numbers would warrant. (The displacement of Mr. Heath by Margaret Thatcher as leader of the Conservatives may have heralded a similar development within their party, with the right increasing its say.)

*Moderate opinion
desires
effective
government*



As a result of the referendum and the joint campaigning of pro-EEC men such as Mr. Heath and Roy Jenkins, the Labour Home Secretary, a number of political commentators have been arguing that the national consensus could best find expression either in a coalition government or by the introduction of proportional representation and, through that, a multi-party system. The holding of the referendum was itself so much of a break with British traditions of indirect democracy that it would be unwise merely to shrug off these suggestions as impracticable, in particular since the country will sooner or later have to face some unpalatable economic realities. But so far there is no shred of evidence that a coalition will be sought, or the electoral system changed. All that has happened is that the fringe — on the left, on the right and in the various nationalist camps — has been exposed for what it is. Its influence has been rejected on a historic issue but has not been eliminated.

Prospects for Benn

The move of Anthony Wedgwood Benn (the champion of a "no" on the Labour side) to become Secretary for Energy is not of overwhelming importance in this context. But his longer-term prospects are already discernible. He used his position as Secretary for Industry and the referendum campaign to establish himself firmly as the leader of the Labour left wing. Had the vote gone against the EEC, he might even have seized control of the party. Had the vote been a faint "yes", he could have held himself in reserve for the day of disenchantment. Since the vote was so resoundingly for the EEC, Mr. Benn may be a spent political force until a moment of real economic disaster. His opponents taunted him with trying to establish a "siege economy" in an isolated Britain. Should events ever call for an economic state of siege, Mr. Benn might hope to be the man of the hour. But it is as well to remember that the Labour Party dislikes witchhunts, and that Mr. Wilson is not a fundamentalist; Mr. Benn may well escape for the time being with a glimpse of the wilderness, without actually being banished to it. In any case, there are those who remember that, not many years ago, Mr. Benn was a devotee of the Common Market.

Enoch Powell was Mr. Benn's Tory counterpart, though he had already broken with mainstream Toryism in 1974 when he accepted nomination to the House of Commons by an Ulster Unionist group. Conservatives, unlike Labourites, do not

have a soft spot for rebels; Mr. Powell is likely to remain isolated unless acute crisis overtakes the country.

Together with the devaluation of Mr. Powell and Mr. Benn there has been a great increase in the statures of Mr. Heath and Mr. Jenkins, who raised the campaign for Europe from the level of the argument about butter prices to the level of idealism. Mr. Heath surprised everyone with the enthusiastic response he aroused among university students. The conventional interpretation was that they had moved to the right; but one suspects the facts are not so simple, and that many young people are eager to be offered a vision worth becoming excited about. Whether the EEC, as constituted, will satisfy that wish is another question; the answer will be determined in part by the contribution Britain chooses to make to the workings and further development of the Community.

Jenkins dominant

Mr. Jenkins has re-established himself as the dominant personality of Labour's right. But it is as well to remember that, as a rule, the party is led by a man (such as Mr. Wilson) who can reconcile its two wings, rather than by the leader of either wing. The constitution of the party gives immense influence to the trade unions — especially the big ones — and, for better or for worse, they tend on balance to be against the EEC, which they look upon as a tabernacle for anti-socialist worship of inhuman Market forces. The Trade Union Congress, umbrella organization of the movement, has indicated that it will accept the verdict of the referendum; it remains to be seen whether the big anti-Market unions will at least acquiesce.

The confrontation in 1974 between the Heath Government and the trade unions provided some evidence that Britain cannot be governed against the determined opposition of the trade union movement. But there is some reason to hope that many union leaderships that opposed joining the EEC may now grudgingly concur. But there is a difference between concurring and actually embracing the Common Market. The result of the referendum may contribute towards a further worsening of labour relations in some industries, adding to the already serious economic problems the country faces.

The classic argument for joining the EEC has been that it would help to solve those problems. In the very short run that may be so; now that the referendum has ended the uncertainties, one barrier to

*TUC
will accept
referendum
verdict*

investment in industry (by both British and foreign investors) has been removed. In the long run, the desired effect may result from the enlargement of the home market and the effects of competition (except that some British industries may find the climate altogether too bracing for their comfort). But, in the medium term, the problems are almost certain to be severe. It is going to require much effort to bring certain British industries up to scratch. Mr. Benn was quite right when he identified under-investment as the weakness of British industry. The implicit argument was that free competition within the EEC would kill not cure, and that industrial investment should increasingly become a matter for government action rather than private enterprise.

Balance of payments

Because of concern about Britain's competitive strength, the campaign produced a great deal of discussion about the British balance of payments. The anti-EEC faction argued that the lion's share of the visible trade deficit accrued from trade with the EEC; the pro-EEC side pointed out that the deficit *vis-à-vis* the EEC had fallen from 41 per cent of the total deficit in 1972 to 33 per cent in 1974, and that the trend was similar if non-oil trade alone was considered. Both arguments are less than complete; the economic case for joining or not joining has to be established on one's expectations of whether a rejuvenation of British industry can best be brought about within or outside the EEC. In that context, Mr. Benn's arguments, too, may have missed the point; nothing in Community rules prevented the British Government from giving an injection of venture capital to British Leyland, the leading British motor manufacturer, any more than the Germans were prevented from rescuing Krupp when that concern was in trouble or the Italians from nationalizing the generating of electricity. Much of the campaign against British membership was based on ignorance of the Community's adaptability and of how it could bend to the breezes blowing from member capitals.

More long-term significance may attach to the argument that, by joining, Britain has surrendered some degree of sovereignty. Member nations, in practice, have the right of veto in the Ministerial Council but, once orders have been passed there, they are binding. A case was put forward that this is undemocratic — an argument not entirely candid since powers of delegated legislation have long existed in Britain. But it does, admittedly, mean

a diminution of national sovereignty. The federalist argument that the best answer would be to go ahead and give real power to the European Parliament is plainly out of keeping with the temper of the time. But we can now expect that Labour will attempt to play a constructive role in the deliberations of that largely consultative assembly. Federalists may hope that one day the British democratic tradition will force an increasing number of British politicians to the conclusion that, if there are Community powers, there also ought to be a real Community parliament. In the meantime, a committee of the House of Commons is trying to keep track of all EEC draft orders in order to ensure that the British representative on the Ministerial Council knows what the Parliament at Westminster wants him to do.

The future of oil in the British sector of the North Sea played an important part in the argument, especially in Scotland. There are those in Scotland who wish to emulate the Norwegian example and build an independent Scotland on that resource and on protected national fisheries. The voters rejected them. In the absence, so far, of an agreed Community energy policy, what can be said is that North Sea oil remains a British asset but that any attempt (along Canadian lines) to charge less to British customers than to other members of the EEC will run foul of the rules.

Commonwealth connection

Relatively little was heard during the campaign of the Commonwealth connection, which not so many years ago was presented as a viable alternative to membership in the EEC. That is not to be marvelled at, given the fact that no member of the Commonwealth urged Britain to break with the Common Market. The developing nations of the Commonwealth have made their peace with the EEC in the Lomé Convention, incidentally meeting one of the objectives of Mr. Wilson's renegotiation of the terms of British accession. Canada, in seeking its own contractual relationship with the EEC, has made it quite plain that it sees more commercial (and perhaps also political) potential in an EEC of nine than in an isolated Britain.

In assessing the situation created by Mr. Wilson's renegotiation, one has to balance imponderables. The uncertainties of 1974-75 undoubtedly acted as a brake on industrial investment in Britain, and it may be argued that the worsening of the international economic climate means that the opportunities lost may not recur for some time. On the other hand, the revised



Wide World Photos

The British referendum on whether or not that country should stay in the European Common Market caused deep division within the Labour Government. Industry Minister Anthony Wedgwood Benn led the forces calling for a negative vote. Mr. Benn, seen here (left) on his way to the polling station on June 5, was to discover that the majority of voters favoured continued membership. Prime Minister Harold Wilson is also seen (right) on his way to the polling booth. He is obviously not scratching his head as he wonders which way to vote. He had already made it clear that he favoured continued membership. Perhaps, though, he did wonder why he had brought the referendum on himself.

Terms do place some sort of ceiling on the contribution that Britain will be expected to make to EEC funds. So many contradictory estimates have been bandied about

that it is wisest to leave it at that. As the Italian example shows, the Community is not in the habit of allowing members to go broke. At the time of writing, there were

already some signs that the Germans would be willing to help Britain if need be.

That raises the fascinating question as to why the Community was willing to go through the whole procedure in order to keep a partner widely regarded on the continent as inefficient, unreliable and a potential liability. Two reasons come to mind. The French, no longer as sure of dominating Bonn as they were under General de Gaulle, wanted another partner of something like comparable weight within the Community — though it is improbable that the British will go along with the newfound French enthusiasm for a common monetary policy.

The Germans, contemptuous though they tend to be of British industrial achievement, retain their regard for Britain as an element of democratic stability — and for the British military contribution to their own security. Partly with regard to that, the Wilson Government proposes to give priority to NATO at a time when it is planning to reduce defence expenditure from 5½ per cent of gross national product to 4½ per cent by 1983-84.

One of the most thoughtful contributions to the entire debate was made by a Labour M. P., Mr. Raymond Fletcher, in

an article in *The Times*. He argued that regardless of the outcome, the referendum would place great powers in the hands of Mr. Wilson: "The people, having willed the end, will allow him virtually to dictate the means. However drastic the measures needed to build up industrial muscle and drain away the inflation that is killing our society, they will be accepted. If, that is, they are powerfully presented as essential and inevitable consequences of the decision (taken in the referendum). . . ."

Mrs. Shirley Williams, one of Mr. Wilson's ministers and a devoted campaigner for the EEC, came very close to the truth when dealing with a reporter who wondered whether the pro-Market faction was not living in a fools' paradise. If Britons were living in a fools' paradise, she said, it was not because they were in the Common Market, but because they were living in a fools' paradise.

Only time will show whether the majority of June 5 agrees with that, or whether Mr. Wilson can seize upon the opportunities foreseen by Mr. Fletcher. But, in spite of Marathon or the Plain of Abraham, turning-points in the fate of nations are not usually recognized until after the event.

Canada-ECC relations

The Canada-Community dialogue is continuing on a number of fronts, and moving at an increasing tempo. The proposal by the Commission of the European Communities that they be authorized to negotiate a framework agreement for economic and commercial co-operation with Canada has now had a first consideration by the Council of Ministers. In this consideration, the Council was "generally in favour of the approach proposed by the Commission . . . and instructed the Permanent Representatives Committee to examine the Commission communication in this positive light so that the Council might be able to take a decision on the opening of negotiations as soon as possible".

A further important element in strengthening communication between Canada and the Community will be the opening this autumn of a full-scale Community delegation in Ottawa. Eventually to be headed by a head of delegation, the Commission office will, in the first instance, be under the direction of a chargé d'affaires, who is expected to arrive in Ottawa in early October. This Community office will be the counterpart in Ottawa of the

Canadian mission to the European Communities in Brussels and will carry out a wide range of functions similar to those performed by an embassy. The Community delegation in Ottawa will be the third such delegation that the Community has opened, the other two being in Washington and Tokyo. The Canadian Government has welcomed this step as a further indication of the importance both Canada and the Community attach to the development of closer relations.

In the area of industrial co-operation, the Community will be sending to Ottawa in September 1975 a mission composed of Commission officials and European industrialists and industrial association representatives concerned with the non-ferrous metals sector. This information mission, which follows two highly successful earlier missions, in the forestry and uranium sectors, will provide "in-depth" exposure for its participants to Canadian economic and industrial policies (both federal and provincial), to Canadian industry, and to the potential for co-operation in the sector. These missions are part of an expected continuing exchange in both directions.

The 'Nasserization' of Egypt and its reversal under Sadat

By Irene Beeson

When the late Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Free Officers came to power on July 23, 1952, one of the trickiest among the many tasks facing them was that of dealing with Egypt's political structure. Egypt had been under foreign rule continuously since the second Persian invasion of 343-342 B.C. With the overthrow of King Farouk, whose son would have continued the line of Turco-Albanian rulers, the traditional structure had collapsed. "We must pave the way to a new era, in which the people will enjoy their sovereignty and live in dignity . . .", Nasser wrote in a note to General Mohammed Neguib on the eve of Farouk's abdication.

The aim of the Free Officers, stated in secret manifestoes before 1952 and openly proclaimed after the coup, was to set up a "clean, honest government", one that would work for the good of the people, not for the interests of the feudalists. These were fine words, with strong appeal for the mass of the people. For them, the Free Officers' Liberation Movement promised the end of appalling conditions of poverty, exploitation and subservience to foreigners.

The Free Officers were nominally under the leadership of Muhammad Neguib. It is reasonably clear, however, that Nasser had set Neguib up as a figurehead in order to leave himself a free hand to work in anonymity, behind the scenes, to pull Egypt into a shape that would fit its dependent status.

The liberation movement in modern Egypt dates from 1798, when the first popular uprising against the French occupation reawakened Egyptian nationalism and launched the long struggle for independence that ended in 1956. During the three-year French occupation, repeated uprisings and guerrilla conflicts produced a new breed of Egyptian, trained in armed combat, politically conscious and resolved to overthrow the British colonialists who succeeded the French for a period and later the Mamelukes, and finally to put an end to the British occupation that began in 1882.

Nasser was born in 1918. The following year saw a revolution in which Egyptians from all classes united in a nationwide movement for independence under the leadership of Saad Zaghloul, founder of the Wafd party. The 1919 revolt was one of a series of eruptions in a long, often-interrupted revolution, which achieved its main goal in 1955 with the expulsion of the British. By the time the Free Officers came to power in 1952, each of a number of parties and groups was convinced of its own claim to leadership in the new Egypt. The Wafd, the largest political party, had started out not so much as a party as a national front embracing all nationalist trends, from the extreme right to the extreme left. In time it became dominated by, and representative of, the ruling class of rich landowners, who sought accommodation with the British as a protection against the rising tide of revolution. Then, shortly after the 1952 coup, it split into several bickering groups.

The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, was a strong, cohesive organization, opposed both to the Wafdist, whom they considered traitors for having signed an agreement with the British in 1936, prolonging the military occupation, and to the "atheist" left. Though the Brotherhood gave the appearance of accepting the 1952 revolution, it was, in fact, working for the establishment of a state ruled by Koranic legislation.

Accommodation with British sought as protection from threat of revolution

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The socialists and Communists, who should logically have led the struggle against British imperialism, were divided into many groups, whose activities were limited almost entirely to intellectual and trade union circles in the big cities. The Communists, with the exception of one group, the HADETO, looked with suspicion upon a revolution carried out by a handful of men who had no ideology and little or no political experience, and had to rely upon professional politicians of the bad old days.

The Free Officers and the bulk of the people had, however, lost faith in the effectiveness of political parties that, whether of the right or left, had little to show for all their theorizing.

"We must decide at once what philosophy of government we are going to follow," Nasser announced at the first meeting of the Free Officers' executive committee immediately after Farouk's departure on July 26, 1952. He insisted that the decision must be reached that very night whether Egypt was to be ruled by democracy or dictatorship. All but one of the eight members of the nine-man committee present at the meeting voted for dictatorship. The exception was Nasser himself.

Whether Nasser's call for democracy reflected his inner convictions is open to debate. His detractors saw it as a gimmick to enlist popularity. His defenders believed in his sincerity and held that the subsequent drift into dictatorship was the inevitable result of the political confusion in the country and the struggle for power, which posed a threat to the revolution from the outset.

The sincere or proclaimed desire to establish democracy faced the many pitfalls of a multitude of parties, each with its own vision of how to rule the country. This was Nasser's dilemma. To have handed over to these competing factions would have led to chaos, his Free Officers reasoned. The only way to secure the revolution was through a period of military dictatorship.

A series of incidents followed by political trials justified, in the eyes of the populace, the removal of all organized political opposition. Communists were held responsible for the August 1952 riots, in which workers seized control of a textile factory near Alexandria. Troops were sent in to restore order. Nine people were killed and 20 injured in the clashes that followed. After a court-martial, two agitators were sentenced to death and hanged the following day. By the end of 1954, 200 leading Communists were serving long sentences. Similarly, student riots in the early days of

1953 led to the arrest of leading politicians including army officers, Communists and Muslim Brothers, on charges of plotting to overthrow the Government, inciting the mutiny, subversion and corruption.

The fact having been established that the regime was facing disruptive opposition from the different political factions, the next logical step was to abolish the parties. On January 19, 1953, all parties with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was reprieved as a religious organization, were ordered to dissolve and hand over their funds. In October 1954, the Brotherhood, too, was banned after one of its members attempted to assassinate Nasser. The would-be assassin fired six shots (all of which missed their mark) while Nasser was speaking at a rally in Alexandria. About 18,000 of the Brethren were arrested. Seven were sentenced to death but the Supreme Guide, Hassan Hodeiby, was reprieved and given a life sentence.

In the meantime, in June 1953, the monarchy had been abolished, and Egypt had become a republic. On January 23, 1953, Mohammed Neguib had announced that a new political organization, the Liberation Rally, would replace the dissolved political parties and that Gamal Abdel Nasser would be its Secretary General. Then, on February 10, a provisional constitution had vested supreme authority in the leader of the revolution and the military committee.

Power to Nasser

All these steps were paving the way for Nasser to assume power openly. But first he had to get rid of Neguib, who was demanding more effective authority if not absolute control, and with whom he was involved in a power struggle. Neguib was no revolutionary; deeply conservative, he was at most a moderate reformer. There was an unbridgeable gap between this middle-aged senior officer and the young revolutionaries who had raised him as their flag. He regarded them as rash and irresponsible, and their actions as ill-advised.

The masses who acclaimed Neguib were, in reality, acclimating the actions of the rash anonymous young leader for whom he was a stand-in. To have handed over to Neguib would certainly have appeared to the people to have been a betrayal of their long struggle. Conveniently, the trial of the Muslim Brothers revealed a connection between Neguib and the Brotherhood. He was dismissed on November 14, 1954, and placed under house arrest. Nasser emerged as effective head of state and president of the council of the revolution.

Supporters of the revolution who had, at the time, regretted the departure of Neguib, whom they assumed to be the leader, later conceded that, had he been in charge, Egypt would have returned to the political and economic mess and confusion of the Forties and, inevitably, to chaos. It required the vision, will, passion and political cunning of Nasser, as well as a degree of ruthlessness, to carry, against the opposition of the West (to the point of armed invasion in 1956) and of much of the Arab world, the reforms and ambitious projects he had in mind for Egypt: land reform, industrialization, the huge iron and steel works of Helwan, free education, social reforms, the Aswan High Dam and, above all, removal of the British military presence.

Majority will

There is no doubt that the Free Officers came to power through the will of the majority of the people. The identity of the 'leader of the revolution' and of his men mattered little to the mass of Egyptians. It was sufficient that they were Egyptian, that the Egyptian Army had taken over and would conclude the long, bitter struggle for independence.

By the takeover in 1952 — a *coup d'état*, not a popular uprising —, the people were the happy but passive recipients of a

new revolution announced over the radio. It was not until 1956 that the population took an active part in the revolution. It can even be said that the revolution did not take place until that year. The sudden withdrawal by Britain and the United States of their offers of loans to finance the High Dam, Nasser's reaction in nationalizing the Suez Canal Company and, finally, in October, the tripartite (Franco-British-Israeli) invasion of Egypt spontaneously mobilized the whole population into active support of Nasser and defence of the revolution. Even imprisoned Communists and other political opponents rallied to Nasser.

In a plebiscite that year for the constitution published in January and Nasser's candidature for the presidency, 99 per cent of the electorate voted "yes".

Nasser's popularity was such, at the time, that few doubted the authenticity of the polls. He had become not only the idolized leader in Egypt but also the hero of the Arab world. In achieving this acclaim, however, he had antagonized a great many people and groups in the country whom he had had to subdue to protect himself and his regime.

Abroad — and this constituted an added internal threat — he had brought on himself the hatred of most Western governments and the fear of the reactionary Arab



Wide World Photo

This 1952 photograph of the Army Revolutionary Council of Egypt shows the country's first President, Major General Mohammed Neguib (front centre), with ten of his 11 advisers. On his right is Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was to succeed him in the Presidency. The only member of the Council missing from the photograph is Anwar Sadat, who assumed the leadership in 1970 following Nasser's death.

regimes, which watched with apprehension the mounting support of their own people for the revolutionary, charismatic Egyptian. All were unshakeably determined to work for Nasser's downfall through Egyptian and foreign groups and individuals, both inside and outside the country, the regime and the administration. It was the business of the police and intelligence services to make sure that these elements were tracked down and neutralized.

Nasser's deputy, Zacharia Muhieddin, who was head of military intelligence, had been put in charge of security, as Minister of Interior, a few months after the Free Officers came to power. But, even before the 1952 *coup*, Muhieddin's men had infiltrated the police and spotted those officers and men who were likely to pose problems. These were weeded out immediately after the *coup*. A General Intelligence Agency was added to the existing intelligence system, manned by Free Officers selected by Muhieddin and new intelligence and investigation agencies, directly responsible to the GIA, were also set up. The system was provided with up-to-date electronic equipment for "bugging" offices, hotel rooms and homes, for taping conversations outdoors and at a distance, and for all types of photography at close and long range, by day and by night.

Inherited surveillance

The regime had inherited from the British, who had inherited it from the Turks, the most efficient, reliable and relatively cheap system of surveillance. An incalculable number of "eyes" and "ears" dotted all over the country would, for a few pennies, report to the police on the movements, frequentations, conversations and other useful data about "suspects" they were set to watch or trail. These legions of "spies" — for the most part doorkeepers, office boys, messengers, telephone operators, waiters, taxi-drivers, street vendors, unemployed and unemployable persons and beggars — relied on small windfalls from the police to augment their meagre incomes. It can be assumed that, after the revolution, many among them carried out their missions with a new sense of dedication.

When President Sadat came to power after Nasser's death in September 1970, he inherited this permanent feature of Egyptian security. Under both Nasser and Sadat, the security machine underwent purges from time to time, usually after the discovery of a "plot" — a term used indiscriminately with reference to acts of dissidence ranging from a critical article in the press to a riot. When Sadat carried out his own pre-emptive *coup*, the "Movement of

Rectification" against Vice-President A. Sabri and about 100 ministers and top politicians, on May 15, 1971, he set fire to himself to a mountain of tapes seized at security headquarters and announced that the days of tapping, taping and the "knock-at-the-door-at-dawn" were over. This is, however, not strictly true. One still hears complaints about tapped telephone lines, and of houses and offices being searched in their owners' absence. Students still protest that universities are crawling with secret police. The knock at the door is still heard at dawn, though less often whenever untoward events — a workers' strike, student disturbances — alert the regime to dangers, real or imaginary.

The 1956 crisis had postponed the constitution of the National Union, the political organization that was to replace the dissolved political parties. In May 1957 the Executive Committee screened 2,500 candidates (it was said that Nasser did the screening himself) for the election in July of the 350 members of the National Assembly. The main body of the National Union was formed in November with Anwar-es-Sadat as Secretary-General. The proclaimed aim of the organization was to create a socialist, democratic, co-operative society, free of all political, social and economic exploitation. It was short-lived, however. The union was dissolved in 1961 when Syria broke away from union with Egypt.

Infiltration blamed

In a speech on October 16 that year, Nasser attributed the failure of the organization to infiltration by "reactionary forces", which he said, had sought to "paralyze its revolutionary potentialities and turn it into a mere facade, unstirred by the forces of the masses and their genuine demands". Socialism was the only road to justice, he said, and the National Union had to be reorganized into a "revolutionary instrument of the national masses". The Arab Socialist Union, which emerged in 1962 as the reorganized National Union, did not, however, develop into the vanguard political organization that was to lead the country towards democracy, any more than its predecessors had done. It never progressed beyond a popular assembly, whose role it was to support government policies.

There was hesitant response to Nasser's exhortations to the ASU to form political cadres with which to build new political structures adapted to the second — Arab Socialist — phase of the revolution. In part this was due to the apathy born of centuries of foreign rule, in part to fear of possible dire consequences from "revealing



London Express/Canada Wide Photo

The current leaders of the Arab world were among the mourners at President Nasser's funeral in October 1970. Surrounding Nasser's son Khaled Hamid are his successor Anwar Sadat, Yassir Arafat, now Leader of the PLO, and Houari Boumedienne, Prime Minister of Algeria.

oneself" in debate. Above all, however, it reflected an awareness of the towering figure of Nasser, who had established himself as the supreme decision- and policy-maker and who was effectively in control of every institution in the country.

Irritated by this lack of response, Nasser urged upon the ASU in May 1964 the need to create within the organization a "genuine avant-garde" party capable of breaking the resistance of the still powerful reactionary elements. He warned of the dangerous political situations that might arise during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Less than three years later, in March 1968, he felt that this *enfant terrible* of his own creation was getting out of hand and ordered a reorganization of the ASU from top to bottom, this time through "free elections". This move followed widespread worker and student riots, in which the loudest calls were for more freedom, political parties and a freely-elected parliament. The rebuilt ASU did not satisfy these demands for popular political participation, and in November 1968 there were renewed student protests and riots.

Sadat's succession

In December 1969, Nasser appointed Anwar Sadat Vice-President and his deputy.

This meant that Sadat would take over the Presidency in case of Nasser's absence or illness and in the interim period before presidential elections. Ten days after Nasser's death, the ASU unanimously approved the selection of Sadat as its nominee for the Presidency, and on November 12 he was unanimously elected President of the ASU.

In October 1974, Sadat went a long way towards ensuring his own succession. Sayed Narei, who had been Secretary-General of the ASU in 1972-73, was elected President of the People's Assembly. Under the constitution drafted by Sadat in 1971, the president of the Assembly takes over the Presidency of the country in the event of the President's being incapacitated and during the interim period before presidential elections. The election of Sayed Narei, who is related to Sadat through his son's marriage to the President's daughter, places him in a strong position for election to the Presidency on Sadat's resignation, overthrow or death.

It was only a few months after the political organization had brought him to power that the new President ordered its complete reorganization after the discovery of an alleged plot to overthrow the regime. He claimed that the 1968 ASU elections had been rigged. Vice-President Ali Sabri

and about 100 ministers and high-ranking politicians, including members of the ASU, were arrested on May 15 in connection with the "plot". They were later tried and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 15 years to life.

Reorganization of the ASU and elections in the Assembly and trade unions completed the purge of dissident elements or "power-centres", as Sadat called them, and placed the country's political party and institution firmly under the control of the new ruler. These moves were interpreted in Cairo's political circles as Sadat's first step towards "de-Nasserization", the removal of these elements considered loyal supporters of Arab socialism for Egypt and the union of progressive Arab countries.

Despite President Sadat's assurances when he came to power that "the revolution goes on" and his exhortations to "safeguard the socialist gains", the trend is undoubtedly towards "de-Nasserization", and is meeting with strong opposition. Consequently, liberalization and "open" policies have stopped short once more of greater political freedom. Censorship was abolished and freedom of the press proclaimed, but chief editors were appointed by presidential decree to all newspapers and held responsible for what appeared in print, and articles and editorials on foreign policy remain as drearily uniform as they were at the height of Nasser's censorship.

Liberalization stopped short of greater political freedom

Student riots in 1971 and 1972, protesting against Sadat's pro-American "anti-socialist" policies, and demanding democracy and personal freedoms, were followed by a massive purge of Egypt's top writers, journalists and intellectuals on charges of "incitement". Mohammed Hasanain Haikal, chief editor of *Al-Ahram* was sacked without notice by presidential decree for writing a couple of articles expressing doubts about a change in U.S. Middle East policy.

In recent months, action has been increasing against the left – a loose term covering all tendencies from liberals and Nasserists to Communists and the New Left. The latest swoop came after workers' protests against low wages, high prices and confusion about the status of workers degenerated on New Year's Day 1975 into street riots. Several hundred leftists were arrested, allegedly for organizing the riots and plotting to overthrow the regime.

Yet another "reorganization" of the ASU has been under debate in recent months, grappling with the traditional dilemma of delegating some powers to the people, granting more political freedom, without, however, diminishing or weakening the control of the central authority. In Nasser's lifetime his critics said that he wanted a "socialist Egypt without socialists". Sadat's opponents are saying that what he wants is a "democratic Egypt without democrats".

Middle East

The Israeli officer corps after the Yom Kippur War

By Edward Bernard Glick

In recent years, Canadians have invested a great deal of diplomatic and military energy in international peacekeeping activities. Since much – though by no means all – of it has involved the Arab-Israel conflict, Canadians have a natural interest in any factors that might affect the military balance and upset the delicate peacekeeping arrangements in which their countrymen, as well as others, are now engaged.

One such factor is the impact the Yom Kippur War has had on the Israeli officer corps. This impact can be categorised under three headings – prestige, personnel

and politics –, bearing in mind that the categories overlap at certain points.

In a book I published last year called *Between Israel and Death*, I wrote that Israelis "accord to Zahal (the Hebrew acronym and nickname for the IDF or Israel Defence Forces) a degree of devotion unique in the history of democratic societies. One could almost describe that devotion as sanctification." I said further that "the practical result of this feeling toward Zahal is that no group of Israelis, including the politicians, who wield great power, and the professors, who enjoy great prestige, possess the esteem, the love, and the post-

retirement career opportunities that accrue almost automatically to the Army's senior officer corps...". And I quoted Ammon Rubinstein, the Dean of Tel-Aviv University's Law School and a frequent contributor to the *New York Times Magazine*, who wrote after the Six-Day War: "All the deficiencies to be found in the veteran political leadership — historical rights, political dogmatism, lack of contact with the people, language and style dating from the past — do not exist in Israel Army leadership."

Changed attitude

That was post-1967. Since 1973 the situation and the attitudes have changed. Israelis are grateful to the Army General Staff and the senior commanders for absorbing the totally unexpected first blows of the Yom Kippur War, mobilizing the reserves while the much smaller regular army was under a fierce two-front attack, assessing the new realities of enemy tactics, strategy, weaponry and manpower in lightning time and fashion, adjusting Israel's counter-attack to these new realities, and then capturing huge new chunks of both Syrian and Egyptian territory — only to be denied, as in the past, the political fruits of their military victories.

But, at the same time, Israelis are stunned at the enormous human and material losses. In mid-March 1974, the Army distributed a booklet listing the 2,552 officers and men killed between Yom Kippur Day 1973 and February 12, 1974. Thirty-four billion Israeli pounds, or about an entire year's gross national product, was shot up in three weeks, and the percentage of the GNP devoted to defence has risen from about 17 per cent before the war to about 33 per cent. Only now are they beginning to recover from what has come to be known as the *mechdal* (Hebrew for "neglect" or "blunder"). Included under the heading of *mechdal* are: (1) the intelligence failure, which did not detect and therefore did not warn of the attack; (2) the logistics failure, which did not deploy even the standing army in sufficient numbers, strength and depth to meet the attack with but minimal losses; (3) the planning failure, which made no allowances for a surprise attack on the standing army unreinforced by the reserves; and (4) the psychological failure — the most important failure —, which allowed the Military Intelligence Branch, the Chief of Staff, the General Staff, the Government, the Parliament, and ultimately the public itself, to be lulled into making a number of very false, interconnected assumptions.

One assumption was that Egypt would not launch an attack without using its air force and attempting to strike deep into Israel, especially at main Israeli airfields. Another was that Syria would never enter the fray except as part of a simultaneous operation with Egypt. And still another was that Military Intelligence would always (on the basis of a promise made by its Chief, Major-General Eliahu Ze'ira) be able to warn the Government of an attack in plenty of time to allow full mobilization. (General Ze'ira and his principal aides steadfastly refused to believe contrary evaluations of Egyptian intentions submitted by a junior officer.)

In short, between 1967 and 1973 Israeli over-confidence, selective perception, and endemic underestimation of enemy capabilities and intentions froze both military and civilian leaders of the Jewish state into the "conception" that the Arabs could not fight a sustained war and that therefore they had not yet learned to fight one, to fight it well, and to fight it together.

Capability of Arabs to fight sustained war not recognized

Agranat Commission

On November 18, 1973, just weeks after the war, the Israeli Cabinet issued a communiqué announcing that a commission of enquiry would be set up to investigate and report to the Cabinet on the pre-war intelligence, its assessment and the decisions based on it, as well as the IDF's preparedness, deployment and actions up to the enemy's containment. The communiqué also announced that the commission would consist of five members appointed after consultation with Dr. Shimon Agranat, the President of the Supreme Court. Dr. Agranat chose as members of the commission, which bore his

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name, his judicial colleague Judge Moshe Landau, Dr. Yitzhak Nebenzahl, the State Comptroller, and two former Army Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant-General Haim Laskov, who is now the Military Ombudsman, and Lieutenant-General Yigal Yadin, the world-renowned biblical archaeologist and professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

On April 1, 1974, they issued their first partial report, which confined itself to military responsibilities and refused to enter the area of political responsibility for the *mechdal*. The conclusions that concern this section of our discussion — namely, the prestige of some of the senior officers then in command — were devastating. For example, the commission concluded that the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General David Elazar, bore personal responsibility for the evaluation of the situation and for Zahal's state of readiness and recommended his termination as Chief of the General Staff. While not presenting a final recommendation on the fitness of Major-General Shmuel Gonen (the Officer Commanding Southern Command) to fulfil tasks in Zahal, the commission recommended that he not fulfil any active role until they completed their investigation. "In view of his grave failure" Major-General Ze'ira could no longer continue as Chief of Military Intelligence. Brigadier-General Arye Shalev (Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence in charge of research and evaluation), was found to carry "the heaviest burden for the gravest error of the Department which he headed," and could not continue his service in Military Intelligence. Colonel Yonah Bendman (head of the Egyptian Branch of the Research Department of Military Intelligence) should no longer be employed in any role connected with intelligence evaluation. Similarly, the commission found that Lieutenant-Colonel David Gedalia (Chief of Intelligence of the Southern Command) did not fulfil his special obligation "on the key front in the days when it was especially vital to be aware of the intentions of the Egyptian enemy", and recommended that he no longer be engaged in any intelligence tasks.

These recommendations calling for the removal of some of Israel's most senior and respected officers, the war's outbreak and outcome, the once-and-for-all shattering of the twin myths of the *Super Sabra* and of the infallibility of Israeli intelligence and the public bickering and involvement in politics by top Israeli military figures (which will be discussed later) have all combined to diminish and devalue the prestige of Zahal's leaders. This devalu-

ation shows itself in certain forms of public criticism — some never expressed before and in difficulties encountered by Zahal (which in Israel includes the land, sea and air forces) in recruiting and retaining men for career service in the regular army.

There is strong evidence of this erosion of the prestige of the Zahal's leadership ever since the war. When, for example, the Minister of Commerce, Haim Bar-Lev, who was Chief of Staff during the building of the ill-fated line that bears his name and who was recalled from the Cabinet in October 1973 to serve in the Southern Sinai, addressed the memorial ceremony at a military cemetery in Beersheba in April 1974, he was "verbally attacked by bereaved families". Some of the parents crowded him, screaming: "You sent our sons to be slaughtered." Earlier that month he was jeered by a hostile crowd of 700 Hebrew University students. Like many other Israelis, they were, and still are, angry at the Agranat Commission's self-imposed decision to limit itself to military failures and not to criticize the politicians for government failures. When Bar-Lev refused to answer the questions "Do you think Defence Minister Dayan should resign?" and "Do you think Dayan is just as guilty as Elazar?", the students booed him with a deafening roar. By doing so, they showed their displeasure not only at the Agranat Commission but also at former generals like Bar-Lev and Moshe Dayan, who entered politics after their military retirement and were refusing to resign their Cabinet posts or in other ways to accept any personal or ministerial responsibility for the *mechdal*.

Mistrust created

Just a few days before the first anniversary of the October War, the new Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Mordechai Gur, admitted that "it was true that a measure of mistrust among the senior command staff was created after the war began". Then, while speaking of the Army's "current training program", he said it would "serve to restore any *trust* which may be lacking [author's italics]". A year after the war, two sergeants were court-martialled, demoted and given seven years for refusing to obey orders during the war. While they took their sentences "impassively", many of their families did not, crying out that "the people really responsible for the (Yom Kippur) blunder should be on trial". According to the press, the police had to be summoned to quiet the courtroom.

In November 1974, Henry Kamm of the *New York Times* reported:

"Belief in the priority of defence needs and faith in the appropriate use of money allocated for the armed forces have eroded in the last year among the more highly educated classes.... 'We trusted the army,' said Ruth Goldmann, a Tel-Aviv bank employee. 'When you said it's for security, we said it's okay. Now we want to know what it's for.'"

A final example of the erosion of prestige involves former General David Elazar, who, as we have seen, resigned in the wake of the evaluation of his leadership before the Yom Kippur War. In the past, "it was not socially acceptable" to publicly criticize senior generals who made lateral transfers into high positions in the private sector. But when it was announced in December 1974 that Elazar had been chosen Board Chairman of Zim, Israel's international maritime carrier, Baron Edmond de Rothschild (unsuccessfully) opposed Elazar's appointment on the grounds that he was not a businessman.

Of the more than 2,500 Israeli soldiers killed in the war, over a fourth were officers: one major-general (Avraham Mendler, commander of the armoured forces in the Sinai), two colonels, 25 lieutenant-colonels, 89 majors, 195 captains, 234 first lieutenants and 35 second lieutenants — deadly proof of the Israeli officer corps' motto *Acharei* ("After Me!"). Aside from the human tragedy involved, these statistics reveal the immensity of the personnel problems facing Zahal: finding, training, and keeping new blood, both in the officer corps and in the Army at large. The personnel problem arising out of the losses on the battlefield has been compounded by a number of other factors. As already indicated, Zahal lost a number of senior officers as a direct result of the recommendations of the Agranat Commission. Second, it lost a great deal of its glamour. Third, there has been a necessary but at times dizzying rotation of senior officer assignments. In addition to a new Chief of Staff, there was, of course, the appointment of a new intelligence chief. There were four Chiefs of the General Staff Branch of the General Staff in about as many months. And there were numerous changes in the officers commanding various corps, divisions, commands, and sections. Fourth, Zahal's decision to organize itself into more units and the increasingly sophisticated weaponry in the arsenals of the air force, navy, artillery and armoured corps have narrowed the pool and lengthened the training period of available career officers (and men). And fifth, while, in the fall of 1973 and the spring of 1974, the number of volunteers increased, the ten-

dency to rally *voluntarily* "round the flag" has apparently diminished with the passage of time, despite pay increases and other inducements.

Thus, last July, on Air Force Day, the Air Force Commander called on his men not to leave:

"We need all the spiritual and material resources inherent in our Air Force and our people. I call upon each of you to acknowledge this fact — despite all temptations posed by easier, more profitable occupations. The road between the immense mission entrusted to us and the means granted for its execution is neither short nor easy — but it can be traversed if we persist. This is what we owe those who gave their lives for our sakes; thus shall we serve their memory." Perhaps he had in mind that Israel, which once had three pilots for every plane, was having difficulty maintaining this ratio.

There are other examples of concern over the quantitative and qualitative erosion of both commissioned and non-commissioned ranks. In August 1974, Defence Minister Shimon Peres and Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur called on non-commissioned technicians to stay on after their compulsory period of service. Peres also announced that officers were being promoted into key positions vacated by the October War's casualties. In September the newspaper *Omer* carried an article detailing the problems of attracting and keeping junior officers in the Navy. In October the Commander of the Armoured Corps, General Moshe Peled, said: "We're getting the iron, but we need more men." And, as illustrated by a notice that has been appearing in all Israeli newspapers for several months now, the Army is checking all men previously exempted from Army service for any reason in order to stretch its manpower base to the fullest.

The relation between Army prestige and personnel problems was highlighted in an editorial that appeared in an Israeli newspaper on July 12, 1974:

"In a period of inflation and overemployment, when civilian salaries far outpace Army pay, there comes a point when even the most devoted and dedicated service personnel find it difficult to resist the invidious comparison they must make between the compensation they receive and what would be available for them as civilians.

"Apart from the arithmetic, however, the problem has also taken on another, no less troublesome feature.... (The) atmosphere of the country following the October War served, if unjustly, to tarnish the Army's image. Such subtle

Examples of concern over erosion of forces

changes in popular attitudes inevitably have an effect on the men in service.... (Such) devaluation of the Army as a career could become a mortal danger if permitted to continue."

All armies political

Since governments are political institutions and armies are instruments and sub-units of governments, *all* armies are involved in politics. They are involved in the politics of budget, the politics of manpower, the politics of weaponry, and above all, *the politics of advice!* An army that gives no military advice is not doing its job; whether, when, and to what extent a nation's civilian leaders take the advice is another matter. And, if an army gives advice, it is involved in both domestic politics and foreign policy whether it likes it or not. The real problem, then, is one of balance. At various points in time and place, what is the proper civil-military balance, especially in a democracy? Who does the wagging — the civilian dog or the military tail?

In the case of Israel, the army is more politicized than its officer corps cares to admit or than its general population realizes. None of the ten Chiefs of Staff could have been named to the post if he was perceived as being at odds with the general socialist-kibbutz-*Histadrut* (Labour Union) orientation of the Labour Party, which has ruled Israel since its inception. I am personally convinced that General Ariel Sharon, the man who trapped the Egyptian Third Army on the African side of the Suez Canal in the October War, has never been made Chief of Staff because he has never hidden the fact that his own political orientation is to the right of the Labour Party.

It was Sharon, a principal architect of the centre-right-wing opposition grouping — the *Likud* — who figured prominently in the "War of Words" or the "War of the Generals" that erupted during and after the Yom Kippur War. It was also Sharon, who, along with other ex-generals, drew sharper public attention to an Israeli phenomenon — the role of retired and reserve generals in Israeli politics.

The War of Words or the War of the Generals, for the first time in Israel's history, and despite supposedly stringent military censorship, generated *public* criticism in the local and foreign press of political and military policies, as well as of political and military leaders, by *men in uniform!* It was fought for months between and among reserve, regular and former Army generals like Sharon, Dayan, Elazar, Allon Par-Lev, Gonen.

*Israeli army
more politicized
than officers
care to admit*

On November 10, 1973, while he was still Chief of Staff, General Elazar issued the following statement:

"It is only natural that various subjects connected with the conduct of the (Yom Kippur) War should be discussed publicly. Unfortunately biased and one-sided descriptions and interviews have been published lately which serve no constructive purpose but only personal enhancement, even if this entails casting unfair aspersions on comrades in arms. "IDF war operations are not the private affair of particular generals, but joint efforts of several military branches and formations working together, the fruits of combat by tens of thousands of soldiers and commanders at every level. "The achievements of the IDF should not be turned into personal ones, nor should mistakes and failures be blamed on others.

"The publication of unfounded conclusions and indiscreet assessments of commanders and operations is an extremely negative phenomenon.

"In this manner, unreliable and distorted information is published and circulated, and injury is done to commanders and soldiers.

"The Army generals have been requested by the Minister of Defence and by me to follow the standing orders (of public silence) in this matter."

New censorship

A month later, new censorship restrictions were announced, requiring advance permission by the Chief of Army Information for interviews with senior officers. Despite these restrictions and General Elazar's "request", on January 20, 1974, the day he left the reserves, General Sharon told his troops in his final order of the day that they had achieved victory despite "omissions and errors, failures and mistakes, the loss of nerve and control".

No wonder that by mid-April Terence Smith, the *New York Times* bureau chief in Israel, could write: "The public has grown increasingly impatient and disgusted as the nation's leading political figures and generals — they are often the same here — have squabbled among themselves in the newspapers and on television."

Smith's phrase "they are often the same here" brings us to the second major political phenomenon to have arisen from the October War — the increased discovery of politics as a second career by former generals of the Israeli Army.

I have already spoken of the multitude of post-retirement opportunities given to Israeli colonels and generals. For the

first two decades of Israel's existence, most of its retired career officers went back to their kibbutz or made second careers for themselves in private business, government corporations, the universities, and the diplomatic and civil service. And, of course, they displaced many civilians who had aspired to these jobs. But, following the 1967 Six Day War, more and more former generals — popular heroes, respected administrators, members of the most highly-respected profession in Israel — as a result of pressures put upon them by *all* political parties — discovered politics. They discovered it in the party hierarchies, the Parliament (*Knesset*), and in the Cabinet itself.

Not only that. The waiting time between leaving the active military and entering active politics became shorter and shorter. Yigal Allon, a very popular military hero of the 1948 War of Independence, waited years before achieving his present political prominence as Foreign Minister. Moshe Dayan didn't wait quite as long, but a respectable period elapsed between his leaving the Army and his becoming first the Minister of Agriculture and later Defence Minister. On the other hand, when Haim Bar-Lev left the Army a few years ago, he became the first Chief of Staff to shift almost immediately to a Cabinet post. And then there is the case of the current Prime Minister, Yitzchak Rabin. Before assuming the premiership, he was Labour Minister. Before that he was Ambassador to the United States, Israel's most important diplomatic assignment. And before that he was the Chief of Staff who planned and led the Six Day War.

This "parachuting into politics", as the Israelis phrase it, or this "habit of graduating generals to high political positions", as C. L. Sulzberger phrased it in the *New York Times*, is completely legal, proper and democratic — even if the shrouds of the parachutes sometimes cut off the hopes of civilian party workers for seats in the *Knesset* and the Cabinet. But during and after the October War something new occurred that made this practice, while still legal and democratic, perhaps a little less proper. The unexpected Yom Kippur War necessitated the call-up of experienced former generals who had entered or were about to enter the swirling waters of Israeli politics. Among them was Ariel, or Arik, Sharon. The Sharon case — the most famous but not the only one — raised the important question of the politicization of former military men who, after tasting politics and liking the taste, find themselves back in uniform again.

Sharon had left the army in July 1973 and formed the *Likud* to oppose the Government in the forthcoming elections. He was recalled into service for the Yom Kippur War and was severely critical of its conduct.

Professor Abel Jacob of the City University of New York addressed himself to this question rather soon after the War, in December 1973. As a solution, he proposed the promulgation of a law to keep retired officers out of politics for five years or so, in order to weaken their contacts with the professional military. The problem referred to by Professor Jacob and exemplified so prominently and persistently by General Sharon has slowly — and it would seem reluctantly — forced the Israeli Government to wrestle with what to do about military commands for prominent politicians, especially MKs, members of the *Knesset*, the Israeli Parliament. Convincing that another Arab-Israel war is inevitable if not imminent, Sharon, an MK, tried for most of 1974 to get a senior field command in the Army. The only way he could do it was to give up his seat in the national legislature, for the Government's way out of its dilemma was to bar *Knesset* members from holding senior appointments in the reserves.

For the time being, the immediate problem posed by the Sharon case has been solved. But there are other ex-generals in the Cabinet and the *Knesset*. It remains to be seen whether the solution of the Sharon case will have an effect on the longer-range problem of former military men in politics. While some Israelis worry about it, others do not. Dr. Mattityahu Peled, a retired major-general, has argued (in the paraphrased words of another observer) that "the mistaken notions about greater security (have) led to deterioration in the important system of checks and balances in the military-civilian relationship. (In regard to the Yom Kippur War) the civilian leadership abdicated its responsibility of control over military policy . . . (to) Moshe Dayan, . . ." — a former general himself.

But, on the other hand, a member of the Agranat Commission — who has asked not to be identified — is not very concerned. "If," he said, "the Americans after the Second World War could make General Marshall at one time Secretary of State and at another Secretary of Defence — and if General Eisenhower could later become Mr. President Eisenhower — without any damage to civilian control of the American military, I don't see any great danger if some of our ex-generals become prime ministers and politicians too."

*Problem
of military
commands
for prominent
politicians*

Prelude to a finale provided by single negotiating text?

By Robert Auger

New concepts
to accommodate
contradictory
interests

With a sense of realism rather than optimism, the world community assembled in Geneva from March 17 to May 9, 1975, for a third session of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. Its task was to elaborate a set of articles giving body to the outline of the future law of the sea treaty that had emerged from the preceding gathering in Caracas (June-August 1974). Discussions at the second session had made it amply clear that the Conference would, in the event, be successful in concluding a viable treaty only if the solutions arrived at were equitable and based on sound management principles. To obtain the needed accommodation between the numerous and often contradictory interests at the Conference, two new conceptions, departing drastically from traditional international law, were put forward: the "exclusive economic zone", applicable to the area of national maritime jurisdiction, and the "common heritage of mankind" for the international seabed area and its resources.

The idea of an exclusive economic zone implied that, in waters adjacent to the territorial sea, to a maximum distance of 200 miles, the coastal state would have title

Mr. Robert Auger joined External Affairs in August 1968. In 1970 he was posted to the Canadian Permanent Mission to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva. He was appointed a member of the Canadian delegation to the UN Seabed Committee, which did much of the Conference's preparatory work. Upon returning to Ottawa in July 1973, he was assigned to the law of the sea section of the Department's Legal Bureau. He has been serving as adviser to the Canadian delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference and has followed closely the work of Committee I, which is responsible for establishing the legal regime of the International Seabed Area and drafting the constitution of the future International Seabed Authority.

to extensive rights over the renewable and non-renewable resources for the protection of the marine environment and for the control of research activities. In Caracas, two diametrically-opposed views of the economic zone were in competition. A sizeable number of developing coastal states envisaged the zone as one of sovereignty, qualified only by the right of free passage for foreign vessels. Conversely, for the states assigning priority to their navigation or distant-fisheries interests, the zone was a special high-seas area in which the coastal state could exercise some preferential rights with respect to resources only. In Geneva there occurred a marked narrowing of these divergent theses through mutual concessions. As a result, the economic zone is now seen mainly as exclusive to the coastal state, which would, however, exercise its rights and jurisdiction therein only to the extent required to protect and safeguard its legitimate interests. This development is in line with the functional approach advocated by Canada over the years.

Common heritage

Likewise, the "common heritage of mankind" gave rise in Caracas to a serious ideological confrontation, this time between developing and industrialized nations. The states of the Third World, in their pursuit of a new and juster world economic order, want the international seabed area — the Area — and its resources, consisting mainly of the potato-shaped polymetallic nodules rich in copper, nickel, cobalt and manganese, to be explored and exploited for the primary benefit of the poorer nations. The richer nations, while willing to share with the international community revenues derived from their mining of Area resources, are mainly concerned with securing access to the minerals of the deep-ocean floor. Even though the eight weeks in Geneva were not sufficient to overcome ideological barriers, the seeds of a compromise might have been sown with the discussion of joint ventures as

possible contractual links between operators in the Area and the future International Seabed Authority.

Much of the real progress made in Geneva is attributable to the delegates' method of work. Never has an international conference seen such a proliferation of working groups and sub-working groups. The informal nature of discussions in these smaller gatherings allowed representatives to divest themselves of rigid national positions and to engage in frank and open exchanges. It also accounts for the scarcity of the session's official acts, which barely unveil the tip of the iceberg. One particularly effective group was that created at the suggestion of the Norwegian Minister for the Law of the Sea, Jens Evensen. The Evensen Group brought together some 40 eminent jurists — including Canada's Ambassador J. A. Beesley — representing every continent and a wide variety of interests, for the purpose of working out acceptable texts on the main issues. After intensive negotiations conducted during two intersessional meetings of two weeks' duration in New York and then pursued on a daily basis in Geneva, texts acceptable to a large majority of the participants were produced on the economic zone, fisheries and the continental shelf.

In order to overcome the stalemate that had arisen in the Second Committee over the traditional aspects of the law of the sea and to salvage the positive results informally arrived at within the Evensen Group, the Conference, on April 18, took a bold and unprecedented step. It gave the chairman of each of the three main committees the difficult task of preparing, on the basis of consultations and formal discussions, a set of draft treaty articles that could help their committees advance at a quicker pace. Wisely enough, the President of the Conference, Ambassador S. H. Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, took the decision to table the three sets, forming a "Single Negotiating Text", on the very last day of the session, without giving delegates the opportunity of airing their comments and reactions. When the Single Text was finally circulated during the last plenary meeting on May 9, he emphasized that it was neither an accepted nor a negotiated document but rather a tool to further the negotiating process at the next session. The main features of the Single Text will be considered in conjunction with the review of the discussions taking place both within and outside the Conference's formal structure.

At Caracas, Committee I, wishing to dispose of the most difficult issues first in

order to facilitate consideration of other aspects of its work, examined at length a key article of the legal regime of the International Seabed Area — who may exploit the Area. Ideological differences were quick to surface. The Group of 77 — constituting, in reality, a more or less homogeneous bloc of some 105 states — submitted its own version of the article, giving the future International Seabed Authority the exclusive right to carry out all activities in the Area, on the understanding, however, that the Authority could confer certain tasks on third parties through service contracts while maintaining its full and effective control at all times. The industrialized nations — i.e., the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and the EEC states (minus Ireland) — for their part envisaged no operational role whatever for the Authority, whose powers would be limited to the issuance of permits to state or private entities interested in exploiting the resources of the Area, all other activities being free of any regulation. A deadlock soon developed.

In Geneva, the Committee, or rather its informal working group, set aside the troublesome article to tackle a related but even more controversial issue — the basic conditions of exploitation. This issue arises out of the insistence by those states whose nationals are contemplating developing the resources of the deep seabed to have embodied within the treaty itself the detailed rules and regulations of exploitation with which both the Authority and operators would have to comply. With these rules, prospective developers would have assurance that the Authority could not, through regulatory action, interfere with their projected activities and possibly jeopardize the considerable outlays required. The Group of 77, in its version of "basic conditions", was ready to provide operators with some guarantees, such as security of tenure, but at the same time wanted large areas of discretion for the Authority.

Detailed regulations demanded to control exploitation

Marked time

For a while discussions marked time as the various factions were constantly referring to their own formulations when considering the basic conditions enumerated in a comparative table prepared by the group's chairman, Mr. C. Pinto of Sri Lanka. The issue was finally joined when the basic conditions dealing with financial and contractual arrangements between the Authority and operators were examined. Mr. Pinto, drawing on an idea first put forward in Caracas by the Canadian delegation, strongly advocated the joint-

venture type of contract as offering a meeting-ground for the views of developing and industrialized nations. In the ensuing discussion, both sides appeared to have moved from their original stands.

Some members of the Group of 77, citing their national experience, emphasized the great flexibility of joint ventures, and referred to their many advantages. The implication was that some form of contractual link with the Authority, other than mere service contracts, might be acceptable. On the opposite side, Britain, departing from the loose licensing scheme it was advocating in Caracas, expressed support for joint-venture arrangements involving revenue-sharing (as opposed to production-sharing). The United States likewise evidenced a spirit of compromise in proposing exploitation of the Area through a dual joint-venture system that, in effect, provided the Authority with a free hand to negotiate contracts covering half the international seabed area — the other half being developed according to the terms set out in the basic conditions.

Mr. Pinto, seizing on the positive momentum that had at last developed, decided to submit a neutral text of basic conditions he had prepared in the light of the discussion and on the basis of formal proposals, in particular that of the Group of 77, which, given its overwhelming support, enjoyed an uncontested political status of its own. In the event, each side found key elements of the Pinto paper reflecting too faithfully the positions of the other. In fact, the Canadian delegation was the only one to state publicly that, subject to minor amendments, it could accept the text in principle. Consequently, Mr. Pinto amended his proposal, which now appears, as revised, in the Committee I Single Negotiating Text.

Even though it did not take decisions on the major issues confronting it, the Committee did make some headway in familiarizing participants, through the discussion on joint ventures, with the many legal and technical complexities of ocean mining — which is, after all, it must not be forgotten, an extremely recent human activity. There are solid grounds for hope that the joint-venture approach will be able to bridge the gap between industrialized and developing nations and will help overcome the mutual distrust permeating the consideration of this important issue.

The Single Negotiating Text prepared by the committee's chairman, Mr. P. Engo (Cameroon), gives weight to the common stand adopted by the Group of 77 on most issues. However, it may be that the legit-

imate interests of the other side, whose members hold the technology and financial means to develop for themselves — and it is hoped, all mankind — the resources in the Area, are not adequately reflected. Many of the solutions suggested both for the legal regime of the Area and the structure of the International Seabed Authority might pose enormous difficulties when the time comes to implement them.

Committee II, whose task it is to resolve all the important jurisdictional issues, was plagued throughout the Geneva session by its inability to cope effectively with the "Major Trends" paper drafted at Caracas, which included in a single document the various proposals that, with respect to each issue, enjoyed the support of a significant number of states. A second reading of the paper was not very successful in eliminating alternative texts because delegations refused to consider within that official body concessions that might affect their positions in informal bodies, such as the Evensen Group, the Group of 77 and other private interest groups, where the real negotiating was taking place.

No significantly new development occurred during the Committee's consideration of the territorial sea issue or that of the use of straits for international navigation. Part II of the Single Text prepared by the chairman, Mr. Galindo Pohl of El Salvador, in line with a majority-state practice, suggests 12 miles as the breadth of the territorial sea. The regime of innocent passage for foreign vessels in the territorial sea remains much as it is in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, except that, for determining when passage is prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state (or no longer innocent), the Text sets out a series of objective criteria instead of allowing the coastal state to make that judgment according to its own rules. Moreover, the Single Text does not redefine non-innocent passage so as to cover passage that threatens pollution, as has been advocated by Canada with the support of a growing number of states.

The separate chapter devoted to straits used for international navigation basically reflects a British proposal tabled in Caracas, though in a slightly amended form. The straits covered by the Text are those used for international navigation, and lie outside internal waters. This definition would appear satisfactory from the Canadian point of view as it excludes *inter alia*, the Northwest Passage. In most straits used for international navigation, a regime of unimpeded transit passage

Positive momentum provided opportunity for neutral text

would be established in favour of foreign vessels, thus minimizing to a large extent the risks of coastal-state intervention. Discussions in Geneva, however, did not reveal any softening of the resolve of states bordering international straits to retain for such waterways the regime of innocent passage. The straits issue is, therefore, likely to remain a very serious subject of contention in future sessions.

Fisheries

Jurisdiction over fisheries is one of the basic issues upon which a fairly large degree of consensus was attained during the eight weeks in Geneva. Both the Evensen Group and the Group of 77 gave thorough consideration to the question, with the latter devising solutions highly favourable to the coastal state while the drafts of the former contained a number of safeguards aimed at meeting the concerns of distant-water fishing nations. The principle is now broadly accepted that the coastal state must have exclusive sovereign rights over the living resources of its 200-mile economic zone. The fisheries articles emanating from the Evensen Group, which reflect this basic assumption, are restated virtually verbatim in the Single Negotiating Text.

The Text provides that, pursuant to its sovereign rights, the coastal state has exclusive management control over the stocks in the zone, including the right to establish the total allowable catch. Its management and conservation regulations must promote harvesting of the living resources up to the maximum sustainable yield, while at the same time avoiding the possibility of over-exploitation. Within the zone, the coastal state would be entitled to take that part of the allowable catch it had the capacity to fish, leaving the surplus of the catch to foreign fishing fleets in order to secure optimum use of the resources and to avoid waste. Foreign fishing activities would in all cases be subjected to regulation by the coastal state.

Canada's plea in favour of a special regime for anadromous species such as salmon has at least met the short-term objective of having the problem raised in the Single Text. In itself, this is a real achievement for Canada. The "salmon article", recognizing the special interests and responsibilities of the state in whose waters the anadromous species breed, is the result of extensive discussions by a group consisting of states of origin and other states having customarily fished for these stocks. In principle, fishing for anadromous species beyond the economic zone

is prohibited, except that traditional fishing states may continue their operations subject to the management regulations of the state of origin. This provision goes a considerable way to meeting Canadian concerns to limit the entry of new fishing nations. Finally, if the anadromous stocks migrate through the economic zone of another state, that state must agree on management and conservation measures with the state of origin.

One Canadian fisheries objective that was not reflected in the Single Text concerns the coastal state's preferential rights over fish stocks occurring immediately beyond the outer limit of the economic zone. The Text would simply impose a vague obligation upon states fishing in the area to seek an agreement with the coastal state on measures necessary for the conservation (but not the management) of these stocks. The Canadian position, which is shared by a number of other states, is viewed as highly contentious by distant-water fishing nations, but it is hoped that future negotiations will find a satisfactory solution to this question. The regime of rights over sedentary species — that is, those species, such as oysters, that spend most of their lives in constant contact with the seabed — remains unchanged in the Single Text. Consequently, the coastal state would have full and exclusive rights to those sedentary species found on its continental margin.

Canadian position seemed to be highly contentious

Continental shelf

As already mentioned, a majority at the Conference envisages the conception of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone as an essential premise to the future law-of-the-sea treaty. With regard to the mineral resources of the sea, this means that the coastal state will be accorded sovereign rights over the mineral resources out to 200 miles offshore whether or not its continental shelf extends as far as that. This is a significant departure from existing law, and seems necessary if states endowed with little or no margin are to feel fairly treated.

One of the most difficult issues facing the Conference is how to deal with the claims of those states now exercising sovereign rights to margins beyond the 200-mile limit. Within the Evensen Group, a number of land-locked and geographically-disadvantaged states rejected the notion of rights to the mineral resources beyond 200 miles. Moreover, one African representative, purporting to speak on behalf of all states of the African continent, espoused that very same view. A major task of the Conference, therefore, is to find

a compromise solution between the strict 200-milers and the broad-shelf states, such as Canada, India, Australia, Argentina, Norway and Bangladesh, which have been founding their position on the terms of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, on the definition of the shelf adopted in the 1969 decisions of the International Court of Justice, and on state practice.

The Single Text, based on articles examined within the Evensen Group, describes the juridical continental shelf as extending to the outer limit of the continental margin, or to the 200-mile limit when the margin of a coastal state does not extend to that distance. Moreover, in line with the provisions of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, it prescribes that any research or drilling operations to be carried out by foreigners must be subject to the prior consent of the coastal state.

The definition of the continental shelf, however, is linked in the Text with another article, imposing on the coastal state the duty of sharing with the international community the revenues it derives from exploiting the mineral resources of its continental margin beyond 200 miles. It is felt, by and large, that only such an obligation would, in a sense, counterbalance the confirmation by the conference of the coastal state's exclusive sovereign rights to its margin beyond 200-mile and so provide the necessary element of equity that might lead to a satisfactory resolution of the issue. Canada indicated at Geneva that, in order to achieve agreement on the continental margin, it was prepared to entertain a form of revenue-sharing, on two conditions: first, that any agreement worked out should in no way derogate from its established sovereign rights out to the edge of the margin; and, secondly, that the financial contributions should go primarily to the developing countries, particularly the least developed amongst them.

The contentious subject of islands, of interest to practically every coastal state and in particular to Canada, which is surrounded by more than 52,000 islands, was debated at length. There were two main groups concerned with this issue — one contending that an island was an integral part of a state and so commanded the same maritime jurisdiction, the other attempting to differentiate between the many circumstances that should, in their view, limit the area of maritime jurisdiction that should be allotted to islands, islets or rocks. The Single Text espouses, generally, the contention of the former group, except that rocks that cannot support human habitation or economic life of their own are to

have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.

There was much debate on the precise rules to be followed by archipelagic states — that is, states whose territory consists only of islands enclosing waters separating them as internal or "archipelagic" waters, beyond which such states can extend their territorial seas and economic zones. The Single Text provides for the archipelagic waters conception. The articles are, however, to be without prejudice to the status of an archipelago, such as the Arctic archipelago, which forms an integral part of the territory of a continental state.

Marine environment

The work of the Third Committee in Caracas had indicated the existence of a consensus in favour of an umbrella treaty or chapter covering all aspects of marine pollution and serving as an organic link between the various specific conventions now in force or to be agreed on in the future. Basic articles respecting the obligation of states to protect the marine environment and to co-operate on international and regional levels were drafted during the 1974 session. In Geneva, the Third Committee made further progress on the umbrella chapter by provisionally agreeing on essential aspects of the following topics: monitoring of activities likely to cause pollution; environmental assessments of proposed activities; the obligations of states regarding marine pollution from activities conducted on land or on the continental shelf; and dumping of wastes at sea.

This committee devoted a great deal of effort to seeking a formulation that would satisfy the particular concerns of the developing states, which did not wish to be bound by unduly severe anti-pollution standards they could not comply with because of their lack of financial or technical resources or because of their need for economic development. On this question Canada has taken the position that a proper balance must be struck between strong and effective measures for the preservation of the marine environment and appropriate recognition of the special needs and problems of the developing states. One avenue the Canadian delegation has suggested is the transfer of technology and the provision of assistance, so that these countries can, on the one hand, benefit from the rights they will acquire in the proposed law of the sea convention and, on the other, face up to the resulting obligations.

Canada prepared to consider revenue-sharing

Another thorny issue is that of the powers to be given coastal states to adopt and enforce their own standards with respect to vessel-source pollution in their territorial seas and economic zones. A number of maritime powers look askance on such powers on the ground that they could be used to interfere with navigation or discriminate against the passage of certain vessels. The question was given preliminary discussion in the Evensen Group on the basis of a proposal originally put forward by Canada. For lack of time, it was not possible to bridge the gap between the maritime powers seeking to preserve the jurisdiction of the flag states from any encroachment and the coastal states vying for a system of rules allowing them to protect themselves effectively against the threat of pollution by vessels. There was growing support, however, for the granting of some rights to the coastal states so long as these were clearly defined and limited.

The part of the Single Text elaborated by Committee III Chairman Yankov (Bulgaria) embodies many of the basic provisions regarded as key elements of an umbrella chapter on the preservation of the marine environment. The major failing of the Single Text is that it altogether disregards the import of the 200-mile economic zone and the concomitant jurisdiction of the coastal state to preserve the marine environment therein. Thus coastal states cannot adopt their own regulations or the control of pollution from ships in their economic zones or even in their territorial seas. Enforcement of the only applicable internationally-accepted standards rests virtually exclusively with the flag states and, in some specific instances, with the states in whose ports polluting vessels call. To all intents and purposes, coastal states are denied any enforcement rights.

On the positive side, the Single Text contains one important provision to which Canada attaches the highest importance. Departing from the general rule it proposes for the economic zone, the Single Text would authorize the coastal state to establish and enforce its own non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the protection of the marine environment in vulnerable areas where particularly severe climatic conditions create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation and where the environment is exceptionally sensitive. If retained in the final treaty, the provision would confirm the right of Canada to take special measures for the protection of the marine environment in the Arctic, as it did in adopting the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in 1970. It is hoped that inclusion of this special

rule in the Single Text will be of considerable assistance in fostering Canada's objective on the protection of "vulnerable areas".

Scientific research

Building on the provisional agreement reached in Caracas regarding articles dealing with general principles for the conduct of marine scientific research and international and regional co-operation, Committee III achieved some measure of success with draft articles relating to the status of scientific installations within the economic zones and responsibility and liability for damages to coastal states occurring in the course of marine scientific programs by foreign states.

No consensus emerged, however, on the controversial issue of a coastal state's right to control scientific research conducted by foreign nations within its economic zone. The confrontation still prevails between, on the one hand, those states that consider that such research may take place as long as the coastal state has received prior notification and is given an opportunity to participate and, on the other hand, the large number of coastal developing states that insist that consent should be requested before any research takes place. Canada's approach is to combine a requirement for prior communication with the ultimate right of a coastal state to withhold consent where agreement cannot be reached.

Conversely, the proposal put forth by a number of Eastern European states to make resource-related research subject to the authorization of the coastal states while all other research could be conducted freely does not seem to contain the elements required to bridge the gap. Canada, supported by a wide number of other coastal states, has taken the position that such a distinction would pose insuperable difficulties in practice, because scientific programs related to the resources or the security of coastal states could take place under the cover of "pure" research.

The draft articles in the Single Negotiating Text (Part III) on marine scientific research are not broadly in keeping with coastal-state (and thus Canadian) objectives. On the other hand, the relevant articles of the Single Text (Part II) relating to the economic zone expressly recognize a coastal state's exclusive jurisdiction over research conducted in the zone. At its next session, therefore, the Conference will have to make these texts consistent with one another. Moreover, the Committee III Single Text denies the right of coastal states even to determine

No consensus on control of scientific research

the nature of such research, and fundamental research is simply subject to a notification system. Finally, it would prevent coastal states from refusing research that may affect their security.

Transfer of technology

The most notable initiative taken at Geneva with respect to the transfer of technology was the tabling, towards the end of the session, by the Group of 77 of a revised set of articles covering many aspects of this issue. The proposal presented a number of difficulties for the developed states — in particular, the provisions dealing with the transfer of patented technology without providing adequate protection to the owner, and the extension of the role of the future International Seabed Authority in this subject area.

Canada adopted a balanced approach to the Group 77 articles by pointing out, in addition to the impracticalities of transferring patented technology, the need of the developed countries to benefit from ocean-related technology.

The Committee III Single Text on this issue appears to be more acceptable to the developed than the developing states. While the Group of 77 proposal was the only one officially tabled at the Conference, the Single Text does not mirror its provisions. The obligations of states to transfer technology are expressed in hortatory terms only. Otherwise, the Text does not go very far toward incorporating the views of the members of the Group of 77, which will no doubt attempt to amend the suggested solutions drastically.

The eight weeks the 2,500 or more delegates laboured in Geneva were very productive, even though a final law-of-the-sea treaty has yet to be agreed on. A major step forward was taken with the refine-

The [single negotiating] text demonstrates the fact that there has now been sufficient development of new principles of international law to permit some radical departures from the pre-existing traditional principle of the law of the sea. On fisheries, the progress has been dramatic. Most countries have agreed on the new concept of the economic zone, which is neither territorial sea nor high seas, as the key to an accommodation between the interests of the coastal states on the one hand and the distant-water fishing states on the other.

Canada's position has always been that the economic zone must be exclusive in that a coastal state must have complete

ment of the conception of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone as the cornerstone of the structure embodying the rights and duties of coastal and other states. After compromises by both those who view the zone more as a territorial sea and those who maintain that it is part of the high seas, the Conference now has a much clearer idea of the nature of the conception. In no other area but fisheries was this spirit of compromise so evident.

Although the Single Negotiating Text is not law and will require much improvement before it becomes the final treaty, it does have a special status that will inevitably place it in the forefront of discussion at the Conference's future sessions. From a Canadian point of view, the Single Text is welcome because Canada's objectives on fisheries (salmon in particular), the continental margin and the protection of the marine environment in vulnerable areas are basically reflected.

Areas where the Single Negotiating Text does not propose compromises, such as the articles relating to straits used for international navigation, general protection of the marine environment and the regime of exploitation of deep-sea resources, may be reopened and discussed still further in order to seek solutions acceptable to the various interest groups.

Above all, the Geneva session demonstrated that the Law of the Sea Conference will only be successful in concluding a viable and largely acceptable comprehensive treaty if the proposed new regime for the oceans is based on equity and sound management principles. In other words, rights granted to states must be carefully balanced with duties and obligations to respect the legitimate concerns and rights of other states.

management rights over fisheries in the zone, coupled with the right to reserve to itself as much of the allowable catch as it has the capacity to take. At the same time, the economic zone must be a shared resource zone in the sense that the coastal state should allow other states to harvest stocks surplus to its needs under coastal-state control and regulation. There appears to be a basis of agreement emerging on just these principles.

(Extract from a report on the Geneva session of the Law of the Sea Conference to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, by External Affairs Minister Allan J. MacEachen on May 22, 1975.)

*Single text
more acceptable
to developed
than developing
countries*

Necessities of compromise forced idealism's retreat

Assessment of the Geneva session

By Barry Buzan

This year, the second substantive session of the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea met in Geneva for eight weeks between March and May. The Geneva session was under considerable pressure to make significant progress on the numerous issues before it. Many observers felt that failure to make a visible advance towards agreement would signify the bankruptcy of large-scale international negotiation as a method of reaching a new law of the sea. An increasing number of states considered new legislation a matter of urgency, and their patience appeared to depend on the demonstration by the Conference of its ability to produce results. Expectations concerning the session were also shaped by the promise during the previous session, held in Caracas in the summer of 1974, that the meetings at Geneva would be devoted to serious negotiation, and not simply to the statements of position that had occupied most of the ten weeks at Caracas. In addition, 1975 had been widely accepted as a deadline for the Conference, and this helped to create a "make-or-break" atmosphere at the Geneva session.

In view of this type of build-up, the actual results of the Geneva session appear at first to be so hopelessly inadequate as to make the failure of the Conference seem a foregone conclusion. Such a judgment, would, however, be precipitate. Very little remains stable for long in the Alice-in-Wonderland world of international politics, and expectations about the Law of the Sea Conference are no exception. Now that a further eight-week session has been scheduled for spring 1976, attitudes are no longer the same as they were before the Geneva session. It is in the still rather dim light of this longer-term perspective that the significance of the Geneva session must be assessed, and the prospects of the Conference as a whole reviewed.

Major goal

The chief purpose of the Geneva session was to produce unified draft articles on the most important issues facing the del-

egates. These draft articles were to be the result of negotiated agreements and compromises, and as such would have represented the essential outlines of a new convention on the law of the sea. They would have constituted the necessary break-through from a situation of diverse national and group positions on key issues to a situation where the most crucial conflicts had been solved and only the details and minor issues remained to be worked out. The process involved was fairly straightforward, and most observers anticipated a relatively clear-cut result from the session — either success or failure in reaching agreement on key draft articles.

The first few weeks of the Geneva meeting passed much as expected, with the delegates almost wholly absorbed in numerous informal meetings. The Caracas promise to move straight into serious negotiations was kept, and the focus of activity moved away from the plenary committees and into a host of working groups, negotiating groups, consultative groups and other informal bodies. Despite this promising start, however, it was

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becoming clear by the middle of the session that very little substantive progress was being made anywhere, and that negotiated draft articles were no longer a feasible object for the session.

In Committee I (dealing with the international seabed regime and machinery), discussion remained locked round the interrelated questions of who might exploit the area and the conditions of exploitation. The acute polarization of developed and developing countries on this issue showed no signs of moderating, and the ideological tones of the global commodity debate dominated the proceedings. An initial attempt by the extremely able chairman of the committee's informal working group to present a compromise text failed to bridge the gap, and the discussion began to move back towards the old issue of the structure of the seabed authority. It appeared as if the effort to solve the confrontation in Committee I by concentrating on the key questions of who exploited and the conditions of exploitation had not been successful and was beginning to break down. Some progress was made on the elaboration of joint-venture ideas and other devices for achieving compromise, but this was merely useful ground-work, and a far cry from the necessary breakthrough.

Almost disastrous

In Committee II (dealing with nearly all the traditional law-of-the-sea items), developments bordered on the disastrous. Because of its extensive, complex and highly controversial agenda, this committee was not so far advanced in its work as the other two, and was therefore more in need of a significant move forward. Such a move, however, did not occur, and, indeed, scarcely any progress was made. The committee spent two fruitless weeks reviewing the work of the Caracas session, and then split up into a dozen informal consultative groups, each dealing with one major item on the agenda. These groups met only a few times each, and those covering the most important topics (the continental shelf, economic zones, straits) did not even begin to meet until the last two weeks of the session. Only a few texts, on relatively minor items, came out of these meetings, and in some respects they served to harden opposed positions rather than to move towards compromise.

Committee III (dealing with scientific research, the marine environment and the transfer of technology) continued to be hamstrung by the lack of progress in Committee II. Some useful work was done on peripheral issues, but the central con-

flicts over scientific research rights and the control of marine pollution remained unresolved.

By mid-April, because of the lack of progress towards stated objectives and the consequent unlikelihood of any satisfactory agreement coming out of the session, the Conference was faced with two closely related problems. First, it had to review its method of work to see if other approaches might offer a way round the impasse. The problem here was that, while the method of working in small groups had proved useful for defining and clarifying various positions, it was not proving fruitful in generating the broader compromise necessary for agreement. No state or group was willing to be the first to abandon its favoured position, and consequently the Conference as a whole had reached a stalemate among all the various entrenched vested interests. The second problem facing the Conference was to find some way of putting an acceptable face on the Geneva session. The session was badly in need of a substantial achievement of some sort to give at least the appearance of real progress and thereby to maintain the credibility of the Conference as a method of creating a new law of the sea. The danger was that, if the Conference lost momentum, its credibility would decline and states would be tempted to take unilateral action that would, in turn, undermine the Conference even further.

Informal tests

A solution to both these problems was found in an idea arising from methods of work used in the informal working group of Committee I, and also in other informal bodies like the Evensen group — namely that the chairmen of the three committees should prepare informal single negotiating texts covering the mandates of their respective committees. In effect, these texts were to represent drafts of what a final convention might look like and, despite the unorthodox nature of the proposal, the Conference accepted it at the end of the fifth week of the session. Since the time remaining was so short, this acceptance can be seen largely as an act of desperation reflecting the inability to make progress by any other route. The single texts, it was hoped, would provide the necessary methodological break-through for the Conference by giving the delegates a coherent set of draft articles covering all issues and reflecting possible compromises in all key areas of disagreement. The single negotiating texts did not commit anybody to anything, but it was hoped that they would attract sufficient support to act as

a focus for subsequent negotiations, and thereby release delegates from the ruts of their own oft-repeated preferences as expressed in the numerous alternative articles in existing texts. They were not made public until the last minutes of the session, the idea being to avoid controversy, to give delegates time to reflect on the single texts outside the pressures of the Conference and to prepare their responses in depth as a basis for the next session. A welcome side-effect of the texts was their value as a visible "product" to justify the Geneva session.

Substance incorporated

An important feature of the single negotiating texts is that they not only reflect the skill of the committee chairmen in finding likely compromises and trade-offs but also incorporate much of the real substance of what was achieved in informal negotiations at the Geneva session. Thus, for example, the Evensen Group (an important informal working group of delegates from over 40 leading states, oriented towards finding compromise solutions on key issues) produced a set of draft articles on fishing rights in the economic zones, much of which found its way almost verbatim into the unified texts. Likewise, a revised formula on conditions of exploitation in the international seabed area, worked out by the chairman of the working group in Committee I, also appeared verbatim in the texts. Both of these reflected a great deal of hard negotiation, though neither could claim to be anything like a formally-accepted set of draft articles. Looked at in this light, the single negotiating texts are more intimately related to the main trends of the Conference's work than they would otherwise appear to be, and consequently carry somewhat more weight than if they were simply products of the chairmen's efforts.

Despite their innovative strengths, however, the single negotiating texts are still only very thin paper over the deep rifts that exist within the Conference. Significant progress towards compromise at Geneva was limited to the Evensen group work on fishing rights, the work in Committee I on conditions of exploitation and the work in the informal group on settlement of disputes. In no case did this work result in an acceptable text, and the movement it represented scarcely amounted to enough to compensate even for the weight of new proposals introduced at the session by states and groups continuing to pursue their own objectives.

Against these very limited achievements stand a number of other develop-

ments that appear to indicate the beginnings of a breakdown in the Conference process. First was the collapse of the coastal-state group, which, at Caracas, had appeared to offer a promising vehicle for compromise. This group was led by relatively moderate states, including Canada, and provided something of a bridge between the more extreme coastal states and the maritime powers. Second, and closely related, was the emergence of an active territorialist group representing those extreme coastal states favouring large territorial-sea claims. This group has a clear interest in seeing the Conference fail, or at least proceed very slowly, and its increasing strength is a sign of diminishing faith in the Conference. Third was the continuation of bitter conflict over all the central issues, such as straits, islands, fishing, the continental margin, scientific research and pollution control. A substantial number of new groups were set up to represent the opposing interests concerned, and this process, with the failure to move towards compromises, indicated a widespread lack of will to make the Conference work. Fourth, and final, was the deepening of the conflict between the landlocked and geographically-disadvantaged states, on the one hand, and the coastal states, on the other. The landlocked and geographically-disadvantaged states worked closely together in a group commanding a blocking third of states at the Conference. They were extremely active in pressing their demands in a situation in which the main trends of the Conference were clearly against their interests and in favour of those of the coastal states. Few signs of willingness to compromise emerged from either side, and the conflict assumed an increasingly angry tone as the session progressed.

Critical condition

In the light of these developments, the Law of the Sea Conference would appear to be in critical condition. This judgment must, however, be modified in view of a new factor arising from the Geneva session — the widespread change in expectations about the time-frame in which the Conference should operate. The Conference has acquired a formidable momentum, based on the years and years of intense effort it represents and, now that it has passed and survived the psychological deadline of 1975, it is under much less time pressure than it was before. The Conference has become a process of indeterminate length rather than a concentrated effort aimed at a specific time. This means that it has forfeited much of

*Failure
of Conference
desired by
territorialists*

its power to act as a restraint on states that feel an urgent need for increased maritime jurisdiction, and it seems very likely that several states, including the United States and Canada, as well as Norway, Iceland and Britain, will extend their fisheries jurisdictions in the near future. Such actions are unlikely to disrupt the international negotiations, partly because they will be framed in terms that will fall within the policy "window" already generally accepted at the Conference and partly because so many developing countries have already taken similar action themselves. One major exception to this would be unilateral action on deep-seabed mining by the technologically-advanced states. Unilateral action here would evoke a strong emotional response from the developing countries, most of which attach a high symbolic importance to the issue, and this would probably wreck the Conference. Fortunately, pressures within the industry are not such as to make unilateral action in this area likely for at least two years.

Two alternatives

The available evidence suggests two alternative courses for the Conference; the second appears to be more likely than the first, but either might fall victim to the Conference's notorious unpredictability. The first alternative is based on the assumption that the impasse reached at Geneva on most issues represents the limit of compromise for most delegations. In other words, it assumes that grounds for further compromise do not exist and that the unified texts will be unable to create them out of thin air. If this is the case, many delegations will see little point in continuing the expensive exercise of the Conference. The spring 1976 session would then be pushed to voting, and the Conference would be brought to an end either by a series of hopelessly-divided votes on the key issues or, more "cosmetically", by producing a convention that most states would vote for and sign but few would ratify or observe. In this case, the primary value of the whole international negotiation would have been to provide the conceptual framework within which such subsequent unilateral and regional action took place. Coastal states would reap the greatest advantage from such an outcome, while landlocked, geographically-disadvantaged and maritime states would be the big losers.

The second alternative is that states will consider some kind of agreement on the law of the sea worth waiting for, and,

consequently, will be prepared to accept the Conference as an ongoing process of considerable duration. This would mean that unilateral action would become an acceptable, if frowned-upon, part of the process, and that the Conference would become more a matter of codification and less a matter of progressive development than it now has pretensions to be. Such an approach would allow the passage of time to erode many of the differences that now seem insurmountable — a process exemplified in the extraordinary changes in the position of the U.S.S.R. between 1968 and 1975. It is favoured by many developing-country delegates, who see time as being on their side in the transformation of the international system, and might even find some favour among the maritime powers as a way of deferring an inevitably unpalatable solution. This alternative would also be a complete victory for the coastal states, moderated only by the possibility of obtaining some uniformity in laws and standards. Its major advantage would be that a continuation of the Conference would keep alive the possibility of an international regime for the deep seabed, which, however emasculated, would still be a significant advance in international organization. This possibility would be lost if the Conference failed.

Falling short

In either case, the Law of the Sea Conference is clearly going to fall well short of the hopes and expectations many have attached to it. The power of individual states, whether based on technological capability, as in the case of states able to mine the deep seabed, or on geographical circumstances, as in the case of coastal states able to make unilateral claims, has unquestionably dominated the impulse to internationalization that started the whole process in 1967. Idealism has retreated steadily before the necessities of political compromise, and the result in many cases will merely be to institutionalize a different form of unfairness and mismanagement from that which existed before. In terms of ocean politics, the idea of control is becoming increasingly divorced from the idea of rational management, and the urge to increase economic exploitation of marine resources is much stronger than the wish to protect the marine environment. Because of these attitudes and developments, the oceans themselves can expect little help from the Law of the Sea Conference.

Adapting international law to handle seabed resources

By Jean Angrand

In 1950, a new approach to the law of the sea was advocated by Professor Nicolas Mateesco Matte. He felt that the tendency of every nation to appropriate the natural riches of the sea for its own use must be reconciled with the ideas of coexistence and interdependence — social, economic, cultural and even demographic. Although there have been considerable developments since that time, the matter he raised remains an important aspect of international law, and the centre of unending controversy. The appearance of the developing countries as players on the international stage has only served to raise the pitch of discussion.

The various marine explorations carried out in this second half of the twentieth century have revealed that the surface and sub-surface of the seabed constitute a priceless source of mineral wealth, containing as they do oil, natural gas and, in particular, metalliferous nodules, which are principally composed of manganese, nickel, copper and cobalt. In the light of this important reservoir of resources, it is not surprising that no time was lost in staking national claims — which can only make the reconciliation of different points of view more difficult. Thus the sea, which up to now has been relatively free, will become more and more "closed". But the exploration and mining of the marine sub-surface call for advanced techniques that only the industrialized countries possess. It can, therefore, be said that international maritime law is a living example of the action of economic and political phenomena on law.

The first conference on the law of the sea took place in 1930. It ended in failure, as the participating nations, though few in number then, found it impossible to reach agreement. This lack of success notwithstanding, the conference did manage to define certain terms, such as "territorial waters", "high seas" and so on. The second conference on maritime law was held in 1958, and can be considered both a success and a failure — a success because certain

principles of law allowed by custom were codified and four conventions were signed and ratified, a failure because, on the one hand, of the lack of consensus among governments and, on the other, of the increase in national sovereignty over some areas of the sea. The recent conferences at Geneva and Caracas have produced no new solutions; in fact, the situation has become more complicated for several reasons, the main ones arising from the dissimilar positions taken by the participants and from the interaction of political claims and economic demands.

Situation has become more complex

Variety of positions

The great variety of national positions is easy to explain. At earlier maritime conferences there was a certain uniformity among the participants, who were at practically the same level of economic development and almost all had commercial fleets. The situation is now radically different. At the 1958 Geneva conference, 86 nations were represented. In Caracas in 1974 and in Geneva in 1975, about 140 delegations took part.

It is difficult to fit these nations into neat categories. The traditional distinction between developed and developing countries does not seem entirely accurate, for it will be seen that there are some industrialized nations that often adopt stands

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taken by Third World countries, occasionally going even further than they do. The classification of countries into maritime and landlocked nations is not tenable either, as it does not take into account the divergences of opinion that certainly exist between developed and developing countries. It can be said that most nations, developed or not, adopt attitudes that vary according to their geographic locations, according to whether they possess continental shelves and according to what form these shelves take.

The principal fear of the countries lacking coastlines is that none of the sea's riches will accrue to them. They wish at all costs to find compensation for the disadvantageous situation in which they have been placed by nature. For this reason, they have not hesitated to demand half the seats in any international organization created to manage resources lying outside national jurisdictions.

The developing countries, it must be noted, formed the majority of the participants in the Caracas and Geneva conferences. In order to foster and protect their economic development, they are claiming increasing sovereignty over their resources. However, they also assert that mineral wealth outside the zones of national jurisdiction should belong to all mankind. This position is shared by the majority of Latin American states, which propose the creation of an international authority to explore and develop the zones in question. They are joined by Tanzania, which also calls for the establishment of an international authority with very broad powers, including those of issuing mining permits, overseeing production and adopting measures with respect to scientific research, technical assistance and other matters.

To summarize, the developing countries agree on the benefits to mankind of sharing undersea riches, while at the same time expressing their desire to extend their sovereignty as far out to sea as possible.

The industrialized countries do not agree on all points. Canada's attitude, for example, differs from that of many developed countries, notably the United States, which recommended in 1970 that all countries sign a treaty as soon as possible renouncing their national claims on high-seas natural resources at depths of more than 200 metres. It also advocated setting up international control zones composed of the coastal continental shelves lying at a depth of more than 200 metres. Countries bordering on such zones would act as representatives of the international community, receiving in exchange a share

of the revenues involved. Finally, an international mechanism created by common agreement would authorize and regulate the exploration and development of seabed resources beyond the continental shelf. This American proposal was misinterpreted, and was the target of much criticism. It had little chance of being adopted at a time when the weight of political claims and economic demands was increasingly making itself felt.


These political claims and economic demands have had, and will continue to have, considerable influence on maritime law, since they involve the very foundations of a nation's existence — on the one hand sovereignty and political independence, on the other the search for greater economic independence.

Exercising rights

There is no doubt that governments mean to exercise their rights over the whole of what they consider to be their national territories, including their marine "territories". The latter include the continental shelves, which are the "natural extension of the land surface". Can a link be established between the geographical situation of a nation and the position adopted by that nation? It can certainly be said that a nation's attitudes are often defined according to its geographical characteristics. This is the factor that has led Canada, for example, to claim rights over the whole of its continental shelf, rights it intends to exercise. With the realization of the vast hidden possibilities of the seabed, there is now a constant increase in claims by governments, claims that can be explained, especially in the case of developing countries, by the search for greater economic independence. Since these countries gained political independence, they have been seeking a degree of freedom of action in the economic sphere. With this end in view, they intend to do as they wish with their own resources, and they have not hesitated to question certain rules of international law in the proclamation of which they did not participate. Having frequently been helpless spectators as their underground land resources were tapped, they want to take measures to ensure that the same thing does not happen to their undersea resources. Professor Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, speaking at a meeting of the *Société française pour le Droit international* (French Society for International Law) at Montpellier, said that the freedom of the seas was contested by the developing countries so far as it was considered an obstacle to their marine economies. They denounced its formal elements and

Control of fishery resources is one factor in the law of the sea negotiations which is of particular interest to Canada. An example of the importance of this area in Canadian life is to be found in the decision announced by Fisheries Minister Romeo Leblanc on July 23, 1975, that Russian fishing vessels would be denied privileges in Canadian ports. This sanction was imposed after numerous protests failed to gain Russian compliance with ICNAF regulations controlling North Atlantic fisheries. Some commentators, including cartoonist Pilsworth, doubted the efficacy of the action.

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set against it the need for equality of real conditions. It must be admitted that the relations between national resources and international problems constitute a source of conflict, for, from the moment it was established that riches were hidden in the sea, an instinctive reaction was apparent — that these undersea resources should be made to benefit the countries off which they lay or that, at any rate, steps should be taken to prevent abusive exploitation of them by countries with highly-developed technical skills. However, the possession of such riches is not enough; technical progress still has a determining influence as far as the exploration and development of the seabed is concerned.

Technological progress

The rate of technological progress over the last few years has given rise to new prob-

lems and it can even be said that science has outstripped international law. In addition, the technological gap between industrialized and developing countries has become increasingly marked. It is, therefore, proving necessary to orient technical research towards the determination of conditions that will contribute to reducing the disparities arising from technological progress.

Exploitation of the sea's mineral resources involves very advanced innovative techniques, which only the "have" nations can supply. In these countries innovative research and development are carried on by large industries receiving numerous subsidies. In the Third World, on the other hand, such work is in its infancy because of the non-communicability of the research results. Thus the developing countries with seacoasts possess natural

*Lessening
of dependence
on developing
nations*

wealth but do not have the capability required to exploit it. This is why the new ethics introduced into international law by the countries of the Third World are so important. Will international law be able to accept this challenge and promote greater co-operation among all nations? In other words, will the developing countries, with their limited means, benefit from the results of the marine research carried out by the developed countries? Unanimity is far from achieved on the principles that would permit a rational use of seabed resources.

Since the declaration of the Maltese Ambassador, Arvid Pardo, and the resolutions subsequently adopted, there has been a tendency to see the part of the sea lying outside national jurisdictions as *res communis*. All governments agree that riches found in that zone must be considered the "common heritage of mankind" and be shared among all countries. This attitude can only reinforce the principles of international law on development and bring about a new awareness of the issues involved in the minds of all peoples.

Unanswered questions

Yet some questions remain unanswered. Fixing the boundary between the zone that is an integral part of a country and the zone outside national jurisdiction is still a problem. There are many other points of disagreement. A coastal state, for example, normally has sovereign rights over the continental shelf for purposes of exploring and developing its natural resources. However, in order not to encroach on the traditional freedom of the high seas, certain rights are recognized, even though most of them remain tied to the consent of individual governments. In addition, freedom of scientific research is not mentioned. Some jurists think this a serious omission, while others say that freedom of scientific research is guaranteed implicitly by Article 2 of the United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958. Among the freedoms mentioned in this article are those recognized by the general principles of international law. Article 5(1) appears to correct the omission in question by stating that basic oceanographic research or other scientific research carried out with a view to publication of the results should not be interfered with. Article 5(8), however, states that the consent of the coastal state is necessary for any research concerning the shelf — which is defined, as we know, according to criteria not only of depth but also of potential productivity.

The problems posed by the future mining of nodules must also be touched on. Such mining may have significant consequences, since the developed countries think that they may in this way be able to lessen their dependence on developing nations for certain metals, such as copper. For nickel, on the other hand, the situation is different; three countries — Canada, France and the Soviet Union — supplied 74 per cent of world production in 1972. Consequently, massive uncontrolled production could have the same effect on these countries as on the developing nations that produce other minerals. As for the non-producing Third World nations, they hope to receive a share of the benefits derived from such development.

Principal difficulty

To conclude, the principal difficulty of mining nodules lies in reconciling the dynamic nature of the technology used with the uncertain market outlook.

The problems of international maritime law are considerable, and the possible solutions vary according to the subject in question. In general, however, it can be said that this field of law is going through a period of transition. Like many other disciplines, it is dynamic, in a state of constant evolution, which is taking shape under the influence of a number of factors such as the effect of technological progress and the attempt by the developing countries to introduce new principles into international law. These factors can be seen as having a transforming impact on international law, but their effects are limited, owing to the still vigorous forces of resistance. This resistance to new forces can be explained by the selfish outlook of certain countries. Certainly, most countries will unite in preaching a kind of internationalism, but they still retain, and demonstrate, tendencies that are more nationalistic than not. Another force for resistance lies in the frequent misuse of the principle of sovereignty, a principle referred to by both the developed and the developing countries.

Because of these various hindrances, there has been delay in applying any of the solutions regarding the rational exploration and development of the seabed. A compromise solution will therefore have to be found, but it can only be reached if all countries are prepared to make concessions. This kind of dynamic compromise is the only way that conflicts can be avoided between the different groups of nations, and it is in the interest of all of them to find solutions to the problems that so greatly concern them.

Memorial to L. B. Pearson unveiled

In his statement the artist said: "The form relates somewhat to an obituary in Telex form with spiritual dimensions.... What I felt needed to be achieved was a sense of spiritual timelessness, which in essence is what art is, as are also the real thoughts and concerns of man. The value of a word is that, if meaningful spiritually, it is timeless and its true interpretation remains a personal experience, therefore, truly provoking and rewarding."



Top — Mrs. Maryon Pearson, widow of the former Prime Minister, discusses the newly-unveiled memorial with the artist, Charles Gagnon, and H. F. Feaver.

Centre — Mrs. Pearson is pictured addressing the several hundred guests just before unveiling the mural. Also in the picture are Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Basil Robinson, the Acting Minister Mitchell Sharp, and Prime Minister Trudeau.

Bottom — Roland Michener, former Governor General of Canada and lifelong friend of Lester Pearson, chats with former Prime Minister and Mrs. John Diefenbaker before the unveiling of the memorial on June 10, 1975.



Canada and South Africa: A Reply to Cranford Pratt

By Kenneth H. W. Hilborn

Cranford Pratt's article "Canadian Attitudes towards Southern Africa: A Commentary" (*International Perspectives*, November-December 1974) is a good summary of the views held by left-liberal ideologues. The reality perceived by the ideologue, through his peculiar set of distorting lenses, bears little resemblance to the reality perceived by the realist.

The growing flexibility displayed by many white South Africans on issues of race is not yet as widely known as it should be in the outside world, and naturally it is either ignored or belittled by advocates of anti-white violence. Early in 1975, in conversations with informed South Africans about racial problems, the present writer found the word "change" repeatedly recurring. Significant progress was already being made towards elimination of "petty apartheid" practices like segregation of park benches, elevators and assorted public facilities. Asked about the life-expectancy of the remaining "whites only" and "non-whites only" signs, an editor in Johannesburg expressed the opinion that, except in isolated rural communities, they would all be gone within a decade.

A few examples of news reports and editorial comments in the South African press will illustrate the trend:

The *Pretoria News* (January 14, 1975) referred to a branch of Barclay's

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Bank in Johannesburg "where discrimination had been dropped, with Blacks and Whites working together". On the following day, the *News* reported: "Petty apartheid signs and regulations at the Transvaal Provincial Administration building in Pretoria have been scrapped."

The *Daily Dispatch* (January 28) remarked editorially: "The Transvaal Cricket Union is to be applauded for taking the bull by the horns and starting the process of racial integration in cricket. A day later, the same newspaper had more praise to bestow: "The East London City Council is to be commended for integrating the city's central reference library."

To quote *The Argus* (January 30): "The decision to lift the ban on non-Whites attending performances at Cape Town's Nico Malan Theatre complex has been welcomed enthusiastically by White and non-White leaders." A small move in itself, this decision was widely regarded as symbolic.

Champions of apartheid

Among the whites there are some rigid champions of *apartheid* — like Dr. J. D. Vorster, moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church — who find such developments alarming and are determined to resist them. Dr. Vorster points out that no clear line can be drawn between "petty" *apartheid* and *apartheid* as a whole. He fears that, as the familiar barriers between the races begin to crumble, one change will inevitably pave the way for another: "One wedge in petty *apartheid*," as he put it in an interview, "leads to the collapse of *apartheid*." The conviction that erosion of petty *apartheid* will result ultimately in the disappearance of the entire structure of racial separation is shared by many strong opponents of the *apartheid* policy. Superficially-minor relaxations of discriminatory rules and practices may have enormous repercussions in the end, if evolutionary processes are given time. For them to be interrupted by the impatience

fanatical minorities (militant self-styled "liberation" movements) would be a tragedy.

To the distress of Dr. Vorster and his like, the press — Afrikaans as well as English — is heavily influenced by those who favour reform. The *Rand Daily Mail* (January 17) reported that the newspaper *Die Vaderland*, a supporter of the governing National Party, had condemned the continued existence of "lift apartheid" (segregated elevators) in one government building. The chief assistant editor of another well-known Afrikaans paper remarked to this writer that the laws he would like to see repealed forthwith included those against mixed marriages and inter-racial sexual relations.

As far as governmental policy is concerned, the key architect of the new approach to racial questions has been Dr. Vorster's much more pragmatic brother, Prime Minister B. J. Vorster. In an interview in Durban, the editor of an English-language paper — a man who advocates a "common society" for all races — observed that some recent developments (particularly with respect to petty apartheid) had been "spectacularly heartening". He described himself as an optimist about racial harmony and the future of the country — not because he expected a change of government but because the Prime Minister has been acting intelligently, and will continue to act intelligently". Still a critic of the Vorster administration, which he considered to be moving too slowly in a liberal direction, the editor explained that his attacks on official policy were intended as a form of support for the Prime Minister against intransigent pro-apartheid elements in the National Party.

Despite gains in the last general election, the outspokenly anti-apartheid Progressive Party remains small. The United Party (the official opposition in parliament) has been torn by such internal dissension that its name is a joke. In the *Urban* editor's words, Vorster is "the only instrument of change available". His early disappearance from the scene (his predecessor as Prime Minister was assassinated) could be a "serious setback", for much depends on his personal leadership.

A serious setback — but, the editor added, probably only a temporary one. The Prime Minister has imparted additional strength and political meaning to South Africa's breezes of change, but those breezes would not die with him. *The Argus* (January 30) reported on a three-day conference held in East London by the Institute of Race Relations: "The most significant fact to emerge... was that at

least some top Nationalists are beginning to think and speak publicly along the same lines as liberal academics and Black leaders. That there was a need for change in South Africa was taken for granted by all at the conference."

Grand design

Under the grand design of *apartheid*, which emphasizes the differences among the various black peoples, Bantu homelands that are largely rural, like the Transkei, are eventually to become independent sovereign states; the Transkei itself will probably be granted independence by 1977. Full implementation of the grand design will not be easy. One source of difficulty is the fact that most of the homelands are geographically fragmented. Whites have been less than enthusiastic about handing over white territory to the blacks for purposes of consolidation.

Even the full independence of consolidated homelands, however, would not solve the problem of blacks permanently resident in urban areas. Under the *apartheid* policy, these people are supposed to exercise political rights only under their respective homeland constitutions. Many blacks have put down roots in the cities, where they are vital to the economy, and the privilege of casting absentee ballots in homeland elections cannot satisfy their political aspirations. The future constitutional position of urban blacks may well be the most crucial challenge confronting South African politicians.

Even with a franchise based on educational (or educational and income) qualifications, full integration of urban blacks into the parliamentary system means ultimate black supremacy, not only over the whites but over the major Coloured minority (ethnically mixed and mainly Afrikaans-speaking) and the Asian — chiefly Indian — minorities too. The white regime has both helped the Indians and Coloureds, on the one hand, and discriminated against them, on the other. These minorities cannot be content with mere maintenance of the status quo, but they have no reason to look forward to black domination as a satisfactory alternative. After all, whites are not the only racists in Africa. In *Partisan Review* (Fall, 1964), the late British socialist R. H. S. Crossman wrote: "I strongly suspect that in twenty years' time we shall look back with pained repugnance at the hypocrisy with which progressive-minded people in the sixties turned a blind eye to the racism prevalent in black Africa, while condemning South African apartheid."

Constitutional challenge from position of urban blacks

A considerable number of thoughtful whites (not excluding Afrikaners) are prepared to accept, or to contemplate accepting, political integration of the urban blacks in the long run. But for many the idea is still unacceptable; they insist that the reality of numbers rules it out. You do not have to be a totally rigid adherent of *apartheid* doctrine not to want your own racial group to be submerged by a majority with a fundamentally different cultural background. In a perceptive article published by the American quarterly *Foreign Affairs* (January 1971), the scholar and former diplomat George F. Kennan pointed out: "The South African whites, and the Afrikaners in particular, are confronted with a very real problem when it comes to maintaining, in the face of a large black African majority, their own historical and cultural identity.... It is an identity in which, as in the case of the Israeli, national components are mixed, for better or for worse, with religious ones; and the Afrikaners are no more inclined to jeopardize it, by placing themselves entirely in the power of a surrounding foreign majority, than are their Middle Eastern counterparts."

At the East London conference, there was discussion of some sort of federal structure. The United Party has advocated this approach, intended to preserve the identities of the various racial elements while affording all of them a meaningful political voice. At least privately, some influential Nationalists now confess to being attracted by the idea.

In the complex ethnic mosaic of South Africa, new solutions to the problem of racial co-existence cannot be found or implemented quickly. But the need for new solutions is widely recognized. Answers are being sought. Change is in the air.

Standard of living

Whatever the future with respect to political rights for blacks and other non-whites, it is clear that their standard of living is already substantially better than many outsiders realize. Although accusations about "starvation wages" are still occasionally heard from extremists, some of the better-informed foes of South Africa concede that incomes for blacks often compare favourably with those in black-ruled countries to the north. When a visitor sees blacks on city streets, he notices at once that, on the whole, they look well-fed, and that they are frequently quite well (sometimes very well) dressed. Billboards in Soweto, the large black community outside Johannesburg, indicate that advertisers have detected a market there for Coca-

Cola, underarm deodorants, and other non-essential consumer goods. Even a brief exposure to South African realities disabuses any rational person of the myth that the blacks in general are a mere downtrodden mass barely able to endure the poverty inflicted on them by white "oppression".

Nevertheless there is clearly room for great improvement in the black man's material lot. Improvement depends on further economic growth, which will necessarily bring a further increase in black employment opportunities — since white labour has long been in short supply. Economic growth, in turn, depends in part on expanded overseas trade and foreign investment. South Africans working for peaceful progress are appalled by those abroad who call for boycotts and embargoes against South African products, or for other measures designed to impair the country's economic health. In an interview in Umtata (capital of the Transkei) early this year Mr. Knowledge Guzana — leader of the anti-*apartheid* opposition party in the homeland legislature — stated emphatically that he wanted to see South Africa obtain as much foreign trade and investment as possible, because of the benefits that blacks would derive from them. Mr. René de Villiers, a respected member of the Progressive Party and of the national parliament, bluntly describes economic (and cultural) boycotts as "lunacy".

That blacks want jobs, even at wages lower than those paid to whites, is evident from their actions. The South African Government has difficulty in controlling the influx of blacks from the homelands (heavily dependent on subsistence agriculture) into the cities where work for pay can be found. Urban blacks display no eagerness to move back to the homelands.

If blacks chose to boycott the available employment as a means of anti-Government protest, Canadians who oppose expanded trade with South Africa and investment in its economy would be on stronger moral ground. As matters stand, these Canadians are seeking to deprive blacks of job opportunities that they clearly desire, and thus to impose on them hardships they would prefer to avoid. Anybody who claims the right to make such choices from afar for other people is guilty of insufferable arrogance. In this case, the arrogance is apparently based on a paternalistic assumption that white Canadian ideologues know better what is good for those ignorant South African blacks than the blacks do themselves.

The only logical reason for desiring black unemployment lies in the possibil-

that the resulting misery might drive blacks to desperation, and therefore to violence. In this way people who would prefer to live and work in peace might be turned into cannon-fodder for the revolutionary race war that so-called "liberation" movements hope to launch. Cranford Pratt, indeed, goes so far as to propose that measures to discourage trade and investment should be accompanied by direct Canadian assistance to "liberation" organizations.

Fraudulent distinction

True, the aid proposed is to be "humanitarian" in nature, but the distinction between humanitarian and military aid to terrorists is a fraudulent one. If Canada supplies them with such items as blankets, the terrorists will have more money for purchases of rifles and grenades.

Whether direct or indirect, whether "humanitarian" or overtly military, external support for "liberation" groups whose aim is to undertake "armed struggle" (that is, terrorism) in South Africa must be condemned as flatly contrary to the purposes of the United Nations as defined in Article 1 of the Charter. The first of those purposes is "to maintain international peace and security", and it is only for this end — not to "liberate" a country or to improve its social or political system — that collective measures such as force or other sanctions are to be used. The article leaves no doubt that "settlement of international disputes or situations" potentially dangerous to peace is to be sought "by peaceful means".

Support for organizations committed to the use of violence against a member state — or, indeed, against any state — that has not threatened international peace is plainly inconsistent with the Charter as a whole, and therefore beyond the legal rights of UN members or of the UN itself (except perhaps through a Charter amendment). On the other hand, the UN General Assembly was acting in harmony with the Charter on December 21, 1965, when it adopted a resolution that read in part as follows: "No State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive terrorist or armed activities directed toward the violent overthrow of the regime of another State."

Widespread failure to abide by this simple and sensible rule has contributed heavily to the degree of international anarchy from which the world suffers at the present time. Canada should do nothing to make the situation worse, especially since it is obvious that efforts by extremist exiles to infiltrate South

Africa and plunge the country into civil strife are incompatible with the economic betterment to which the bulk of the black population seem to give priority. A man who wants a job does not want investors frightened off, employers murdered, or places of employment destroyed.

Namibia

As for South West Africa (also known as "Namibia"), the issue is far more complicated than Cranford Pratt's article suggests. It is true that the International Court of Justice has handed down an opinion, albeit a merely advisory one, to the effect that South Africa's continued presence in the territory is illegal. The opinion was not unanimous, however, and the reasoning behind it was highly questionable. On October 19, 1971, in the House of Commons at Westminster, Mr. Anthony Kershaw (Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) stated explicitly that the British Government rejected the Court's interpretation of the law: "We do not accept the illegality of South Africa's presence in South West Africa."

Having conquered "South West" from the Germans in 1915, South Africa later held it as a League of Nations mandate. Mr. Kershaw pointed out that the Council of the League, "working within its own constitutional framework", could not have revoked the mandate without South Africa's consent. As the mandatory, South Africa would have been entitled under the Covenant to be present and to vote at meetings of the Council where the mandate was under consideration, and unanimity would have been required for a decision. In Mr. Kershaw's words, "the mandatory was thus in a position to block any resolution seeking to assert and exercise a power to revoke the mandate".

Even if the United Nations is assumed to have inherited all the powers of the League, it cannot possess any additional powers not stated in the Charter; and the Charter does not authorize any UN body to terminate a mandate over the objections of the mandatory (Article 77 merely indicates that territories held under mandate "may" be placed under the UN trusteeship system by agreement). It can be reasonably argued, therefore, that votes against South Africa's position in the UN and its affiliate, the Court, have no more effect in law than they have in reality. Whether the stand of the British Government in 1971 was correct or not, it does at least prove that the legal rights and wrongs of the issue remained open to responsible debate after the Court's decision was announced.

*Ruling
of International
Court of Justice
rejected
by British*

The law being uncertain, statesmen should emphasize practical considerations. In his article in *Foreign Affairs*, George F. Kennan put forward a persuasive case for regarding South Africa's continued authority over the disputed territory as desirable.

The total population of "South West" is now somewhat over three-quarters of a million, including over 90,000 whites. The majority (over 350,000) of the blacks belong to one or another of the seven tribal groups composing the Ovambo nation, whose homeland is located in the northern region near the Angolan border. The Ovambos (as Kennan made clear) have enjoyed a substantial measure of local autonomy, but with many benefits provided by South Africa. Among these benefits have been medical and health services, primary and secondary education (with standards comparable to the best on the African continent), pest control and water development.

Without South African expertise, chronic shortages of water would certainly have affected South West more severely than they have. Pretoria's National Institute for Water Research (which this writer visited early in 1975) has taken a keen interest in water reclamation. As a result, Windhoek — South West's capital — has been obtaining safe drinking water directly from purification of sewage. The South Africans believe that it is the first city in the world to do so, and they may well be right.

Allegations of South African oppression in South West must be viewed (to say the least) with caution. Seeing Ovamboland for himself in 1971, a correspondent for *Newsweek* found nothing to support charges made at the United Nations that the Ovambos were being badly treated. He pointed to the economic opportunities they enjoyed as owners of local businesses, and to the training made available to equip blacks for a greater role in industry and government. Black and white civil servants, the journalist discovered, "earn the same pay Blacks and whites seem to mix easily." (See *Newsweek*, July 5, 1971, Pages 43-44.)

In a paper prepared in 1966 for the American-African Affairs Association, a professor at the University of Maryland, Walter Darnell Jacobs, maintained that the South African record in South West, though not unblemished, had been "on balance and on objective analysis, good". Kennan's research and the *Newsweek* report confirmed that earlier verdict.

Allegations of oppression must be viewed with caution

Self-determination

As for the question of self-determination, *Newsweek* reminded its readers that Pretoria had offered repeatedly to hold a plebiscite in South West to let the people there express their wishes. *Time* magazine (July 5, 1971) reported that the blacks had "tribal loyalty" but no feeling of South West African nationhood, and that the vote in any plebiscite would plainly be "overwhelming for continued South African rule". No doubt that helps to explain why South Africa's foes at the United Nations were not satisfied with the plebiscite proposal.

Those who demand that unitary independence be imposed on South West's peoples are ignoring the problem of the non-Ovambo native population. There are over 50,000 Herero, nearly as many Ka- vango, and over 25,000 East-Caprivians. These groups at least resemble the Ovambo in being of Bantu origin but nevertheless they possess identities of their own. The Bushmen (over 22,000) and the Hottentots (also called Nama) — some 33,000 — are not Bantu at all. The ethnic origin of the 66,000 Damara (also known as Dama or Bergdama) is obscure, but the Damara were at one time enslaved by the Nama and speak the Nama tongue. Since these various smaller peoples have so little in common with the Ovambo or with each other, there seems to be (as George F. Kennan realized) no chance for any generally-acceptable native government of South West as a whole.

Perhaps a partial answer to the difficulty may be found in separate independence for Ovamboland, which would protect the smaller peoples from the dangers of Ovambo domination. But, deprived of the natural resources of the rest of South West, Ovamboland would be economically weak. Possibly a loose federal structure would be preferable, but for the United Nations to impose any particular solution on the peoples concerned would be indefensible.

Though dominated by Ovambos, the "liberation" movement calling itself the "South West African People's Organization" (SWAPO) was decisively repudiated in the last Ovamboland elections, held in January 1975. Defying SWAPO's advocacy of a boycott, a substantial majority of the electorate went to the polls. All too often, however, militant armed minorities win political power regardless of popular sentiment; and, if South West fell under SWAPO control, it might well become a base for terrorist incursions into South Africa proper. For Pretoria, retention of South West would be militarily prudent.

On the other hand, retention would jeopardize the objectives of South Africa's current foreign policy. Pretoria is seeking improved relations with black-ruled states. Overtures in this direction have included visits by the South African Foreign Minister to Zambia, and by Prime Minister Vorster to Liberia. Along with the issue of Rhodesia, that of South Africa's presence in South West presents an obstacle to further successes in the quest for an African *détente*.

According to *The Times* of London (February 17, 1975), Mr. Vorster told the Liberian President that, even on economic grounds, South Africa would be happy to "get South West Africa off our backs" — because what was being done for the population cost more than the tax revenues that the territory produced. But simply to abandon South West, withdrawing the established structure of services and administration, would be to create a shambles. If there is to be change, it should be brought about in a responsible way, with respect for complex realities. The South African presence should come to an end only after agreement has been reached

among South West's peoples on what is to take its place; and for that, as we have seen, there is no easy or simple formula.

Meanwhile, like those of South Africa itself, the peoples of South West can benefit from economic development and increased employment opportunities. Canadian trade and investment conducive to such development should be strongly encouraged, not only because of their immediate advantages for the population but also because of the contribution they will make to laying economic foundations for the future emergence of one or more viable independent states in the South West African region.

Canadian trade and investment should be encouraged

To promote trade with South and South West Africa, to increase our investments there, and to oppose all forms of external assistance to "liberation" (terrorist) factions — here is the basis for a wise Canadian policy. These proposals are the reverse of Cranford Pratt's; but the sole merit of his article lay in the consistency with which it advocated folly. If we read his prescriptions and do exactly the opposite, we can be confident of not going far astray.

Meeting at Laval

Canadian foreign policy and the Quebec intellectual

By Louis Balthazar

as a result of the sensible initiative of the *Centre québécois de relations internationales* (an inter-university body affiliated with both Laval University in Quebec City and the Canadian Institute for International Affairs), the Canadian Department of External Affairs held an information session in Quebec City on March 13 and 14 of this year. The session was held to give representatives of the Department an opportunity to outline the directions of Canadian foreign policy before a small group of people from government, university and journalistic circles who could be described as "opinion leaders".

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen, himself gave an impressive opening address, in which he made explicit, in a style marked by sim-

plicity and open-mindedness, Canada's position in its relations with its most important partners. He emphasized particularly the balance Canada wished to maintain between the preservation of its sovereignty and good relations with the United States, between a new relationship with Europe and a North American location. Following his speech, the Minister agreed to answer questions.

Among those representing the Department at the official level during the session were Mr. D'Iberville Fortier, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, and the heads of the Middle Eastern, Western European and Transport, Communications and Energy Divisions. The audience included: journalists representing the Canadian Press, the Canadian Broadcast-

ing Corporation, private radio stations, newspapers such as *La Presse*, *Le Soleil*, *Le Jour* and *The Gazette*, and the magazine *Maclean's*; professors from Laval University and the University of Quebec in Montreal, the University of Montreal, McGill and Concordia Universities; and a number of senior Quebec government officials.

First meeting

To my knowledge, it was the first time that such responsible representatives of the Department of External Affairs had held a meeting of this type in an entirely Quebec context. Meetings between officers of the Department and leading figures in economic and intellectual circles have been organized several times, in Ottawa and elsewhere, with *Francophones* present. But inevitably the *Francophones* were always in a minority, and in numbers far fewer than the French-speaking percentage of the Canadian population. These French Canadians usually spoke, when they did, in English or, if they spoke French, definitely felt rather marginal. Consequently, such meetings gave Canadian diplomatic personnel little opportunity to identify clearly the Quebec viewpoint on foreign policy.

Of course, the Department had many opportunities to realize the existence of this point of view, if only through the long and arduous negotiations with the Quebec government concerning the role of the provinces and their prerogatives in the area of international relations. However, there had apparently never been any previous discussion of Canadian foreign policy as a whole with influential thinkers in Quebec, using the French language exclusively.

It is interesting to note that there was no mention of disputes between Ottawa and Quebec (although officials from the Quebec Department of Intergovernmental Affairs were present and the External Affairs representatives undoubtedly seized the opportunity to hold private discussions with them), or of France-Canada relations or Canadian interest in the French-speaking world. The three subjects dealt with were the Middle East, Europe and energy problems. In addition, a general view of Canadian foreign policy was presented by the Assistant Under-Secretary

Professor Balthazar is co-editor of International Perspectives. The views expressed in this article are purely his own, however, and are not intended to reflect the policy of the Department or to state an editorial position for this magazine.

of State. Unfortunately, a session on Canada-U.S. relations had to be cancelled at the last minute.

Québécois stamp

While these topics were presented, appropriately, in a clearly Canadian perspective, as they would have been before any other Canadian audience, the assembly's response often bore a *Québécois* stamp. This does not mean that the participants tended to study only those parts of Canada's foreign policy that could be favourable to Quebec. Actually, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there was almost no discussion of Quebec's interests as such. Rather, it was the spirit of the comments, and the view of the international system and foreign policy that they reflected, that disclosed the characteristically Quebec attitudes.

Unlike most intellectuals in English Canada, most Quebec intellectuals have a definite sympathy for the Arab countries in their conflict with Israel in the Middle East. Apparently they wish to see Canada accept the Palestine Liberation Organization as a valid international entity, as the majority in the UN General Assembly has done. Similarly, they deplore the somewhat lukewarm Canadian response to the new majority that has recently emerged in the UN organizations. Canada is also blamed for far too timid a foreign policy, for too much delay in recognizing the validity of certain revolutionary forces in the international system, and for too great a tendency to side with the interests of international capitalism. For example, the *Francophones* would apparently have liked to see Canada denounce the brutal overthrow of the Allende Government in Chile, and take more time before recognizing the military junta, thereby showing Canadian disapproval of the repressive methods used by the current Chilean Government. Finally, they would like Canada eventually to move further from the United States, especially in matters involving Third World countries. Such sentiments (and these are only a few examples, of course), are also expressed in some Canadian English-speaking circles, but they seem to appear more often in the comments and writing of Quebec journalists and academics. They may be impossible to put into practice, taking into account Canadian interests as a whole, certain prior commitments and the opinion of the majority of Canadians. To borrow the comment of a representative of the Department of External Affairs, Canada's foreign policy is probably not as dramatic as some would like it to be, but its strength and effect

Previous meetings gave little opportunity to identify Quebec viewpoint

perhaps depend on its flexibility and caution.

Be that as it may, there is an approach to foreign policy that is peculiar to Quebec, which is probably not true of other Canadian provinces. Of course, Alberta, Ontario, British Columbia and the rest have their special interests, but it would be surprising to find that the perception of the international system, and the prescription of practical foreign policy choices, were as distinct between one English-speaking province and another as between French-speaking Quebec and the rest of the country.

Canada's foreign policy has made tremendous strides in recent years towards bilingualism and greater attention to the interests of the *Francophone* population. The shrewdness and audacity of some Quebec governments have had a great deal to do with this development. The Canadian Government had to redouble its efforts in response to the actions taken by Quebec, particularly with regard to France and the French-speaking countries. It has carried out this task with great success, and shown that it could quickly adjust its foreign policy position in response to a more demanding *Francophone* population and better-defined interests.

Not yet bicultural

Even though Canada's foreign policy has become bilingual, it is doubtful whether it has yet become truly bicultural. Although Canada has quickly made its presence felt within the French-speaking world, especially by its immensely diversified aid policy maintaining a balance between the French-speaking and English-speaking countries, it is not certain that some ideas dear to Quebec intellectuals have gained entry to the Pearson Building. Indeed, a foreign policy is seldom devised to satisfy the criticisms and desires of the intellectuals of a country. The criticisms of the English-speaking leadership of Canada are certainly not always well-received in Ottawa; but at least they are heard, and are assuredly better known than those that come from Quebec. There is undoubtedly, to take only one example, more "osmosis" between the Toronto *Globe and Mail* and the Department of External Affairs than between the Department and *Le Devoir* of Montreal. The recent arrival of Claude Lemelin, a former member of the staff of *Le Devoir*, in Allan MacEachen's office, as special adviser, may change this situa-

tion. It is to be hoped that the Minister will benefit from Lemelin's experience and knowledge of Quebec circles.

Continuing the dialogue

A conference such as that in Quebec City last March could not fail to make the Department aware of certain Quebec points of view, or, undoubtedly, to contribute to a better understanding by influential thinkers in Quebec of the constraints to which Canadian foreign policy is subject. All the participants hoped that the meeting would be followed by many others and that the dialogue would continue. Such exchanges will never be easy; they may occasionally turn into a dialogue of the deaf — theorists and practitioners rarely start from the same premises. However, provided certain basic rules of mutual respect are observed (as was eminently the case in Quebec), the dialogue should generally be beneficial. The makers of Canada's foreign policy will never act completely in accordance with the wishes of their critics, and even less in accordance with the sometimes idealistic demands of Quebec intellectuals. If, however, some of these ideas were singled out for discussion and even, occasionally, partially incorporated into the policies drawn up in Ottawa, it would be a major step forward.

After all, according to the title of the 1970 foreign policy review, Canada's foreign policy serves the interests of its people. Quebecers form a large part of Canada's population and, while they have not yet swallowed the ideas transmitted to them at regular intervals by their opinion leaders, they are likely to absorb a good many of them in the long run. The intellectual direction of élites is a much better indicator of future social changes than the data of the public opinion poll. However, it is not easy to draw up a representative sample of these élites. In this respect, attendance at the March session was still somewhat unrepresentative — for example, not all leading papers were represented, there was no spokesman for business or industry (which would never happen in English-speaking Canada) and none for the labour unions.

In any case, this was only an initial experiment, which was quite successful, and we must hope that it will be followed by many meetings of its kind, from which Canadian foreign policy, and its clientèle, cannot fail to benefit.

Incorporation into policy of critical viewpoints a step forward

‘Canada’s War’ a misnomer for Granatstein’s book on King

By Peter St. John

In his book *Canada’s War: the politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939-45*, Professor Granatstein has given an immensely readable account of both the atmosphere and the inner workings of “one of the strongest cabinets Canada ever had – if not the strongest”. The difficulties of managing a Federal Cabinet (and, incidentally, of trying to coexist with Mackenzie King) are vividly portrayed, while the accounts of the conscription crises of 1942 and 1944 come through with clarity and understanding.

Several chapters drawing on new primary sources throw considerable light on Canada’s wartime relations with Britain and the United States. As to the former, notwithstanding the consistent generosity of Canada to Britain (including a \$1-billion gift in March 1942) an atmosphere of hard bargaining, and even suspicion, prevailed. As Granatstein points out, the stage had been set even before the outbreak of war: “The Prime Minister’s calculated refusal to permit consultation and liaison with London and the British forces, his persistent unwillingness to commit Canada in advance, had all but paralyzed co-operation.” After the outbreak of war, King drove a hard bargain, insisting that the BCATP (British Commonwealth Air Training Plan) be balanced by greater British wheat purchases in Canada. Still later, he was bargaining for greater representation in the war effort by withholding advance notice to the British Treasury of a forthcoming and much-needed loan. Since Mackenzie King considered Churchill to be “an erratic warmonger” and

“one of the most dangerous men I have ever known” and Churchill considered King “deficient in forthrightness and courage” and “a colonial who should, but didn’t always, know his place and keep it”, it is little wonder that Anglo-Canadian relations had their tense moments.

A further extremely interesting chapter documents the growth of Canadian-American integration through the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park Agreements. Before the American entry into the War, Canada occupied a favoured position with both the President and State Department, possibly even a mediatory role in the Anglo-American relationship. Mackenzie King fairly basked in the sunshine of Roosevelt’s solicitous friendship. But after 1941 Canada not only experienced a modification of the special relation but also began to feel the pressure of a great power increasingly insisting on getting its own way. The chapter entitled “A Nation on the World Stage” is useful only for its tracing of the functionalist idea; otherwise it is totally inadequate, out of kilter with the rest of the book, and would have been better left out.

Breaks new ground

Canada’s War certainly breaks new ground and is a welcome addition to the literature about Canada’s role in the Second World War. But the inevitable result of writing a book that leans so heavily on the King diaries and concentrates so exclusively on the record of internal leadership is that far too flattering a portrait is painted of Mackenzie King’s performance as war leader. It is true that, domestically, King kept the country together; also that, electorally, he survived the war. But his foreign policy and his management of the fighting forces detract from the favourable image of King that emerges from *Canada’s War*.

In assessing critically the general scope of *Canada’s War*, I find it impossible to evade three distinct issues: First, was it really “Canada’s war”, when all is said and done? Second, was Mackenzie King really a knight in shining armour, as Professor

New sources
throw light
on wartime
relations



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anatstein depicts him, or could we do more of the critical edge of Eayrs and acey? Third, can one so heavily de-emphasize (virtually ignore) the internal and diplomatic record while evaluating a prime minister's war leadership?

Professor Granatstein states that Canada was no longer fighting Britain's war but its own", that both abroad and home it was "the people's war . . . our war! Essentially, Professor Granatstein's thesis is that, throughout the "phoney war" period, Canada, as a nation, remained committed to war but "the defeats in France and Flanders galvanized the country as never before, turning a half-hearted Dominion into Britain's ranking ally . . .". The War truly became Canada's War," he declares, "and the nation's pride and honour became identified with the battle in a fashion that all the propagandists of 1939 had been unable to make real." The assumptions are that Canada was in the conflict to a man, and that Mackenzie King enthusiastically led the war effort. Another school of thought might insist that many Canadians were uncommitted to Britain's war in Europe, and that Mackenzie King's leadership in the war was conditioned by self-interest and the desire to remain in power as long as possible. There is a good deal of support for this view – internal evidence as it were – within Professor Granatstein's book. On Page 18 he observes: "In Quebec there was no enthusiasm at all for the war and much subdued muttering against it. On the Prairies too, the European immigrants remembered 1917 and were unhappy." These people were not likely to be, and never were, galvanized into any furious enthusiasm for war by the events of 1940! Much later, Granatstein states: "The simple fact remained to be that many people living in Canada still thought of themselves as Canadians or German or Irish, not as Canadians. The war was a war for England, not for Canada." A serious error in the text seems to symbolize the attitude of many Anglo-Saxon Ontarians toward Quebec. Referring to the bill to permit overseas subscription under the NRMA, Granatstein says "only eleven French Canadians voted against the Bill". The opposite was true. Only 11 Quebec MPs (including English-speakers) voted for the bill (7 July, 1942). The vote against was 47 from Quebec, with another French-Canadian from Ontario, and the CCF. An error of this magnitude can only indicate wishful thinking and a failure to perceive a significant historical movement, which the war merely speeded up in Quebec. In fact, the Federal government's own party in Quebec finally

revolted, the path was open for a Union Nationale return to power in 1944, and the alienation of much of Quebec from federal politics became a permanent feature of Canadian life.

Interestingly enough, Mackenzie King revealed his true emotions over the war on October 31, 1939, when, at a difficult moment in the conversations concerning the BCATP with Lord Riverdale, he blurted out that "it was not Canada's war in the same sense as it was Great Britain's". Sir Gerald Campbell, the British High Commissioner, "felt compelled to register his disapproval . . . he had been shocked . . . to hear King say 'this is not our war'". What most convinces me that this was *indeed* not Canada's war is the revelation by Professor Granatstein of the true nature of Anglo-Canadian relations during the war.

The negotiations surrounding the creation of the BCATP and the loan to Britain are imbued with the fears and suspicions of a man who has never come to terms with the British – even after independence has been won. It was amazing, said Mackenzie King of Lord Riverdale, "how these people . . . from the old country . . . seem to think that all they have to do is tell us what is to be done. No wonder they get the backs of people up on this side." With this pattern of difficult relations between so many high Canadian and British officials, it is no wonder that King failed in his objective, which was "to tie the two great English-speaking nations together". Rather, as Professor Granatstein concludes, "there can be no doubt that Mackenzie King and his cabinet fought against the preconceived notions of the British Government in the first months of the war with more vigour than either Canada or Britain mustered against Hitler". One is not suggesting for a moment that Canada made anything less than a generous contribution to the war coffers. Neither is one intimating that the fighting record of both French- and English-speaking Canadians was anything short of magnificent. But one might perhaps be forgiven for suggesting that the subtitle of the book describes the content more accurately than the title.

*Subtitle
describes
content
more accurately
than title*

Controversy unavoidable

No book that deals with even a limited time-span within the Mackenzie King record, especially one leaning heavily on the diaries, can avoid controversy concerning the man himself. In the preface, Professor Granatstein states that "the diary clearly reveals Mackenzie King as two men, almost completely separate entities. King the political leader and Prime Minister . . .

a man of sagacity and cunning... Mackenzie King, the secret self, was the spiritualist and sentimentalist and the mother-fixated boy. These natures coexisted well together, there was no schizoidal war between the two personalities. Each seemed complete on its own". It is perhaps easier to make this assessment of King when one concentrates on his record as a wartime domestic leader; but is it really valid when one considers his whole record, including his foreign policy performance? King shines brilliantly on the domestic scene in Professor Granatstein's book. But his contemporaries abroad, almost without exception, held a very poor opinion of him. "Churchill, it seems clear, had no high regard for Mackenzie King, whom he saw as deficient in forthrightness and courage," Granatstein admits. Harold Balfour, in *Wings over Westminster*, describes King as "a bachelor (who) gave one the feeling that he was an entirely sexless creature". Sir Gerald Campbell, from a closer vantage-point, describes him as "a very complex character". "On the one hand," Campbell writes, "he goes far beyond the average Canadian in his mystical and idealistic talk of a crusade... against the enemies of colonization and democracy. On the other hand he is the narrowest of narrow Canadian nationalists."

The only statesman King got close to in any sense was F.D.R. and, as Professor Granatstein points out, "on a more personal level King and Roosevelt met regularly for chats about the state of the world". Roosevelt seems generally to have taken the initiative in these conversations, while King "hesitated before raising anything contentious with the President. He preferred to listen to Roosevelt's views and to draw him out...". In fact, *Canada's War* describes very lucidly how Roosevelt subtly drew both Mackenzie King and Canada out, into both the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park Agreements, with little or no public debate, thus radically altering the economic and military future in Canada and in North America. After 1941, King was of little importance in the general scheme of the war, especially to Roosevelt, since the "United States and Great Britain preferred to concentrate power in their control, not to share it with lesser powers". *Canada's War* leaves one with the impression that Mackenzie King's wartime leadership was a national triumph and that the man has been unjustly maligned and misunderstood. It is contended that he kept the country united, supervised an immense and valuable national war effort and presided over the emergence of Canada as a "nation", and that what Mackenzie King

lacked in statesman's vision the Department of External Affairs made up. All these factors, though part of the story and perhaps partially true, do not outweigh the failure of Canada's national wartime leadership to make any significant contribution, either intellectually or diplomatically, to the strategy of the war and the shaping of the peace. Mackenzie King's official biographer, McGregor Dawson, concludes his first volume by stating that King's leadership "would have been improved had he been more venturesome and more willing to offer forthright advice to the nation". King's tactics enabled him to secure and retain office.... But King too frequently stopped right there, and because he was reluctant to press on and try to realize some *independent conception of the national interest*, his politics slipped into the mire of pure expediency". Well into the war, the U.K. Dominions Office observed "It is true that Mr. M. King... has so far shown little desire to participate in high strategical decisions and that even now he is on bodies dealing with questions of supply... that he is primarily pressing for the full measure of Canadian representation". In 1941 Churchill telegraphed Mackenzie King "that although the President is our best friend no practical help has (reached us) from the U.S. as yet... any pressure which you can apply in this direction would be invaluable". This and subsequent Churchill telegrams were "heavy blows" to King: "He was near despair, his world of certitudes crumbling around him." Again in 1943, when faced with pressure from the great powers over representation of UNRRA, Mackenzie King confessed: "I had felt the only thing for us to do was to accept. We would have gained nothing by refusing... (except) the ill will of the four great powers... The whole business is very involved and is one of those cases where it is clearly impossible for a lesser power to really do other than be largely governed by the views of the greater powers..." No quite the same attitude as that of Dr. Evatt, spokesman for a still smaller power at San Francisco in 1945! Mackenzie King was not "an intermediary in the grandios way" but "a medium of communication" and with this he would have to be content since the international world of tension was too fearful a place for a man whose purview was limited to the maintenance of political power and the vindication of his great-grandfather's memory.

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Roosevelt
altered
Canadian future
with no debate

The British Imperial Idea: Two Recent Perspectives

R. Matthew Bray

Subjects have attracted so much attention as the study of imperialism; the publication of two new books on the topic is not likely, therefore, to generate much excitement in the reading public. Nevertheless, both *The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union*, by John Kendle of the University of Manitoba, and *Imperial Economic Policy, 1917-1939*, by Ian Drummond of the University of Toronto, have valuable contributions to make to our knowledge of the British imperial idea.

Professor Kendle's book analyzes the activities of the Round Table Association, an imperialist organization founded in 1909 and centred in England but with branches throughout the various Dominions, which sought to effect the federation of the British Empire. Kendle finds the parentage of this association in the "kindergarten" of young, British-born, imperial enthusiasts that congregated about Lord Milner during his tenure as High Commissioner for South Africa from 1897 to 1905. Successful in promoting the union of South Africa in the first decade of the twentieth century, the "kindergarten" then used its collectively-considerable talents and organizational abilities at the disposal of the idea of imperial centralization.

Transformation of leadership

On turning its attention from South Africa to imperial affairs, the "kindergarten" itself underwent a transformation, particularly in terms of leadership. Its original mentor, Milner, receded into the background and his place was taken by Lionel Curtis. It was Curtis, the "prophet", who most fully articulated the aims of the Round Table Movement, first in the so-called "Green Memorandum" of 1910 and later in such works as *The Problem of the Commonwealth*, published in 1916. It was this "prophet" who took the lead in demanding "Home Rule All Round" for the constituent parts of the United Kingdom and self-government for India, steps thought to be necessary corollaries to the creation of an imperial parliament, com-

plete with taxing power, that would be responsible for the crafting and administration of defence and foreign policies for the entire British Empire. As described by Kendle, the vision of imperial union projected by the Round Tablers was first and foremost that of Lionel Curtis.

The pre-eminent role played by Curtis was symbolic both of the strengths and weaknesses of the Round Table Association for, while he brought to it a vitality that was essential for what success it enjoyed, he also represented forces that, in the long run, undermined its effectiveness. Like many in the kindergarten, Curtis tended to equate the interests of the Empire with those of Britain; this, as Kendle points out, resulted in a distorted perspective because it meant "they were too inclined to talk with men who shared their own views and to listen only to what they wanted to hear". "Many," he added, "never appreciated the difference in assumptions and attitudes between Great Britain and the Dominions." Such myopia was fatally prejudicial to the fortunes of the Round Table Movement, especially during the First World War, when nationalistic fervour in the Dominions was stirred to unprecedented heights.

In an ironical, but perhaps predictable, fashion, the few weaknesses of Kendle's study tend to parallel those that characterized the Round Table Movement itself. Because he focuses so much attention on the kindergarten, and especially on Curtis, Kendle considers only superficially the views of the Round Table supporters resident in the various Dominions. *The Round*

British interests equated with those of Empire

Professor Bray teaches Canadian history at Laurentian University, where he is also co-ordinator of the Canadian studies program. He is also engaged in the final stages of a doctoral program at York University. His main research interest is in the nationalistic response of Canadians to the First World War. The views expressed in this review are those of Professor Bray.

Table Movement and Imperial Union is thus primarily a study of British imperial thought – and a very good one – but it does not give a complete picture of the Round Table Movement itself.

No economic discussion

Similarly, though in a much more deliberate manner, Kindle has chosen not to discuss the economic ideas of the Round Tableers, on the grounds that the Movement studiously avoided committing itself to any single economic platform. This decision is questionable because it means that one of the major factors in the Movement's lack of success receives far too little consideration; it also leaves the impression that the advocates of the Round Table idea were economic neutralists – and that, as demonstrated by Ian Drummond in *Imperial Economic Policy, 1917-1939*, was most definitely not the case.

Written primarily for the student of economic history, Drummond's study focuses on the economic realities of the imperial partnership in the inter-war years. In particular, he looks at three phases of the imperial relationship: the Empire-settlement schemes of the 1920s, the Ottawa Conference of 1932, and the Ottawa "aftermath", 1932-1939. The overriding question the author seeks to answer is whether British policy was "exploitative" in the conventional anti-imperialist sense of the term. Drummond's conclusion is that it was not. He argues that British policy-makers in the 1920s and 1930s de-

voted most of their attention to the Iminions, over which they had no political power and upon which no exploitative policies could have been imposed, even if they had tried. The Empire-settlement programs of the postwar period, for example, failed dismally because of the lack of interest in them by Canada, New Zealand and South Africa; Australia, the only Dominion to participate in them, did so, much to its own advantage and at the expense of Britain. Similarly, Drummond demonstrates how the Ottawa agreement of 1932, as well as the subsequent trade negotiations during the rest of the decade, were carried out in a spirit of self-interest by all the parties concerned and resulted in no particular gain to Britain. On the other side of the ledger, the dependent colonies over which Britain did retain a measure of control played only a very minor role in British economic planning and were not, therefore, exploited either.

For those interested in the study of economic imperialism, the reading of *Imperial Economic Policy, 1917-1939* will provide valuable and rewarding insights. Marxist economists most certainly will find the book provocative and demanding a reply. Some readers may consider it irksome, as did the reviewer, Drummond's propensity to judge the events that he is analyzing according to the standards of current economic wisdom; but then perhaps it is not the task of the economist, as it is of the historian, to understand the past in its own terms.

Question of
whether
British policy
"exploitative"

Letter to the Editor

Sir:

I was surprised and a little disturbed at the note Professor Paul Painchaud appended to his interesting article on the France-Canada-Quebec triangle in the January-February issue of *International Perspectives*.

He raised the question of whether it was wise for academics to contribute to the publication as they might be seen to be creating the impression that there existed a consensus on matters of foreign policy; in other words, academics might well be co-opted into a "disguised vehicle of support for Government policies".

I think that the three-and-a-half-year record of *Perspectives* – an experiment in dialogue between Government and university specialists, as he puts it – shows that the fears and doubts Professor Painchaud raises are groundless.

With the valued assistance of others, led by the previous Under-Secretary, A. E. Ritchie, and Lyn Stephens, then Director General of Public Affairs for the Department, I served as founding editor of the publication for three years. During that period and subsequently under the current editors, Alex Inglis and Louis Balthazar, I think *Perspectives* has demonstrated that this experiment can work *without* co-opting academics in the way suggested by Professor Painchaud.

It was made clear from the outset that the substance of the work of academics would *not* be altered, that different points of view would be sought on Canada's role in the world and on current international questions of interest to Canadians. This is made clear in each issue of the magazine.

To be more specific, let me cite a few examples. After the then External Affairs minister Mitchell Sharp issued his paper on "Options for the Future", dealing with Canada-U.S. relations, *Perspectives* published in early 1973 a four-part symposium in which all four participants from the academic world took issue, in whole or in part, with aspects of that study. In the January-February 1974 issue, Claude Lemelin, then parliamentary correspondent for *Le Devoir*, described Canada's and the External Affairs Department approach to Europe and the EEC as samples of a kind of "asthmatic diplomacy" and chastised the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the same article.

In the July-August 1974 issue, Professors Barrie Morrison and Donald Page, discussing India's nuclear option, questioned Canadian efforts to achieve proper safeguards and made it clear they could not accept the official Canadian version of all of the events leading up to India's explosion of a nuclear device earlier in the year. "Canadian technological assistance," they said "was a catalyst in developing India's potential for becoming a flexible and independent nuclear power."

In an analysis of Canadian attitudes toward southern Africa, Professor Cranford Att, in the November-December 1974 issue, spoke of Canadian policy in terms of highly audible liberal rhetoric that is combined with diplomacy that is either inactive or quietly pursuing objectives that are narrowly self-seeking . . .".

There are other examples to be found of this type, not only in direct terms of Canadian diplomacy but in articles by academics and others outside the Department dealing with other countries and general international situations — a series on *détente*, for example.

I think the Department has shown a latitude and freedom in this publication which is perhaps unique among foreign ministries. In any event, the publication does not warrant the kind of doubts cast upon it by Professor Painchaud — at least up to this point in time.

Yours sincerely
Murray Goldblatt,
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No. 28 (April 24, 1975) Statement by the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs on the withdrawal of the Canadian office from Saigon.

No. 29 (May 5, 1975) Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

No. 30 (May 6, 1975) Anglo-Canadian Cultural and Information Consultations.

No. 31 (undated) Summary of statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs at the NPT Review Conference, Geneva, May 7, 1975.

No. 32 (May 9, 1975) Canada-Belgium Literacy Prize awarded to Pierre Mertens.

No. 33 (May 9, 1975) NORAD Agreement renewal.

No. 34 (May 9, 1975) Canadian delegation to the twenty-eighth session of the Conference of Ministers of Education from French speaking States, Paris, May 12 to 1975.

No. 35 (May 14, 1975) Pan-African Communications Network.

No. 36 (May 15, 1975) Recognition of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam: text of the Canadian message.

No. 37 (undated) State visit by the President of the Republic of Upper Volta, May 13 to 16, 1975: final communique.

No. 38 (May 16, 1975) Canada's election to the Commission on Human Rights.

No. 39 (May 29, 1975) Convention between Canada and Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation

No. 40 (June 4, 1975) Canadian participation in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in the Middle East.

No. 41 (June 11, 1975) Mozambique.

No. 42 (June 11, 1975) The seventh meeting of the Canada/Japan Ministerial Committee, Tokyo, June 23 and 24, 1975.

No. 43 (June 12, 1975) Canadian contribution to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

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No. 45 (June 20, 1975) Appointment of Honorary Consul General in Reykjavik.

No. 46 (June 20, 1975) Canadian participation in the United Nations Emergency Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

No. 47 (June 25, 1975) Canada's contribution to U.S. Bicentennial celebrations.

No. 48 (June 24, 1975) Garrison Diversion Unit.

No. 49 (undated) Joint communique of the seventh meeting of the Canada/Japan Ministerial Committee, June 24, 1975.

No. 50 (June 27, 1975) Establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and the Republic of South Viet-Nam.

No. 51 (June 27, 1975) Canada-Korea joint communique.

No. 52 (June 30, 1975) External Affairs appointment.

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75/9 The General Policies of the Canadian International Development Agency. A speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Ottawa, April 10, 1975.

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75/12 The Fundamental Principles of Canada's Middle East Policy. A statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, to the Canada-Israel Committee, Ottawa, April 30, 1975.

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75/14 Assessing Canada's Aid to the Third World. Notes for a speech at St. Mark's United Church, Port Hawkesbury, N.S., by the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

75/15 International Co-operation — Moral Imperative and Political Necessity. Notes for a speech on May 20, 1975, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, to the Ottawa branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

75/16 The Temporary Withdrawal of Canadian Embassy Personnel from Saigon . . . A statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, in Ottawa, May 26, 1975.

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75/18 Law of the Sea Conference — II. A statement to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, May 22, 1975.

75/19 Freedom and Democracy — the Strength and Problem of NATO. Remarks by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels, May 30, 1975.

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No. 75/21 Global Population Problems. A statement by the Honourable Jeanne Sauvé, Minister of the Environment, to the World Population Conference, Bucharest, [August 20, 1974].

No. 75/22 Canada's Obligations as a Nuclear Power. Remarks by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, to the Canadian Nuclear Association, Ottawa, June 17, 1975.

No. 75/23 A Monument More Enduring than Bronze . . . A testimonial address by the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, President of the Privy Council and Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the unveiling of a mural by Charles Gagnon in the main lobby of the Lester B. Pearson Building, Ottawa, on June 11, 1975, in memory of the late Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson.

Treaty Information

Bilateral

Belgium

Convention between the Government of Canada and the Government of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Settlement of other matters with Respect to Taxes on Income

Ottawa, May 29, 1975

Brazil

Technical Co-operation Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil

Brasilia, April 2, 1975

Costa Rica

Technical Co-operation Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Costa Rica

San José, July 24, 1973

Instruments of Ratification exchanged

May 15, 1975

In force May 15, 1975

Cuba

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba

Havana, March 18, 1975

In force March 18, 1975

El Salvador

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of El Salvador

San Salvador, May 14, 1973

Instruments of Ratification exchanged

May 7, 1975

In force May 7, 1975

Ghana

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Ghana concerning the Training in Canada of Personnel of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Ghana

Accra, May 13, 1975

Jamaica

Development Co-operation Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Jamaica with memorandum of understanding

Kingston, May 5, 1975

In force May 5, 1975

Spain

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Spain for Co-operation in the Development and Application of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes

Madrid, July 7, 1975

U.S.A.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America constituting an Agreement concerning the organization and operation of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD)

Washington, May 8, 1975

In force May 8, 1975

Multilateral**Onchoceriasis Fund Agreement**

Done at Washington, May 7, 1975

Signed by Canada, May 7, 1975

In force May 7, 1975

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Governments of Dahomey, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta relating to a Section of the Pan-African Telecommunications Network

Done at Ottawa, May 14, 1975

Protocol extending the International Wheat Trade Convention, 1971

Done at Washington, March 25, 1975

Signed by Canada, April 14, 1975

Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited June 18, 1975

Protocol extending the International Food Aid Convention, 1971

Done at Washington, March 25, 1975

Signed by Canada, April 14, 1975

Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited June 18, 1975

Amendments to Articles 10, 16, 17, 18, 20, 28, 31 and 32 of the Convention on the International Maritime Consultative Organization, 1948

Adopted at London, October 17, 1974

Canada's Instrument of Acceptance deposited July 4, 1975

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Demographic studies needed to supplement Green Paper

By Freda Hawkins

Content for many years with very short-term objectives in immigration policy, Canada's federal and provincial governments, as well as the Canadian public, are now obliged by external and internal circumstances to think harder about the purposes of immigration in relation to national goals. This is a doubly difficult task, first, because very few Canadian governments at the federal or provincial level have shown any inclination to articulate long-term goals — indeed, they have preferred to do without them — and, secondly, because immigration has always worried Canadian politicians and officials, who have never regarded it as a congenial subject for public debate. Nevertheless, we are now engaged on a national review of immigration policies, which began, in a public sense, when the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Robert Andras, tabled a Green Paper on immigration policy in the House of Commons on February 3 of this year.

Since then, consultations have been taking place on immigration and population policy between the Federal Government and the provinces. A Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons has been holding public hearings on immigration across the country, and now, after a hard-working and extended period of travel, intends to submit a report to Parliament by October 31. A Demographic Policy Steering Group of Deputy Ministers has been meeting in Ottawa under the chairmanship of the Deputy Minister of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, and a small internal task force in that Department, the Green Paper Policy Analysis Group, has been studying immigration-policy development, including the possible shape and content of a new Immigration Act, which the Government now hopes to place before Parliament fairly early in 1976. Hundreds of briefs have been submitted both to the Special Joint Committee and to the Minister. A one-day working party of some 50 representatives of national organiza-

tions, the academic community and the media was convened in Ottawa in March by the Department of Manpower and Immigration, to assist in developing a widespread national debate on immigration and population, and a great many meetings and some conferences have been held across Canada to study the Green Paper and its policy implications. These late summer days, therefore, some six months after the publication of the Green Paper, may be a good moment to reflect on this first stage of our national debate on immigration and population, on the quality and impact of the Green Paper itself and on the possible future directions of Canada's immigration policies and programs.

Developing a widespread national debate on immigration

Reasons for review

What are the external and internal circumstances that have impelled the Federal Government to initiate a national review of immigration policy at this stage? Why was this particular route chosen by a Government with a very large majority? Why did the Cabinet plan what was obviously intended to be a short, brisk exercise — a Green Paper produced in six

Dr. Hawkins is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto and a specialist on Canadian immigration and international migration. She is the author of Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern, a study of postwar immigration policy and management, as well as a number of articles and papers on this subject, including a supplementary contribution to the Green Paper entitled "Immigration Policy and Management in Selected Countries". Dr. Hawkins is a member of the Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. She is a former British immigrant to Canada, and has lived in Toronto since 1955. The views expressed in this article are those of Dr. Hawkins.



months on a small budget, a national debate that was clearly not meant to last too long, a new Immigration Act to be placed before Parliament in the fall of 1975 and a report from the Special Joint Committee (since Parliament had insisted on being involved) by July 31? All these deadlines have had to be extended because of sheer practical necessity and in response to Parliamentary and public demand. And why were no plans made for the serious, in-depth demographic research — the route taken by the United States and Australia when faced with the same dilemmas —, which alone can provide some of the essential background information for policy-makers in this field?

The answer to the first question obviously lies in the condition of our times both in the international community and in Canada. World population pressures, the rapidly-accelerating demand for migration facilities to North America and the increasing problems of control and enforcement affecting all receiving countries are the most serious of the external circumstances. Internally, the changing needs of the Canadian labour market, the crying need, in a wide range of policy areas in Canada, including immigration, for forward-looking economic and social planning that involves a substantial degree of collaboration and joint action among all levels of government, the long-felt need for a new Immigration Act to replace our illiberal and inadequate Act of 1952 (now largely irrelevant except in the area of control and enforcement), the need to review our selection procedures in conditions of very high demand — all these have been important pressures on the Government leading towards the present review of immigration policy. But more important still are the very difficult questions of economic growth and population size and distribution (now that our birth-rate has moved below the replacement level), together with the serious problem of the declining strength of the French language in Canada and the declining proportion of the French element in our population, which could have profound implications for our political structure and process. In relation to population growth and distribution, the Minister put it this way when he addressed the House on February 3:

Finally, at issue is nothing less than the future of Canada's population, its size, its rate of growth, its distribution and composition, and the basic principles that should govern our decisions to augment the nation's human resources through the admission of migrants from abroad. It follows that immigra-

tion policy must be seen as an element in a broad demographic or population policy for Canada. The Government has been examining demographic questions for quite some time. On the basis of this study, of which immigration policy forms a part, we have concluded that steps should be taken now to develop a national consensus about longer-term population goals for Canada, goals which future immigration policy can be fashioned to support.

Alternative routes

Canada's Green Paper on immigration policy, entitled *The Canadian Immigration and Population Study*, finally published after about 14 months of intensive work by a small task force in the Department of Manpower and Immigration, consists of four separate volumes and is accompanied by eight supplementary studies. According to custom, it is presented as a discussion paper and does not make policy recommendations or propose desirable courses of action. The first volume, entitled *Immigration Policy Perspectives*, consists of a short essay on current temporary immigration policy in which the principal issues the Government wishes to put before the public are discussed or mentioned briefly. Volume Two, *The Immigration Program*, provides a brief history of immigration legislation and procedures and an account of recent patterns of immigration, as well as a detailed description of Canada's immigration programs, including selection procedures, control and enforcement, refugee policies and programs, immigrant services and the admission of non-immigrant workers. Volume Three offers a comprehensive set of immigration and population statistics. Volume Four contains the first report of the Department of Manpower and Immigration's Longitudinal Survey on the Economic and Social Adaptation of Immigrants, which was started in 1969.

The eight supplementary studies, which have been published during the last few months, have been written either by academics or officials and, like the Green Paper itself, have had to be produced within a relatively short time, which, in most cases, precluded original research. Nevertheless they include some very interesting material on such matters as the economic impact of immigration, immigration and inflation, the effect of immigration on population, immigration and language imbalance and the absorption and adaptation of immigrants. It is a pity that this useful idea was not used

Numerous pressures on Government to review policy

initiate more studies and discussion papers on a wider range of topics.

Canada is not the only country to explore the question of population growth and immigration. Two other major "receiving" countries involved in international migration — the United States and Australia — have also carried out national investigations and debates in this area. In July 1969, President Nixon proposed the appointment of a Commission on Population Growth and the American Future to examine the extent and impact of population growth during the remaining years of this century, and to make recommendations as to how the United States could best deal with it. A Commission of 24, including the Chairman, John D. Rockefeller 3rd, with a staff of 48, worked for two years on the population question. They held public hearings across the country and initiated over 100 research projects. Eventually, in March 1972, the Commission produced an excellent and wide-ranging report entitled *Population and the American Future*. Unfortunately, neither President Nixon nor the Congress took any action on it and the issue itself has since been submerged, at least for the time being, under the weight of Vietnam, Watergate, recession and other major national concerns. It is interesting, nonetheless, to note the Commission's principal recommendation, which was included in a letter to the President accompanying the report. It reads:

After two years of concentrated effort, we have concluded that, in the long run, no substantial benefits will result from further growth of the Nation's population, rather that the gradual stabilization of the Nation's population through voluntary means would contribute significantly to the Nation's ability to solve its problems.

The Commission's principal recommendation relating to immigration advised that immigration "not be increased and that immigration policy be reviewed periodically to reflect demographic conditions". The Commission also recommended "that Congress require the Bureau of the Census, in co-ordination with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, to report biennially to the Congress on the impact of immigration on the nation's demographic situation". It appears that this is the first time that any official recommendation has been made in the United States urging that the development of immigration policy be related to demographic considerations. It is reported, however, that the Commission was divided on the immigration question and that the

vote taken on this recommendation was very close. Some members of the Commission believed that immigration should be halved over a five-year period, or reduced by about 10 per cent a year in the interest of population stabilization, relief from urban congestion and from unfair competition in the labour market, particularly for deprived minorities. But they did not advocate any change in current policy on family reunion and refugees. A slightly larger group, however, held the view I described in a recent issue of *Canadian Public Policy* as follows:

The end of population stabilization did not outweigh the traditional political and humanitarian reasons justifying the current flow of immigrants, that the contribution to population trends of cutting immigration in half would be small in any case . . . that on the international scene this country could not lead in the development of enlightened population policy and at the same time seek to "solve" its own population problem by shutting out the rest of the world, and that immigration should not be used as a convenient demographic safety valve up or down depending upon our own population trends.

No change in policy on reunions and refugees

Australian inquiry

The first report of Australia's national population inquiry, entitled *Population and Australia: A Demographic Analysis and Projection*, was tabled in the Australian Parliament on February 25 of this year by the then Minister for Labor and Immigration, Mr. Clyde Cameron. The inquiry was initiated by the former Liberal Government in the fall of 1970 and, when the Labor Government took over two years later, its terms of reference remained unchanged. The study was carried out by the Australian National University and directed by Australia's eminent demographer Professor W. D. Borrie, assisted by an interdisciplinary Advisory Committee. In the opening paragraphs of the report, it is stated that the inquiry was to be concerned with "all aspects of population growth, both natural increase and immigration", and that, while it was recognized as essential "to focus attention on matters of particular concern to the Government in order to produce results that would contribute usefully to the formulation and application of national policies", the studies should "provide for the academic freedom necessary for objective research". The basic proposition set down by the Minister at that time was "that, for planning purposes, the desirable future popu-



CP Photo

Robert Andras, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, touched off the national debate on immigration policy when he tabled his Green Paper on immigration on February 3, 1975. The battery of microphones he faced later is indicative of the widespread interest in the immigration policy that will be adopted for Canada.

lation levels towards which immigration should contribute should be examined".

To relate immigration to population goals or to reflect on its basic purposes is not new in Australia, nor is the involvement of the academic community in research and planning in this field. Just before the end of the Second World War, Australia's first Minister of Immigration, Arthur A. Calwell, announced, on behalf of the wartime Labor Government, a large-scale post-war immigration program designed: to strengthen national security and economic development by increased population growth; to meet postwar labour shortages; and to fill the serious gaps in the age-structure of the population. This program was to involve diversifying Australia's migrant sources while maintaining a British majority, resuming and extending the prewar assisted-passage schemes for migrants to offset the cost of a long journey and competition from other receiving countries, providing short-term accommodation for assisted migrants who needed it, and, in a remarkable piece of

political innovation at that time, formal consulting with and involving the Australian community in this nation-building exercise in a variety of ways, including creation of Immigration Advisory, Planning and (later on) Publicity Councils. Australia's postwar immigration program has been based on these major objectives and the Borrie Report documents the character and success of this endeavour.

Under the present Labor Government, however, there have been major changes in immigration policy of a kind that suggest rather different directions at least for the immediate future. These changes include: the official removal of racial discrimination in immigration policy; a lowering to 80,000 of the annual immigration target; the dismantling of the old Department of Immigration and the Immigration Planning and Advisory Councils, and the creation of a combined Department of Labor and Immigration, as well as a new Population and Immigration Council; and the introduction of a comprehensive visa system whereby everyone who enters Australia, with the exception of Australian and New Zealand citizens, will now require a visa.

It is not possible in this article to summarize the findings of Australia's very thorough and interesting population inquiry, partly because they are very extensive. By 2001, net immigration is to offer options rather than specific conclusions. In the words of the authors, in their intention "to indicate some of the parameters that appear to be relevant to the formulation of policy in the light of the demographic analysis presented in the Report and of the evidence placed before the Inquiry in its Commissioned Paper and in its Public Hearings". Among the important points that should be noted, however, is the fact that the Report is not at all hostile to growth for Australia. Despite what is called the fragility of the environment, it is emphasized that Australia could support a much larger population than it now has. Since natural increase will take the population to about 15.9 million by 2001, net immigration of 50,000 a year (which would raise this to 1.7 million) or 75,000 a year (raising it to 2.6 million) could easily be sustained, the Report states, without undue stress on the economic system or threatening Australia with resource depletion. Even a higher immigration rate of 100,000 (requiring 160,000 new settlers a year to offset departures, which is a high rate for Australia) would still be manageable in terms both of environment and resources, at this level, according to the Report, without

"against the current climate of opinion in Australia". Nor is the Report at all pessimistic or anxious — as Canada's Green Paper is — about urban concentration or urban growth; the point is made that it might be argued that "Australia's urban millions would do more environmental harm by being spread around in a multitude of small centres than by being concentrated in a few major ones".

Finally, the approach taken by the Horrie Report towards Australia's immigration program is that this should be managed very flexibly and related closely to the country's demographic and manpower requirements; and that it should, perhaps, be on the low side at present while the Australian labour force is in a peak phase (due, as in Canada, to the "baby boom" and the large numbers of women taking up full-time employment), but should pick up again in about a decade when labour-force growth seems likely to decline. The idea, therefore, of a long-term constant average intake of immigrants, a major feature of Australia's immigration program hitherto, is not satisfactory according to the Report. What is needed is short-range flexibility in determining desirable immigration targets and the dovetailing of immigrant flows to assessed manpower needs both in terms of quantity and range of skills.

The American and Australian reports are impressive documents and the reader is struck by the wide-ranging and scholarly research that has been done and by the clarity of the analysis and the conclusions drawn or options offered. Regrettably, the same cannot be said for the Canadian Green Paper, even when allowance has been made for the different character and purpose of the document and the much shorter time available for study and research. As a Green Paper designed to inform and stimulate a national debate on immigration and population, its quality is simply not good enough and it has had a cool reception in Canada. This applies particularly to Volume One, *Immigration Policy Perspectives*, in which the discussion of policy issues is of a very limited and inadequate nature, and to Volume Three, *Immigration and Population Statistics*, in which no effort has been made to present these important statistics in an imaginative and visually attractive way.

Lacking both clarity and depth, as well as an intimate understanding of and feeling for the immigration field in Canada, Volume One has probably offended most by its ambiguous language, pessimistic tone and failure to speak plainly. Its

ambiguities and lack of plain speaking in discussing Canada's multiracial immigration movement, the problems of control and of urban living in the largest cities have disturbed those who are knowledgeable about these matters less, because they know the facts. But it is clear now, from the proceedings of the Special Joint Committee and other evidence, that they have disturbed those Canadians who are not very knowledgeable in these areas very much indeed, and have caused many to draw quite unwarranted conclusions about the intentions of the Government in immigration, seeing restrictions, cutbacks, quotas and sinister moves on every hand. This is quite apart from the activities of a few militant and mainly left-wing groups who, using racism as a political weapon, have attacked the Green Paper as a racist document and have attempted to disrupt or monopolize some of the meetings across Canada. If it does nothing else, the Green Paper should surely now act as an awful warning to the authors of future government documents on this subject that blacks must be called blacks, racial tensions and antagonisms, if they exist, must be explicitly described as such, and multiracial Canada must be spoken of as multiracial Canada and not referred to in the tired terminology of ethnic and cultural diversity.

It is very much to be hoped that the report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, due on October 31, together with all the evidence and the briefs that have been submitted to them and to the Minister, will move Canada's debate on immigration and population beyond the narrow confines of the Green Paper, and will reflect the varied views of Canadians on economic growth and population size, and on the degree to which and ways in which immigration can continue to contribute to Canadian development.

Policy development

What are the policy issues in Canadian immigration and population that are emerging thus far from the available evidence and from the national debate itself? The major ones have been identified in the Green Paper, even though they are not explored in a sufficiently objective and rigorous way.

It is important to note, in examining the policy issues in our national debate on immigration and population, that there are four key elements in our present immigration policy that the Government obviously believes should be retained. They have been stressed in the Minister's

Ignorance leads to unwarranted conclusions

Major issues identified in Green Paper

explanatory statement, in his speeches and in the Green Paper itself. These elements are:

- (1) Non-discrimination — i.e., a universal approach to the selection and admission of immigrants;
- (2) careful selection of immigrants for the labour force to meet the present needs of the Canadian labour market;
- (3) an emphasis on family reunion, although the ways in which we try to achieve this are now under review;
- (4) an active refugee policy and programs.

With these key elements in mind, the critical issues now being studied and debated in Canada are the following:

- The related questions of economic growth and population goals, and immigration as an important factor in both these areas. Since our birth-rate has moved below the replacement level, standing now at 1.9, we can achieve a population of only about 26 million by the year 2001 through natural increase without immigration. With immigration, however, we could aim at a significantly larger population, ranging realistically between about 28 and 35 million. How large do we want Canada's population to be by 2001?
- The problem of (a) the declining strength of the French language in Canada and the declining proportion of the French element in our population. Strenuous efforts are now being made by the federal and provincial governments together to recruit more French-speaking immigrants for Quebec as well as "francophonables". Can any other steps be taken in this particular field? (b) The collective size of the non-British and non-French ethnic communities in Canada now represents about 27 per cent of the Canadian population, and will overtake the French element by 1977. What implications, if any, does this have for Canadian politics?
- The maldistribution of population in Canada, regional disparity and the concentration of population in our three largest cities, where 50 per cent of all our immigrants settle, are felt by many to be very serious problems, though substantial differences of opinion on the advantages and disadvantages of urban concentration are emerging from the debate. Can, and should, incentives be used, as in Israel, to persuade a larger number of immigrants to settle in some of our small urban centres, or in areas needing development? There is probably

unanimous agreement on the need for a new Immigration Act and not much disagreement as to what should go into it (perhaps a statement of principles, location of authority in this field without the overwhelming discretionary powers of the 1952 Act and a modernized and liberalized listing of the prohibited classes and activities). But the process of immigrant selection and admission, now embodied in our immigration regulations and nine-point assessment and selection system, presents more difficulties. Should we keep this system, which has many advantages? How can it be adapted to give it more flexibility in relation to the changing needs of the Canadian labour force? How can we achieve better control over total volume in conditions of high demand and in the context of our non-discrimination policy? Do we need a general annual ceiling, or hemispheric ceilings or some form of universal limitation by country, as in the United States?

— Canada is already a multiracial society — how can we ensure its harmonious development along these lines? There is an apparent, though fairly small-scale increase in racial anxieties and antagonisms in some of our major cities. How serious is it? Do we now need more effective human-rights legislation to provide a better shield against racial discrimination? Many Canadians believe that we need more public education and community effort in this area, as well as much better services for migrants and their children.

— Canada's refugee policy and programs now need a thorough review, so that they can be better adapted to changing world refugee situations and our refugee programs can have better co-ordinated and more consistent management. How should this be done? Should some elements of our refugee policy be included in a new Immigration Act?

To conclude this short review of the first months of Canada's national debate on immigration and population and of the issues involved, perhaps we should put the question — why a Green Paper and why a national debate envisaged, in the first place, in rather modest terms and within a very short time-frame? One important reason may lie in Canada's need for a new immigration legislation — a new Immigration Act — (a factor not present to-day in the United States or Australia), coupled with the fact that there have been many abortive drafts of new Immigration Acts since 1952 that no Canadian Government

had the will or concern to put before parliament, and that, as suggested earlier, permanent anxiety syndrome obtains in Ottawa relating to any new developments in public discussion in this area. Hence the present Minister's strong desire, expressed on a number of occasions, to move ahead quickly with this project and presumably to get a new Act before it becomes bogged down in interminable controversy. Another reason may be that the Government's original objectives, beyond a new immigration Act, were not particularly ambitious, and that they saw this exercise primarily as an educational process leading, it was hoped, to a greater understanding on the part of the provinces and the

public of the issues involved, and the beginning of a more effective intergovernmental dialogue in this field (thus we have the ministerial references to moving towards a consensus, establishing guidelines and developing a common perception about population goals). More light may be shed on these matters as the debate proceeds.

One point needs emphasis, however, and a number of expert witnesses have been emphasizing it to the Special Joint Committee. Basic, long-term demographic research is still an essential requirement for future policy-making in immigration and population. Canada, therefore, may still need a national population inquiry.

Long-term demographic research essential

the great immigration debate

The cost-benefit impact of immigrants on economy

Constantine Passaris

Global population pressures, widespread drought, poverty, and famine, accelerated inflation, and a severe case of economic stagnation in a large number of countries have enhanced Canada's magnetic attraction for prospective immigrants. There is no doubt that the current world-wide economic malaise has thrust Canada into a position of relative economic strength and influence *vis-à-vis* the economic uncertainties of the rest of the world. This confidence in Canada's prospects has been translated into a total immigration of 200,000 people during the 12 months of 1974 and a significant 38.8 percent increase over 1973 levels. These statistics represent the heaviest influx of immigrants in a single year since 1967.

Canada's new drawing-power does not rest solely on its favourable economic prospects. Of considerable importance in the immigration equation is the fact that other nations that have attracted migrants in the past are now pursuing highly-restrictive immigration policies. Australia, which in 1973 relaxed restriction on the entry of non-whites, has recently sharply reduced its general immigration levels because of rising unemployment. Britain

has since 1962 imposed highly-stringent barriers against large-scale entry, including that of British subjects from both white and non-white Commonwealth countries. West Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and many other European countries have reacted to their current social and economic strains by discouraging any increase in migrant workers from abroad — going as far, indeed, as failing to renew or permit any extension of work permits held by foreigners. Since 1965, the United States has limited immigration to 290,000 per-

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sons a year, with a 20,000 ceiling for any one country.

It is against this turbulent international backdrop that Canada has chosen 1975 as the year in which to release the Green Paper on immigration and population. The preface to the four-volume, 585-page document states that the principal "aim of the Green Paper is to furnish Canadians with a foundation for constructive discussion of the role immigration policy should play in creating the sort of society they wish for themselves and their children... to help Canadians to think together about the many positive purposes immigration policy is designed to serve, and to explore the complex problems that need to be resolved in establishing policies that will best support these purposes".

Rhetoric and discrimination

Historically, whenever a public debate on immigration policy has been held in Canada, the atmosphere has consistently been intensified with heated rhetoric and fiery outbursts of racial discrimination. All too often, however, the views and concerns that surface during these public debates have been, and in certain instances continue to be, cloaked in inherent impulsiveness and enveloped in a cloud of mysticism. Canadian history is replete with examples of this type of rhetoric, from those who argue the need for more immigration as well as those who claim that immigration is the source of all of Canada's major problems. Sir Clifford Sifton, a former Minister of the Interior, wrote to J. W. Dafoe, Editor of the *Manitoba Free Press* in 1907: "The cry against the Doukhobors and Galicians is the most absolutely ignorant and absurd thing that I have ever known in political life. There is simply no question in regard to the advantage of these (immigrant) people, and I do not think there is anyone in the north-west who is so stupid as not to know it." The arguments expressed by those subscribing to the opposite point of view are perhaps best exemplified in a statement made in 1913 by the Reverend W. D. Reid of Montreal: "Canada today faces the greatest immigration problem that has ever confronted any nation.... One man out of every five who lands on our shore is a foreigner. He comes here with a foreign tongue, foreign ideals, foreign religion, often a mere caricature of religion, with centuries of grievances and oppression behind him, often bringing with him problems that the best statesmen of Europe have failed to solve...." In the course of time the names associated with public

outbursts on the pros and cons of immigration have changed but the issues perceived by both camps remain essentially unchanged.

From an economic perspective, enlightened discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of immigration is closely related to the population and demographic characteristics and trends, inasmuch as they directly influence the varied components of the labour force. Ever since Confederation, immigration policy has been determined largely by economic forces from a short-term perspective. Furthermore, these economic forces have been primarily contained in attempts to equate the supply and demand for specific skills, training and education of the labour force by relying on immigrant manpower. Indeed, the slow growth of the native population in working age relative to the demand for labour that would ensure an accelerated pace of economic growth in the primary and manufacturing sectors of the economy placed increased importance on the means of immigration. Persistent attempts were therefore, made to bridge the gap between the accelerated employment opportunities and the limited growth of the native born portion of the labour force. Canadian history provides ample evidence of specific instances when immigrant labour provided significant contributions to the economic growth of this country. In the days before the era of the railways, an organized party of immigrants, numbering about 250, left their homes in Upper and Lower Canada and journeyed overland by way of Fort Garry and Edmonton to Kamloops and the Cariboo. This group of men, who later became known as the Overlanders of 1862, pioneered an immigrant road to British Columbia — the first organized attempt to seek access to the western part of Canada. Sir John A. Macdonald's national dream of linking the East with the West by means of a transcontinental railway would have remained a dream had it not been for the 15,000 Chinese coolies who were imported to provide the unskilled labour that was required to complete the Canadian Pacific Railway through the rugged terrain of the Canadian Rockies. To encourage settlement of the Prairies, and provide the manpower requirement of what was later to become one of Canada's most significant economic eras, the "wheat boom" of the early 1900s, Interior Minister Sir Clifford Sifton issued his famous call for "stalwart peasants in sheepskin coats" and inaugurated the first wave of German, Ukrainian and Eastern European immigration. The success of the first venture to settle the

Rhetoric
the traditional
vehicle
for discussion
of immigration

rest with agricultural and farm workers to the pursuit of similar policies following the Second World War.

Economic sensitivity

It would seem, therefore, that, over a historical spectrum, Canadian immigration policy has been largely responsive and sensitive to economic conditions in Canada. This attitude of selectivity has become more and more pronounced since the mid-1950s as a result of the shift in manpower demands. The turn of the century saw a dramatic shift in manpower requirements from farmers and farm labourers in the farming sector to skilled and semi-skilled workers for manufacturing and construction and the professions, where severe shortages were in evidence. In response to the prevalent labour shortages, immigration policy once again fell in line with the nation's labour requirements and the immigration policy of the period reflected a distinct preference for skilled industrial workers and qualified men and women to fill the professional occupations.

Many economists point out that the existence of a combined federal Department of Manpower and Immigration is ample evidence that in Canada immigration policy is largely based on economic considerations and manpower requirements. This view, however, is only partly true, since Canada has an international reputation for being one of the principal countries with a sympathetic attitude towards political refugees. In the last 20 years, political refugees have been allowed to enter Canada from Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), Tibet (1970), Uganda (1972), Chile (1973) and South Vietnam (1975). Although the refugee aspect of immigration flows has tended to be sporadic and discontinuous, one out of every ten new settlers in Canada since the Second World War has been granted a refugee visa. There appears to be today widespread public support for continuing Canada's humanitarian role by allowing political refugees to settle within its political boundaries.

Three advantages

To an economist, a well co-ordinated immigration policy offers three distinct advantages — an enhanced demand for goods and services, the investment in human capital, and additions to the nation's labour force. The first dimension refers to the increase in demand and consumer spending that is likely to be brought about by a broadening of the population base through the influx of immigrant

workers and their families. The pattern of consumer spending for immigrant workers and their families follows two distinct cycles. The first cycle reveals an increase in the demand for basic necessities such as food, clothing and shelter (mostly rented); the second cycle is often more significant in its economic-multiplier effect, and is concentrated on such expenditures as specialized medical services, transportation (car purchases) and shelter (buying or building a home).

The second dimension refers to a saving in human capital by tapping the labour forces of other countries in order to enhance Canada's manpower resources. The economic interpretation of saving in this case reflects the absence of Canadian private and public expenditures on medical fees, housing, shelter, clothing, education, etc. — all of the standard expenses that normally accrue in the process of raising an infant to the adult age, when he is able to enter the labour force. In this respect, the cost of raising each migrant worker is borne by the immigrant's country of origin. Conversely, an immigrant's country of destination reaps the benefits of a labour-force participant without incurring the cost of his upbringing. The economic significance of this imputed saving, particularly in the case of highly-skilled and professional people, has been estimated to be in the range of several hundred thousand dollars. A recent study reveals that the cost for Canada of "producing" the output of skills that were imported in the form of university education alone would have amounted to \$532 million (in 1961 prices) over the period 1946-63. Furthermore, these computations take into account only the direct cost in the form of instruction, facilities, books, etc., that would provide an equivalent number of Canadians with a comparable quantity of education possessed by the immigrants in question. It has further been estimated that an indirect cost of \$455 million would have been incurred in the form of forgone earnings by those who would have occupied themselves with study instead of work.

Bruce Wilkinson, in a research project entitled *Studies in the Economics of Education*, has estimated that the value of education embodied in all immigrants who arrived in Canada between 1951 and 1961, measured in terms of the costs that would have been incurred in providing a comparable educational attainment in Canada, was \$5.9 billion. After deducting the education cost of Canadian-born emigrants to the United States, which have been estimated at between \$980 million

Other countries tapped for savings of human capital

and \$1.7 billion, he concludes that "the net education value of immigrants less Canadian-born emigrants for the decade range between \$4,167 and \$4,920 million".

The statistical data available reveal that Canada's manpower gains through immigration over the period 1946-71 have been very significant indeed. The average annual inflow over the entire period was about 70,535 workers, a large portion of whom possessed education levels and skills that were in short supply in the Canadian labour market. There is no doubt that this represents a substantial investment in human capital. Furthermore, the basic difference between this form of foreign investment in Canada and capital investment is that, whereas it is purchased or rented at a price, the manpower acquired through immigration is essentially a gift. For example, when one sifts the immigration statistics by occupation from Britain during the years 1956-62, it is as if Britain had donated to Canada 1,344 physicians and surgeons, 4,670 engineers, 923 chemists, 5,408 professors and teachers 6,118 nurses, 3,671 draughtsmen, 15,816 stenographers, 523 architects, 727 airplane mechanics and repairmen, 1,347 toolmakers, and thousands of other categories of skills and occupations demanded by the Canadian economy. Other nations, both from Europe and the Third World, have also made "generous contributions" towards enhancing Canada's supply of manpower from external sources.

Third World concern

Third World countries are, however, becoming increasingly concerned with the detrimental effects of the "brain-drain" on their economies. In an attempt to maintain their skilled and educated manpower resources, most of the less-developed countries of the Third World have introduced stringent emigration policies, as well as stricter binding clauses for nationals who receive scholarships to study abroad. These sources of additions to the labour force, therefore, may not offer any degree of permanency in the years ahead.

Just like any other economic issue, immigration has costs as well as benefits. So far, we have concentrated on some of the economic gains that have accrued to Canada through the process of immigration. Let us now turn to some of the costs that are involved. The economic literature in this area is neatly divided among three principal arguments against immigration. The first is based on the ground that immigration triggers what economists refer to as "the principle of diminishing marginal physical productivity". This refers

to the lower rates of growth and lower wages and salaries that are likely to occur in time owing to the influx of immigrant workers acting on a finite volume of resources. While there is ample theoretical validity in this postulate, it is not an economic model that has exhibited a high degree of applicability in the Canadian context — the reason being that the Canadian economy has been characterized by continuous organizational, technological and structural changes that have been reflected in rising productivity and expanding absorptive capacity.

The preceding argument has also come under attack from internationalists such as Maurice Strong and others who refer to the moral and ethical aspects of the question. The internationalists claim that Canada holds title to a disproportionate share of the world's territory and natural resources. They point out that an isolationist attitude with respect to Canadian immigration policy would be subjected to severe international criticism, particularly in an era when the global struggle against population pressures, famine and poverty appears to be weakening. On the contrary, they subscribe to the hypothesis that Canada has a moral obligation, at this time, to absorb a large population, particularly through migration from the least-developed countries.

Another economic argument that is often quoted by the sceptics on immigration states that the influx of immigrant workers takes jobs away from Canadian-born workers. This argument assumes that the number of jobs at any time is fixed and immigrant workers displace and eradicate the number of jobs available to native workers. The truth is, however, that the employed portion of the labour force has been increasing rather than remaining static. Furthermore, despite the current recessionary trend, the Canadian labour market is experiencing a statistical dichotomy in that, along with the increasing unemployment rates, we are also experiencing high "job-vacancy rates" (the latter is the technical term used in computing the lack of suitable manpower to fill specific jobs). This in itself should indicate the need to import specialized personnel.

The third and final argument raised by those who see no benefits to Canada from immigration is simply an extension of the previous one. It states that, because the large majority of immigrants are accustomed to a lower standard of living and poorer working conditions than prevail in Canada, newly-arrived immigrants are more likely to accept lower wages and salaries.

tolerate less-satisfactory working conditions, ultimately forcing the native labour force out of the labour market. This argument has been used by Mabel Timlin in her book *Does Canada Need More People?*) and others to explain most of the emigration of Canadian-born persons to the United States. There is no empirical evidence available, however, to support this type of speculation. Indeed, the counter-hypothesis that has been cited to explain Canadian "out-migration" sounds more plausible. It states that the "pull factors" that influence immigration to Canada also influence emigration to the United States. Thus, the magnetic pull of higher wages and salaries and the prospects of a bright and promising future that most Canadians associate with a career in the United States are the primary forces that propel Canadians to emigrate.

In the final analysis, when one comes to weigh the arguments for and against immigration, one has to bear in mind that, except for its native Indian and Eskimo people, Canada has been populated by immigration within an extended period of three and a half centuries. The significant contributions that migrant workers have made towards the economic development of this country have been explicitly documented by economic historians. One would, therefore, hope that, whatever the course of future immigration policies, we should not be remiss in acknowledging that human resources are our most valuable economic resource. It follows, therefore, that their acquisition, development and efficient utilization are functions of the highest priority in any attempt to sustain and ensure the long-run growth of the Canadian economy.

*Human resources
most valuable
economic resource*

The great immigration debate

Special problem of refugees receives special attention

By J. A. R. Brazeau

The refugee, a victim of man's inhumanity to man, has been with us since the beginning of history. Discrimination against particular racial, religious or political groups, as well as wars, political upheavals, changes in national boundaries, and the rest, have uprooted people and caused them to flee home and country. In many instances, displacement has been permanent; the refugee has become stateless as well as homeless. It was the massive displacements of population that occurred during this century that forced the international community to seek solutions, to protect those who no longer had the protection of a state, and to assist them in resettling elsewhere.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established in 1950 to provide international protection for refugees under the auspices of the United Nations and to assist governments and private organizations in the voluntary repatriation of

refugees or, failing that, in their assimilation within new national communities. The UNHCR identifies the immediate and long-term needs of refugees, enlists the help of governments, organizations and individuals in meeting them, and co-ordinates and finances refugee relief programs.

In 1951, the United Nations adopted a Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and invited UN member states to accede. In its preamble, this convention

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emphasizes the fundamental human rights and freedoms of refugees. It goes on to recognize that granting of asylum to refugees places heavy burdens on certain states, and that the whole problem calls for international co-operation. And it urges member states to do everything possible to prevent refugee problems from becoming a source of international tension.

While assigning to the states adhering to it the responsibility to determine eligibility for refugee status in their territories, the convention defines the term "refugee" and lays down specific standards for the treatment of such persons in countries both of first asylum and of permanent resettlement. This convention remains the chief international instrument for the protection of refugees.

A refugee is defined in the convention as "any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it".

Canadian accession

Canada acceded to the convention in 1969. Its original reluctance to accede was caused essentially by concern that parts of the convention protecting refugees against expulsion might be incompatible with the deportation provisions of Canada's Immigration Act — which would mean that the convention could not be fully honoured. Nevertheless, even before accession, Canada complied in practice with both the letter and the spirit of the convention, its policy being to avoid deportation in cases where a threat of persecution existed for the individual in his homeland. In addition, all refugees admitted to Canada have access to social and other benefits that generally exceed those required by the convention.

The eligibility of a person for admission as a refugee is determined by whether or not he or she comes within the convention definition. The articles of the convention protecting from arbitrary expulsion the refugee who has been lawfully admitted (with safeguards for national security) necessitate procedures to establish the validity of claims to refugee status within Canada. Under the terms of the convention, giving each state party the responsibility to determine the validity of



CP P

The mother's smile and the child's puzzlement expression in this picture capture something of the problem of refugee immigrants arriving in Canada following the Communist takeover in Vietnam. Reaching safety can bring relief, but the strangeness of the new world can bring bewilderment

claims to refugee status in its territories. Canadian practice affords each applicant an opportunity to have his claim examined in a fair and sympathetic manner, under procedures offering legal guarantees, including the right of appeal. An interdepartmental committee composed of representatives of the Department of External Affairs and of the Immigration Division of the Department of Manpower and Immigration examines claims for refugee status by persons in Canada, and advises senior management on whether the persons concerned conform to the convention definition. The committee meets on a regular basis and reviews individual dossiers requesting whatever further information, legal opinions or clarification it needs to make its recommendation. The UNHCR representative in Canada participates in the committee's work in an advisory capacity.

In response to an appeal by the UNHCR, Canada introduced in 1967 a Handicapped Refugees Program, conducted in co-operation with the provinces, under which Canada sponsors up to 50 handicapped refugees and their families each year. Where the seriousness of his medical condition precludes a person's legal admission as an immigrant, he is allowed to come to Canada under the authority of a special Minister's permit until such time as he can meet immigrant standards. By its very nature this program has been difficult to administer, and as required the close co-operation of the UNHCR, the provincial governments concerned and voluntary agencies.

Response to crises

Canada's response to major international crises is well known. Common features of most of these crises have been their suddenness and unpredictability. Otherwise they have differed widely, requiring a special type of policy response in each instance. However, there are standard features that have characterized all special programs. The usual selection criteria have not been used as the only gauge of

the prospects of applicants for successful establishment in Canada. These have been weighed with other factors, such as the availability in Canada of special measures to assist the refugees' settlement. Applicants have been medically examined and security background checks conducted as thoroughly as conditions permitted. Methods and approaches with respect to these features and controls have naturally been adjusted to the circumstances involved in each program. It has been standing Government policy to co-operate closely with national and international voluntary organizations actively engaged in the refugee field.

Canada has to this day given permanent haven to well over 300,000 refugees and victims of persecution. There has, perhaps, been little general public awareness of Canada's on-going regular refugee programs, under which an average of 2,000 refugees a year were admitted for permanent residence in Canada from World Refugee Year (1959) to the middle Sixties.

Probably the most dramatic movement of refugees undertaken by Canada occurred in 1956, when tens of thousands of Hungarians fled their country in the

Government co-operation with voluntary organizations



UPI Photo

This photograph of a crowded airport waiting-room for the reception of Vietnamese children captures the human as well as the administrative problems of refugee immigration. Name-tags, numbers and the development of new relationships tell only part of the story. Whatever the difficulties, however, they are much less than those of continued existence in the chaotic aftermath of war.

aftermath of revolution and sought refuge across the border, mainly in Austria. By the end of the following year, Canada had accepted for permanent resettlement nearly 38,000 of these refugees. This influx made Canada's contribution the highest of any nation on a *per capita* basis, and the second highest in absolute numbers. Procedures were, of course, considerably simplified in order to move so many people so quickly; the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) played a key role, particularly in arranging transportation. Although there were amazingly few problems, medical and institutional care was required for some 1,500 of the refugees. Also involved were about 1,000 university students, and special arrangements were made for those who wished to continue their studies. Provincial governments, voluntary agencies and several private citizens' groups had valuable parts to play in receiving the refugees and helping them to settle.

A decade later, following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Canadian Government undertook another major program in response to appeals from the UNHCR and the Austrian Government. From September 1968 until January 1969, when the emergency operation ended, arrangements were made to fly 12,000 Czechoslovakian refugees to Canada.

The Government agreed in 1970 to accept a small group of Tibetans from India for resettlement in Canada. In this instance selection criteria were set aside in order to choose a group of families and single adults accompanied by their spiritual leaders. The 228 Tibetans thus admitted to Canada were settled, with the agreement of the provinces concerned, in Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, mostly in rural areas where it was thought they would adapt more easily.

Tibetans accepted

A new crisis was provoked when the President of Uganda announced in 1972 that all members of the Asian minority in that country would be obliged to leave or be expelled within a matter of months. From September 5 to November 8, 1972, the deadline set by the Ugandan Government for the Asians' departure, 4,420 persons were airlifted to Canada in 31 flights. Including relatives who followed later, Canada has received over 7,000 Asians from Uganda. Apart from Britain, which accepted the largest number, Canada received more Ugandan Asians than all other countries combined.

The *coup d'état* in Chile in the autumn of 1973 created a grave and complex situa-

tion affecting thousands, Chileans as well as nationals of other Latin American countries living in Chile. The magnitude of the problem, the number of persons whose lives and liberty were in jeopardy, prompted the UNHCR to appeal for international assistance. In the aftermath of the *coup* the situation was confused in the extreme. Reports differed as to the number of people in imminent danger, about how many sought permanent resettlement and where those who did wanted to go. Reliable information was hard to obtain about the status of those claiming refugee treatment, and their intentions. Since views in Canada varied widely, the Government was subjected to contradictory pressures. Consistent and responsible policy demanded energetic efforts to get the facts and the development of a program to process those people who most needed and deserved attention. This was achieved by setting up a special program along lines similar to those followed in past refugee situations.

Canada has accepted for permanent resettlement more than twice as many Chilean refugees as have been accepted by any other country. In addition to the 1,786 who have arrived in Canada, as of May 31, 1975, under the special program 1,250 persons have come to Canada from Chile as ordinary immigrants. These people did not apply as refugees or were not considered to be refugees, but they were able to meet the normal selection criteria. A further 804 persons have not yet used the Canadian visas issued to them. The total number of Chileans whose admission to Canada has been approved since the *coup* is 3,840. There are currently 2,400 additional applications under consideration or in various stages of processing.

In September 1973, there were very few persons of Chilean origin in Canada and consequently no substantial sponsored or nominated movement developed after the *coup*. Only 200 relatives from Chile have arrived in Canada in the past 21 months, and nearly all of these were sponsored or nominated by refugees who arrived after the *coup*.

The number of Cypriots displaced by the Greek-Turkish war on the Mediterranean island was estimated by United Nations investigators at almost 200,000. Although the situation was chaotic at the time of the outbreak of hostilities, later developments did not warrant a large scale evacuation of individuals who could be considered refugees. Special measures were, however, initiated by Canada to assist residents of Cyprus wanting to join family members or other sponsors.

anada. Applications relating to approximately 2,000 individuals were accepted at the time.

The most recent Canadian special program concerned South Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees. So far, Canada's performance has been second only to that of the United States in providing refuge. It was estimated at the time of the fall of Saigon that from 125,000 to 150,000 South Vietnamese refugees were living outside their country of origin. In response to a request from the U.S. Government, it was decided on May 1, 1975, that Canada would accept 2,000 refugees evacuated by the United States and a further 1,000 who had managed to enter neighbouring countries — e.g., Thailand and Hong Kong. In addition, it was agreed that Canada would accept any relatives sponsored or nominated by Canadian residents. As of July

1975, 4,580 Cambodians and South Vietnamese have arrived in Canada. Of these, nearly three-quarters are sponsored or nominated relatives. Approximately 80 per cent of those admitted to Canada are French-speaking, and the majority have been destined to the Province of Quebec.

The Government recognizes that refugees need special assistance to make it possible for them to start a new life in Canada. Over the years, prevailing conditions and the special problems of each refugee situation have determined the nature and the extent of this assistance. Help has always been forthcoming to cover travel costs. Initially, this meant chartering ships — for the displaced persons after the Second World War and again for the Hungarian refugees in 1956. More recently, the Government has organized and financed major airlifts. In addition, refugees accepted under Government-sponsored programs (e.g., for handicapped refugees) receive non-recoverable travel assistance. Although the provinces play no direct role in selection, their participation and their views are sought regarding acceptance of refugees with special needs.

The chief motive behind Canada's contribution to refugee resettlement has consistently been the desire of Canadians to help. This has found very tangible expression on many occasions. Individual Canadians made countless offers of assistance of every type, and committees in several cities performed invaluable services. Voluntary organizations have long been active in sponsoring the admission of refugees and helping them after they arrived. While most of these organizations seek the funds to undertake long-term financial assistance to newcomers, there is much they can do to help the newly-

arrived refugee. Ethnic, religious and social groups have provided transportation, day-care centres, initial accommodation and material aid in the form of clothing, furniture and other household items.

No diminution

The actual and potential numbers of refugees on a global basis show little sign of diminishing — rather the reverse. Although it is not possible to determine such numbers with any precision, their magnitude is suggested by the fact that, in recent years, between two and three million persons have been estimated to come within the terms of UNHCR's mandate. Wars of liberation, border disputes, tribal conflicts, and internal political upheavals have occasioned the temporary or permanent displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons.

Refugee crises in densely-populated developing countries can reach staggering proportions, as during the 1971 conflict in East Pakistan/Bangladesh, which displaced 10 million persons. No single country can begin to cope with a problem of such dimensions; only urgent and substantial international assistance can provide adequate solutions. These can take a variety of forms. Besides channelling emergency financial and material assistance to countries faced with a sudden influx of refugees, the United Nations, through the UNHCR, assists in negotiating repatriation arrangements. Land-resettlement projects and integration in countries of asylum, with the help of the international community and UN agencies, have proved an appropriate solution in several instances.

Whatever the responses made by Canada or the international community in the past to refugee crises, there is no reason for complacency about the future. Continuing pressures on minority groups are only examples of the complex situations that continue to exert difficult demands on Canada's generosity and sense of international responsibility. The only certainty for which Canadian policy in this area must be prepared is the prospect that refugee crises will continue to erupt. Policy must provide for flexible response to situations in which it will be imperative to preserve a sensible and humane balance among a wide range of factors and options. In each instance, the choice of an equitable distribution of responsibility between Canada and the international community at large must be weighed — bearing in mind that a basic aim of Canada is to promote institutional and individual freedom and humanitarian concern for the treatment of the individual.

*Successes
must not
lead to
complacency*

Different motives combine to produce CSCE Final Act

By John Carson

In February 1971, President Nixon reported to Congress on the major elements and the development of American foreign policy and, in summarizing the attitude of his Administration towards a possible future European security conference, stated: "... We see little value in a conference whose agenda would be unlikely to yield progress on concrete issues, but would only deflect our energies to drafting statements and declarations, the interpretation of which would inevitably be a continuing source of disagreements." Although these words were only part of the continuing exchange of rhetoric between Washington and Moscow, the Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact, which marked the preparation of both East and West for discussions in a CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) and in MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Relations) talks, they are quoted here because they foreshadow the dissatisfaction and frustration that many people in the West will inevitably experience about the final agreement on the CSCE that was signed in Helsinki at the end of July. Of course, such emotions will be felt by those who hoped for or expected a more concrete agreement, distinctly formulated, that one normally associates with treaties and binding agreements. However, there was never any possibility of that in the CSCE, and the point to be considered in connection with a declaration agreed

to by 35 governments is the form and substance of the principles of international behaviour to which each of the nations (or rather, their governments) has been able jointly to ascribe and the reasons for doing so.

I do not intend to narrate here the long history, the many exchanges, proposals and counter-proposals, that form the prelude to the initial meeting of the representatives of the participating states that took place in Helsinki late in the autumn of 1972. There is neither the space nor the need to trace the diplomatic background of the CSCE, but there are two elements of its origins that should be repeated in order to facilitate a clearer understanding of the substance of the Final Act and the atmosphere in which the heads of state gathered in Helsinki at the end of July. The first, and frequently forgotten, element stems from the title of the meetings and of the Final Act that emphasis was and is to be placed on both security and co-operation, and that, further, "security" can only be realized in an agreement to which there are so many signatories by outlining the steps to be taken that will reassure other signatories of one's likely actions. These "confidence-building measures" will at least remove many of the artificially "secret" aspects of military operations conducted by the two alliances.

Co-operation can be developed only by each nation subscribing to a readiness to exchange information of all sorts — economic, commercial, industrial, technological, cultural, social and familial. Along with the confidence-building measures there should be an anticipation of growth by familiarity, by a development of mutual trust, and by a utilitarian recognition that more can be gained through a co-operation that is not fixed to a rigid set of detailed and specific items. Security and co-operation of this sort are desired by the states with which the "nonaligned" European nations and the states on Europe's borders are particularly concerned, in the achieve-

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ent of which they are eager to play a part. And there are states within the alliances that have a great deal to gain by agreeing to principles that allow for a rapid development. If the leadership of the Soviet Union gains self-confidence through the successful conclusion of the Final Act (and this would seem to be the case), it is possible that the nations of Eastern Europe will be permitted a greater degree of independent action in economic and socio-cultural development.

The second element of the background to the CSCE is that it has taken place at the same time as the two military alliances have been attempting to negotiate an agreement on force reductions. Originating in NATO's *Harmel Report* (1967), the desire for discussions leading to mutual and balanced force reductions was expressed by NATO to the Warsaw Pact in June 1968. The MBFR proposal became something of a bargaining tool; and, sure enough, during the visit of President Nixon to Moscow in May 1972, came an agreement that CSCE and MBFR talks should be conducted concurrently but separately. MBFR negotiations accordingly began in Vienna at the end of October 1973. From the outset, it was clear that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had very different views on the nature of the problem: precisely what reductions were necessary (not only quantitatively but also whether the reductions were to be made to ground forces alone or to both ground and air forces) and which forces were to be reduced (those of the super-powers alone or of both the super-powers and of their respective Central European allies). Not surprisingly, considering the nature of the task, the negotiations have proceeded very slowly, providing as they do an enormous variety of alternative proposals. And, by the beginning of 1975, MBFR was progressing, if at all, very slowly.

Strategic arms talks

At another level of negotiating, that conducted by the governments of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on limiting strategic arms, the first half of 1975 has been a period of great importance. Following the meeting of Mr. Brezhnev and President Ford in Vladivostok in November last year and the publication of an accord that governs detailed negotiations leading to the SALT II agreement, the Soviet Government presumably viewed action and agreement in Geneva and Helsinki, and in Vienna, as prerequisites for a continuing *détente*, on the one hand, and an evolutionary withdrawal of the U.S. from Western Europe, on the other hand.

By the spring of 1975, the parallel conferences of CSCE and MBFR were not moving towards a productive conclusion as rapidly as were the bilateral strategic arms negotiations. SALT II was near completion (it is expected to be signed in Washington later this year) but MBFR was stalled by, among other matters, the unwillingness of the U.S. negotiators and their allies to discuss limitations on air forces and tactical nuclear weapons. At the same time, while agreement had been reached in Geneva on much of the wording of the "first-basket" principles and of some "second-basket" items, delay continued over such problems as the definition of major military manoeuvres (first basket), human contacts and information flow (third basket), and a follow-up plan for the CSCE. The resolution of these problems at Geneva, between March and July of this year, can be interpreted as a comparatively sudden determination on the part of the Soviet leadership to give further encouragement to those individuals and groups in Western policy-making circles that have been described by Franklyn Griffiths as the "realists". Griffiths wrote in 1973 in his *Genoa plus 51: Changing Soviet Objectives in Europe*:

In terms of strategy, Soviet policy makers would envisage a long-term endeavour to attune policy to the task of strengthening the "realist" trend at the expense of "Atlanticism", thereby creating an increasingly secure situation in which tendencies toward comprehensive East-West economic co-operation could flourish.

Such encouragement would suggest that the direction of the Soviet Union's foreign policy swayed towards a "reformist" trend, and this thesis is supported by the Soviet's agreement with the agenda items of the CSCE, agreed to in 1973, and the relatively rapid agreement reached over the wording of many items in the first and second "baskets". By encouraging the Western "realists" at Geneva, the Soviet Government has considerably increased its chances of reaching a satisfactory agreement in Vienna. Granted that the MBFR and SALT II agreements will be governed by a high degree of such technical and technological criteria as force ratios, comparative force statistics, "throw weight", "site hardness", guidance-system accuracy, and so forth, the manner in which the West negotiates, the resolution with which the Western states pursue what they consider to be an equitable agreement, will be influenced by recent Soviet behaviour at other bargaining tables.

As another event in multilateral attempts to resolve some outstanding problems in the settlement of European security after 1945, and as an agreement of all European states (except Albania) to take measures to increase international co-operation in many socio-economic areas, the CSCE must be seen as important by any standard of judgment. But as an element of Soviet foreign policy the CSCE has been of even greater significance. In the Soviet Government's continuing attempt at easing the Western European states away from the influence and leadership of the United States (one of the results of *détente*), the diplomacy of *détente* has had to be pursued on many levels. The CSCE has been one of these levels, but the various levels have been tied to one another — the successful con-

clusion or settlement of each dependent on progress at another level. Western participation in the CSCE has been dependent on Soviet discussions of force reductions. MBFR has been necessary for both East and West: for the West, to reach a negotiated multilateral settlement of the withdrawal of American forces before Congress initiates a unilateral force reduction and, for the East, to encourage both American and West German force reductions, while maintaining the American influence in NATO. Progress in MBFR has been made (by the West) dependent on a satisfactory conclusion of the CSCE, which has really meant a preparedness on the Soviet side to discuss the issues in Basket 3 (some observers have suggested that the contrary precondition — that progress in Geneva depended on progress

A reporter's eye view of Helsinki

By John Best

The Helsinki summit conference was a hard one to get hold of. You had the impression of being present at a historic event, without being quite sure why it was historic. It may simply have been all that massed political "clout". Gatherings of 35 heads of state, representing most of the world's major powers, including the two super-powers, don't happen every day.

The 108-page declaration signed by these potentates in the final hour of the three-day conference, and officially called the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, is another matter. At Helsinki, there were as many sceptics as believers.

The 20-member Canadian delegation, on the whole, was highly enthusiastic about the document. Its members appeared genuinely to believe that the laboriously-negotiated passages on family unification, movement of people and ideas, cultural, business, scientific and artistic intercourse would be trans-

lated into a breaking-down of East-West barriers.

They rejected the argument of doubters among the Canadian press contingent that the only lasting, tangible result of the conference would be to confirm the territorial status quo in Europe, as long sought by the Soviet Union. Journalists who took this line were only serving the ends of Soviet propaganda, some of them suggested.

The conference took place in Finlandia Hall, an enormous, low-slung building near the centre of Helsinki. Security was exceptionally tight. Plain-clothes policemen with "walkie-talkie" sets were everywhere. Dogs, helicopters and harbour craft were all part of the security blanket. The general public was kept well away from the conference site.

The 1,300 journalists who covered the conference outnumbered official participants by about two and a half to one. Each time one entered the building (through an entrance well removed from the delegates' entrance), one's papers were inspected and one had to pass through a security gate similar to those in use at airports.

The sessions themselves, apart from the signing ceremony, consisted of 35 set-piece speeches. Strange as it may

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n Vienna — was more important, but it seems logical that a satisfactory settlement of Basket 1 in Geneva should precede the detailed negotiations of MBFR).

These considerations presumably led the Soviet leadership, in February and early March of this year, to move to conclude the CSCE as soon as reasonably possible. In an address to the Eleventh Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party on March 18, Mr. Brezhnev called on the participants at Geneva to conclude their work with a summit meeting in Helsinki in the summer. Mr. Brezhnev wrote to various Western heads of state proposing June 30 as the date. After many months of inattention to some outstanding items in Basket 3, the Soviet delegation moved rapidly to a series of accepted wordings on the reunification of

families and the freer flow of information between East and West. Towards the end of April, an official of the State Department in Washington announced that the summit meeting of President Ford and Mr. Brezhnev, scheduled for the summer, has been postponed, and one of the reasons given was an expected summit in Helsinki in July. As the negotiations in Geneva continued at this accelerated pace, the possible dates for the Helsinki summit were moved further back, and by early June it seemed that the first week in August would be the earliest possible date; after that, given the exigencies of the international diplomatic timetable, the Helsinki meeting could not take place before November. It is a tribute to the hard-pressed negotiators in Geneva that the final document was completed for the

seem, most were not too hard to listen to. One of the most remarkable was delivered by Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union, who managed not once to refer to the status quo or the formulation contained in the Final Act, and much prized by the Kremlin, on inviolability of frontiers.

He called the conference not merely "a necessary summing-up of the political outcome of the Second World War". His major conclusion was this: "No one should try to dictate to other peoples, on the basis of foreign-policy considerations of one kind or another, the manner in which they ought to manage their internal affairs."

It sounded almost like an echo of Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, the Soviet bloc's leading maverick, who earlier had told delegates: "... The ensuring of free development for every nation, sheltered from any aggression or intervention in internal affairs, will be an achievement of historic importance."

President Ford gave a "tell-it-like-it-is" speech, which summed up many of the misgivings held in the West about the Helsinki declaration, while not damning it altogether. "History will judge this conference not by what we say today, but what we do tomorrow, not by the promises we make but by the promises we keep," said the President. "Peace is not a piece of paper." To no one's surprise, he stressed the need for movement on two related fronts: balanced East-West force reductions, and strategic arms limitation by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

Prime Minister Wilson of Britain said *détente* meant little "if it is not reflected in the daily lives of our people. There is no reason why, in 1975, Europeans should not be allowed to marry whom they want, hear and read what they want, travel abroad when and where they want, meet whom they want . . .".

Similarly, Prime Minister Trudeau warned that security and co-operation could not be produced by state activity alone: "Without the promise of family reunification, without the interchange of ideas and opinions, the new era of harmony we seek will not be found."

The Canadian Prime Minister obviously enjoyed hobnobbing in the international big leagues, and his aides reported later that he had off-stage, bilateral discussions with 17 other leaders. These ranged from an eight-minute huddle with Mr. Brezhnev on the conference floor, through a 15-minute talk with Mr. Ford over a bowl of strawberries outside the main hall, to a breakfast meeting with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

His talk with Mr. Brezhnev quickly led to the opening of diplomatic discussions to settle the Soviet-Canadian fisheries dispute. With Mr. Ford and Mr. Schmidt he talked about the problem of nuclear-arms proliferation through supposedly peaceful commerce in nuclear-power equipment.

With Mr. Schmidt he also discussed Canada's military contribution to NATO, now up for review in Ottawa.

summit that took place on the last day of July.

The final text is a massive document, the substance of which is divided among the subjects of the three baskets: politico-military; economic, scientific and cultural; and humanitarian and other fields. It is of interest to remember that Mr. Maltsev, the Ambassador of the U.S.S.R., proposed to the preliminary meeting on November 29, 1972, a three-point agenda that did not include any reference to human contacts or information. These points were

first proposed by the members of the Nine in January 1973. Eventually, by June 1973, at the end of the preparatory talks "Humanitarian and Other Fields" was accepted as the third agenda subject.

In considering the Final Act, the text signed on July 31, the first basket comprises two subjects: a declaration on the Ten Principles Governing Relations among Participating States, and Military Questions. Throughout the principles (such as recognition of each other's sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity), the

A photographer's eye view



The gathering of the heads of state and heads of government of 35 nations at Helsinki for the signing of the CSCE Final Act was the answer to a press photographer's dream. The selection here shows (bottom left) Soviet Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko applauding U.S. President Ford's speech. (Top left) President Ford, Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during an after-dinner discussion. (Top centre) The 35 national leaders lined up in Finlandia House for the signing of the Final Act. (Top right) Prime Minister Trudeau in conversation with Leonid Brezhnev on the conference floor. (Bottom right) Symbolizing the advances in détente marked by the CSCE, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (r) shakes hands with East German First Secretary Erich Honecker. (Bottom centre) French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing during his address on the second morning of the conference.

All photos are by UPI with the exception of that of Messrs Trudeau and Brezhnev, which is a Wide World Photo.

rsistent theme is an agreement not to use force against another participant. Perhaps the most significant principle, especially when it is considered along with the agreement not to use force, is the statement that "... all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status...". The principles have been composed in such a manner as to repeat the accepted and usual standards of international law and conduct while, at the same time, not

specifically precluding in any way the possibility of change — either internally or externally — to a state's political status. While the Soviet, and perhaps East European, governments will regard the principles as a multilateral recognition of the European geographical and political arrangement of 1975, Western governments will continue to stress the nature of the text — political rather than legal — and the opportunity that it provides, perhaps in a somewhat negative way, for change. Legally, the principles mean very little,



but, like much well-prepared legislation, their importance probably consists in what they do not contain or specifically preclude.

The "military" part of the first basket contains the now familiar confidence-building measures of prior notification of major manoeuvres and major military movements, invitations to observers from other states to attend manoeuvres, and exchanges of military delegations.

Second basket

Basket 2 covers a wide range of subjects and activities. Many of the items have normally been negotiated bilaterally (for example, technical assistance and commercial exchanges) or in wider and more institutionalized discussions. However, there appears to be one important gain that affects most of the headings in this basket, and that is a stated intention to facilitate contacts and to provide more comprehensive statistical information of many kinds. This will be of a particular significance for the Nine and for the Eastern European states. Of special interest to the Canadian Government, the long and detailed section on co-operation to protect the environment has drawn Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union into participating with the UN environmental protection agency in accord with the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment.

It is too easy to be either over-optimistic or, on the other hand, too cynical about the substance of the text of the third basket. All participants have agreed to support and "deal in a humanitarian spirit" with requests for family meetings and reunification, marriage across state borders, tourism and youth meetings; and inevitably these paragraphs will be only as useful as the determination of the individual governments to live up to the spirit of the agreement. It is not likely that a great change will be immediately apparent but, conversely, there is every reason to believe that some change will occur and is likely to accelerate, if very slowly. There is cause for some optimism, if not celebration, in the fact that the Soviet Union has participated in negotiating such statements. The same can be said about the paragraphs referring to the dissemination and exchange of information and the possibility of journalists travelling between West and East.

Mainly through the efforts and persistence of the Government of Malta, the participating states agreed to the inclusion of a three-page text that declared their intention of assisting the non-participating Mediterranean states in promoting secu-

rity and stability in the area and of operating with them in development and environmental protection. The text is acknowledgement of the keen interest displayed by six Mediterranean states — Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel and Syria — and the statements made by them at Geneva. It is one very obvious sign that the Final Act is a product not simply of the bargaining between the major alliances dominated by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. but of the very active negotiating carried out by the neutral and non-aligned European nations. The non-participating Mediterranean states, physically close to Europe, also had reasons to be seen at Geneva.

If one accepts Franklyn Griffiths' analysis of trends in Soviet foreign policy and the Soviet analysts' distinction of trends in Western policy (and I am inclined to agree with his analysis), then the CSCE text is a victory for the reformists in Moscow dealing with Western realists. In 1973, Griffiths wrote:

Assuming these views prevail in Moscow and Washington, the following limited East-West bargains, with some luck, might therefore emerge at Helsinki: the West explicitly recognizes the inviolability (but not the validity) of the territorial status quo in Europe, including the Baltic frontiers of the Soviet Union and the U.S.S.R. provides the West with a balanced reduction of forces in central Europe and with stabilizing political agreements at one or more CSCEs; the West gives the U.S.S.R. part of the economic and technological assistance it needs, and the U.S.S.R. yields a bit of the freedom of movement of people and ideas that the West wishes to see in the Soviet bloc.

With the exception of the balanced force reductions, which may well be in the offing from Vienna, these things have come to pass. At the end of the first stage in Helsinki (in 1973), Mr. Gromyko suggested that the final outcome of the CSCE would be a "... historic milestone on the way to stable and lasting peace in Europe". Mr. Brezhnev has much to be pleased about for a number of reasons. The governments of the West also have cause to be pleased. When the participating states reassemble in Belgrade in 1977 to review what progress has been made, the delegates of the Western states will be attending in the knowledge that the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was not only a "historic milestone" but the first multilateral statement of an intention to discuss some issues that have suffered from more than 30 years of neglect.

Protocol signed at San Jose provides reform of Rio Treaty

Alfred Pick

April 1973, the Organization of American States decided to conduct a study of the depth of the Inter-American System with a view to its general reform or restructuring. A resolution of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) noted that there was "general dissatisfaction" with the functioning and results of the Inter-American System. A special committee, which came to be known as CEESI from its Spanish initials, was therefore set up to make a thorough investigation and to come up with recommendations. The purpose was to study the Inter-American System and propose measures for restructuring it".

The term "Inter-American System" refers to the collection of official organizations, organs, agencies and entities that have an inter-American character. Bodies that are exclusively Latin-American or sub-regional are not included. It would, however, be better to visualize an irregularly-shaped archipelago rather than a closely co-ordinated solar system.

It is often said that the Inter-American System is founded on three pillars: (1) the Charter of the OAS (Bogota, April 1948); (2) the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty of September 1947); and (3) the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (the Pact of Bogota, April 1948). This article is concerned only with the Rio Treaty, which created the regional system of collective military security. It was drafted in anticipation of the OAS Charter, which itself sets forth the essential obligation of collective security. It had been anticipated in the Act of Chapultepec of March 1945, and it preceded the North Atlantic Treaty by a year and a half. The essence of such instruments is the principle that an attack against one is an attack against all, though the obligations of mutual defence are of somewhat varying force. Dean Acheson pointed out in his memoir *Present at the Creation* that the main idea for the Atlantic had been taken from the Rio Treaty.

The Rio Treaty had its origin in the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, which met in Mexico City in March 1945 – that is, before the end of the Second World War and on the eve of the San Francisco Conference, which founded the United Nations. The Act of Chapultepec recommended the conclusion of a treaty to "prevent and repel threats and acts of aggression against any of the countries of America". The Rio Treaty itself was drawn up in Brazil and signed in Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947. Its' principal article provides that "an armed attack by any state against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all the American states". The OAS Charter of the following year has a very short chapter on collective security, with a reference, in effect, to the Rio Treaty. It had been generally considered that the two instruments constituted a single package. However, Barbados, which joined the OAS in 1967, Jamaica, which joined in 1969, and Grenada, which joined more recently, have not become parties to the Rio Treaty. Some of the older members dislike this state of affairs.

Five rounds

In all, CEESI met in five major rounds or stages, starting in Lima on June 20, 1973, and ending in Washington on February 20, 1975. In the interval, at the fourth regular OAS General Assembly, in Atlanta in April 1974, its mandate was renewed, with some more definite guidelines, including the suggested use of voting rather than the device of consensus

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in order to bring its activities to a conclusion. Hundreds of meetings took place at various levels, and an enormous amount of documentation was turned out, much of it of a haphazard character that is difficult to digest and assimilate.

In the course of its work, CEESI gave full and careful consideration to the revision of the Rio Treaty. On the basis of the special committee's final report, the OAS General Assembly decided in May to convoke a conference of plenipotentiaries to complete and sign a Protocol of Amendment to the Rio Treaty. After preparatory work in Washington, this conference met in San José on July 16 and the protocol was signed there on July 26.

Parties to the protocol

The protocol contains a number of more or less customary final or concluding articles to spell out how it will harmonize with the original treaty and how it will come into force. During the final preparations in Washington before San José, brief consideration was given to the possibility of opening the revised Rio Treaty to American states that were not members of the OAS. The countries envisaged include Canada and also, at present, Guyana and the Bahamas. It was said, in a report of a working group, that it might not "be advisable that states that are bound by extra-continental treaties or military pacts, and which do not have the obligations and rights set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States, should be able at the same time to participate in the Rio Treaty, thus introducing a *de facto* connection between this Treaty and situations outside of the American hemisphere". Along the same lines, it was further stated "that the very spirit of the reforms contemplated for CEESI were precisely to prevent the regional pact from being used for extra-regional obligations or situations". Because of the interlocking of the obligations under the OAS Charter and the treaty and the institutional structure of the Inter-American System, it would be difficult at present to allow American states not members of the OAS to become parties to the Rio Treaty. In any event, this was not seriously considered and the San José protocol says that it is open for signature by members of the OAS, whether or not they are now parties to the treaty itself (the latter, of course, at present being Barbados, Jamaica and Grenada).

The protocol will come into force when ratified by two-thirds of those that signed it at San José. Experience shows that this process of ratification can take a long time — perhaps several years —, depending on

the constitutional requirements and the political will of the signatories. It would, for example, have to be submitted to the United States Senate.

The long debate that preceded the signing of the protocol in San José turned on a number of fundamental points. There was a strong move, led principally by Peru and Mexico with support from Panama, to limit the nature of, and obligations under, the Rio Treaty. In the background were the views that the treaty was, or (more accurately, in the historical sense) had become, an instrument to serve the global strategy or interests of the United States in the Cold War, and that it had been wrongly used to impose sanctions on Cuba. Thus it was argued that the treaty should apply only to an armed attack by another American state — that is, it should not cover an extra-continental attack but only an intra-continental one. At the very end, Peru, when signing, reserved its position. Secondly, it was urged that the treaty should cover only armed aggression, and not the kind of indirect aggression provided for in the present Article 6, which speaks of "an aggression which is not an armed attack" or "any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America". Mexico had firmly and consistently opposed the appeal to these clauses to justify the boycott of Cuba.

Generally, however, these proposals to limit the scope of the treaty did not receive support. It is interesting to observe that not only the United States but many of the smaller countries of Central and South America, and also countries such as Brazil and Colombia, attach great importance to the maintenance of the treaty as an instrument of security, substantially in its present form and thus covering an attack by any state against a member state as well as indirect aggression. They consider that the Rio Treaty has restrained the arms race and helped to settle conflicts and maintain peace in the region, especially in Central America. Costa Rica, for example, which has no regular armed forces, says it relies on the protection of the Rio Treaty. Incidentally, the fact that they are parties to the treaty has not prevented a few Latin American countries from participating in the non-aligned movement, either as members or as observers. Peru was host to a conference of non-aligned foreign ministers in Lima at the end of August.

CEESI did considerable work during its five stages in redrafting the main provisions of the treaty, spelling out the somewhat different procedures to be followed in the event of an attack by another Amer-

an state or, in the other case, an armed attack of extra-continental origin. The United States went along, but professed to prefer that no distinction be made between an intra-continental and an extra-continental conflict. One important change was agreed on for Article 3, the main provision of the treaty, which declares that an attack against one is an attack against all. In future, under the protocol, Article 3 will no longer cover armed attack against "an American State" but will be limited to armed attack against "an American state that is a Contracting Party". Such an attack against a state party could, however, take place in the wider treaty area, as explained below, which includes all American states.

Article 6, in the amended form in the CEEESI report and the final protocol (now to be Article 5), retains the conception of direct aggression but in somewhat narrower and more careful language; it maintains the idea of collective action to cover more than armed attack — namely, in the case of "a conflict or serious event that might endanger the peace of America". Here, some distinctions are made between parties and non-parties to the treaty. If a state party to the treaty is affected by such a conflict or "serious event", measures shall be taken immediately to come to its assistance, as well as measures for the common defence and the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent. In the case of a non-party (i.e., "any other American State"), under similar circumstances, there is no commitment to come to its aid but only to take measures for the common defence and the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent.

In the existing treaty, no attempt was made to define aggression, though Article 4 contains two examples of acts of aggression. This article has been redrafted to define aggression at considerable length, using substantially the language finally arrived at in the United Nations last December after years of drafting efforts. Even here, as in the present article, there is a residual clause allowing other cases to be determined as constituting aggression.

Treaty area

Article 4 of the Rio Treaty defines the security zone or the treaty area in very broad terms and covers a vast region running from the North Pole to the South Pole and embracing considerable parts of both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. No countries are mentioned in this definition, but the area includes all of Canada and Greenland. It has been pointed out in this context that Canada is a beneficiary of

protection under the Rio Treaty, though it was not consulted before being included in the treaty area.

In CEEESI, there was a strong move, led by Peru and Mexico, to limit the geographical scope or area of application of the Rio Treaty. There was general agreement that Greenland should not be considered as part of the Americas ("non-American territories . . . should be excluded from the scope"). In the North Atlantic Treaty the obligation to take collective action in the event of an armed attack is limited to an attack on the territory of the parties in Europe, Turkey and North America, though it also covers the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean. It was suggested, especially by Mexico, that the Rio Treaty zone should be similarly limited, but this proposal did not receive wide support. The United States made it clear that it wished Canada, in particular, to be included in the zone.

A new description for Article 4 was not adopted in CEEESI, but instead criteria were approved on the basis of which cartographers could prepare a map for later acceptance. These included the statement that the scope of application should exclude territories that were not geographically American, except those under the full sovereignty of an American state. The outer line was to be drawn "taking as a basis the minimum distance of two hundred miles parallel to the coasts of the *American States*" with a view to its effectiveness for the protection of the "American territories under the sovereignty of the *States Parties*". Also, "in drawing the line, the interests of the States Parties with regard to their respective coasts shall be taken into account".

In the lengthy examination of this matter, a sub-committee looked at several maps, of which some would have included Canada in the zone and others would have excluded all Canadian territory, or at least a good part of it. It will be noted from the above that the majority decision in CEEESI (12 to zero, with six abstentions) was that the area of all American states — of which, of course, Canada is one — should be embraced in the treaty zone, though the purpose is to look after the protection of the territories of the states parties, which it is assumed may not include Canada in the future any more than in the past.

Similarly, there had been a move to narrow the treaty zone in the southern hemisphere by bringing it closer to the coasts. However, it was clearly desired to avoid entanglement in the conflicting and overlapping claims to territorial sovereignty in the Antarctic sector. On a propos-

Treaty-zone limitation suggested



CP Photo

Fixing the geographic area to be covered by the Rio Treaty was one of the major issues under discussion in San José in July. Despite a widespread desire for a reduced treaty area, Argentinian demands in the end led to its broadening. Shown here examining a map of the world at the San José Conference are Argentine Ambassador Julio Cesar Carasales (left) and Brazilian Ambassador Paulo Padilha Vical (centre).

sal of Brazil, with the support of Argentina, it was decided unanimously in CEESI to maintain the status quo. One of the criteria reads: "The present security zone shall be maintained for the South Atlantic and the Antarctic". Ironically enough, in the end, the area in the South Atlantic and Antarctica was actually enlarged by moving the line from the Equator to the South Pole eastward from 24 degrees longitude to 20, partly to meet Argentine concern about the South Sandwich Islands.

Canada embraced

On the basis of cartographic work by the OAS Secretariat, the San José Conference adopted a new description for Article 4. This embraces Canada and, generally, the adjacent sea up to and beyond 200 miles. In the North Polar region, the line goes up to 86 degrees 30 minutes north latitude at 60 degrees west longitude, about half-way between Ellesmere Island and the Pole. The separation between Canada and Greenland is the line in the agreement signed by Canada and Denmark

on December 17, 1973, on the delimitation of the continental shelf. It was understood throughout that the definition of the security zone did not reflect national boundaries. Nevertheless, Canada, in its observational capacity, made a statement at San José to the effect that it did not accept any inferred or intended definition of territory subject to the exercise or claim of Canadian sovereign rights or under the jurisdiction of Canada, that might be implied in the description of the security zone to be adopted. A similar statement was made by the United States.

When signing the protocol, Mexico made a formal declaration repeating its conviction that, in the new Article 4, as far as possible, the superposition of regions protected by other international instruments that had received the express or tacit approval of the United Nations should have been eliminated. This could be read as referring to Canada and its membership in NATO.

Considerable public attention has been attracted to changes in the voting require-

ents under Article 17. This, in the old treaty, provides that decisions shall be taken by a two-thirds vote. To this has now been added by the protocol a brief provision saying that, to revoke the measures taken under Article 8 (which deals with mandatory sanctions), a vote of an absolute majority will be required. This change received the support of the United States and all other signatories except Chile and Paraguay, the latter making a reservation when signing the protocol.

It should be recalled that the economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed against Cuba in 1964 were taken on the basis of Articles 6, 8, and 17 of the Rio Treaty. The lifting of sanctions has required a two-thirds vote. The Quito Conference of last November failed to take a formal decision to lift the OAS sanctions since the proposal to this effect gained only 12 votes (a simple majority) rather than 14 (the required two-thirds).

A special meeting was subsequently convened in San José to vote again on the question of the sanctions against Cuba. It was fully recognized that the two-thirds requirement under the unamended Rio Treaty would be juridically required in spite of the provision in the protocol (still not legally in effect) reducing the requirement to a simple majority. A quick decision was reached, in a single sitting on July 29, to grant freedom of action to the parties to the treaty to normalize their relations with Cuba in any way they considered advisable. This time the vote was 16 in favour to three against, with two abstentions. The main change was the shift in the U.S. position to a vote in favour of giving each country the freedom to lift sanctions. Three other abstainers at Quito — Bolivia, Guatemala and Haiti — also supported the affirmative vote. Brazil and Nicaragua continued to abstain and the three "hard-liners" — Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay — voted in effect to maintain collective diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba.

In short, the San José resolution can be said to have regularized, *ex post facto*, the unilateral actions of several parties to the Rio Treaty, such as Peru, Argentina, Panama, Venezuela and Colombia, in resuming direct relations with Cuba.

Pluralism

The protocol to the Rio Treaty contains a few new articles, one of which, reflecting the idea of ideological pluralism, reiterates the principle of non-intervention and asserts the right of each state freely to choose its political, economic and social organization.

There is also an additional article, proposed by Peru at an early stage of CEESI, in which the parties recognize that "collective economic security for the development of the member states" must be "guaranteed" through suitable mechanisms to be established in a "special treaty". Much time had been devoted at other meetings of CEESI in drafting a convention on collective economic security. Throughout, the United States expressed reservations about trying to express this in a legally-binding instrument. At San José the article was adopted by a vote of 20 in favour, with a single negative vote by the United States. When signing the protocol, the United States made a formal reservation that it did not accept any obligation to negotiate, sign or ratify a special treaty on collective economic security. Specifically, in terms of the Rio Treaty, it argued that it was inappropriate to incorporate such a conception, touching on the idea of economic aggression, in an instrument concerned with collective security in the normal military sense.

United States rejected economic clause

Rio Treaty and the United Nations

In the lengthy consideration in CEESI of both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty, there was much discussion of the relation of the regional system to the United Nations, part of which does not concern us here. The United States wanted the emphasis on the regional system, but others, led by Mexico, Panama and Peru, wished to place the accent on the United Nations. In the protocol it is reiterated, but in weaker language than in the present Article 2, that the parties agree to "make every effort" to achieve the peaceful settlement of disputes through the Inter-American System before submitting them to the UN Security Council. A new clause has been added, however, specifically stating that this provision is not to be interpreted as impairing the rights and obligations of the parties, under the terms of Articles 34 and 35 of the UN Charter, to have disputes handled by the Security Council. Mexico, in signing the protocol, made a declaration of its continued belief that, except in the case of self-defence, the collective measures taken under the treaty could not be applied in an obligatory form, given their coercive character, without the authorization of the UN Security Council.

It could be added here that, in response to a suggestion by Mexico and a proposal of the United States, it was determined, in order to give greater flexibility, that the text should make it clear that action under the treaty could include recommendations to the states parties, as well

as decisions imposing binding obligations on them — which is the present situation.

Conclusion

In essence, the Rio Treaty has been maintained and the legal niceties have been observed. Some significant updating and changes have occurred. Countries critical of the treaty, such as Peru and Panama, may continue to speak against some aspects of it, but they do not appear prepared to denounce it in the formal sense. It remains to be seen what will happen to the usually long process of ratification of the amending protocol, which could take two or more years.

As for the newer idea of collective economic security, the Latins have won a kind of victory in their display of solidarity, but it may well prove empty, since the U.S. does not support it, no doubt in the conviction that the U.S. Senate would not be prepared to incur treaty obligations that appeared too unilateral in their essence.

There is a brief chapter in the OAS Charter on collective security that many consider will have to be harmonized with the revised Rio Treaty. This opens up the much broader question, however, of the revision of the Charter as a whole and some other aspects of the Inter-American Sys-

tem. On the basis of the CEESI report, the OAS General Assembly made certain procedural decisions in May to follow up the work on the possible amendment of the Charter, both in regard to fundamental principles and structural changes as well as the Pact of Bogota, as well as on statements or instruments on collective economic security and co-operation in development. There continues to be "general dissatisfaction" with the working of the Inter-American System. It has been a creditable feat to bring about the reform of the Rio Treaty, but there appears to be less agreement on the changes that should be made in other important aspects of the Inter-American System. The widespread desire to reform the system is combined with an increasing plurality of ideologies and diversity of forms of government and economic and social systems. It is therefore going to take longer and be more difficult to bring about other fundamental changes.

A more detailed report on the reform of the Rio Treaty by Mr. Pick is available in mimeographed form. Readers wishing to obtain copies should write to *International Perspectives*, Lester B. Pearson Building, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G2.

The Americas

Kissinger visit required to mitigate disenchantment

By James Nelson Goodsell

A year ago in this periodical, the writer suggested that there was an indication of an improving climate in United States/

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Latin American relations — that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was likely to bring a fresh approach to Washington's Latin American policy.

Now, a year later, such a suggestion seems woefully out of step with reality. Relations between Washington and its southern neighbours have, in fact, deteriorated. Although Dr. Kissinger still professes interest in Latin America, he has done little to support his protestations and, indeed, many Latin Americans are adopting a cynical view, saying that they knew all along that the Secretary of State never intended to embark on any ne-

diplomatic initiatives with the rest of the hemisphere. "What we see is more of the same talk and lack of action that has so characterized United States policy with Latin America for years," commented a senior Colombian diplomat, who, despite his strong words, has strong friendships in the United States. He added: "Washington simply isn't interested in us and we might as well accept that."

There's nothing new in such language. In one way or another, it has all been said many times before. But what makes it different this time is that it results from freshly-frustrated hopes that something new and important was about to emerge in United States/Latin American relations. Latin Americans somehow expected more of Dr. Kissinger. They instinctively like and admire him. They believed him when he said in Atlanta in April 1974 that the United States was going to implement "the policy of the Good Partner".

Still waiting

A year later they are still waiting for this good partnership relationship to be put into effect. They are still waiting for Dr. Kissinger to make his repeatedly-postponed Latin American trip, and they are still waiting for Washington action on a host of hemisphere issues. So far as Latin Americans are concerned, Washington's actions in the past year have simply shown, over and over again, that other areas of the globe take priority and that Latin American sensitivities are ignored by Washington.

For its part, the United States rejects such talk, saying it is not so — Dr. Kissinger and the United States *do* in fact care about Latin America and the Latin Americans. But such protestations are falling on increasingly deaf ears. Latin Americans are saying, in effect, "all right, prove it." During the past year, the Latin Americans say they have evidence to the contrary:

(1) Dr. Kissinger has yet to make that much-talked about Latin American swing. On the ground of more important business elsewhere — the Middle East and Vietnam — the trip was repeatedly postponed through early 1975. Moreover, the length of the trip and the number of countries to be visited were cut. Now, the visit is only loosely scheduled for October or November. Latin Americans are increasingly sceptical and wonder if Dr. Kissinger will not find other important activities at that time to postpone the visit yet again.

(2) Dr. Kissinger did not show up in Quito last November when the hemisphere foreign ministers met to consider the lifting of collective diplomatic and economic

sanctions against Cuba. Again citing more important business, the Secretary of State sent qualified but lower-level officials.

(3) Dr. Kissinger has on several occasions forgotten scheduled sessions with Latin American diplomats. On one occasion early this year, 38 envoys, representing 23 Latin American and Caribbean nations, waited for the Secretary for nearly an hour, only to be told he was otherwise occupied, although the meeting had been scheduled for weeks. As it turned out, Dr. Kissinger was visiting at that moment with Mexican Foreign Minister Emilio O. Rabasa, who had shown up earlier in the day and sought an interview with the Secretary. All well and good, the Latin Americans say, that Mr. Rabasa could get in to see Dr. Kissinger — but what of the scheduled meeting with the assembled Latin American envoys to Washington? The incident, unfortunately, was not exceptional; similar situations have repeatedly occurred. State Department spokesmen merely say the date with the envoys "slipped".

(4) Washington requested a month's postponement in the scheduled Organization of American States general assembly meeting because of Dr. Kissinger's other activities. Then, when the meeting was held in May, Dr. Kissinger put in only brief appearances. "We were forced to upset our time-schedules for Dr. Kissinger," one Latin American diplomat complained, "but then Dr. Kissinger didn't have the courtesy to make it seem worth while."

(5) The number of issues dividing Latin America and the United States is as large as it was a year ago, if not larger, but there has been relatively little effort on the part of Washington to whittle away at the list. These issues include the Panamanian dispute with the United States over the Panama Canal, upon which there has admittedly been some progress, at least in the number of discussions between the two nations. But on other issues there have been only limited discussions: the problem of United States tariffs imposed on Latin American goods entering the United States market and competing with U.S. manufacturers; the issue of "countervailing duties" on some Latin American products that are receiving export subsidies in their homelands; and the mushrooming revelations of Central Intelligence Agency interference in the internal affairs of Latin American countries and the frequently illegal practices of United States multinational companies in the area.

The list goes on, but these are the items most generally mentioned by Latin

Kissinger's failure to attend meetings criticized

Americans — and they are sufficient to suggest the degree of unhappiness throughout the hemisphere over Washington's attitudes and actions in Latin America.

Postponements most resented

The Kissinger trip-postponements are most resented, for they go to the core of what Latin Americans see as Washington's lack of interest in their part of the world.

Dr. Kissinger, it needs to be noted, took office as Secretary of State with a tremendous amount of goodwill on the part of Latin Americans. In his two years in office, much of this goodwill has been dissipated. Each time Washington announced another postponement or a slimming-down of the Kissinger Latin American trip the Secretary lost some of that goodwill.

Editorial comment in newspapers all over the hemisphere tells the story. After the third postponement in April, Buenos Aires' *Clarín* said: "We should have expected as much, but somehow thought Dr. Kissinger meant it when he said he had our interests at heart." Or take this comment from a radio commentator in Bogota, the Colombian capital: "Does Kissinger think we are children who can be put off with a pat on the head and a promise of play tomorrow?" Or this comment in the Rio de Janeiro *Jornal do Brasil*: "We can appreciate Dr. Kissinger's initiatives in other parts of the world and the necessity to postpone the visit again, but this ought to be the last postponement."

It proved not to be the last postponement. For, within days, the United States position in South Vietnam began to unravel, again forcing Dr. Kissinger to put off his Latin American tour. "We knew it was too good to be true, that he would come this month," a Venezuelan Foreign Office spokesman commented. "He's always got something else to do."

Even in the State Department in Washington, there was an admission in April that it would have been better if Dr. Kissinger had taken the Latin American swing when it was originally scheduled late last year. "That, of course, is hindsight," one official said. "But we should have recognized at that moment that there was no better time than the present for the trip."

And, of course, that is precisely what Latin Americans complain about — that Washington recognizes only in hindsight what it should have done or not done with regard to the hemisphere.

Latin Americans never had any illusions about the Kissinger trip. It would not serve as a panacea, they realized, nor would

it result in quick solutions to the long list of problems besetting U.S./Latin American relations. The visit was, of course, to have symbolic meaning, merely opening the path to serious discussion of the issues. But the postponements also had symbolic meaning, as did Secretary of State Kissinger's decision to stay away from the Quito meeting called to look into the removal of the collective sanctions imposed on Cuba by the Organization of American States in the early 1960s. By staying away, Dr. Kissinger signaled to Latin America that he was not ready, despite pronouncements to the contrary, to move on the Cuba issue.

Majority opinion

When the question came to a vote, the majority of hemisphere nations favouring an end to the sanctions could not quite muster the two-thirds vote needed to take the step. Imposition of the sanctions had been in accord with the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which requires a two-thirds majority vote to withdraw approval for any action. The majority at Quito fell two votes short. Washington abstained from voting, an action that State Department officials continue to have as a sign that the United States will not interfere with the majority. Yet, by abstaining, the United States thwarted the will of the majority. Dr. Kissinger had said earlier that the United States would go along with the majority, a promise Latin Americans took at face value. Many of them realized that Washington was probably not ready to take the step of renewing relations with the Government of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, but that did not seem to be a stumbling-block. After all, support for the removal of the collective OAS sanctions does not automatically mean that a country will renew relations. Such support merely means that a nation like the United States is voting to allow each nation to decide legally for itself whether such relations should be renewed. It is a case of supporting self-determination. A number of Latin American nations, grown weary of waiting for the removal of collective sanctions, have unilaterally restored relations with Cuba. Only in July of this year did a special meeting at San José vote in favour of letting each country decide for itself whether to lift sanctions.

As if this were not enough, the United States Foreign Trade Act of 1974 caused a major furore in Latin America because it included provisions barring oil-producing Venezuela and Ecuador from new trade preferences because of their membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

ng Countries (OPEC). Congress inserted the provisions in retaliation against the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74. That neither Venezuela nor Ecuador went along with the embargo (and, indeed, Venezuela shipped more oil than usual to the United States during the embargo) was lost on Congress. It was similarly lost on the Ford Administration.

Although Gerald Ford said he objected to some provisions in the bill, singling out those affecting Venezuela and Ecuador, he did little after signing to push Congress to alter the provisions. Beforehand, he had done nothing to get changes in the measure while Congress was debating it. In fact, Washington acted with surprise in January of this year when Venezuela and Ecuador took exception to the bill. "After all, they have to realize that their problem is only one of many we must deal with daily," a White House spokesman told this reporter. "We have other more important matters."

Consternation

But Latin America as a whole reacted with consternation over the provisions in the trade bill. Protests began reaching Washington almost daily. It was at this point that Dr. Kissinger was supposed to meet Latin American and Caribbean envoys in Washington, only to forget the occasion and to leave the ambassadors cooling their heels. A week later, many of these same ambassadors approved an OAS resolution calling the offensive trade bill provisions "discriminatory and coercive." Argentina promptly cancelled a special foreign ministers' meeting set for March in Buenos Aires — a meeting that was to have taken up the "new dialogue" Dr. Kissinger promised to want with Latin America. "How can we dialogue when one nation acts so offensively?" asked an Argentine foreign ministry official.

To help rectify all this, Dr. Kissinger made several promises in February to carry on with his oft-discussed Latin American swing. On one occasion, he said he would make the trip before the April general assembly meeting of the OAS. Then came the postponement after another, and finally the month's delay in the general assembly session to allow Dr. Kissinger more time in which to take the trip. What followed in April — the massive pullout of United States diplomatic and advisory personnel from Vietnam and the collapse of the South Vietnamese Government — forced the indefinite postponement of the Kissinger trip. "What else could we do?" asked a State Department spokesman,

angry with newsmen for inquiring about the repeated postponements. "You've got to realize, and so do the Latin Americans, that there are other parts of the world that demand attention."

True, say the Latin Americans, but in the process do not forget us.

That, essentially, is the Latin American plea directed to Washington. It is based on the complaint of Washington neglect of and insensitivity to the needs and opinions of the Latin Americans. "What we ask from Washington," said *Jornal do Brasil* in an editorial, "is the patience to listen to us and to our aspirations; not always to go along with us, of course, but to give us a feeling that we are being heard."

This clamour for attention is more and more evident throughout Latin America. But Washington seems less and less inclined to turn its attention to its southern neighbours. All sorts of stories are making the rounds in Latin America these days suggesting that Dr. Kissinger has no use for Latin America. One has Dr. Kissinger saying that "the Latin Americas don't count for anything in the world power struggle, so why pay them any heed". Dr. Kissinger probably never said that. But the fact that such stories are making the rounds suggests to many hemisphere observers that it is time for Washington to do what it can to dissipate this mood.

Future problems

In failing to take Latin America seriously, Washington may be sowing the seeds of future problems. The tragedy of all this is that it is so unnecessary and that the corrective measures are readily at hand. A Kissinger trip, although it might prove a little more taxing than if it had been taken six months ago, is a small price to pay for improved relations. Such a trip would certainly improve the climate and, while it would only be a first step, it would, if followed by serious diplomatic initiatives, restore the possibilities of improving the ties that bind the United States with its southern neighbours.

A Kissinger visit, with sufficient time spent in half a dozen countries, ought to be at the top of Washington's diplomatic priorities for the rest of 1975. Whether it is remains to be seen. If it is not, Washington has only itself to blame for the present drift in hemisphere relations. Moreover, that drift is bound to continue unless the United States takes it upon itself to pay attention to Latin America.

*Clamour
for attention
growing*

Continuing U.S. influence on Canada-Cuba relations

By Jack Ogelsby

The United States and its citizens have had more control over Canadian-Cuban relations since Confederation than most Canadians are aware. Even the 1975 initiatives that have resulted from discussions in Cuba and Canada at the ministerial level give the appearance that the two countries suddenly realized they had better take greater advantage of the 1961 break in relations between Cuba and the United States before the two republics settled their differences. The Cuba-U.S. split had provided Canada and Cuba, two countries whose international trade depended for more than 60 per cent of their markets on the United States, with a unique opportunity to improve their own bilateral relations. But for 14 years, for reasons to be discussed later, the two countries could not seem to adjust to the new situation, a situation that had bothered British North Americans more than a century before.

In 1866, the Fathers of Confederation had wanted to bypass the United States role in Canada's trade with Latin America. They desired close and direct ties with the Caribbean, Brazil and Mexico. To that end, they despatched a mission to the area, and one group from that mission visited Cuba, then still a Spanish colony. On its arrival in Havana, the group conferred with government leaders. Mission members were disturbed by the fact that British North American trade with Cuba, while extensive, did not have sta-

tistical recognition because so much of it went through the United States. They suggested that it was probably unwise for Cuba "to remain wholly dependent for many necessities on a single source of supply, and that source the United States...". They offered British North America as an alternative, to mitigate a possible breakdown in U.S.-Cuban ties.

The Cubans, naturally enough, wanted to sell as well as buy. In their view, Canadian-Cuban bilateral trade relations would depend on Cuban ability to sell sugar, the island's major export, to the Canadian market. The trade mission suggested the possibility that Canadian sugar consumption could be increased by reducing the high import duties levied against producers from outside the British Empire and would "entertain in a liberal spirit any proposition for a reduction of these duties...", provided reciprocal arrangements could be made. It would be 20 years before the Anglo-Spanish trade treaty provided those arrangements.

Stability imposed

Canada-Cuba ties were not very strong, however, until U.S. intervention in the Cuban war of independence (1895-98) ensured that the island would not remain in the Spanish empire. That intervention and the subsequent four-year U.S. occupation provided Cuba with a stability it had not had for some 30 years. Several Canadian groups, often in partnership with leading U.S. capitalists, sought to take advantage of this stability. The Hanson Brothers of Montreal led one group; Sir William Van Horne and certain persons involved with the Canadian Bar of Commerce formed another. Both groups had their eyes on the Havana tramway system. The Hanson Brothers won a short-lived concession, but within a few years U.S. investors had gained control. Van Horne, in partnership with U.S. entrepreneurs, made a greater impact with the completion of a railway linking Santiago in eastern Cuba with Havana.

Opportunity
to improve
bilateral
relations

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The flurry of interest in Cuba among leading Canadian financiers did not escape the notice of E. L. Pease, manager of the Montreal branch of the Merchants Bank of Halifax (the Merchants Bank became the Royal Bank of Canada in January 1901). As a result of his efforts, the bank's directors, somewhat reluctantly, agreed to open a Havana branch. The branch began operations in March 1899; one of its two senior officers was the former U.S. Vice-consul in Havana. His appointment provided the bank with an immediate entrée into the Havana business community. But more important to the future growth of the bank's Cuban operations was the determination of the United States to guarantee Cuba's stability in the post-occupation period. The United States accomplished this by adding to the Cuban public's constitution an amendment drafted by Senator Platt, which remained in force until 1934. Among other things, this amendment granted the United States the right to intervene should Cuba become unstable.

This U.S.-guaranteed stability provided the protection under which foreign firms established themselves in the republic. Canadian bankers, insurance firms and settlers were attracted to a development on the Isle of Pines, and others came to the island in the first decade of this century. The Royal Bank demonstrated Cuba's potentialities as it quickly became a major influence in the economic life of the republic (the Bank of Nova Scotia went into Cuba in 1906, but had a more limited network). It opened branches in Santiago (1903) and Camaguey (1904). Under its local leadership, more daring than the head office in Canada, the bank became the Cuban Government's agent for paying off the veterans of the Army of Liberation. At the same time, the bank persuaded many veterans to open accounts. The banking business thus continued to expand and by 1923 the Royal Bank had 12 branches on the island.

Investment growth

As the bank's holdings grew, so too did investments in Cuba. In 1914 it purchased the Rio Cauto Sugar Company, with its large sugar mill. This was part of an increasing attraction of "the economy of bigness", which found the bank purchasing *Central Tacajo* and *Central Bajos*. These formed the Antilla Sugar Company. The bank also had holdings in the Sugar Sales Corporation, a brokerage firm, and the Cuban Canadian Sugar Company. Unfortunately, the Royal made its investments just before the 1920s decline in the

sugar market and it was a number of years before it could sell its holdings. Only in the 1940s was it able to "either collect its old sugar mill loans or dispose of all of its direct sugar mill interests at prices which pulled it out of the hole dug in the 20s . . .".

The Royal Bank remained in Cuba until December 1960. Its business improved in the post-1945 period. During the second Batista regime, it opened seven branches, but the overthrow of Batista and the new revolutionary government's subsequent nationalization of all banking operations, save for those of the Royal Bank and the Bank of Nova Scotia, dramatically altered banking prospects in the republic. The reasons for the Cuban Government's willingness to make an exception for Canadian banking interests are not clear, but the fact that the Government of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was not taking sides in the dispute between the United States and Cuba may have had something to do with it. The banks, however, did not think that they could continue to do business in Cuba, as all the firms that had been recently nationalized had had to transfer their funds to government banks. The Canadian banks therefore entered into negotiations with Cuban officials and accepted the official offer of compensation. They publicly expressed satisfaction, but it was no secret that the negotiations had been difficult and the banks' leaders were disappointed over the lack of compensation for goodwill. The Canadian Government, even under the pressure of urging by the banks, maintained a correct diplomatic posture during the negotiations.

The Canadian position on the Castro revolution during its first ten years had been conditioned by several factors. In the first place, the Canadian public had had to rely in the main on press reports emanating from the United States. Between December 1956 and late 1959, these reports were generally sympathetic to the struggle. Canadians tended to be sympathetic too. But the growing split between Cuba and the United States also received coverage and Canadians either accepted the U.S. view or were sympathetic to the Cuban position. Opinion in Canada appears to have been divided on the issue.

Mildly nationalistic

The fact that the Diefenbaker Government was mildly nationalistic, however, helped to balance the impact of news from the U.S. The Diefenbaker Government was more than willing to carry on Canada's normal diplomatic practice of maintaining

Public approval and private dissatisfaction

relationships . . . / countries whose political system was different. It also recognized that Cuba's break with the U.S. offered the opportunity of increased Cuban-Canadian trade.

In analyzing the results of this policy of continued recognition, one is forced to conclude that it lacked substance for almost a decade. The fact that Fidel Castro chose not to follow the professed liberal aims of the revolutionary movement against Batista alienated many Canadians, including those who influenced foreign policy. After an initial inept attempt to take advantage of a possible vacuum in Cuba's trade, both the Diefenbaker and Pearson Governments settled down to maintain correct rather than close relations. The Cuban links with the Soviet Union, the Cuban missile crisis and the Castro Government's interest in exporting revolution inhibited Canadian initiatives.

The Cubans, on the other hand, were also quite distant during the height of Cuba's revolutionary policy toward Latin America. Cuban officials appreciated Canada's willingness to maintain relations even in the face of U.S. disapproval, but they also recognized that Canada was a firm ally of the U.S. Canadian officials could not be treated in the same way as officials of the Soviet bloc. It would be fair to recognize that Cubans saw the Canadian Embassy as a possible source of information for the United States. Cubans may also have wondered about the Canadian claim that companies chartered in Canada and subject to Canadian law were really Canadian companies, in the light of evidence that such companies, when they were subsidiaries of U.S. firms, seemed more inclined to obey restrictive U.S. laws than to take advantage of their freedom under Canadian law. The Cuban Government was not anxious to assist U.S. companies that had had assets in Cuba.

Correct relationship

This correct, but far from close, relationship between the two nations was also reflected in the trade pattern. The Cuban Government was slow in meeting its debt obligations to certain Canadian firms, and in turn the Canadian Government was reluctant to provide insurance to Canadian exporters. It was also unwilling to extend credit to Cuba for the purchase of Canadian goods. The total annual trade of the two countries between 1961 and 1969 rarely exceeded \$60 million, and Cuba's exports comprised only about 10 per cent of that total.

Canadian-Cuban relations began to alter after 1969. Canada's foreign policy

review included Latin America, and Cuba, of course, had a prominent place in the review. At a New York meeting attended by several non-government participants in the review process, advisers to the United States Government made the point that apparently both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. were interested in finding a solution to the U.S.-Cuban split. They wondered if Canada was inclined to serve as an honest broker, but the individuals present did not think Canada, however willing it might have been at an earlier stage, would be prepared to play that role in 1969. Canada's geographical position and its close relations with the U.S. militated against such a possibility and, as has been noted, Canada's own relations with Cuba had not been particularly close. Rather than become involved in the U.S.-Cuban quarrel, Canadians interested in Canadian-Cuban relations were more eager to strengthen bilateral ties. It seems that the Cuban Government had a similar goal.

Cuba was particularly anxious to improve its trade balance with Canada. It also appeared that, as a result of the foreign policy review, Canada was more willing to believe that, while Cuba functioned as a "revolutionary government," it was also determined to be a good credit risk. Canada began to relax its former restrictive approach to export-credit insurance. This may in part account for the sharp rise in Canadian exports in 1970 (from \$40.7 million in 1969 to \$58.9 million). But this development did not greatly help Cuba to sell its sugar and merely widened the value of the trade margin between the two countries (from \$33 million in 1969 to \$49.4 million in 1970).

The Cubans sought to reduce the balance-of-payments deficit by increasing their sugar sales to Canada; they sought to compete on an equal basis with the Republic of South Africa. This appears to have been a relatively modest request in the face of it. Canada, after all, led the attack that culminated in the South African Government's decision to withdraw from the Commonwealth in 1961. However, South African sugar has continued to remain on Commonwealth preference and thus enters Canada at a more favourable rate than non-Commonwealth sugar. The Canadian Government justified this trade on the basis of a 1932 agreement signed when South Africa belonged to the Commonwealth, so that the Canadian Government has preferred to wait for completion of a major revision of Canadian tariff policies in conjunction with international negotiations under GATT. The Cubans might well wonder at this



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The warming of relations between Cuba and the other American states has given rise to an increasing number of official visits to the island in recent months. Pictured here on his arrival in Havana is Mexican President Luis Echeverria (centre) as he stopped in Cuba to visit Premier Fidel Castro (left) as a last act on a round-the-world tour. Also at the airport to greet Echeverria was Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos (right). A visit from Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau is scheduled for January 1976.

situation is revealed in the following figures on trade at the beginning of this decade:

	1970	1971	1972
Raw sugar to Canada (in \$ millions)			
South Africa	19.4	23.7	35.2
Cuba	2.2	2.4	1.1
Dominican Republic	4.8	5.9	3.9
Canada also had a sizeable trade deficit with South Africa in the same period.			

sugar prices

The world rise in sugar prices in the past two years, of course, benefited Cuba, and its government has had more funds

available for purchases abroad. There has also been an alteration in Cuba's relations with other American republics as the U.S.-inspired embargo has been breached. Argentina, some 6,000 miles from the U.S. border, took the lead in this and not only extended some billion dollars of (perhaps unstable) credit to Cuba but also insisted that subsidiaries of international companies in Argentina must defy U.S. law and trade with Cuba. This action contributed to a new boldness on the part of U.S. subsidiaries in Canada, resulting in the decision to take advantage of increased opportunities in Cuba. They were helped

by strong statements from Canadian officials. The measure of the increase in trade between the two countries is the sudden upsurge in dollar value of trade in 1973 (exports to: \$82 million; imports from: \$17 million) and 1974 (\$145 million, \$76 million). The prospects for the future, according to participants in the Canadian trade mission to Havana in March 1975, are bright.

Canada and Cuba have apparently overcome the difficulties of the 1960s. Cuba had slowly but surely reimbursed Canadian companies whose assets had been seized in the early years of the revolution. It also, belatedly, came to recognize that perhaps the best way of exporting revolution was to make the revolution work successfully at home and thereby provide an example for others to follow. It has certainly made significant gains but is still heavily dependent on Soviet assistance (Cuba is often criticized for its dependence on the Soviet Union, but in these times it might be more fruitful to see how this assistance is used in improving living conditions. A useful comparison might be made by looking at U.S. support for the Dominican Republic. Private and public U.S. funds on a *per capita* basis are roughly equal to the Soviet support for Cuba). Canadians and Cubans have also become less distrustful of one another, and this has somewhat reduced suspicion, though it would be unduly optimistic to expect peoples of such divergent views and backgrounds to be completely at ease with one another.

The United States provided the stability that attracted Canadian investment and business to Cuba at the turn of the

Cuba and the U.S.

There are reasons to think that the point of greatest U.S. leverage in its negotiations with Cuba may well be now. Cuba's first five-year plan, covering the period 1976-1980, is currently being drafted; assumptions about the availability of U.S. goods might affect immediate Cuban decisions with operational consequences two or three years from now. Unless the United States acts soon to make it clear that normalized relations are being sought, Cuba may well find itself forced to make commitments which will severely limit American access to a market in which the United States would otherwise have considerable competitive advantage. And this would, in turn, sharply reduce Cuba's incentive to compromise.

Similarly, international economic and political circumstances make this a good

century. Its close relations with Cuba ensured their successful operation until the Castro revolution broke the U.S. dominance on the island. For more than a century, as well, Canadian and Cuban exporters had continued to accept the U.S. as an intermediary in the vast majority of trade cases involving Canada and Cuba. The Castro revolution also broke that pattern, which, as has been noted, had greatly disturbed the Fathers of Canadian federation.

The years since 1959 have demonstrated that the Cubans can maintain their own stability (for a recent statement in this regard, see *The Banker: London & South America Review*, May 1975) and that Canadians and Cubans can exist without the U.S. as an intermediary. But 16 years is a short period in more than a century of relations. The fact that it appears that only the approach of a possible Cuban-U.S. *rapprochement* has galvanized Cuban and Canadian officials into trying to cement their relations by establishing closer economic and trade ties indicates that tradition weighs heavily on the relationship. The U.S. still influences Canadian-Cuban initiatives.

As Cuba and the United States move to re-establish formal contact, Canadian and Cuban officials should heed the warnings of those sensible members of Canadian society who organized Canada's first trade mission to Cuba. It would be all too easy to fall back into old patterns, yet to do so would probably not be to the advantage of either Canada or Cuba. It is to be hoped that this relatively recent flurry of activity will continue and be to the benefit of citizens of both nations.

time to break the impasse in Cuban-American relations. Having enjoyed the benefits of record high sugar prices and having seen these prices fall back down to about 12 cents a pound in mid-1975, Cuba would undoubtedly value the increased economic security that improved relations with the United States would afford. If the United States drags its feet, however, Cuba will either find itself in a stronger bargaining position in the future (assuming that sugar prices stabilize at about 20 cents a pound, as many experts predict) or else more dependent than ever on the Soviet Union; in neither case will the United States be more likely than it is at present to reach advantageous compromises with Cuba.

Excerpt from "Cuba: Time for a change" by A. F. Lowenthal in Foreign Policy, fall 1975.

Canada, France and Britain as hosts to multinationals

by David Leyton-Brown

the extent of foreign ownership in the Canadian economy has been documented by a succession of governmental and private reports. Readers of this journal are no doubt familiar with the observation of the Gray Report that the degree of foreign ownership and control of economic activity is substantially higher in Canada than in any other industrialized country, with one-third of the total business activity in Canada undertaken by foreign-controlled enterprises. In view of the unequalled magnitude of this phenomenon, it would not be surprising if many people assumed that the political problems encountered by the Canadian Government in its role as host to foreign investment and foreign-owned multinational enterprise are also qualitatively unique. Nevertheless, an examination of the policy experience of comparably-industrialized countries reveals striking parallels in the nature of the issues that have given rise to political conflict. In particular, the governments of Canada, Britain and France, over the last 30 years, have experienced differences of degree rather than kind in their policy conflicts with multinational enterprises, or with their parent governments.

The political issues to be discussed are all in the public domain. That is to say, there is both some public knowledge of the course of events, and some public concern over the outcome, of every case. Such publicized cases may or may not be representative of the larger number handled quietly through government channels, but they provide a ready standard of comparison among countries.

The first general type of political problem encountered in all three countries is the conflict between the policy goals of the host government and the corporate objectives of a multinational enterprise. Conflict of this sort falls into three clearly-identified issue areas: (1) domestic operations of the foreign-owned subsidiary, especially concerning labour relations; (2) proposed takeovers of existing national

firms by foreign investors; (3) proposed investment by foreigners to create new enterprises.

Labour relations

All three of these countries have encountered problems because of attempts by subsidiaries of multinationals to import industrial-relations practices familiar and comfortable to the parent company but foreign and disruptive to the experience of the host economy. Seen in this light, efforts by some American multinationals to apply President Nixon's 1971 wage freeze to their Canadian subsidiaries against the expressed wishes of the Canadian Government are clearly related to the desire of the Chrysler-owned Rootes Motor Company to conclude a rapid wage settlement with striking workers in excess of the British Government's wage restraints because of the importance of its British plants to a globally-integrated production and marketing system. Other such cases are the unsuccessful efforts of the Ford Motor Company to make their British labour contracts with specified grievance procedures legally binding, in contrast to the customary British practice of labour-management negotiations or the economically-motivated layoffs of workers by foreign firms in France without the normal prior consultation and relocation assistance.

The field of labour relations cannot be the only aspect of the internal operations of a firm in which corporate and governmental objectives conflict. It does, however, seem to be the only area in which

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public sensitivities become easily affected. It would probably be correct to conclude that these instances of policy conflict in the labour-relations area are only the publicly-exposed tip of an iceberg of disagreement about other aspects of business activity, such as procurement and marketing practices, reinvestment and dividend policies and the introduction of new product lines. It would probably also be correct to conclude that the general lack of success of host governments in avoiding socially-damaging layoffs and plant shutdowns, or preventing inadequate or excessive wage settlements, reflects a relative inability to prevent undesired changes in the internal operations of foreign-owned multinationals.

Takeovers

All three of the governments mentioned above have demonstrated some antipathy to proposed takeovers of existing firms by foreign multinationals. All have either blocked takeovers outright, or granted approval conditional upon performance guarantees. Under the Foreign Investment Review Act, it is now possible for the Canadian Government to deny, or negotiate to alter, any proposed foreign takeover, without public involvement. However, before the introduction of this legislation, the Canadian Government had acted, under sometimes ambiguous authority, to prevent the foreign acquisition of such Canadian enterprises as the Mercantile Bank, Home Oil and Denison Mines. Though a screening mechanism has long existed in France, in some important cases negotiations have been at least partly public. The French Government failed in its attempts to keep the computer company Machines Bull out of the hands first of General Electric and then of Honeywell, but it successfully altered a proposed merger between Fiat and Citroen, and prevented Westinghouse from acquiring Jeumont-Schneider as the base for its European atomic-energy program. The British Government has not explicitly blocked any takeover bids, though on one occasion it encouraged mergers in the British ball-bearing industry, which had the effect of keeping one of the British firms involved from being acquired by SKF, the Swedish multinational. On several other occasions, the British Government has compelled foreign multinationals such as Ford, Chrysler and Philips to give formal public undertakings of future benefit to the British economy in such areas as increased employment, regional economic development and export expansion, before it granted approval. Whether motivated by economic considerations or

Acquisitions previously prevented by ambiguous authority

by more political calculations, host governments have frequently been able to achieve their purposes in this issue area by blocking takeovers or imposing conditions upon them.

The number of foreign takeovers that occur in each of these countries is greater than dozens in a single year. Of this number, only a very few become politically salient. For the most part, politically-contentious takeovers involve firms in sectors of the economy considered sensitive by the host government. Canadian cases have involved uranium, oil, banking and publishing, while British cases have involved automobiles, electrical equipment and oil, and French cases have involved automobiles, computers and atomic energy. These sectors are normally growth sectors considered vital to future economic development of the country. Occasionally, however, a takeover is publicly blocked because the firm or industry in question is symbolically important to national traditions or identity. An example is the French rejection of the proposed acquisition of Parfum Rochas, the last major French-owned perfume manufacturer in France, by the Helena Rubinstein Company of the United States.

New investment

Another issue area common to all three governments concerns proposed new investment by foreign multinationals to create new production facilities in the host country. The convoluted negotiations between the Federal Government and certain provincial governments in Canada and some oil multinationals over the Syncrude project bear a close resemblance to those between the British Government and several aluminum multinationals, including Alcan, concerning the creation of a domestic aluminum smelting capacity in Britain, and to the French Government's dealings with Libby McNeill and Company, the American food-processing multinational, in an attempt to create a giant cannery in the depressed southern eastern region of France. In all these cases, the host government, while eager for the benefits associated with the establishment of the new enterprise, is vulnerable to the global mobility of the multinational enterprise, which gives it added bargaining strength. Credible threats to locate a smelter in Ireland rather than Scotland or a cannery in Italy rather than France can produce very favourable terms for the entry of the new enterprise. Economic interdependence with other autonomous jurisdictions, as in the former free-trade area between Britain and Ireland, or

he European Common Market, or among the different Canadian provinces, limits the ability of the host government to take unilateral action, and strengthens the ability of the multinational to play off governments against each other.

The next general type of political problem encountered in these three countries is conflict between the policy goals of the host and parent governments over the behaviour of the subsidiary of a foreign-owned multinational. These conflicts again fall into three clearly-identified issue areas: (1) controls by the parent government over the exports of foreign subsidiaries; (2) extension of anti-trust regulations of the parent government to activities of foreign subsidiaries; and (3) efforts by the parent government to improve its balance-of-payments position by influencing the investment, profit-reatriation and production-location decisions of its multinationals and their subsidiaries. In all cases, in these three issue areas, the parent government has been that of the United States. However, other parent governments could, and perhaps do, act in similar ways elsewhere.

Export controls

The Trading With The Enemy Act has been used by the United States Government to prevent sales to proscribed communist customers by American subsidiaries in each of these three countries. In the 1950s and early 1960s, China was the main target, as the United States government sought to prevent sales to China of such products as Canadian trucks, British aircraft and French trailers. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the focus of concern has shifted, and the United States government has interfered with Canadian sales of flour, locomotives and office equipment to Cuba. At the present time, with American controls over exports to Cuba standing, Cambodia and Vietnam have been added to the "enemies" list, creating the possibility of continued tensions in this issue area.

The principal justification offered by the United States Government for the extraterritorial application of its export controls to the activities of foreign-based as well as United States-based companies is the desire that its restrictions apply in non-discriminatory fashion to all American businesses and nationals, whether or not they own a foreign subsidiary. Certainly the impact on the economies of Communist countries has been minimal in each individual case. Only once has the United States Government identifiably used its export controls in pursuit of an immediate

political objective, when it ordered International Business Machines to forbid its French subsidiary to sell to the French Government for use in the French nuclear-weapons development program a computer manufactured in France but including some American-made components. In this case the sale was prevented, and the development of French nuclear weapons was delayed though not halted, but one must wonder whether the immediate gains were not outweighed by the resulting damage to French-American relations.

Canada alone has concluded an agreement with the United States Government to lessen conflict in this issue area. The Diefenbaker-Eisenhower Agreement does not guarantee that Canadian wishes will prevail, but it does establish a consultative mechanism to "depoliticize" such cases, and provides for the possibility, though not the certainty, of exemptions from the export controls under certain conditions in individual cases.

Antitrust policy

The extraterritorial "outreach" of the United States Government has also created problems when it has tried, through its antitrust policy, to prevent restraint upon American commerce, whether that restraint occurs domestically or in a foreign country. Host governments have resented the intrusion of American courts into questions of the structure and operation of industries under their domestic jurisdiction. United States authorities have tried, unsuccessfully, to subpoena documents from Canadian and British subsidiaries of American parent companies. American companies have been forced to divest themselves of foreign holdings, as when Dupont was required to sell its interest in Canadian Industries Limited and when the Aluminum Company of America was compelled to sell its interest in Alcan. In a surprising turnabout, American firms have been forbidden to acquire foreign enterprises if those foreigners are potential competitors in the American market, as when Schlitz was prevented from acquiring Labatt's.

Co-operative agreements between American companies and their foreign affiliates have on occasion been dissolved, as when the Timken Roller Bearing Company was ordered to compete at arms length with its British and French joint-venture affiliates. American courts forced the termination of a patents pool participated in by Canadian subsidiaries of General Electric, Westinghouse and Philips, and designed to protect manufacture in Canada, on the grounds of restraint of

*Intrusion
of U.S. courts
resented*

American exports. This latter case led to another Canada/United States agreement. The Fulton-Rogers Agreement is designed to depoliticize future cases in the anti-trust issue area, by providing for prior consultations, though, again, no guarantees of the realization of Canadian objectives.

Economic policy

Increasing deficits in the United States balance of payments in the 1960s led the United States Government to use American multinationals as instruments of its economic policy. American corporations were given guidelines designed to affect their investment, profit-repatriation, dividend and financing policies so as to increase net capital inflow to the United States. In 1965, such guidelines were voluntary, and treatment of Canada and Britain was lenient, though Canada's Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce was prompted to issue a list of guiding principles for good corporate behaviour. American investment in France declined, but since the guidelines coincided with the French Government's freeze on American investment, it is hard to isolate the cause.

In 1968, the American guidelines were made mandatory, with different effects in the three host countries. Canada negotiated an exemption in return for a commitment to prevent the "pass-through" of United States funds to third countries and a promise to convert \$1 billion of Canadian foreign-exchange reserves into non-liquid United States Treasury Securities to lessen world pressure on the American dollar. Britain was treated more leniently than other Western European countries but still suffered some decline in American corporate investment. France, like other Western European countries, was subjected to a complete moratorium on new American investment and a ceiling on the permissible reinvestment of profits by French subsidiaries of American multinationals, which prompted outrage and threats of retaliation by the French Government.

All three of the host governments viewed American attempts to reduce the outflow of American capital for investment purposes as legitimate, and comparable in principle to the British and French exchange controls. However, American attempts to dictate an accelerated rate of profit-repatriation abroad by companies incorporated under host-government law were viewed as an unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of another sovereign state.

The August 1971 10 percent surcharge on most imports of manufactured or processed goods from Canada, but not on most imports of unprocessed raw materials, threatened to disrupt the pattern of inter-affiliate trade, which accounted for a large proportion of Canadian exports to the United States. The American Domestic International Sales Corporation program is designed to encourage American multinationals to produce for export in American plants, rather than produce for foreign markets in foreign subsidiary plants. All cases in this issue area serve to impair the image of multinational enterprises as truly multinational, and capable of acting as good corporate citizens in a country in which they operate.

Host policy

One last general type of political difficulty has so far arisen only in Canada. The previous three issue areas have concerned efforts by the parent government to use multinationals as instruments of its policy. In this issue area, the Canadian Government has taken the initiative in exploiting the unique characteristics of foreign-owned multinationals as an instrument of its own policy.

The Canadian Government achieved the desired economies of scale and rationalization in Canadian automobile production through the Canada/United States Automobile Agreement, to which the four American automobile companies attached formal letters of undertaking. Political rather than economic gains were realized by the Canadian Government when the Humble Oil Company signed letters of compliance accepting Canadian pollution regulations in the 100-mile pollution-free zone in the Arctic, despite the fact that the United States Government objected to Canadian claims of jurisdiction. Not all Canadian initiatives are crowned with success, however, as the history of the *Time/Reader's Digest* case demonstrates.

This brief account should have made it clear that, though the details of individual cases differ, the same political issues arise in the policy experience of various host governments. Multinational corporations can mount an autonomous challenge to the authority of a host government, or can be used as instruments of government policy, commonly by the parent government but also, infrequently, by the host government. Host-government policy has been largely responsive in character in all three countries, with issues ordinarily being placed on the agenda by the actions of enterprises or of other governments.

Host governments have proved to be relatively ineffectual in attempting to prevent undesired changes in the internal operations of a local subsidiary of a foreign multinational, when such disagreements are played out in the public domain, particularly in the area of labour relations. There is greater effectiveness of host-government policy when applied at its orders to prevent or attach conditions to the entry of a multinational. On the other hand, it is at the moment of prospective entry that the international mobility of multinational gives it maximum bargaining advantage in dealing with governments.

Since Canada, Britain and France are

simultaneously hosts and parents to multinationals, and are seeking to maximize the benefits to be received from their operations as well as to minimize the costs to be suffered, there is little likelihood of arbitrary or discriminatory policy. Interdependence with other jurisdictions, in a federal-provincial or common market relationship, and the globally-integrated operations of many multinationals, also make extreme unilateral policy an increasingly unlikely prospect. Host governments must, and will, adjust to the existence of a new player in the game of world politics, as the effects of multinational enterprises become better understood.

Extreme policy unlikely

The politics of those multinational entities

by Brian Meredith

The special position held by Canada in the conduct of international affairs, and particularly in that phase embracing the uneasy relations between the developing and the industrialized worlds, has acquired new character. The change comes with Canada's share in the work of the 48-member UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, and focuses a concern Canadians have shown in a number of other UN organs during the past few years.

The multinational corporation (to stick to the old name), long a familiar feature of the Canadian scene, is the cause of much affluent and ambivalent anxiety; but it has long since proliferated far and wide most profitably and become a source of concern to others nationally, as well as something of an enigma internationally.

The multinationals have brought "entity politics" into being — a new kind of problem at international conferences such as the UN's struggles with the law of the sea, or IMCO's efforts to put up a new system of marine satellites, or NCTAD's wrestlings with commodity stabilization and the state of the world economy generally. They have been seen, and attacked, as creatures of Croesus, detached from any national affiliation or concern or loyalty, and playing off the

societies in which they operate against one another for their own benefit. Governments have eyed them uneasily, both internationally and nationally. They have, of course, been stoutly and expertly defended as world citizens, as instruments of a future global government, and they have pointed to the scars they showed from their encounters with greedy governments.

Some degree of melancholy is understandable among the multinationals, if only because they have been sought after by nations wishing to industrialize their economies, to acquire foreign technology and finance and to modernize and improve their living standards, as they have been encouraged to do from the beginning by the UN and its agencies. But, once estab-

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lished, the multinationals are seen as alien presences in the host countries, introducing or creating, as they set up shop, political and social tensions and changes and threats to those in authority, and a multitude of cultural imponderables.

Canada understands

It is all part of a painful mystique we can well understand in Canada because we see the multinationals in the light of our general concern over foreign investment, a demoralizing hydra with which we have been struggling languidly from the dawn of our history. Multinationals are simply "packagings" of the issue of foreign ownership of our resource-rich economy; and our recent uncertainties over the Foreign Investment Review Act reveal the confusion of federal-provincial feelings about them.

It is worth while to recall the opening of the Gray Report on foreign investment in 1972: "The degree of foreign ownership and control of economic activity is already substantially higher in Canada than in any other country and is continuing to increase." The report noted that foreign-owned enterprises undertook about a third of the total business activity in Canada.

The *Financial Post* of Toronto has listed 64 of the 100 largest manufacturing, resource and utility companies in Canada as being wholly or largely under foreign control, and it has pointed out how, in addition to foreign ownership of most of Canada's resources, outsiders have been buying up large sectors of the best urban and rural land and property available in the country. Canadians have been trying to buy Canada back; a single purchase reduced foreign ownership in the mining and smelting sector from 70 per cent in 1970 to 54 per cent in 1974.

The multinational is, of course, a feature of this scene, and inevitably we see it less as an international than as an identifiably American influence on us. We have felt political pressure over transactions with China and Cuba and Vietnam; we are exposed to American cultural expansionism; and we are especially aware of the presence, and value, of branches of great international American companies, and of the operations of similar companies in the communications, cultural and industrial fields. So much has been said and written about our dilemma that it is pointless to labour it here.

Suffice it to say that, if we have come to any conclusion, it is that multinationals are a symptom and not a disease, and the fact that they are there may make the ailment easier to deal with. The real

malaise is the degree to which we tolerate penetration and partnership proprietorship by others. And we can see this as a world phenomenon. We accept the fact that there must be interrelation and interdependencies and constant international communication; it is inevitable that there must be interpenetration commercially. Not only is no man an island — he is no longer wholly the master of his own self and his fate. Everybody is busy with, and investing in, everybody else's business. This is simply what is called progress, and the multinationals are in the forefront of it.

Switching briefly to UN terminology, it is interesting to hear our national status defined in the context of this new UN exercise on the relations of governments and multinationals.

According to the UN press release issued at the time, Fergus Chambers, speaking for Canada in a discussion on the draft work program of the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations at its first session last March, said that Canada desired imported capital to develop its resources and was the home country of a number of transnational corporations. He hoped, therefore, that the questions confronting the Commission would be seen in both the host-country and home-country contexts. He called for international action to monitor those operations of transnational corporations that had had a negative effect on the social and economic development of countries. The Commission must not "polarize" on political or economic grounds, he added.

In the view of Mr. Chambers, research on the political, economic, legal and social aspects of transnational corporations was some of the most important work to be done by the Commission. It should begin by collecting reports on the extent of the study that had been devoted so far to the subject. His delegation believed that a code of conduct for transnational corporations should be voluntary, should emerge gradually, and should be subject to revision. Such a code should deal with the question of application and should cover the responsibilities of the host country as well as those of the corporation, he said.

A comprehensive information system deserved careful study before implementation, said Mr. Chambers. He thought that the Information and Research Centre should restrict itself to collecting information that had clear utility — to avoid being interfering in the private affairs of corporations and swamping itself with unnecessary material.

Reconciling interests

It is conceivable that this new forum for transnational, multinational company affairs could prove in time to be the place where the interests of all these international entities, commercial and governmental, might be reconciled. If there are policies that are wrong or unproductive or unfair on either side, this should be the place where they could be put right and where a *modus vivendi* could be worked out. The Commission would be where contacts and meetings of minds could take place, where mutually-acceptable philosophies could be shaped, and where much preventive diplomacy could be exercised by all concerned.

The Commission exists as a result of the hearings and deliberations and conclusions of the UN's now famous Group of Eminent Persons. The multinationals were eloquently represented throughout and, in the new organ, if the deliberations are carried on intelligently, the companies might be "harnessed", to make invaluable contributions to the work of the UN mechanism as a whole.

Some minor encouragement may be found in the inclusion in the original structure, as a subsidiary of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), of a Commission for Non-governmental Organizations, and through it the granting of consultative status to a wide variety of international interests. The first 30 years of UN history show that many world organizations have in this way had constructive impact on UN deliberations — in the ideas, the facts and criticisms they have advanced, and the active field work some of them have undertaken on UN projects or objectives. It seems reasonable that great companies with global experience and resources and vast industrial expertise should similarly be consulted. Many would see this as a risk, as a supping with the devil — but it could be worth it.

At the UN "Mother House", and at gatherings of its satellites and subsidiaries, commercial interests have, of course, long had their unofficial observers; but, being non-governmental entities, they have, at the UN itself, been able to work officially through a very limited number of channels. One of those has been the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) which has had NGO consultative status and, incidentally, has added an important document to the vast bibliography on the multinationals, in the form of an analytical critique, item by item, of the report of the Group of Eminent Persons. It could be argued that commercial lobbies should come into the open and be employed in

matters of trade, commodity control, technology transfer, and numerous other matters on which they have expert status.

This is, in effect, the case on lower UN levels. For instance, at the headquarters of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) in London, a variety of commercial and specialist interests, such as the international chamber of shipping, have consultative status and maintain contact with technical committees of direct concern to them. There were several in attendance at the first session of the IMCO conference in May on the establishment of an international marine satellite system to improve the crowded and imperfect state of current communications for ships at sea. This is the case also with meetings on pollution of the sea by shipping, on safety at sea, on navigation, and so forth.

Human ingenuity has yet to devise a better alternative to the inventiveness, initiative, flexibility and power inherent in these multinational entities, and until this is found some closer contact for them with political realities and social needs could have a most sophisticating and salutary influence on them. The Commission on Transnational Corporations, if it can avoid pure negativism, could provide the means for fruitful collaborations, and, if companies can work with it and learn from it, the Commission would work constructively and purposefully as an arm of ECOSOC.

Better alternative to multinationals yet to be devised

Deplorable and disreputable

The danger of wishful thinking and sweet reasonableness in this vein is that it sweeps under the carpet the utterly deplorable and disreputable circumstances in which some individual multinationals have been found to be operating and for which, rightly or wrongly, they have been blamed. Not to be forgotten are revolutions and assassinations and bribings on a colossal scale, crushingly low wages, poor housing and working conditions, and ruthlessly anti-social behaviour in far places, not to mention lively co-operation in the circumvention of the expressed wishes of the international community concerning territories held under illegal domination or whole peoples ruled by grotesquely discriminatory authority. The protests at annual general meetings of shareholders of some of the companies found to be associated with, and indeed almost apologists for, such things gives some hope of reform from within; but it is a small hope. The real opportunity lies in intergovernmental co-operation in observing and controlling their activities and in instilling into them a true awareness of their political and social

responsibilities, as well as of their economic power. There is both governmental and commercial dirty linen to be laundered before much can be done, and this will at first be the preoccupation at the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations.

At its first two-week session last March, the Commission approved a preliminary work program giving priority to a code of conduct for transnationals and establishing guidelines for the information and research centre that is being set up in the secretariat.

The Commission undertook to identify areas of concern relating to the transnationals, and was given draft listing from three groupings of states. One came from the Group of 77, a second from developed home and host countries, and a third from the socialist states.

Among the 21 areas proposed by the 77 were: preferential treatment over national enterprises demanded by transnationals; their refusal to accept exclusive jurisdiction of domestic law in cases of litigation or of compensation for nationalization; their tendency not to conform to national objectives and lack of respect for the socio-cultural identity of host countries; and their use as instruments of foreign policy by other countries, notably for the collecting of intelligence.

Among the 23 areas cited by the developed home and host states were: the degree to which host-country legislation may discriminate in the treatment of foreign-controlled firms; the extent to which expropriation was accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective compensation; the need to define what was acceptable and what was unacceptable in the political activities of transnationals; and the extent to which transnationals improve or worsen the working conditions of their employees.

The socialist group, headed by the U.S.S.R., supported the 77 and added two points of their own: the negative attitude of transnationals towards the organization of workers and trade union rights and their negative impact on international economic relations.

By May, the Commission was getting suggestions as to what more it should do. The Economic Commission for Latin America, meeting in Port of Spain, decided by a vote of 20 for, one against and three abstentions (Canada included), to set up a regional unit of its own under the aegis of the Transnational Commission. The aim, Trinidad's Prime Minister explained, was "to bring the activities of the transnational enterprises under surveillance, co-ordinate national efforts, and provide appropriate

advice to national governments and mote the adoption of a code of conduct for transnationals".

General pattern

This is the general pattern. The Commonwealth Secretariat held a seminar in January that came to the conclusion that to cope with multinationals, governments should increase their capacity to appraise proposals put to them and to consider alternatives for finance, technology management. They needed to strengthen their resources for negotiating terms and conditions for new investments and for amending existing agreements. And they had especially to be able to monitor the operations of multinational companies.

The Secretariat, it turned out, had some time previously set up a special group with broad expertise that had already been involved in advising on the setting-up of arrangements in a variety of places and in several types of undertakings. Their advice included legislation, tax systems, royalty regimes, prospecting and licensing arrangements, labour terms and anti-pollution controls. The Commonwealth approach has been clearly less political and more practical than other quarters.

Another exercise has been in progress in an OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) committee. This got attention in the press, as it was instigated by trade unions and was in a developed-world setting — where, in fact, the ICC has pointed out, two-thirds of the operations of the multinationals take place. The permanent advisory body on trade union matters has been critical of the OECD Secretariat, which, as a correspondent of the *Financial Times* of London writes, clearly ducked the issue of cooperation with multinationals because "governments lack the political will" to challenge them.

The rub for trade-union interests, of course (and this has been reflected in an earlier examination of the issue conducted by the ILO), is that multinationals pit the workers in one country off against those in another. The company standard (and this had been seen in Britain) in dispute is "either you accept our offer or we move production elsewhere and run the plant down". So far there has been no adequate answer to this ultimatum.

Things to come

The multinationals, transnationals — whatever you will —, are portents of things to come as well as of things that now obtain. They are likely to become infinitely more politically aware; and governments

may be apt, as many have been already, to buy heavily into them. The Canadian Hudson's Bay Company was initially a company of adventurers, but it became in fact the custodian of British Government policy and of much Canadian terrain and, of course, it has since been repatriated as Canadian conglomerate.

This metamorphosis could happen with others. Host governments are bound to feel ill at ease and apprehensive concerning wealthy foreign bodies in their midst, and, even in market economies, the political and economic circumstances will

be found to lead to take-over, nationalization and repurchasing.

What must happen in any society — especially our own — is that an awareness must develop of the limits to which the benefits of foreign investment ought to go. As an individual must preserve his integrity and self-respect in relation to the community, so the community must keep its identity and character in relation to outside influences, including developers. The multinational is a camel to be kept under control; let him into your tent, and you will be trampled underfoot.

Book review

Cuban-American Relations

by Arthur Blanchette

It was Léon Mayrand's restless curiosity about his surroundings that brought him to Cuba in February 1964. He asked for the assignment and came to know the island well. He spent more than six years there as Ambassador, with a dual accreditation to Haiti, before retiring from Canada's foreign service early in 1971. He travelled extensively throughout the country and was on friendly terms with Fidel Castro, for whom he had a good deal of admiration.

Mayrand had an optimistic outlook on life, an agreeable sense of humour, and a lively interest in his surroundings. He went through life enjoying its pleasures with discernment. As I read his *Vers un accord américano-cubain*, I expected some of this to filter through, but relatively little does. The book was written as his life was ending. He worked on it assiduously, both in Southern France, where he had settled in 1971, and in Ottawa. He spent part of the spring and summer of 1973 doing research in the Historical Division and I could not fail to notice that his usually gay spirits were flagging. It was only later that year, in a letter from him asking me to check a point for his book, that I discovered why. He was already suffering from the disease from which he

died last winter. His book was thus written in difficult personal circumstances against that most irrevocable of deadlines, and readers should keep this in mind.

Castro's personality

Vers un accord américano-cubain is a short, orderly, well-organized, and clearly-presented book. Mayrand starts out by tracing briefly the island's history before Castro, its complex and at times humiliating relations with the United States arising out of the Platt Amendment. In the first chapter he also presents a perceptive study of Castro's personality, an analysis of his political philosophy, an account of his struggle against Batista, of his victory in the field and subsequent consolidation of power. Although brief, this is one of the most interesting parts of the book. His study of Castro's personality is particu-

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larly engaging and should be helpful to all students of Cuban affairs.

He then goes on to describe the Cuban-American dispute in its various phases during the past decade and a half, beginning with the break in diplomatic relations and the battle of the Bay of Pigs and ending with the present day. He analyzes with detachment, and in some detail, the attitudes of the parties. He mentions the abortive offer of good offices made by Howard Green when he was Secretary of State for External Affairs. This chapter is the longest in the book and is a mine of well-marshalled, useful information dispassionately presented.

The next two chapters present the problem, first in its legal aspects and then in terms of the international mechanisms available for its solution: arbitration, submission to the International Court of Justice, good offices and mediation, direct negotiations, etc. The advantages and disadvantages of each of these procedures are analyzed and a decision in favour of direct negotiations emerges.

After considering possible solutions to the problem, such as neutralism, non-alignment, neutrality and non-engagement for Cuba (Mayrand defines each of these terms for his own purposes and some readers will probably find his definitions wanting), he opts for neutralism as offering the best chance for a lasting settlement. In his own words, his preferred solution would be "*un régime non pas de neutralité, mais de neutralisme pour Cuba*" brought about by direct negotiations. He recommends that Canada and Mexico, the two American countries that have maintained diplomatic relations with the Castro Government without interruption, should "*concerter leurs efforts pour aider à la solution dudit conflit*" by helping to bring the parties together.

He considers that neutralism as a solution reflects the views of the Castro Government itself. He bases this opinion, regrettably, on second-hand evidence: a statement allegedly made by Castro in 1962 as conveyed in a book published in Lausanne in June 1962 by Jean Dumur in the series *L'Atlas des Voyages*, and a

"Plan of Neutralization" issued in 1964 "a group of revolutionaries living on island". Mayrand considers that this plan which calls for the neutralization of Cuba "could not have been issued without knowledge and consent of the competing Cuban authorities". Perhaps.

Brighter prospects

The prospects for direct negotiations between Washington and Havana certainly seem somewhat brighter now. Secretary of State Kissinger has disclosed that there have recently been a number of United States diplomatic overtures to Cuba. Whether the question might well be asked whether Mayrand's preferred solution, particularly the role envisaged for Canada and Mexico in helping to bring it about, is a realistic proposition. To try to undo the past, establishing *un régime de neutralisme pour Cuba* (somewhat along Austrian lines, he seems to intimate on Page 195) struck me as being — at the very least — rather easier said than done, especially after some 15 years of close Cuban association with the Communist bloc. The Austrian and Cuban situations have relatively few points in common and Mayrand himself, at one point, asks rhetorically whether the Soviet authorities would go along with the idea. At any rate, a solution along these lines is not for tomorrow. Moreover I, for one, would seriously doubt whether, in the current state of Canadian and Mexican bilateral relations with the United States, either country would wish to complicate its position further *vis-à-vis* Washington by becoming directly involved in this problem.

However that may be, Mayrand's ideas are stimulating and thoughtful. They are presented in a graceful style, which is a pleasure to read, and the *Centre québécois de relations internationales* deserves congratulations for having included this valuable study in its useful and growing *Collection CHOIX*.

Mayrand, Léon, *Vers un accord américain-cubain*. Québec, *Centre québécois de relations internationales*, Collection CHOIX, 1974.

The 'Praetorian Guard' of Uganda's Idi Amin

by Michael Twaddle

nce 25 January 1971, the day he toppled Milton Obote from power as President of Uganda, Idi Amin has rarely been out of world-press headlines. Alternately observers outside Uganda have been fascinated by his cheeky advice to politicians like Edward Heath and Richard Nixon and scandalized by his extravagant praise for such heroes as Adolf Hitler. But, until the appearance of *General Amin* by David Martin, there was no book that could be confidently recommended to those interested in the finer as well as the grosser aspects of his regime in Uganda. To be sure, there was *Amin* by Lady Listowel, but that was a much slighter publication by a rather less knowledgeable author, which is now only useful for stray aspects of Amin's earlier military career.

David Martin is a more impressive authority. He worked for several years as a journalist in Tanzania, where he was able not only to interview a constant stream of political refugees from Amin's Uganda but also, benefiting from the regional communications services that still link Uganda to Tanzania, to check points of fact with Ugandans still living under Amin. His book is also a longer one, running to 249 pages. Martin himself is modest about it ("It is not intended to be a historical or academic work. Rather it is a piece of reportage – an interim report. When Amin has gone it will be possible to ascertain in much greater detail all of the forces that motivated him and the damage he did."), but his modesty is misplaced. While Idi Amin remains alive and kicking, it is important to analyze whatever information is available about him, and David Martin has written such an informative book that no serious student of recent events in Uganda can afford to ignore it.

Early life

To start with, there is the account of Amin's early life on the margins of the colonial economy in Uganda, which certainly must have given him much to kick against. Amin's parents seem to have

separated shortly after he was born, and thereafter his mother, who looked after him for most of his childhood, became a camp-follower at successive garrison towns in southern Uganda. Amin himself appears to have had a succession of dead-end jobs before joining the King's African Rifles (KAR) after the Second World War, but his real chance came with the achievement by Uganda of independence from British protectorate rule in 1962. Unfortunately, Martin's account of these years is marred by the tendency of his principal informant (Milton Obote) to smear Amin with an atrocity record even at this stage of his career. The testimony of the British officers who had dealings with Amin at the time (and whose views have appeared in print, either under their own names or in stray sections of Lady Listowel's book) suggest rather that he was promoted first to non-commissioned status and then to officer rank because he was one of the best soldiers available in a pretty undistinguished bunch; British protectorate officials and army officers in Uganda, alas, did not excel in encouraging recruitment of more-educated Africans to the armed forces. Amin's advancement immediately after independence also owed much to the inherent instability of the parliamentary

Opportunity
came with
independence
of Uganda

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coalition that took Uganda into independence.

At this time, there were three main political parties in Uganda: the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), headed by Milton Obote and representing areas of the country outside the core kingdom of Buganda (whose status during the British protectorate period had been guaranteed by special treaty); Kabaka Yekka (KY), the coalition ally of the UPC dominant in the Buganda kingdom; and the Democratic Party (DP), with supporters both inside and outside Buganda.

In 1964 there were army mutinies throughout East Africa, mostly concerned with pay. British troops reinstated Milton Obote in power as Prime Minister, and soon political attention was focused upon the status of the Buganda kingdom in an independent Uganda. Obote tackled this problem by gradually building up his parliamentary support to the point at which he could rule without the assistance of the KY, but his success here was largely illusory; several Buganda politicians associated with the King of Buganda joined the UPC as covert rather than overt KY supporters and allied themselves with existing UPC supporters to form a "southern" faction opposed to Obote's continuance in power. Besides plotting in parliament, "southern" politicians made friends with army officers. Opolot, the army commander, became their man, but Amin, his deputy, countered by becoming Obote's ally. The latter proved the more successful alliance in the short run; because of his personal background, Amin had closer ties with the rank and file of the army, and "southern" politicians under-estimated the importance of these ties. Since most secondary schools in colonial Uganda were situated in the southern part of the country, "southern" politicians could rely upon considerable support from Sandhurst-trained officers in the now fast-growing Ugandan army. When, however, the eventual confrontation with the Buganda kingdom came in 1966, it was Amin's allies amongst the NCOs — not his enemies amongst the officers — who decided matters in Obote's favour.

Police support

A further mistake that "southern" politicians made before 1966 had been to neglect the role of the police as a support group for Obote (it was the police, not the army, that arrested the five leading "southern" cabinet ministers in 1966). This error Obote transformed into a major principle of policy between 1966 and 1971. Military assistance was attracted from a

*Background
gave Amin
close ties
with army's
rank and file*

variety of foreign donors rather than from any single source. Obote built up an extra battalion here to balance an existing one there. Not only was a special police force created as a para-military unit capable of taking over from the army in emergencies such as the one that followed the abortive attempt upon Obote's life in December 1969 but a police air-wing was also established to keep an eye on the air force.

By these means, Obote tried to fragment popular loyalties within Ugandan armed forces so that a military takeover of his government would be impossible. But, when Amin seized power in January 1971, it became clear that it was Obote who had miscalculated. Amin's seizure of supreme power was facilitated not by a highly cohesive army but by a deeply-divided one; though it was difficult for any segment of the Ugandan armed forces to seize power in this situation, it was, for the same reason, even more difficult to stop Amin's seizure of power once he set about it.

In his book, David Martin stresses a second miscalculation by Milton Obote at this time — he grossly underrated the importance of Amin's sociological links with other Nubians in the Ugandan armed forces. This is an important point, as David Martin is one of the first commentators to make it. Politically, the struggle for independence in Uganda took the form of an ethnic duel between the supporters of Ugandan nationalism advocating a unitary state for all tribesmen in Uganda and the proponents of a separate Buganda nationality. Ethnically, most Ugandans classified themselves by tribe.

The Nubians formed a somewhat small and anomalous social category outside tribal society. They had first come to Uganda as mercenaries recruited by the earliest British protectorate administrators from the remnants of the Turkish Egyptian empire in the southern Sudan (which had been cut off from Cairo by the Mahdist revolt further north during the last two decades of the nineteenth century), and for a time they had formed the backbone of the KAR in Uganda, with special privileges distinguishing them from ordinary tribesmen in the country. Between the First World War and the Second, these privileges were progressively whittled away, and the total number of Nubians scarcely increased as some Nubians drifted into the poorer quarters of trading settlements throughout Uganda and almost imperceptibly merged with other groups.

But the Amin coup in 1971 changed all that. The suggestion — clearly echo-

views of Ugandan exiles from the Amin regime in Dar-es-Salaam — by David Martin — that the Amin *coup* itself was a Nubian conspiracy, organized over a period of months by Amin in conjunction with fellow Nubians, whose "Nubianness" had been underrated by Milton Obote, is difficult to swallow whole because elsewhere in his book Martin provides chapter and verse on the plots and counter-plots that were multiplying immediately prior to Amin's seizure of power (as much because of the many internal divisions in the Ugandan armed forces as anything else). Yet, as an effect rather than a particularly important cause of the Amin *coup*, this "Nubianness" is clearly of crucial importance. It does much to explain such internal cohesion as the Amin regime now enjoys, its opposition to Asian traders and educated Africans, and its policy of terrorizing the majority population.

It is on Amin's policies of terror that David Martin is understandably most informative. His book provides many circumstantial details of the early bloodlettings in the Ugandan armed forces immediately after Amin seized power, when he was desperately trying to establish a stable second republic in Uganda, and of the later ones that followed the abortive invasions of the country by Ugandan exiles from the Sudan and Tanzania. Together with the careful report that was issued by the International Commission of Jurists last year, it amounts to an enormous indictment of Amin's political behaviour, in the light of which his harrassment of expatriates, brown as well as white, seems demonstrably mild. Asian traders expelled from the country in 1972 understandably find it difficult to make such comparisons, but the basic comparison stands all the same.

*Enormous
indictment
of political
behaviour*



UPI Photo

President Amin, a former sergeant in the King's African Rifles, now wears more splendid regalia. He is pictured here in his uniform of field marshal in the Ugandan army with his baton raised during a march past of troops under review in Kampala.

Neither the United Nations nor the Organization for African Unity has done much to protest Amin's policies of terror, partly perhaps because these policies are not completely without parallel elsewhere in the African continent. Protest may also have been muted partly because of the widespread belief in many quarters that the worst forms of terror in Amin's Uganda were now over. For the last 18 months, there has been a marked slackening in the grosser kinds of terror reported by David Martin, or at least of accounts of such terror.

Opinions differ over the significance of this apparent trend. One view is that the Amin regime may eventually be transformed into something if not lovable at least tolerable by the international community. Ugandan exiles say that Amin was so desperate to make a success of the OAU meeting that took place in Kampala during July 1975 that he was prepared to moderate his policy of terror towards the majority population in Uganda and to give in to pressures that otherwise he would probably have ignored — such, for example, as pressures favouring a peaceable departure from the country of his former foreign minister, Elizabeth Bagaya. Yet another view is that Amin's power-base in Uganda is now so small that he cannot afford to antagonize many more Ugandans without seriously endangering his political survival.

Only time will tell which of these is closest to the truth.

One thing, however, does seem clear. The Amin regime today is a very different political structure from the one established immediately after Amin's seizure of supreme power in January 1971. Then there were very few structural differences between the Amin regime and the Obote regime immediately preceding it. Presidential rule has since effectively been replaced by a "Praetorian Guard" whose leaders are linked to Amin no longer by a complicated game of ethnic ins and outs but by the near-illiterate fellowship of "Nubianness".

David Martin's *General Amin* is indispensable to an understanding of many aspects of the process of transition from "presidentialism" to "praetorianism", his informants amongst the Ugandan exiles in Tanzania were clearly far too biased about Amin's betrayal of Obote's early trust in him for Martin's account of the first structure to be wholly objective, while the vagaries of publication have prevented him from commenting upon the more recent apparent slackening in the politics of terror. It is much to be hoped that David Martin will not remain silent for long.

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54 (July 7, 1975) Visit of Commonwealth Secretary-General.

55 (July 4, 1975) Canada-Indonesia joint communiqué on the occasion of the state visit of the President of Indonesia, General Soeharto, to Canada, July 2-5, 1975.

56 (July 8, 1975) Commonwealth group of experts begins meetings in Ottawa.

57 (July 9, 1975) Canada at Expo 75.

58 (July 15, 1975) Diplomatic appointments.

59 (July 18, 1975) Emergency assistance for Romania.

No. 60 (July 21, 1975) Convention between Canada and Israel for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital.

No. 61 (July 22, 1975) Diplomatic appointments.

No. 62 (July 28, 1975) Canada to salute American Bicentennial at 1976 Tournament of Roses parade.

No. 63 (July 28, 1975) Visit of the President of Iceland to Canada.

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Signed by Canada June 8, 1974

Canada's Instrument of Approval deposited September 8, 1975

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Third-Quarter Report 1950-75

From cold war to détente

An optimist on the United Nations

Canada-U.S. economic relations

Evolution of the Commonwealth

Directions for Canadian foreign policy

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Prologue

The changing world of 1950-75

Third-quarter report

By Alex I. Inglis

In the world of business, corporations find it necessary to report to their shareholders every three months. These quarterly reports are invaluable indicators of the economic health of the company. In the realm of international affairs and the health of nations, however, such quarterly reports would be of much less value. In any given three-month period, the world can be dashed into war or a series of its institutions can crumble, depression can follow prosperity or new nations can emerge from colonial empires. Nonetheless, in general, the movement, the progress, the declines are much slower. Although a war can be declared and occasionally won or lost in a three-month period, the impact of that war is much slower in working its way into the fabric of society. Thus, in dealing with the international scene, it is more appropriate that quarterly reports cover quarter-centuries rather than quarter-years. It is with this in mind that the last issue of *International Perspectives* for 1975 is in the form of a report on the third quarter of the twentieth century.

Two major factors which were on the scene at the opening of the quarter-century have been constants of the period: the Cold War between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and their respective allies and, secondly, decolonization and the subsequent emergence of the Third World. The East-West confrontation was at its height in its Western civil form, and well under way in its military form. Although it was five years since the Soviet cypher clerk Igor Gouzenko had defected in Ottawa, the repercussions of the information he had brought with him were still reverberating through the system. The Royal Commission had already handed in its report on the dangers of espionage in Canada, but Senator McCarthy still presided over Star Chamber in the U.S., while at the bar of his court were such minor figures as the future Senator Robert Kennedy and the future President Richard Nixon. The most tragic side effect of the McCarthy witch-hunt for Canada, the

suicide of Herbert Norman, was still seven years off. McCarthyism was the U.S. response to the threat posed to Western security by Soviet espionage. That the perceived threat was real is clearly established in the material which Gouzenko had brought with him. But perhaps, in the end, greater damage was done to the liberal democratic tradition by the extravagance of the response than could have been done by any conceivable successes of Soviet espionage. Certainly it is true that, in the other Western countries (where the response was more subdued), there has been less of the searing soul-searching on the validity of the Western tradition during the latter part of the third quarter than in the United States, where McCarthyism was allowed to belie such basic principles of liberty as freedom of thought and the legal tenets of equality before the law, innocence of the accused until proved guilty and the specificity of charges.

In its military form, the Cold War, notwithstanding Vietnam, has been less inimical to Western traditions. The North Atlantic Treaty, with its provision for mutual defence, had been signed in Washington on April 4, 1949. It was not until after the outbreak of war in Korea, however, that the West embarked on a full program of rearming and made use of the treaty to establish SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) in April 1951. The East European response came in 1955 with the simultaneous signing of the Warsaw Pact and creation of a joint command for the forces of the eight signatories. For almost the entire quarter-century, then, Europe has been the locus of these two armed camps, in battle readiness, as the political climate between the

McCarthyism
belied
basic principles
of liberty

Mr. Inglis is Editor of International Perspectives. The views expressed in this article are purely his own, however, and are not intended to reflect the policy of the Department or to state an editorial position for this magazine.

two poles alternately warmed and cooled. The last years of the quarter-century, however, have been marked by a prolonged period of gradual reduction in tension, as both sides have pursued a policy of *détente* in the face of a changed world scene where the emergence of China and the Third World has resulted in a multipolar system replacing the bipolarity of the 1950s and much of the 1960s. It is not without significance that, as the period drew to a close, the heads of government of 35 states met in Helsinki early in August 1975 to affix their signatures to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Thus the quarter-century which began with the creation of military alliances ended with the formalization of the measure of *détente* which has been achieved and with the ground prepared for further advances.

As tensions have lessened in recent years, a process of re-examination and revision has begun and a debate is under way on how real the threat to Western security was. Whatever the outcome of that debate in the final judgment of history, it, together with the lessening of tensions between East and West, has raised a question about the validity of the NATO concept. NATO advocates hold that peace has only been maintained (and is only maintained now) because of the Alliance's provision for immediate retaliation in the event of war in Europe or in the North Atlantic. They also argue that NATO has provided Europe with a large measure of stability which has permitted, *inter alia*, the formation of the European Communities and the adoption of a relatively independent position by Yugoslavia. The advances in achieving *détente*, however, have appeared to reduce the immediacy of the threat to security and stability. In consequence, NATO officials and advocates have been casting around for alternative justifications for the existence of the Alliance — so far with little success. It is of interest to note that the treaty did, in fact, contain a provision which, if developed early in the third quarter, would have done much to lessen the need to search out non-security justifications today. But Article 2, calling for economic and social co-operation between the allies, for the most part received only lip service. In consequence, the vacuum was filled by the OEEC and, in its expanded form, by the OECD. The fate of Henry Kissinger's "Year of Europe" suggests that it is too late to develop a community of the North Atlantic. If this is so, NATO will survive only so long as it provides an important military contribution in the face of a per-

ceived threat or continues to be a major stabilizing force.

Between 1950 and 1975, the East-West confrontation went beyond mutual preparedness on two major occasions where major fighting occurred. At the beginning of the period, the scene of battle was Korea, where North Korean aggression was met by a Western and South Korean military response under the aegis of the United Nations. After an almost catastrophic retreat to the sea, the UN forces, under the supreme command of General Douglas MacArthur, reversed the situation by a brilliant though risky landing on the Inchon Peninsula followed by a drive across the country which effectively cut the Northern forces in half and could have ended the hostilities. Instead of settling for the accomplishment of the original UN objective, i.e. the repulsing of the North Koreans, MacArthur pursued them across the 38th Parallel in an attempt to unify Korea by force. As U.S. troops under the UN flag approached the Yalu River, which forms the border between North Korea and Manchuria, China intervened directly in the war. In consequence, the war, which could have ended in 1950, dragged on for another two and a half years and ended with the creation of a demilitarized zone across the continuation of two relatively hostile Koreas. In the meantime, General MacArthur's military career ended in his dismissal by President Truman.

Vietnam war

The other major open warfare was the long and agonizing conflict in Vietnam that lasted, in one form or another, for virtually the entire period. Western involvement was initially in the form of the French colonial war but, following the withdrawal of France in 1954, a much more serious situation was created when the United States entered the fray. For almost the entire remainder of the period, the United States became more and more deeply involved in a war which became increasingly difficult to justify in domestic political or general strategic terms. As protest mounted at home, the U.S. problem became less one of how the Vietnamese war would end and more one of how the United States could extricate itself with the least damage to its credibility.

Perhaps the most hopeful aspect of Vietnam (and to a lesser extent of Korea) is that the United States, for all its difficulties, refrained from escalating the weaponry used to the nuclear level. In this regard, it is of interest to note that one of the primary objectives of the Canadian Government was attained, *viz.* that, when

war occurs, every effort must be made to limit that war both in geography and, more important, in weaponry.

The second constant of the quarter-century has been the process of decolonization and the steady though slow emergence of the Third World. Forced on the Germans and Japanese by military defeat and on the British and French by economic and political necessity in the immediate postwar years and into the 1950s, the process of decolonization continued through to the end of the quarter-century, when it culminated in the *coup d'état* in Portugal and the subsequent institution of self-government in the Portuguese colonies of Southern Africa. The major strides towards the creation of a new economic order, as witnessed, for example, in the 1974 and 1975 special sessions of the UN General Assembly, are the indirect offspring of the tentative steps in world aid which had been going on between the end of the Second World War and 1950 and the 1950 Commonwealth measures begun at the Colombo Conference. There Canada, with some reluctance and much hedging, began to participate in the process which has come to be recognized by many as the *sine qua non* for the continuation of peaceful growth on this planet. Despite decolonization and the recognized need for development, however, it has only been with the unified front by the oil-producing countries that the Third World has gained real political "clout". At the same time, the use of oil-pricing and supply as a political weapon by the Arab states has perhaps obscured something of its origins and basic design. Similarly, the coincidence of the oil crisis with worldwide inflation and general recession has given rise to a tendency to blame all our economic woes on the Arab states — *post hoc ergo propter hoc*.

The history of oil development has been the story of the industrialized world utilizing the resources of the less-developed world at minimum cost. A cheap fuel in bountiful supply led, perhaps inevitably, to over-dependence. Coal-burning locomotives gave way to diesel, steam-generating plants were converted to oil, the family automobile moved from being a luxury

item to being a staple of family life. In the meantime, only limited research was conducted into alternative energy sources, except in the nuclear field, where much of the research motivation was based on military requirements.

So long as alternative supplies of oil were available, this situation could continue with little or no ill effect. The formation of OPEC, however, sounded the warning that change was on the way. Oil was one of the few resource commodities that lent itself to control by a cartel of a handful of nations. By acting in unison, these nations could extract from the industrialized world a better return for the depletion of their non-renewable resource. The stage had already been set and minor increases effected when the 1973 Yom Kippur War added to the Arab members of OPEC the political motivation to deploy their new-found economic strength. By the two-edged device of reducing production and increasing prices, they effectively introduced a major new consideration into the stalemates Middle East equation.

Yom Kippur War provided OPEC with political motivation

Inflation increased

In the process, the inflationary spiral, which was already very much in evidence in the Western developed countries, was greatly increased. The recession, which had already set in following almost a quarter-century of boom (interrupted only by mild corrective recessionary slowdowns), was greatly deepened. The roots of both inflation and recession lay outside the oil-energy question but, when the energy resource factor was added, the result was a somewhat gloomy economic end to a quarter-century of phenomenal growth.

Although, in the short term, the resulting economic crisis gives cause for concern, the end result may prove beneficial to all. For one thing, there has been created within the Third World an economic base for growth. Assuming that the necessary adjustments to the massive flow of capital can be made and the capital is moved from paper into productive pursuits, the foundation may well have been laid for the emergence of at least some Third World countries into the economic benefits which have been employed by the West throughout the twentieth century, and more particularly in its third quarter. In addition, to the extent that the oil-rich countries distribute their wealth to other less-developed countries, the adjustment of the latter may also be eased.

For the industrialized world there are also long-run advantages. For one thing,

Economic crisis may prove beneficial

World population:	
1950	2,486,000,000
1975 (est.)	4,021,756,000
increase — 61.8%	
Canadian population:	
1950	13,712,000
1975 (est.)	22,800,000
increase — 60%	

the growth in reliance on a non-renewable resource as the basic source of energy has been halted, or at least slowed, while there are still supplies available. At the close of the third quarter of the twentieth century, the motivation has been artificially induced to conduct now the research needed to tap other renewable energy sources, such as solar, wind and ocean systems; to make better use of other non-renewable resources such as coal; to substitute better management for the previously indiscriminate consumption of oil; and to develop more widely resource-efficient nuclear systems. Therefore, although massive economic adjustments have been called for at the close of the third quarter of the twentieth century, the scene has been set for a timely provision during the fourth quarter of the means for the continued well-being of the human race into the next century.

In more immediate terms, the oil crisis has provided the motivation to find a political solution for one of the most dangerous issues of the third quarter. This past quarter has been plagued by the possibility of a war beginning in the Middle East and spreading to the rest of the globe. With the United States in particular, and the other Western countries in general, determined to avoid the crisis of another Middle East oil cut-off, and with the Soviet Union having to accept lessened Arab dependence, the pressure on Middle Eastern states to settle the dispute over Israel has been increased. The achievement of a further disengagement of Israel and Egypt at the end of the period augurs well for the fourth quarter.

If there have been constants during the third quarter, there have also been changes, particularly in the world power structure. The period was ushered in with the established supremacy of the United States and the Soviet Union. As mankind enters the fourth quarter of the century, these two super-powers remain dominant, but developments in Europe and Asia have left them no longer supreme. In Europe, the fall of Britain from great-power status has continued and been confirmed (though at the close of the quarter the first flow of oil from the North Sea holds out the promise of reversing this trend). Germany, on the other hand, has greatly recovered, while France, too, has reclaimed part of its former authority. Perhaps de Gaulle's attempt to re-establish the glory of France was to some extent backward-looking, but it did lay the groundwork for the present, more practical role of France under Giscard d'Estaing as a major actor in Europe.

The major change, however, has not

been in individual countries but in Europe as a whole. There has begun there, with the creation of the Common Market and the other branches of the European Community, with the declared political goal of the unification of Western Europe and with the absorption of Britain into the system, a development which is destined to radically alter the world balance. Although the path of political union in Europe will be long and thorny, there are indications that it may well be travelled. Whether political union is achieved or not, however, the Community has already altered the balance by its economic strength and by its consultative procedures.

The greatest change in the power structure, however, has occurred not in Europe (or in the Third World) but in Asia. There, Japan, smashed into unconditional surrender as the only country in the world to experience nuclear attack, has emerged over the quarter-century to great prominence in manufacture and trade. Almost totally devoid of natural resources, Japan imports vast quantities of raw materials and sells them back at a wide range of goods, from heavy machinery and automobiles to radios and highly-sophisticated electronic equipment. Hard hit by inflation and recession and extremely hard hit by the energy crisis, the Japanese economy has, nonetheless, shown great resilience and will undoubtedly continue to occupy its place of prominence after the recession lifts. The major change which is likely to occur in the Japanese economy is that, as the recession lifts, there will develop a greater reliance on off-shore processing of raw resources for importation in a more finished form. This will be particularly true for commodities like aluminum, the refining of which is costly in terms of energy consumption. Similarly, forest products can be transported more economically as squared timber than as round trees. In these and other areas, Canadian and Japanese interests will be complementary, since the Canadian Government is committed to a policy of diversifying its economic contacts both in the form of greater trade with countries other than the U.S. and in the form of greater processing of resources before exportation. It is doubtful, however, if much change in the current pattern of trade will be seen until the world economic picture has changed.

Rise of China

Spectacular as the recovery of Japan has been, the greatest development in Asia during the third quarter has been the stabilization and emergence of China. The

Disengagement augurs well for peace in Middle East

nal unification of China under Communist rule took place as the second quarter-century drew to a close. The successes of the next 25 years have provided a secure base for the continuation of the regime. In addition, as the third quarter progressed, China became more active in world affairs. As a result, the balance of power has shifted markedly in the 25-year period. One outstanding question, however, is of the utmost importance for the future. At the time of writing, the leadership of China is still that which was in power at the opening of the quarter. But the men are much older. Mao Tse-tung is now 82, Chou En-lai is now 77 and ailing, and Teng Siao-ping is now 71. With the likelihood of a massive turnover in leadership in short order, and with the succession not all clear, the future of China is not easy to predict. Only one thing is clear. China will not only remain a major political force in Asia and the world but, with the discovery of large reserves of oil, will become a major economic force.

As all of these forces work themselves out and as the relative decline of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. continues apace, difficult adjustments will have to be made in the global economic and political structures. In this difficult but essential task, we shall, fortunately, have the United Nations available as a forum. It is no overstatement to acclaim the UN the most hopeful aspect of the third quarter. It has already outlived its predecessor, the League of Nations; it has become virtually universal in its membership; it has, through its Specialized Agencies, done much to advance human welfare; it has sponsored working conferences on some of the most pressing challenges to continued human survival on the planet Earth — population, environment, food and the law of the sea being most prominent at the close of the quarter. Most of all, it has provided the vehicle for the achievement of political solutions to international problems. The UN in the process has weathered some stormy seas and is in the midst of such storms now as new accommodations are sought. But, although it has been born on some of the rocks, so far it has not been dashed against them. With good will, good judgment and good luck, the institution, and with it mankind, will survive the fourth quarter.

Finally, there is Canada. Canada entered the third quarter still in the full bloom of its postwar influence. But it was a relative thing, as much attributable to the weakness of both the victor and the vanquished of the Second World War as to the leadership in international affairs

of some of the country's most able men, led by Lester Pearson. As the quarter-century continued, that influence was naturally eroded and Canada came readily to accept its place as a "middle" power. With the changes outlined above, however, there is a growing need to reappraise Canada's position in the world. In the confrontation of developed and developing countries, we have a foot in both camps; in the energy crisis, we have sufficient resources for our own needs; in the nuclear age, we have developed a reactor that is as efficient as any in the world; in terms of military might, our forces are kept at a minimum, but we have a demonstrated capacity for sustained war effort.

In terms of our relationships with others, we are also fortunate. In the Middle East, we have long been involved in peace-keeping and have won acceptance by all parties for our role. With China we have a long pattern of trade, and we took the lead among Western countries in re-opening relations. With Japan we have certain complementary trading interests. With the U.S.S.R. we have a common interest in development of the North. In Europe, we have the NATO partnership and the search for the elusive "contractual link". Most important, with the United States we have a history of longstanding friendship based on a shared continent and a wide range of mutual interests. Although in recent times there has been an abundance of strains between the two countries, to the point where both have acknowledged that the age of "special" relations is over, that refers only to the "special" relations in the aspect of each country's expecting and receiving treatment from the other different in kind from the way third countries are treated.

Finally, as the other changes in the world take place, especially as we move from bipolarity to multipolarity, the opportunity for international action and initiative by Canada is increased. As the fourth quarter of the twentieth century proceeds, Canada could regain the degree of influence it possessed at the opening of the third quarter, only this time its influence will be based more on inherent and continuing strengths than on the relative and temporary weakness of other countries. As this occurs, the task for Canadians in the fourth quarter will be to maintain a clear perspective on their true long-term interests, to recognize the opportunity (and the responsibility) to accept greater influence, and to mesh the two to the benefit of all. That task, though easy in statement, will be difficult in practice.

Canada fortunate in relations with others

From Cold War to détente

For the third time of asking

By André Fontaine

It used to be that there was either war or peace. But, in our time, new expressions have been coined — Cold War, peaceful coexistence, *détente* —, which by their very definition imply that between war and peace there exist intermediate stages.

These notions are all rather vague. The term "Cold War" refers to a war in which people do not kill each other. But the history of the Cold War, from Korea to Santo Domingo, was marked by bloody conflicts, which together took a toll of several million victims.

"Peaceful coexistence" was defined by Stalin as an interval during which the socialist camp could improve its position before the war that was certain to come. But, in Khrushchov's time, the idea of the inevitable confrontation was abandoned.

And if one considers its etymology, *détente*, like tension, can be thought of as merely a phase of the Cold War. But it is also an attempt to leave the Cold War behind or, better, a profession of faith in the possibility of doing so.

Before the present *détente*, which began in 1962-63, there were two others. Both raised great hopes, only to have them dashed.

The first began in 1953, following the death of Stalin. His successors wanted to reassure the West, and stop the drift toward world war. In just a few weeks, they relaxed their position at the Korean armistice talks sufficiently to make a cease-fire possible, gave their consent to the appointment of a new Secretary-General for the United Nations, renounced their claims in Turkey, made several offers to meet Western statesmen and in countless other ways tried to ease the strained atmosphere.

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This period took its name from Illa Ehrenburg's novel *The Thaw*. It gave rise to several important agreements: the Korean armistice, the less successful 1954 Geneva Agreement on Indochina, the establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and the U.S.S.R., and the signing of the Austrian peace treaty. But, by the end of 1956, it was clear that *détente* had run its course. An disarmament plan put forward by one camp was sure to be vetoed by the other. The climate of *détente* might, however, have continued to prevail had not the events of October 1956 suddenly raised a storm. The Soviets intervened in Hungary when "de-Stalinization" in that country got out of hand, and the Israelis and English intervened jointly in Suez, against the advice of their American protector.

East-West relations were slow to recover from this double blow. Khrushchev unleashed his hatred for the capitalist world. American intrigues in the Middle East gave him the opportunity to end the diplomatic isolation that had been his lot since Budapest. The triumph of *Sputnik* in 1957 was to him proof positive of the inevitable victory of socialism. *Sputnik* was, in fact, an impressive success for the Soviet leader — first of all militarily, for in exposing the territory of the United States itself to attack, he had stripped the Americans of the huge advantage they had hitherto enjoyed by virtue of their inviolable national sanctuary; and then, politically, because Washington's clumsy reaction and the initial lack of success in greeting American efforts to send ridiculous "grapefruit" satellites into space helped spread the idea that the socialist system was the better one and that the key to the future lay in Moscow.

Contrary to what was widely thought, Khrushchev's head was not turned by *Sputnik*. It is now known that during the only summit meeting ever held by all the Communist parties in power — 12 at the time — he vigorously opposed Mao Tse-tung. The latter, convinced that "the East Wind was prevailing over the West Wind", advocated a general offensive against the West. To Mao, imperialism

First détente following death of Stalin

was only a "paper tiger", which would never risk a war. If by chance it did take the risk, then, to be sure, there would be tens of millions of dead, but socialism would triumph once and for all. To which "Mr. K", as he was beginning to be called, replied that the "paper tiger" had atomic teeth. The balance of terror, on which the present *détente* is founded, was not far in the future.

Even so, Khrushchov meant to profit from the advantage *Sputnik* gave him, if only to reinforce his position of authority within the socialist camp, where his Chinese ally was becoming more and more critical. Loudly, he demanded that the "cancerous tumour" of the Allied presence in West Berlin be eliminated by giving that city neutral status. But he met with more resistance than he expected. A four-party conference achieved nothing; it was an impasse, fraught with danger. In an attempt to gain time and ease the tension, the Americans invited Khrushchov to visit their country.

Khrushchov's U.S. visit

The Soviet leader jumped at the chance. In September 1959, he arrived in Washington, grinning broadly and carrying a model of *Sputnik* intended as a gift for President Eisenhower. The latter readily acknowledged that the situation in West Berlin was "abnormal". If the situation is abnormal, it follows that it must be changed; Khrushchov was exultant. Thus began the second *détente*. It was to be marked by the Soviet leader's trip to Peking, during which he told Mao that the time had not yet come to test the strength of the capitalist world by force; a press conference in which de Gaulle announced the Sino-Soviet split; and a visit, as picturesque as could be wished, by Khrushchov to France.

The second *détente* was not long-lived. Khrushchov misjudged Eisenhower's intentions when the latter, after much hesitation, refused to apologize for the incident in which a U2 spy plane flew over Soviet territory. The Big Four conference of May 1960 was over before it began, and "Mr. K" vented his fury in memorable scenes, from the Palais de Chaillot in Paris to the United Nations in New York.

Immediately on becoming President of the United States the following year, John F. Kennedy organized a meeting with the Soviet leader in Vienna. However, the two managed to agree only about Laos. And on August 13, 1962, the Berlin Wall began to go up. The West protested strongly, but did nothing further. Encouraged, Mr. K decided to forbid Western

commercial airlines using Berlin air-corridors to carry members of other nationalities. This move was designed chiefly to stop the flow of East German refugees.

This time the West said no and, against the backdrop of an increasingly close arms race, tension built towards a climax. But in one of his speeches Khrushchov declared that he had been a metallurgist and that he knew how to go about cooling down red-hot metal. He mentioned to Paul-Henri Spaak, then Secretary-General of NATO, that it might be possible to set aside his demands concerning West Berlin. But the sarcasm of Peking over this retreat led the East German leaders to resume the attack. Clearly, Khrushchov did not dare to test Western strength in Berlin; however, he stood to lose a great deal of prestige if he gave way in an affair he himself had started. This doubtless explains the Cuban missile crisis.

The affair remains vivid in everyone's mind. One day in October 1962, Kennedy announced to America and the world that the Soviet Union was installing missiles in Cuba that were capable of reaching American soil. He stated that this would give the Soviets an "unacceptable" advantage and that he had decided to forbid, by force if need be, the delivery of strategic arms to Cuba. It seems that Moscow's plan was to face Washington with a *fait accompli*, and then propose the withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba in exchange for that of Western troops from Berlin.

Agitation apparent

His ploy discovered too soon, Khrushchov wrote letters in which his extreme agitation is apparent, encountered opposition that was not long in becoming public from some of his comrades in the Politburo, and finally decided to withdraw the missiles from Cuba in exchange for an American promise not to intervene there.

Kennedy was wise enough not to try to push the point further home. He gave his adversary the pledge he sought all the more readily, since he had, three months earlier, declared himself willing to give it if the Soviets would promise not to set up strategic forces on the island. After the Cuban crisis, "the two Ks" showed increasing determination never again to find themselves in a situation where the sole choices were capitulation by one or the final catastrophe for all. And thus the third *détente*, the present one, was born when tension was at its highest.

The first decision heralding the new *détente* was the installation of the "hot line" between the White House and the Kremlin, to allow Soviet and American

*Loss of face
for Khrushchov
explains
Cuban crisis*

*Choice between
capitulation
and catastrophe
avoided*

leaders to confer dispassionately in times of crisis. Shortly thereafter, in July 1963, the United States, Britain and the U.S.S.R. signed a treaty banning nuclear testing above ground.

From a practical point of view, the treaty meant little. The two principal signatories already possessed enough weapons to wipe out the population of the entire globe several times over; they scarcely needed to test any new ones. But politically the treaty had tremendous significance. For the first time, the Soviet Union had concluded with the foremost "imperialist" power an agreement openly denounced by China. It was at this time that an open rift developed between the two Meccas of socialism.

Recognition of facts

The policy of the two super-powers was guided by a sensible recognition of facts. The tremendous expense each incurred to protect itself from the other was an absurdity when the balance of terror prevented either from making war. Both now possessed second-strike capability — that is, submarines and missiles installed in underground silos to ensure their survival in the event of surprise attack. The aggressor in a nuclear confrontation would be certain to suffer reprisals out of proportion to any benefit he might hope to derive.

There were, in theory, ways of ending the impasse. A tight network of antiballistic missiles (ABMs) would give a would-be aggressor if not impunity then at least a superior position that would increase his power to intimidate. But the building of such a network would require resources beyond the means of both Americans and Soviets.

Since a 60-megaton bomb would never be more powerful than three 20-megaton bombs, the effectiveness of an offensive arsenal could not be improved by designing weapons with greater destructive potential. But this end could be attained by perfecting vectors through multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) that would turn each missile into a spray of bombs with unpredictable trajectories.

Fire precision could be augmented so that the number of probable direct hits on the emplacements of the enemy's retaliation system would be increased. And, finally, methods of tracking nuclear submarines could be perfected, thus depriving them of the virtual invulnerability they enjoy today. To be sure, it is difficult to imagine in any one of these fields, except perhaps the last-mentioned, the technological breakthrough that would give its discoverer a decisive advantage. But

the fear of being outdistanced by the adversary has compelled both antagonists to make enormous research efforts, with disastrous effects on their economies.

Thus the two sides sought to slow down the arms race by mutual accord. The nuclear test-ban treaty was followed by another prohibiting the use of outer space and the seabed for non-peaceful purposes, by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, by the first SALT talks, leading to a limitation on the number of missiles each side could have, and, finally, by the MBFR negotiations on the reduction of forces in Europe.

Negotiated by the Johnson administration and signed by President Nixon, the non-proliferation treaty merits separate discussion. Its aim was to prevent the emergence of new nuclear powers. The nuclear signatories undertook not to help any nation to obtain nuclear weapons; the others undertook not to seek to acquire nuclear arms, and agreed to inspection and control. It was an agreement by two super-powers that intended to remain the only super-powers. It is not surprising that a number of non-nuclear countries — Brazil, Israel, Spain, Romania and India, among others — refused to commit themselves to a pact that would determine their future. France and China, already nuclear powers, did not wish to be parties to an arrangement they felt would dangerously consolidate Soviet and American supremacy. West Germany, on the other hand, signed the treaty. It was primarily that country that the Kremlin wished to prevent from obtaining atomic weapons. Without them, how could West Germany hope to alter the territorial and ideological status quo that had prevailed since the last war and that was guaranteed by the fantastic military might of the Soviet Union?

That the United States subscribed to such an arrangement, and that President Johnson, in a speech on "bridge-building" in October 1967, intimated that the U.S. might make concessions in Europe to repay any Soviet assistance in extricating itself from the Vietnam hornet's nest — all this signified to the Europeans that they had better not count on the Americans to draw back the Iron Curtain. The promises of German reunification that Bonn had clung to became worthless.

De Gaulle was the first to understand. As early as 1963, he launched the slogan "*détente, entente, coopération*" in the hope of inciting countries of both blocs to shake themselves free from the domination of their respective leaders. However, none of the countries of the Eastern bloc followed the example of France, which opted out of



The Helsinki summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe gave "official recognition" to *détente*. On August 1, U.S. President Ford addressed the meeting of heads of government and heads of state in Finlandia House. The Canadian delegation was led by Prime Minister Trudeau.

ATO in 1966. Only Romania dissociated itself somewhat from the positions of its Soviet protector. When de Gaulle visited Warsaw in 1967, Gomulka told him clearly that he was not about to delude himself. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 proved Gomulka right — *détente* was not to be allowed to affect ideological positions; in other words, Soviet supremacy over the Warsaw Pact countries was to be maintained.

But this does not change the fact that, in a world where nuclear arms abound, there is no other solution than *détente*. Michel Debré is said — wrongly, it seems — to have observed that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was only an incidental event. Despite the cynicism of this remark, it must be recognized, seven years later, that the Soviet intervention did no more than slow down a necessary process.

The *Ostpolitik* that Willy Brandt began to devise when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs under Chancellor Kiesinger was inevitable a consequence of the Soviet-American armistice as de Gaulle's policy of *détente* had been, was fully developed only after the occupation of Prague. The latter event, despite the pitch of emotion that it legitimately roused in the West, did not in the end prevent the settling of outstanding differences between the Federal Republic of Germany and its neighbours to the East, the entry of both Germanies into the United Nations and, after long discussion, a

four-party agreement on the status of West Berlin, which was thus finally consolidated.

Détente recognized

In the last analysis, the Helsinki Conference in August 1975 did no more than give official recognition to *détente*. We can only hope that the spirit and the letter of all the clauses of its Final Act, including the one prohibiting all types of intervention in the affairs of others *on any pretext whatsoever*, and those encouraging the development of all types of contact, will be respected.

The events in Czechoslovakia were not the only ones that put *détente* to the test. It has withstood the Indochinese drama and two Arab-Israeli wars.

The U.S.S.R. did not react strongly to the massive increase in American involvement in Vietnam. The huge Communist offensive in the spring of 1972 did not prevent Mr. Nixon from going to Moscow. Nor did the Soviet leaders ask him to cancel his trip, in spite of the massive air-raids on Hanoi and Haiphong, during which some Soviet sailors were killed, and the blockade of the North Vietnamese coast, which was essentially directed against the Soviet Union. On the contrary, behind the scenes the Kremlin was recommending moderation to the North Vietnamese leaders and trying to smooth the way for a successful conclusion of the Paris peace talks. Similarly, the crumbling of the pro-

U.S. involvement in Vietnam did not evoke strong reaction from U.S.S.R.

American regimes in Saigon and Phnom Penh in 1975 did not appreciably alter the climate of relations between the two super-powers.

Détente has also survived two Arab-Israeli wars, even though the one side received plentiful Soviet support and the other benefited from American aid. In both 1967 and 1973, the U.S.S.R. used the threat of direct intervention to ensure that the United States would exert pressure on the Israelis to stop the advance of their armies. In both cases, the use of the "hot line" helped to contain the crisis and thus made its solution easier. In the same way, the landing of the Marines in Santo Domingo, the CIA-engineered collapse of the Allende regime in Chile, and the overthrow of the Greek and Portuguese dictatorships had no telling effect on the climate of East-West relations.

Economic imperatives

The reason is that, while the balance of terror prevents the two giants from making war on each other, *rapprochement* has been speeded by the imperatives of economic co-operation. Under Brezhnev, the U.S.S.R. has begun an immense effort to develop its national resources, which it cannot carry through without Western technology and even Western economic assistance. The United States and other capitalist countries, for their part, are only too pleased to find new markets in a period of recession. Day by day, more contacts are made, no longer only between diplomats and statemen but between economists and businessmen, and thus, slowly, attitudes are changing. It is probably in this process, as Samuel Pisar has said, that we have our best hope that *détente* will in time develop into something more permanent.

However, the dialogue between Washington and Moscow is viewed with dismay by countries that feel they no longer have any say in world affairs and, indeed, that they are pawns to be moved as the Soviets and Americans see fit. Of course, there is as yet no example of a political solution jointly pressed upon a third party by what Michel Jobert, borrowing an expression from Mr. de Rencourt, has called the "Soviet-American condominium". Rather, in the Middle East the two nations seem to be competing. The Israeli-Egyptian agreement of September 1975, which Mr. Kissinger negotiated by the sweat of his brow, was not well received by the Kremlin. Previously, the Indo-Pakistani war over Bangladesh had revealed the conflicting interests of two super-powers continuing to struggle fiercely for naval

New contacts
lead to
new attitudes

supremacy in the Indian Ocean. The serious setbacks for the United States that occurred in quick succession in Southern Europe and Indochina must be considered successes for the U.S.S.R. Similarly, the strengthening of ties between Egypt and the U.S., the fall of Mujibur Rahman in Dacca and the ousting of Vasco Gonçalves in Lisbon were setbacks for the Kremlin. Nevertheless, concord seems to prevail over conflict most of the time in Soviet-American relations, and lesser powers inevitably find their freedom of action restricted in consequence. Of what worth are guarantees given by two giants who would risk catastrophic destruction if really suited their purpose? How can a smaller power resist pressure from them if its defence or economy is totally dependent on their good will?

Not everyone can follow Mao Tse-tung's advice never to count on anyone but oneself. And even though China has succeeded in maintaining total independence, at the price of enormous military effort, extreme discipline and austerity and some diplomatic acrobatics, it does not treat the "two imperialist powers" altogether equally. America being, in Chinese eyes, on the decline, it sometimes allows itself to seek that country's support in sparring matches with the "revisionists" in the Kremlin. The effects of this approach are felt as far away as Angola.

As for Western Europe, the efforts of de Gaulle and Pompidou, continued in more conciliatory manner by Giscard d'Estaing, to have Europe play an independent role in world affairs have as yet produced only limited results.

The Third World, for its part, has gained considerable leverage in world affairs, owing to its oil reserves. But closer examination reveals that only the producing countries are benefiting, and, in some cases, oil revenues are not even enough to ensure national prosperity. Non-alignment may be the declared aspiration of all, but necessity imposes many compromises. The Third World challenge has apparently not yet made much impression on the two powers under whose tutelage humanity finds itself, for better or for worse.

This is why so much resentment, frustration, suspicion and pressure are building up in the shadow of the peacefully-coexisting super-powers. If peace is the tranquillity of order, as St. Thomas Aquinas defined it, then the *détente* that allows so much disorder and so little real tranquillity is not – or at least not yet – peace. It is, nonetheless, the *sine qua non* of peace, and that is why we must work to strengthen and extend it.

The constancy of sea power in strategic considerations

By John Moore

The sea is an alien element to all but a very privileged few of the world's populations. Many live more than 500 miles from the nearest coast; even greater numbers have never seen the face of the sea and, of those who are in contact with the vast ocean which covers nearly three-quarters of our globe's surface, a pathetically small proportion are aware of its power, its beauty and its vital importance to every living being. Not only does it provide a means of transport over the major trade-routes of the world, but its depths are the home of creatures that could provide a high proportion of the protein intake of the world's human population, its waters hold a vast mineral reserve and, on and in its bed, lie huge resources barely tapped by our highly technological society. The very term "sea power" is too often confused by the modern, liberal mind with something unpleasant and out-of-touch with present-day thinking. "Power" is a dirty word, a description of something abhorrent that is exercised by governments as a threat to universal peace. The purpose of this review is to show that this misunderstood entity is as real and necessary today as it ever has been in the confused history of the last thousand or so years.

Many definitions of "sea power" have been proposed. For the purposes of this article let us consider it as "that strength in naval ships, associated aircraft and training that enables a country to promote the political and trading interests of itself and its allies in peacetime and their supremacy over an enemy in war". In its earliest manifestations in the Mediterranean, its primary uses were for the transport and protection of armies bound for conquest and, particularly in the case of the Phoenicians and, later, their Carthaginian empire, the promotion of sea-borne trade. The use of oars in their galleys had a limiting effect on range — the ships themselves were built for calm-weather operations, with increasingly numerous banks of oars.

This form of propulsion was also used by the Norsemen, but their beautiful craft were of low freeboard, driven by a single sail and one bank of oars, which were manned not by slaves, as in the Mediterranean, but by the warriors themselves. In their case, expansion to other lands was forced upon them by the strain placed on their farming economy by a growing population. They ranged far — to the Mediterranean, France, Britain, Iceland, Greenland and North America; they fought fiercely to possess these new lands, and one result of their invasions was the realization by King Alfred of Wessex that he must fight these predators on the sea as well as on the land. He built ships, larger and faster than those of the Norsemen, and with these he attacked them both at sea and in their base ports — an early example of the "attack at source".

Early example of attack at source

British example

In a study such as this, the origins and advances of British sea power make a useful starting-point. A similar appreciation of the fundamentals of the use of sea power in the defence of England was not seen again after Alfred's death for 200 years. Once more, the country at risk was England, and again the Norsemen were the invaders, this time as Normans under Duke William. King Harold had gathered a fleet off the Isle of Wight designed to intercept the Norman ships but, not for the last time in British naval history, insufficient attention was paid to the men

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who manned the fleet. Cash and victuals ran short and the crews withdrew to more remunerative labours. William led his fleet unopposed to Pevensey and thence across the marshes where this is being written. For the lack of a fleet a kingdom was lost.

During the ensuing four centuries a dozen enterprises were launched on the English coast, admittedly in varying strength but all having a major similarity. None was opposed at sea. All occurred during a lengthy period in which there was little progress in ship-building — round-bottomed ships with little manoeuvrability were used principally as troop-transports. In 1485, Henry Tudor landed from Harfleur, won the Battle of Bosworth and the English throne and introduced not only a measure of financial stability but also an appreciation of the part the sea would have to play in England's future. The expeditions of the Cabots across the Atlantic showed the way to little more than the cod abounding off the Newfoundland Banks, but did provide a tough school in offshore seamanship. One of the necessities of sea power was being created without either the government or the sailors realizing it — training. Nothing can be a substitute for daily contact with the sea in all its aspects, for the occasional period of acute discomfort in which the task nevertheless has to be performed and for the understanding of how design and operation can be improved to ensure the production of greater efficiency in the ships and those who man them.

Henry VIII succeeded to the throne at a time when political groupings in Europe were achieving a solidity and power hitherto little known. Exploration and the exploitation of the riches of the newly-discovered lands were providing a totally new foundation for growth. Expansion and conquest were to be launched on a far broader front than ever before, and Henry feared for the safety of his realm and its comparatively minute population. He had learned from his father's activities, and set to work on the establishment of a seaborne counter to the increasing dangers from without. Not only did his fleet soon number over 100, but its administration was put in the hands of a Navy Board; another necessity of seapower had come to life in the shape of command and administration. It was a far-sighted advance, even if one of no great magnitude at the time. Throughout the years ahead, it was to be the vital aspect of both naval and mercantile administration that was to falter far more frequently than the men of the fleet. On the rare occasions when the latter failed to measure up to the requirements of

the country, it was invariably owing to maladministration, ignorance or total lack of comprehension of the necessities of power by those charged with the conduct of the Navy's affairs.

In Henry VIII's time, the design of naval vessels branched off from that of the standard "round-ship", which had survived for centuries. Henry himself insisted on the mounting of cannon in the "King Ships", and this forced a change in the beam-length ratio, a new type of craft, longer, leaner and heavily armed came into the slipways at Deptford and Portsmouth. The strategy behind this fleet remained one of defence, and it was not until Elizabeth I was at variance with the Spaniards that the new craft operated in an offensive role. Attacks on treasure fleets and galleons were frequently successful and success brought remuneration for those who backed the ventures. Sea power was entering a new phase, the plundering of lines of communication.

Growth of trade

Trade followed on the explorers' heels throughout the 100 years after Elizabeth's accession in 1558. But her successor, James I, was so bitterly opposed to armaments that the fleet reached a sad state of demobilization and decay. The "Turks" and "Dunkirkers", pirates of the more violent type, were free to harry the English coasts, to blockade the Thames and take prisoners from sea-coast towns — in fact to threaten the new-born trade in its infancy. Charles I, with "ship-money" and a far clearer vision than his father, attempted to rebuild a fleet adequate for the defensive role. He lost his throne and his head, but bequeathed to his successors of the Commonwealth the foundations of a navy that, much reinforced, was to wage a series of true maritime wars with the Dutch.

Greed is frequently the forcing-bed of strategy — greed for power, position, land or trade, being doubly reinforced by the thrust of religion or ideology. In the confused state of Europe after the Thirty Years War, all ingredients for this recipe of strife were present. Problems of trade stood between Britain and the Netherlands, France was engaged in the civil war of the Fronde but still had its sights set on the acquisition of the Spanish Empire, bitterness gnawed at friendships in Scandinavia, Catholics stood embattled against Protestants. These were but a few of the points of friction in Europe, and by now colonial possessions and concessions were matters of keen interest to all. Passage to the colonies lay mainly by the new-found

sea-routes and success in the consummation of national policies clearly required the backing of sea power.

But again and again in the stormy period stretching from the mid-seventeenth century to the early nineteenth, when war was never far distant and more frequently in active existence, this need for strong and competent fleets was appreciated by only a few. The building of ships is a laborious task, but far, far more taxing is the provision of their crews. Training, organization, the knowledge of elementary tactics fade rapidly with lack of interest or downright opposition amongst a country's rulers. During these 170 years of worldwide turmoil, not only Britain suffered in this respect. France forgot its fleet as it entered on a continental strategy. The failing rulers of Spain had allowed their country to sink into impotence. Throughout the countries involved in this awful procession of hostilities, weariness followed war, disbandment and dissolution of the fighting forces was the immediate reaction, fleets withered for lack of direction and through the loss of both men and ships. As trade recovered after each warlike spasm, so did its protectors find themselves rendered less and less competent to meet the call should it come.

Throughout this period, men and their families found new lives abroad. New communities and new centres of trade were established. Men fought for freedom from tyrants, bureaucrats and their oppressions, but all the time, on the long sea-routes, ships moved steadily back and forth. Without them, without their trade and the money it meant to colonial settlers, European businessmen and the governments at both terminals, little progress would have been made.

In the aftermath of the French Revolution and the wars that resulted from it, one fleet became pre-eminent. The Royal Navy was an irresistible force when, in April 1814, Napoleon was shipped to Elba. It had defeated his main fleets, had ensured the maintenance of Wellington's armies in Spain, had throttled the large bulk of France's overseas trade. By June 1815, with Napoleon's return thwarted at Waterloo, it seemed to be a certain guard for the world's oceans and a guarantee of the peace so earnestly sought by European statesmen.

But it was not to be. Pious hopes are born to be dashed, and the surge of ideas and ideology that pulsed throughout Europe in the wake of the French Revolution brought unease, conflict and civil strife. That this did not flare further into major wars must, in some measure, be

credited to the existence of a powerful naval force that made invasions and threats to seaborne trade appear dubious adventures. Under the guard of the British fleet, new colonies grew to maturity and the greatest assembly of countries in a single empire was at hand. Not only did this guard cover the imperial affairs but, since President Monroe had, in December 1823, enunciated his doctrine of non-interference in American affairs by European states, it had also provided a shield and support for the policies of the United States of America.

No major war

The 85 years of the nineteenth century following Waterloo were a period in which British sea power was called upon frequently for assistance, although, apart from the Crimean War, there was no occasion in which it became involved in a major war. The suppression of Mediterranean piracy began with Exmouth's operations against the Dey of Algiers in 1816. From then on, action took place in various places throughout the world, activities that went hand-in-hand with the suppression of piracy off the African coasts, in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. None of these, though, was an adequate training-ground for major naval operations. What took place was in support of the political requirements of the Government in Whitehall — all were tests of seamanship and initiative. But, as the sorry record of the Crimean War showed, 40 years of peace had brought about a stagnation in ideas and administration that threatened the very ability of the world's greatest fleet.

New thoughts were abroad, and yet, secure in its omnipotence, the Royal Navy was unduly slow to adapt its thinking to modern methods. The Industrial Revolution had made Britain enormously wealthy, but the Admiralty lagged sadly behind its competitors in adapting its lessons to the exercise of sea power. France was racing ahead in planning new and innovative designs, the breech-loading gun had returned to the naval scene, the American Civil War saw the reintroduction of submersible craft, and, in 1866, Mr. Whitehead invented his locomotive torpedo.

But these were technical affairs that, the Admiralty considered at the time, could make no dint in the vast armour of British sea power. Presence was what mattered, the ability to provide a ship at the centre of disturbance. The landing of a company of seamen, well and courageously led, was of far more importance than the ability to engage "the enemy" at sea. After all, who was the enemy? In 1882 the Medi-

*Stagnation
of ideas
threatened
greatest fleet*

terranean Fleet, with astonishing incompetence, bombarded Alexandria as a prelude to the British suzerainty of Egypt. Was this land-based insurrection an enemy to Britain's sea power? Appearance, presence were the great requirements because no one was seriously challenging the Royal Navy. But, in America, in France, in Russia, the submarine was being developed — not with any great efficiency, but with an eye to the future. In Europe new alliances were contrived; abroad the British Empire was expanding.

It was the public of Britain, not the Government, that had the final voice at this time of hesitancy and incompetence. In 1889, the Naval Defence Act was passed and the "Two-Power Standard" was adopted in Whitehall. But this referred only to battleships — the great, the mighty, the all-powerful. Very few worried if the huge guns in these monsters could hit the target — if, in truth, an engagement with an enemy fleet could result in victory. British sea power at this time held an overwhelming priority in numbers that none dared assail. Peace continued as a result, though the peacekeeping force was both incompetent and ill-led. The British public loved their Navy, the power that would subjugate the lesser nations should they threaten the trade and integrity of the British Empire.

But other events were afoot. The dais from which Britain's naval authority viewed the world was so great that it overshadowed the opening of Japanese trade to the U.S. in 1853, the increase of French power abroad, the possibilities of Italian expansion in the years after unification. Above all, it failed to appreciate the supreme dedication of the Kaiser, Wilhelm II, of Germany to his megalomaniac ambitions. The growth of his navy under the guidance of Admiral von Tirpitz roused little opposition in the early years of the new century. Germany said this fleet was to defend expanding German trade — who were the British to doubt it? Apathy was abroad; the comfortable and the affluent held the reins, the poor and the deprived were in no state of education or power to dispute their rulings.

Yet there were some of the ruling caste who saw the direction in which mat-

ters were moving. In the Navy, the titan figure of Sir John Fisher fought and won his battle for fighting efficiency in the fleet. Despite political hurdles at every point on his course, he achieved a building program which, during the 1914-18 War, kept the High Seas Fleet of the Kaiser in its ports. But naval power was still, in those pre-war days, related to numbers of battleships. The British, late in the field, had developed a powerful submarine service but no way of countering an enemy's resort to this form of warfare. Thus the Grand Fleet of 1914 was in no sense a balanced force. It was capable of naval warfare but totally unable to protect the merchant ships on which its country depended for the existence of its population and the support of its armies in the field. It was not until 1917 that the adoption of the convoy system, a method much used in earlier wars, placed the superior force in an advantageous position.

After the First World War

Much had happened between the turn of the century and 1918. The Kaiser had aimed at world hegemony but had been defeated on land and by the relentless pressure of blockade. Japan had destroyed the naval might of Russia and beaten it on land. France and Italy had remained strong at sea, while the U.S.A., acting as the Western arsenal until its delayed entry into the war in 1917, was on its way to possessing a fleet with pretensions to world supremacy. Secure from invasion or bombardment, and with only 18 months of active hostilities to drain its resources, the U.S. was in a position akin to that of Britain in 1815. The mantle of sea supremacy was about to change hands — Britain, financially enfeebled by four years of conflict, was in no condition to retain a two-power standard. Nor, indeed, claimed the politicians, was such an expenditure needed. For 20 years the phrase "peace in our time" was brayed about the world — 20 years in which Mussolini put his fingers to his pseudo-Roman nose and flouted all civilized codes of conduct, in which Hitler followed his incarnadined road of rearmament and conquest, and in which Japan laid waste its neighbour's territories and published a book called *Japan Must Fight Britain*.

Of these three countries, both Italy and Japan were totally dependent on maritime trade for their sources of raw materials, while Germany relied on its imports of many vital commodities. But, by a series of treaties, those powers still under democratic government turned their back on the need for sea power in a world

Naval strength (1974)

	U.S.A.	U.S.S.R.
Manpower	551,000	475,000
Major combat		
surface ships	177	221
Attack and cruise		
missile submarines	73	245

that was rapidly falling into a dark and tumultuous chasm of warlike intentions. When the inevitable happened and hostilities brought the flames of war to all but a few European doorsteps, the allied powers of Western Europe were in poor shape to protect their own sea-lines of communication, although rather better off in the interdiction of those of the enemy. The blindfold of peace at any price had caused Western politicians to cast away the precious protection which sea power could have provided. Eighty-one was the limit set upon Britain's destroyer force, a fact that meant that the first Canadian troop convoy from Halifax was defended from the assaults of the U-boats by a single battleship.

But, once again, the tireless and highly professional activity of the Royal Navy and the navies of its allies, combined with the immense backing of the U.S.A., the fortitude of the Allied merchant fleets and the resourcefulness of British shipyards, succeeded in frustrating the initial onslaught. Yet, by the time the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor brought the entry of the U.S. into the war, over four and a half million tons, representing some 2,500 ships, had been lost. Apart from attacks by aircraft, E-boats, surface ships and losses from unknown causes, a thousand of these casualties are known to have been caused by U-boats, with many more probably due to the same form of attack.

As an exercise in cost-effectiveness, this was a startling result — in September 1939, Germany had 49 operational U-boats and by January 1942 this had risen to 91. At the most generous average, the figures allow 33 operational boats a month available in 1940 (471 merchant ships lost) and 50 in 1941 (432 merchant ships lost). Of these submarines available, one-third could be expected to be on patrol at any one time, thus giving 30 boats on patrol in December 1941, when, with 90 operational submarines, the high point of availability was reached. By this time, the force of escorts opposed to these submarines had reached 399. Even allowing the one-third availability given for submarines, this meant a total of 133 at sea, a superiority of over four to one. So, in the two-and-a-quarter years before the U.S. entered the war, this comparatively small force of U-boats had very nearly crippled the Allies. Sea power wielded by the lesser navy, which was strong only in one vital arm, almost tipped the balance of the war. But there are other aspects which eventually redressed the balance — the geographical position of Britain, the immense capacity of the Allied building yards, the

background and training of the Western navies. Germany was beaten in the Atlantic, Italy routed in the Mediterranean, Japan demolished in the Pacific.

U.S. supremacy

In the chaotic years that followed 1945, the United States Navy was supreme at sea. The possession of nuclear weapons gave the Allies a hitherto unbelievable superiority in offensive capability, but it was still the sea that provided the paths for the raw materials, the exports and the imports which were essential if the world was to recover from the effects of the six disastrous years of conflict. It was all so self-evident that too few people remembered the lesson. In a way bitterly reminiscent of postwar reaction on many occasions in the past, the very instrument that had staved off defeat and ensured victory was whittled down — rather less, proportionally, in the United States, but with an apocalyptic ardour in Britain.

There was, though, one country in which this urge to demolish the fleet was not in any way in evidence. In July 1945, Joseph Stalin had called for a strengthening of the Soviet Navy — this at a time when twenty million of his countrymen lay dead, a third of the Soviet economy had been demolished, and war with Japan still continued. But, if Lenin's vision of a world forcibly turned to Communism and Stalin's immediate and imperialist aims were to be achieved, the motherland needed protection and the navy was to be an important part of this plan. The shipyards were rehabilitated and warships of all types from cruiser downwards poured off the slips. In six years (1951-57), 240 *Whisky*-class submarines were completed — more than two-thirds of the total held in all other navies.

And yet numbers were by no means all — vast inroads had been made into the Soviet officers' corps by Stalin's purges of the 1930s, the performance of the Red Fleet during the war had been incompetent and inadequate, the navy was untrained in long-range seagoing. A huge training program, an insistence on technical competence, at last caught up with the astounding advances made in the new designs of Soviet ships. In 1956, at the time of Suez, and in 1958, when the U.S. saved Lebanon from disaster, the U.S.S.R. was unable to do more than shout and threaten.

Cuban aftermath

The Cuba crisis of 1962 brought a disastrous reversal for Soviet policies and, in the next year, Admiral Gorshkov, the dy-

Stalin called for strengthening of Soviet Navy

namic Commander-in-Chief who had by then been in his appointment for nine years, ordered his fleet to "get to sea". From the North, the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Pacific came the ships — tentatively at first, incompetently in many ways, but they came and as they came they learned. As they learned, so their numbers increased, rising from a trickle ten years ago to a flood in 1975. For what purpose did they come? Was this the age-old purpose of protecting their rapidly expanding merchant navy? Scarcely, as all but one of the major raw materials is available in quantity within the boundaries of the Soviet Union. This mass of mercantile shipping, and the Russians acknowledge the fact, is a money-spinner, not a vital link in both peace and war as in all the other major countries. In wartime, it could be dispensed with, its ships used to strengthen the Navy's support. So this is not the purpose of the innumerable squadrons of the Soviet fleet. The Russians have again given the lead in describing its peacetime purposes — this is a political instrument, a world-wide means of furthering the Kremlin's aims. In war, it would be a powerful shield but its numbers are far greater than those required for this purpose and would certainly be employed in harassment and interference during a time of tension and interdiction should low-level deterrence fail. Nor is there any validity in the argument that nuclear and thermonuclear weapons make a naval war an impossibility. It is at sea that actions can imperil a country's population without inflicting a single wound. Under the threat of a nuclear exchange a classic trade-war could be fought out without immediate recourse to nuclear weapons.

*Soviet fleet
a political
instrument*

And how does the West stand today — what would there be at sea to offend targets to such an assault? In simple terms could sea power once again decide the world's future? Here it must be remembered that no nation has ever become a world power without strength at sea. The senior partner of NATO, the U.S.A., today has an expanding world trade, currently standing at some \$80 billion, which includes a very high proportion of raw materials. At any one time, 800 ships are loading or discharging in the East Coast ports — a small figure, though, when compared with the 2,800 ships alongside the docks and wharves of Western Europe. Moving to and from these ports each day there is an average of 3,350 ships at sea in the Atlantic and 750 in the Mediterranean. Further south, off the Cape of Good Hope, 57 per cent of the shipping doubling that magnificent promontory belongs to NATO countries, while, in the Indian Ocean, there are, at all times, 20 tankers of Western registry at sea.

This array of figures may mean little to the average citizen but let him reflect for a time on his own personal position should those ships fail to make their destination. No air-lift, whether now or in the foreseeable future, could come near to providing for the manifold needs of a modern society. Ships must operate freely to ensure the continuity of affairs — if they are delayed, the result will be instantaneous. If they are intercepted, the outcome will be a little more delayed as stocks such as Western Europe's two months of oil reserves are used up. Then, for the lack of sea power, for the failure to guard our heritage, we shall learn the lesson written so large over the last 400 years. Deprived of the use of the sea, our civilization would wither and a great number of us die.

MERCANTILE MARINE

(fishing, sea trade and oceanographic research)

	<u>Vessels</u>		<u>Tonnage</u>	
	<u>1948</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1972</u>
BRITAIN	6,294	3,785	18,112,101	27,334,695
U.S.A.	5,524	3,327	29,601,982	16,265,669
U.S.S.R.	979	6,575	2,107,412	16,194,326
FRANCE	585	1,399	2,424,346	7,011,476
CANADA	720	1,228	1,381,434	2,366,175

Sadder but wiser: the UN at thirty

By John W. Holmes

It is possible – and indeed conventional – to look at the 30 years of the United Nations as a history of decline and disintegration, of sordid betrayal of the noble ideals of the founders. As one whose first association with the United Nations was prenatal, I think it is equally possible, and probably more honest, to see it rather as 30 years of “wising-up”. The ideals of the founders were noble, but their grasp of global realities was limited. Life in the UN has been an extended and painful learning experience. Everyone is wiser now. It is the wisdom of experience, and the founders cannot be blamed for not having had it. The League experiment proved largely misleading. The United Nations in 1975 is dangerously shaken with tremors, but the operators – at least the older ones – have a better grasp of what that body will stand, its capacities and its frailties. And, although the voting procedures in many of its hundreds of organs do not justly reflect either power or population, it is a more lifelike reflection of the whole, real world that was the élitist affair that was launched in 1946.

There was the illusion of universal, enforceable collective security to be worked through. It was an impossible and dangerous misconception of the way to prevent war, associated with the narrow view that wars were caused by aggression. We know better now, that wars are more often the product of inescapable human conflict, of “the malignancy of the human condition”, as Inis Claude put it. Fortunately, the founding fathers, although they talked about collective security, knew that it was a formula that could turn small conflicts into world wars, and they provided for vetoes on such rashness in the Security Council. It has taken the Western powers a quarter of a century to realize what a blessing the veto is, that a passionate majority of one kind or another must at times be prevented from starting wars or expelling members in what for the moment looks like a just cause. It took a war in Korea, a switched majority and two decades of trying to define aggression to learn all that.

It has been necessary also to learn that the earth is round and Europe is not its heart. The UN in 1945 more closely approximated universality than did the League, and its great triumph has been to keep the Communist and Western powers in the same meeting-rooms throughout the Cold War. Nevertheless, the global vision at San Francisco was narrow. Even the concentration on the so-called East-West struggle ignored the world that came to be called the “Third”. In the Charter and in the debates at San Francisco, in the planning at Hot Springs or at Bretton Woods, the great economic issues were seen in terms of the freeing of trade and the regulating of currency – old problems of the industrialized world. It was honestly assumed, of course, that freer trade would be good also for the under-developed countries, as they were called, but no one – the Communists no more than the capitalists – foresaw that aid and development would become very soon the major – almost the sole – economic preoccupation of the whole UN family. As John Deutsch wrote in 1972: “... There was one very important aspect which, as I look back now, we did not understand very well.... At Bretton Woods we were looking for and we thought we were building a universal system.... It has in fact made possible a fantastic growth in trade and production in the industrialized West. But this is in very strong contrast with the rest of the world. The under-developed world really is not part of this system at all.” The World Bank, which was founded for conventional international purposes, has

Economic issues at Bretton Woods were free trade and regulation of currency

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shifted course to become almost entirely an agency for coping with problems of the Third World.

To say all this is not to cast aspersions on the founders; it is to affirm the purpose of the United Nations as a universal learning experience. It is more than that, of course, but its greatest value perhaps is to make it difficult for countries to hide. To the alert, even the dullest opening speeches at a General Assembly contain warning signals. There has been a tendency in the West, because we did not like these warnings, to blame the UN, as if the UN had created the problems of the Third World rather than drawing them to our attention. By no means all the causes that surfaced in this way are just or practical or to be submitted to as waves of the future. Many of them have to be combated. We ignore them, however, at our peril. It is worth pondering, as a case study, the attitude of the European colonial powers to the anti-colonial themes in the UN in the Fifties. Many of them fondly imagined that it was an unnecessary emotion the UN had provoked. It can be argued, however, that the UN debates — and even the UN-devised formulae, the trusteeship system, the probing missions and the occasional international plebiscite, however passionate and disorderly they seemed — did nevertheless contribute to a more orderly transition from the imperial system to independence — independence being, for better or worse, for richer or poorer, inevitable. What the colonial powers did not realize until later was the great favour that had been done them by relieving them of the burden of colonies and the horror of prolonged colonial war.

Adaptable system

The UN has helped its members to adapt in time. The UN system has been very adaptable itself. When it quickly became clear that there could be no security maintained by the Security Council but that, to prevent the dangerous consequences of fear and panic, member states had to prepare to defend themselves, a group of like-minded countries acted, in accordance with the provisions for self-defence in the Charter (Article 51), to form their own defence system, NATO.

UN Membership

1950	60
1975	144
Increase 140%	

The example was followed, in due but unacknowledged course, by the Eastern Europeans in the Warsaw Pact. What might have looked like a descent from the high ideals of universal security to sordid power politics was probably the best thing that could have happened to the UN. Thereafter, the powers of East and West no longer tried to use the UN for enforcement purposes it was quite unable to sustain. The confidence their alliance gave them reduced the danger of pan-national action. Instead of turning the UN into their partisan instrument, they began to exploit it for the purpose it would best serve — that of preventing, forestalling or neutralizing conflict. All this was accompanied by such bellicose speeches and postures that the stabilizing process was hard to recognize at the time. So much of the conflict-prevention was, in fact, managed in the darker corridors, where the UN ambience facilitated the incessant brokerage necessary to keep the world on an even keel. The public speeches should be recognized as a front.

Improvisations

The same institutional flexibility and adaptability can be seen in such improvisations as GATT or UNCTAD. When it proved impossible to get agreement on the charter of an International Trade Organization, those states that wanted some mechanism for clearing the channels of trade simply transformed into a permanent body the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade they had been negotiating. Those who were not interested did not have to join. It had the advantage that it was a product of the actual process of getting down to business rather than of windy declarations of noble intentions. When the Economic and Social Council proved an inadequate vehicle for the Third World, the latter obtained a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in the early Sixties, which also turned into a permanent agency in Geneva and the forerunner of other instrumentalities by which the developing countries could exert pressure. By this time they were better able to get their will in the Assembly, it was the industrialized powers that needed to organize. Even though such bodies as the OECI are outside the UN system, the developed countries are well supplied with institutional resources — not to mention those three vetoes in the Security Council and the ability to reject projects of an Assembly majority for which they refuse to pay.

The UN has developed a remarkable system of checks and balances. It is no

easy for a majority to get its way against stubborn opposition, even though they can pass resolutions to their hearts' content. The fashionable logic of the moment, that the Third World now has the kind of power to assert its will that the United States, or the West, had in the early days is laudable in intention but misleading. Neither the United States nor the West was ever able to command automatic majorities. There was always lively resistance within the circle of Western powers; and India, Pakistan and the Arab states were a force to be reckoned with. When an American resolution passed with a large majority, it had usually been considerably altered to secure that majority. It should be noted, furthermore, that it was during the period of so-called Western dominance that the UN blessed and stimulated the process of decolonization, began welcoming all the new states to its company, and shifted its economic direction from free trade to aid and development. The picture of American hegemony and Third World submission is considerably overdrawn. Asian, Latin American and other countries supported the United States over Korea because of their own belief that the UN was threatened.

Influence declined

That the Western influence has declined and that of the Third World grown is not disputed. It is the overstatement of both situations that leads to false conclusions. The present collusion of developing countries and the Communist powers is by no means a fixed pattern either. There are too many cross-purposes within the majority. What is most important to grasp is that there are still enough people from all camps who recognize the futility of pressing causes so far that the UN will cease to be universal, just as there were enough people in the early days to argue against those who wanted to drive out the Communists and turn the UN into an instrument of the "free world". Just as the formation of functional bodies like NATO relieved the strain on the universal body, so the formation of functional groupings over oil or Palestine or the territorial sea helps to save the general structure. They provide a constructive outlet for frustration. The UN is world politics, and the game of politics is played out everywhere in the shaping and reshaping of combinations, behind the scenes and in formal speeches on the stage. One can criticize the specific decisions of OPEC or the Soviet-American SALT talks, but they are both institutions

that are entirely reconcilable with the rough-and-tumble politics of an earthy United Nations.

As for the "disintegration" of the United Nations, much of this has been good. The planners at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, perhaps inevitably at the period of abstraction, thought in terms of a synthesized structure, with budgetary and program control by ECOSOC or the General Assembly. The Specialized Agencies — the ILO or FAO or ICAO, feudal baronies already in being or under construction — quickly put an end to that illusion. They grew, however, healthily and zealously out of the pressing need for them. Then more new agencies proliferated in response to challenging needs. They proliferated also in response to Parkinson's law, bureaucratic imperialism, and the attractions of "conferencing" by the waters of Lake Leman. Looking back, however, on the schemes for centralization produced in 1944 and 1945, one can see that the life would have been squeezed out of the functional agencies by any effort to enforce all the proposed rules for proper channels.

Pressing need gave rise to Specialized Agencies

Danger of strangulation

It is true that the UN system is in constant danger of strangling itself in its own words and papers, and the heedless proposing of conferences, commissions and declarations stimulates cynicism, which is not good for the international cause. The decentralization of power and activity, however, and the opportunities it provides for variations in membership and consequently the weight of voting, does help to strengthen the checks and balances. We have to avoid international anarchy, on the one hand, and the tyranny of world government, on the other. The physical decentralization has been healthy also. The most constructive work of the UN is probably done now in Geneva and Vienna, by no means immune from but less directly blown upon by the political storms in New York. Here the lapidary approach to world order is more in evidence, the slow fitting of stone upon stone to create an infrastructure of international rules and regulations — about the rights and obligations of ships at sea, the prevention of bacteriological warfare, the terrorization of diplomats, or the restraint of multinational corporations. It may be too slow but it is surer, because it is based on the recognition that international law must be founded on widespread consent, achieved through compromise to consensus, an approach that is certainly implicit in the Charter but somewhat

Avoiding both anarchy and tyranny essential

obscured by initial assumptions about enforcement.

A wise comment on this, the most important and least spectacular aspect of the UN's work, was made by Richard Tait, a Canadian diplomat with a good deal of Geneva experience: "Agreements between nations are, like harvests, dependent on all sorts of uncontrollable factors. And, again like harvests, agreements often seem to require time to ripen and develop before the moment comes when conditions are favourable to reap the fruits of the process...." We should not be too complacent in 1975 about the leisurely pace, because we have in the UN a large and impatient majority threatening to abandon the system if quick action is not taken. The only quick action possible, however, is political: the violent replacement of one set of masters by another, the total alienation of the rich from the poor and the militarily-powerful from the weak — none of which is going to help the Bengalis or the Eritreans. However unfashionable it is in the day of the doomsayer, we have to argue for stone-building and foundation-laying on solid ground. While a new economic order is desirable and essential, it is no time for Jacobins.

UN network

A basic problem in the present debate over the UN's relevance is, as always, that people never seem to get through their heads what the United Nations is. It is neither an avenging God nor a dispenser of divine justice. Nor is it the devil incarnate. It is a loosely-linked network of institutions and agencies within which member states can do or not do what they can find a consensus or a majority or enough great-power agreement to carry out. It is also, of course, a Charter, a common bond to good behaviour among sovereign states, and in that sense something greater than the sum of its parts. But as the UN it cannot act, and the system is not responsible for the actions taken within its component parts. If we do not like decisions of the Assembly, the recourse is not to abandon the institution but to seek ways of altering the majority or the majority view. If we don't like the actions of our government, we go into opposition; we don't call for the abolition

UN Budget

1950	\$ 20,000,000
1975	\$259,700,000
Increase	1,298.5%

of Parliament. To talk as if the UN were dispensable is to misunderstand what has been happening in this century. In Claude wrote in *Swords into Plowshares* "... Whatever the basic policy question to be decided in our time may be, they do not include the question, 'Shall we have international organization?' International organization is a distinctive modern phase of world politics; it is a recent growth, but it has become an established trend. International organizations may come and go, but international organization is here to stay."

The habit of multilateral collaboration is so deeply ingrained — not just because it is desirable but because it is unavoidable — that, in a vacuum, new institutions would reform like a spider's web or flesh over scar-tissue. The problem for the West is that they might not again be universal and we would be on the outside. Without a UN, a Middle East settlement might be juggled for a time by the great powers on their own; but who would control epidemics, civil aviation, or meteorology? These latter are the critical issues of international survival, managed well enough within the UN system for us to take them for granted. They are not secondary purposes. No purpose is more important than the preventing of nuclear proliferation, which, if it can be handled at all, must be controlled within a UN framework.

Utopians and cynics

The enemies of the UN have always been the utopians and the cynics. The former see it as government asserting its will over sovereign states, a perspective that bears no relation to world politics in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, by positing an "all-or-nothing" approach, it stunts the growth of the UN as an organism of enormous vitality constantly finding means of dealing with diverse problems, building the infrastructure by experimentation rather than imposing a philosopher's dream that would shatter at the first challenge. Cynics, on the other hand, like to pretend that the UN is a world government in order to score points against it by proving that it does not act like one. Without altering the Charter, the existing organs could be used for the purposes the critics have in mind. We have to work for consensus because the UN is a voluntary system, and no change of the rules on paper can alter that fact of life.

The UN was invented not to abolish international politics but to provide a setting in which they might be conducted more effectively and harmoniously. One

may well ask whether the present cacophony does more harm than good. It is surely preferable, however, to the terrifying reverberations in the void that could follow the dismantling of a system that does force the powers to split their differences and be called to account. It is this enforced association that matters most, and its best results are rarely expressed in formal resolutions. The UN Charter does not insist that all peace-making take place in its formal sessions. By Article 33, parties to a dispute are enjoined "first of all" to seek a solution by "peaceful means of their own choice". These is nothing essentially contrary to the Charter in Henry Kissinger's efforts to find solutions in Jerusalem and Cairo, or in the efforts to do the same in Geneva. It is the results that matter.

To pretend, of course, that present problems in the UN are routine would be as dangerous as giving up the struggle. We do need perspective, however. The UN is going through another period of agonizing adjustment, as members try to come to terms with a changed political configuration. Majorities form and reform, and the UN has adjusted reasonably well. The danger has always been that those in control of a majority will exploit their temporary advantage to alter the universalist structure. The Western powers were in a comfortable situation when, in 1955, a gamble was taken on universalism by admitting all the applicant states. Many Europeans were shocked at the Canadians for their leadership in letting in all these potential antagonists. One argument that the long-range gamble on universality is paying off might be the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are not only still sitting together in UN bodies but are actually collaborating in efforts to control nuclear proliferation as well as brush-fire wars. Their progress can by no means be regarded as satisfactory, but their accepting such a program is something we would hardly have dared hope for 20 years ago. It is a curious kind of partner/antagonist relation. It certainly doesn't solve all the issues, but the essence of the UN is the recognition that we are all natural antagonists and competitors, who have to restrain our competition so that we don't tear each other apart. It is a higher level of civilization than is envisaged in conceptions based on the fantasy that men and tribes are by nature loving and complementary, frustrated in their longing for peace by self-seeking leaders.

The universalism of the UN is part

of its present problem. The balance has swung too far. The once grossly under-represented Third World has an unhealthily-swollen majority in the Assembly. Power and responsibility — especially the responsibility for paying the bills — are out of joint. A majority has been using its voting power somewhat recklessly and threatening the principle of universality, the basic conviction that we are all sinners at times, that membership in the UN is a discipline, not just a privilege. Countries like Israel and South Africa cannot hope for fair-mindedness while states of the majority can practise genocide with no fear of censure. The United States can expect only its sins to be noted by Assembly orators. It is time for the Americans and others to resist, to set limits to what is tolerable, and remind the exasperated of the essential role they have played. In doing so it is wise, however, to realize that the current abuse by the majority must be compared with, for example, the exclusion by another contrived majority of the real government of China for two long decades. Present misbehaviour ought not to be justified by bad precedents, but recollection of the latter inspires humility, of which the Assembly is in need.

Two-decade exclusion of China also contrived by a majority

Creative possibility

The lash of the Third World and the energy dilemmas of the "First" have propelled the UN into what could be its most creative phase. It is most creative when it is dangerously challenged. The planetary issues — food, population, pollution, the seas and outer space — cannot now be evaded. Governments are just beginning to come to grips with them in the established UN organs and agencies and by means of special conferences on resources, population, food and the law of the sea. If the UN did not exist, something like it would have been invented under pressure in 1974. That our governments have barely come to grips with the life-and-death issues is obvious from the rudimentary — though mostly positive — steps taken last year in Geneva, Bucharest, Rome and Caracas. But the UN is ready and available, with its infinitely flexible machinery and its chastening but encouraging experience, to support just as much change and progress as national governments, or, more particularly, their frightened electorates, are prepared to sanction. One value of the UN forum is that in the end it induces pragmatism and reveals the irrelevance of the closeted doctrinaires, capitalist or Marxist. We now have to get out of our pulpits and into committees of the whole.

Wider still and wider— Nuclear proliferation 1950-1975

By Hedley Bull

In 1950 only the United States and the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons, although Britain had taken the decision to acquire them three years previously. The nuclear striking strength of the two super-powers was, by the standards of today, puny: the explosives available to them were fission devices in the kiloton range (the Soviet Union, which began nuclear testing only in 1949, may not have yet accumulated a stockpile), and the delivery systems they possessed were bomber aircraft of medium range, so that the United States could strike at the Soviet Union only from bases on its periphery, and the Soviet Union could not strike at the United States mainland at all. The exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was still in its infancy; no nuclear-power reactor had then been built, the first nuclear-propelled submarine was still five years off, and no nuclear explosion had been conducted with non-military applications in mind.

In the quarter-century that has since passed, there has occurred a "horizontal" proliferation of states possessing nuclear weapons, a "vertical" proliferation of nuclear-weapons systems in the arsenals of these states, and a proliferation of civil nuclear programs that has provided a rising number of governments with the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, should they choose to do so.

Britain, the foundations of whose nuclear capacity had been laid during the years of wartime collaboration with the

United States, became the third nuclear power, exploding its first fission device in 1952 and its first fusion device in 1957. It is notable that, while these events took place when Conservative Governments were in power, the decision to acquire nuclear weapons was taken by the Attlee Labour Government in 1947; moreover the Wilson Labour Government that was elected in 1964 failed to disband the British nuclear force, despite its insistence during the election campaign that that force was "neither independent nor British, nor a deterrent". France became the fourth nuclear power, exploding its first fission device in 1960 and its first fusion device in 1968. France's entry into the nuclear club thus took place during the Presidency of General de Gaulle but the essential decisions on both the fission and the fusion programs were taken during the last phases of the Fourth Republic. China, whose nuclear-testing area and gaseous-diffusion plant were built with Soviet help, continued alone after the break with Moscow to become the fifth nuclear power, exploding its first fission device in 1964, and its first thermonuclear weapon in 1967, ahead of France. It is notable that China's early fission explosions were achieved with uranium devices, not plutonium, and that, alone among the nuclear-weapons states, China appears to have pursued only a military nuclear program, and not so far to have developed nuclear energy for civil purposes. By contrast India — which after a spell of nearly ten years in which no "horizontal" proliferation had taken place, became in 1974 the sixth country to conduct a nuclear explosion — maintained a nuclear program that was purportedly for peaceful purposes only, while disclaiming any intention of acquiring nuclear weapons.

Alongside the process of "horizontal" proliferation there occurred the "vertical" proliferation of the nuclear weapons of the super-powers. The small stockpiles of fission weapons available to the United

*Three forms
of nuclear
proliferation*

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States and the Soviet Union in 1950 grew to include thermonuclear weapons in the multi-megaton range, and also “miniaturized” fission weapons in the sub-kiloton range, adapted for tactical or battlefield use. By 1970 it was estimated that the United States possessed 9,652 nuclear warheads with a total yield of 52,000 megatons of TNT equivalent and the Soviet Union 2,000 nuclear warheads with a total yield of 23,000 megatons, figures that do not take account of the great expansion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal since that time. The capacity of the two super-powers to deliver nuclear weapons, which in the early 1950s was based on the medium-range bomber incapable of flying two-way missions over intercontinental distances, came in the late 1950s to be based upon the intercontinental bomber, in the 1960s to be based upon intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), each of which directed a single nuclear warhead against a target not defended by anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, and in the 1970s to be based on ICBM and SLBM forces complicated by the existence of multiple warheads and ABM systems, as well as by great improvements in missile accuracy. When, at Vladivostok in November 1974, President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev agreed on guidelines for a numerical limitation of strategic nuclear-delivery vehicles, the ceilings they stipulated – 2,400 for each super-power, of which 1,320 could be equipped with multiple and independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) – were astronomical in relation to the levels of 1950.

Civil proliferation

Alongside these military forms of nuclear proliferation there also took place during the quarter-century a proliferation of civil nuclear programs, both “horizontal” and “vertical”. The most important focus of these programs was the nuclear-power reactor, which proved competitive with coal- and oil-fuelled electricity-generating plants, despite the greater capital costs of constructing it. Between 1954 and 1974, nuclear-power reactors were acquired by an average of one new country a year; at the end of the period there were 170 power reactors in operation in 19 countries, while six more countries had such reactors under construction. Moreover, under the impact of the four-fold increase in oil prices that occurred from 1972 to 1974, it was widely predicted that by 1980 there would be a fourfold increase in installed nuclear capacity over

the level reached in 1974, while the number of countries possessing power reactors would have grown to 28. Possession of a nuclear-power reactor provides the basis for development of a plutonium explosion.

Lost monopoly

Also by the end of the quarter-century, the United States and the Soviet Union were losing their virtual monopoly of the process of uranium enrichment, which provides the fuel most commonly used in power reactors and also provides the means of developing a uranium explosion. In 1974, seven enrichment plants employing the gaseous-diffusion method were in existence, three in the United States and one each in the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China. Work was proceeding on the gas-centrifuge method of uranium enrichment in the United States, Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands, Japan and Brazil, and on the jet-nozzle method in West Germany and possibly in South Africa. The ability of the super-powers to control nuclear proliferation through their position as the chief sources of uranium enrichment was also threatened by the work being done in eight countries (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, Italy and India) on fast breeder reactors, which produce more fuel than they consume. The availability today of reactors of heavy-water design, which consume natural rather than enriched uranium, should also be noted.

The spread of civil nuclear programs also gave rise to an interest in the use of nuclear explosions for purposes such as facilitating the extraction of oil, natural gas and minerals, engineering projects such as the digging of harbours and canals, and scientific research. The United States initiated Project Plowshare in 1957, and conducted 41 nuclear explosions for purportedly peaceful purposes between 1961 and 1973; the Soviet Union conducted 34 such explosions between 1961 and 1974. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was opened for signature in 1968, sought to confine the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) to nuclear-weapons states, while providing for “nuclear explosive services” rendered by the latter to non-nuclear-weapons parties to the treaty, on favourable terms. But a number of non-nuclear-weapons states evinced an interest in PNEs and made it clear that they reserved the right to conduct them unilaterally. Brazil and Argentina, in expressing their support for the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which sought to establish Latin America as a

Ability of super-powers to control proliferation threatened

nuclear-free zone, held that this did not exclude the conduct of PNEs within that area. In proclaiming the peaceful nature of its nuclear explosion of May 1974, India defied the logic of the NPT, which refuses to countenance any distinction between peaceful and military nuclear explosions, in cases where these are conducted by non-nuclear-weapons states.

Control efforts

All three forms of proliferation were accompanied by efforts to control or limit them. The attempt to stop "horizontal" nuclear-weapons proliferation began with the efforts of the United States and Britain to prevent Nazi Germany's access to nuclear secrets and materials, and to destroy its nuclear plant. This policy of forcible prevention of proliferation occurred, of course, during a war; such prevention is more difficult to conceive in time of peace, although it was allegedly discussed in the United States and the Soviet Union when China was on the point of acquiring nuclear weapons, and it would be wrong to assume that no circumstances could arise in which a super-power would resort to forcible prevention.

No nuclear-weapons state has yet engaged in nuclear dissemination in the strict sense of the direct transfer of nuclear weapons to another state. There have been important examples of military nuclear assistance short of such direct transfer: the provision of *Polaris* missiles and other help by the United States to Britain; the arrangements between the United States and NATO allies for joint control of tactical nuclear weapons; the assistance provided by the Soviet Union to China's nuclear program before the Sino-Soviet break. But all the countries that have so far acquired nuclear explosives have had to manufacture them. Moreover, the more recent members of the nuclear-weapons or nuclear-explosive club — France, China and India — despite their postures of rhetorical opposition to the anti-proliferationist policies of the original three nuclear-weapons states, have, in fact, done nothing directly to facilitate the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other countries. It is not dissemination by the nuclear-weapons states that accounts for "horizontal" proliferation, but the failure of attempts to prevent or discourage non-nuclear states from conducting nuclear explosions by their own efforts.

The anti-proliferation policies of the super-powers were directed partly towards providing those of their allies that were potential nuclear powers with guarantees of support against nuclear threats. Thus

the United States in NATO sought to discourage the development of the British and French "independent nuclear deterrents" and to promote a sense of the validity of its own nuclear deterrent for the alliance as a whole by seeking to impress the allies with the idea of the inferiority of any nuclear forces they could produce to those of the United States by promoting — in the early 1960s — the bizarre notion of a NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), later by establishing the Nuclear Planning Committee in the framework of the alliance, and (perhaps more important) by maintaining its physical presence in Western Europe. These efforts — together with others in the framework of America's Pacific alliances — have had a considerable measure of success; the non-nuclear-weapons status not only of the key "threshold" powers — West Germany and Japan — but also of Canada, Italy, Australia and others, is founded on their confidence in the validity of U.S. guarantees.

But the British and French nuclear forces had ultimately to be accepted by the United States; Soviet guarantees of China did not dissuade the latter from embarking on its nuclear program. It has to be noted that the nuclear guarantees of a nuclear-weapons state ally, however convincing they may be, will not dissuade a country from seeking nuclear weapons if it is motivated not only by security concerns but also by the ambition to become or to remain a great power. It has also to be noted that the loosening of alliance systems that took place in the late 1960s and 1970s has led to a further questioning of the reliability of U.S. and Soviet guarantees, which must weaken inhibitions against proliferation, at least within the American alliance system.

Guaranteed

The nuclear guarantees of the super-powers have extended beyond formal alliance arrangements; the United States, for example, is sometimes said to provide implicitly a nuclear guarantee of Sweden and Israel, and both President Johnson and President Nixon (in his 1969 "Guam Doctrine") made general statements of willingness to support countries threatened by a nuclear power. The Soviet Union is sometimes said to provide such a guarantee of India and of certain Arab countries; and, together with Britain, the two super-powers offered a form of multilateral guarantee, which in effect did no more than reassert their obligations under the UN Charter, through Security Council Resolution 255 of June 9, 1968. The prin-

cipal importance of the latter was as a show of solidarity with India against perceived threats from China, and the subsequent entry of China into the UN deprived it of whatever meaning it had.

Non-Proliferation Treaty

When in the early 1960s the two super-powers drew together, one expression of their *détente* was collaboration in opposing "horizontal" proliferation; this was formalized when the NPT was agreed to in 1968 and came into force in 1970. The principal Soviet objective in promoting this treaty was probably to impose legal obstacles to the nuclear armament of West Germany, and the negotiations from 1965 to 1967 focused principally on the attempt to find a form of words that would accomplish this but also permit NATO to establish some form of joint management of its nuclear strategy. Thus the demands of India and other Third World countries, perhaps more crucial to the control of proliferation in the long run, received less than adequate consideration. By the time of the May 1975 NPT Review Conference, the treaty had been signed by 106 states and ratified by 89. But three of the six nuclear-weapons or nuclear-explosive powers were outside the system. Certain of the crucial threshold nuclear powers had either not signed the treaty (Israel, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina) or not ratified it (Japan, Egypt, Indonesia). The treaty was essentially an exchange of pledges, containing an escape clause and without sanctions. Its inherently discriminatory nature made it a natural target of attacks by China, India and other Third World states, which interpreted it as simply the instrument of the nuclear "haves" in their struggle to maintain their ascendancy over the "have-nots".

The treaty bore the marks of its origins in the mid-1960s, when the ability of the two super-powers, working together, to mobilize support for their policies through the world as a whole was greater than it had become by 1975.

The control of "horizontal" nuclear proliferation cannot be separated from the control of "vertical". It would be unwarranted to make the assumption, implicit in the rhetoric of the nuclear "have-nots", that, if the existing nuclear-weapons states disarmed, the threshold nuclear powers would lose their interest in nuclear armaments for all time; on the contrary, they might well seek to establish for themselves the military ascendancy enjoyed by the super-powers now. But there is no prospect of discouraging the increase in the number of nuclear-weapons states unless the existing nuclear "haves" can demonstrate in their own policies that nuclear weapons are of limited and declining political and strategic utility.

In seeking to do this, the nuclear "haves" have not been entirely without success. If, during the last quarter-century, they had actually used nuclear weapons, on however limited a scale, or threatened their use frequently rather than occasionally, "horizontal" proliferation would have proceeded at a much faster rate than it actually has done. The series of arms-control agreements arrived at under the sponsorship of the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain, beginning in 1963, has at least imposed restrictions in certain areas of secondary importance in strategic nuclear competition (testing in environments other than underground, deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space and on the seabed, etc.) and supplied the atmospherics of progressively-increasing control. The SALT negotiations that have been in progress since 1969 have issued in the acceptance of one major restraint — the 1972 ABM Treaty — and may be said to have set the stage for significant restrictions on strategic offensive arms. But the United States and the Soviet Union still demonstrate in their everyday acts that, contrary to what they have contended in sponsoring the non-proliferation idea, they regard possession of nuclear weapons as a diplomatic and military instrumentality of great importance. Moreover, while they seek to discourage more countries from acquiring nuclear weapons, they also treat those that succeed in acquiring them with deference — Britain's nuclear-weapons status led to the relaxation of the McMahon Act, France's to the acceptance by the United States of its

Only decline in utility of weapons could prevent proliferation

Canadian uranium production

1955 —	\$ 26 million
1956 —	45.6 million
1957 —	136 million
1958 —	290 million
1959 —	325 million
1960 —	270 million
1961 —	195 million
1962 —	158 million
1963 —	137 million
1964 —	84 million
1965 —	62 million
1966 —	54 million
1967 —	53 million
1968 —	52 million
1969 —	53 million

special position in the alliance, China's to President Nixon's journey to Peking.

Efforts to control the proliferation of civil nuclear activities have met perhaps with even less success than in the case of military. The underlying international ideology, propagated by Eisenhower's 1953 "Atoms for Peace" program, and enshrined in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) established in 1956, has been that civil nuclear activities are beneficial, and that "control" should be restricted to prevention of diversion of these activities from peaceful to military purposes. In retrospect, it may be argued that, great though the benefits of peaceful nuclear activities may be, it would have been better to forego them in order to avoid the military dangers to which they lead. The spread of nuclear plant, materials and technology, accelerated by commercial, and also by covert military, motives, and sanctioned by the ideology of "Atoms for Peace", is, in fact, the spread of the capacity to make nuclear weapons. International transactions in nuclear plant and materials are, in most cases, subject to safeguards against diversion imposed by the donor on the recipient. In the case of non-nuclear-

weapons states parties to the NPT, the safeguards apply not merely to plans and materials transferred but to all their peaceful nuclear activities. But the basic condition under which non-nuclear-weapons states have accepted safeguards of various kinds, those of the IAEA and others, has been their dependence upon a small group of supplier countries in establishing their infant nuclear industries. As this dependence disappears, and the recipient nations graduate to self-sufficiency in nuclear industry — the example of India is a telling one — their motive for accepting safeguards is likely to disappear also, and they will be no more willing to submit all their peaceful nuclear activities to international inspection than are the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France or China today.

Efforts to control the three forms of nuclear proliferation that have been mentioned may have served to slow it, to minimize its adverse consequences for international security, and to pave the way for setting ultimate limits to it. But they have not deflected the steady movement of the international political system over the last quarter-century in the direction of a world of many nuclear powers.

Excerpt from address by Mr. George Wald to the Twentieth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs in Tokyo:

I have come halfway across the world to speak what I believe to be the truth. It is a dreadful truth, hard to live with, but if we do not live with it, we shall die by it. I speak here as an American, but even more as a fellow human being, a scientist concerned with life, a teacher deeply troubled for my students, a parent fearing for my children and for their children.

Human life is now threatened as never before, not by one but by many perils, each in itself capable of destroying us, but all interrelated, and all coming upon us together. I am one of those scientists who does not see how to bring the human race much past the year 2000. And if we perish, as seems more and more possible, in a nuclear holocaust, that will be the end not only

for us but for much of the rest of life on the earth.

We live — while that is permitted us — in a balance of terror. The United States and the Soviet Union together have already stockpiled nuclear weapons with the explosive force of 10 tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on the earth. You might think that enough, but we are now in the midst of a further escalation on both sides, replacing every single nuclear warhead with multiple warheads and devising new and more devastating weapons.

My country at present is making three new hydrogen warheads per day. The Soviet Union keeps pace with us. We are told that our security — strange thought! — lies in Mutual Assured Destruction — MAD. It is well-named. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima, and ended by killing about 100,000 persons, was a small one by present standards, with the explosive power of about 15,000 tons of TNT.

The myth and reality of Canada-U.S. relations

By Irving Brecher

"You are old, Father William," the young man said,
"And your hair has become very white;
And yet you incessantly stand on your head —
Do you think, at your age, it is right?"
"In my youth," Father William replied to his son,
"I feared it might injure the brain;
But, now that I'm perfectly sure I have none,
Why, I do it again and again."

— *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*

The new conventional wisdom in Canada is that this country has come a long way from its early dealings with the United States. Where there was ignorance, there is now understanding; where there was apathy, there is now vigour; where there was fear, there is now self-confidence. Self-proclaimed "economic nationalists", in particular, are fond of telling us that, in contrast with our dullness and ineffectiveness during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, we are rapidly becoming the kind of nation that knows what it wants out of the Canada-U.S. relationship, knows how to articulate those wants, and knows how to go about getting them. It would, of course, be very comforting if all this were so. But we delude ourselves if we fail to recognize it for what it is — a combination of myth and reality that are no less difficult to rank than to separate. Let us examine the record and look to the future as well.

Early years

There can be little doubt that over the 70-odd years leading from Confederation to the Second World War, Canadian attitudes towards the U.S. link were largely conspicuous by their muteness, and by an overwhelming sense of the need to avoid policy irritants with a far richer and more powerful neighbour. At the same time, American attitudes could best be characterized as massive unawareness of, and indifference to, the needs and aspirations of the Canadian people.

Obviously, this type of relationship left much to be desired. But a variety of mitigating factors are worth noting. For one thing, the external dangers to Canadian survival were both real and physical, at least in the early post-Confederation years. Secondly, the National policy in-

troduced in 1879 — whatever its shortcomings — was specifically designed to countervail U.S. dominance by stimulating east-west trade within Canada and between Canada and Europe. In any event, the strong Canada-Britain link was always there to blunt any adverse Canadian effects that might flow from inept handling of Canada-U.S. problems. In that context, it is a fact of no small importance that, in an area of deep mutual concern, boundary waters, Canadians and Americans had the good sense to establish the International Joint Commission — a quasi-judicial body now widely respected as an instrument of co-operation on bilateral issues. Canadians were also sensible enough to pose the issue of reciprocal reduction of trade barriers for sharp public debate in the national elections of 1891 and 1911.

IJC respected as instrument of bilateral co-operation

The 'grand awakening'

For Canada, however, the "grand awakening" came after the Second World War. That grim conflict added the most terrible of all chapters to the story of man's inhumanity to man. It also gave an unprecedented stimulus to the sense of Canadian nationhood and Canadian involve-

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ment in world affairs. There had been some five years of extensive mobilization of human and material resources. Canada had made a substantial contribution to the Allied victory. It approached the 1950s with a much-expanded, more-broadly-based economy, and with an eagerness to share in the enormous task of world reconstruction. Meanwhile, Canada-U.S. trade and investment links were growing at a prodigious rate; and questions were increasingly being raised about the direction and pattern of Canadian economic development.

Gordon Commission

Not surprisingly, these important changes began to be reflected in various strands of Canadian research. The most comprehensive work of the 1950s was done by the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects. Even for a staff alumnus, this is not the place to assess the general impact of the Gordon Commission. Several basic points need to be made, however.

Careful staff analysis found that, despite the reality of such costs as inhibited Canadian exports, long-term capital inflows — much of them U.S.-based — had yielded large net gains in terms of rapid economic growth; and that many of the problems attributed to such inflows stemmed from other causes, especially the persistence of high Canadian and foreign tariffs. At least as important was the finding that Canadian tariffs were costing this country's consumers dearly, and that, "in the absence of... American and Canadian tariffs, the performance of Canadian secondary manufacturing industry would be improved significantly as a result of both changes in productive techniques within industries and shifts among industries". (J. H. Young, *Canadian Commercial Policy*, Ottawa, 1957, P. 149.) Both the trade and investment studies were fully aware of the Canadian socio-political concerns underlying these issues. In the investment case, for example, it was deemed vital to emphasize that "the economic aspects of the problem are by no means the only significant ones; and, indeed, that they may not be the central ones". (I. Brecher and S. S. Reisman, *Canada-United States Economic Relations*, Ottawa, 1957, P. 153.)

The Commission itself tried hard to project this sense of balance. And to some extent it did. Eloquence joined with realism to produce some memorable prose: "Canada and the United States live in a kind of symbiosis — two organisms separate and distinct, each with its own ends and laws; but highly interdependent, in-

dissolubly sharing the same continental environment and, in spite of a great disproportion in wealth and economic power, each necessary to the other." (*Final Report*, Ottawa, 1957, P. 35.) As far as American investment was concerned, this meant non-compulsory and non-discriminatory proposals for increased Canadian participation in foreign-owned enterprises — a "very moderate" package designed to dispel Canadian fears about U.S. political dominance while sustaining the capital inflows that had made, and would continue to make, "tremendous contributions" to Canada's development. On the trade front, however, it was quite a different story. The Young study was the only one of 33 staff reports with a Commission introduction stating that "we do not accept responsibility for or necessarily approve the statements and opinions which it contains". This disclaimer turned out to be far from mild. What the Commission did, in effect, was to reject its staff findings of high economic costs in the Canadian tariff down-grade the economic benefits that would accrue from Canada-U.S. free trade and restate the time-worn platitude that "the economic cost of the tariff, whatever it may have been, was a legitimate price to pay for national independence". (*Final Report*, P. 445.) In retrospect, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a major legacy of the Gordon report was to ease the path for Canadians choosing to view the U.S. relationship from the following perspective: Begin with an untested premise that closer links with the United States weaken Canadian independence; proceed by giving maximum credence to unsupported generalizations about the negative economic and social effects of particular Canada-U.S. links; and, finally, decide as a matter of faith that any positive effects are worth foregoing in order to guarantee this country's survival.

To be sure, the Gordon Commission was not prepared to "eliminate completely any thought" of Canada-U.S. free-trade arrangements "of more limited scope" than general reciprocity. Nor, obviously, were the Canadian policy-makers who negotiated the Automotive Agreement with the United States in 1965. Despite some undoubtedly protectionist features, the Agreement was quickly to bring a much more specialized Canadian industry and correspondingly large gains in productive efficiency.

Then, too, the Commission's work provided plenty of scope for further in-depth research on Canada-U.S. relations. And there were analysts ready to take up the challenge. By the late 1960s, an impres-

Despite costs capital inflows led to rapid economic growth



During his 1965 visit to the L.B.J. Ranch in Texas, Lester Pearson signed the Auto Pact. Pictured here at a table outside the ranch-house are Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin, Prime Minister Pearson, President Johnson and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

sive array of economic studies, private as well as public, had appeared on the Canadian scene. Understandably, they continued to focus on the enormously important trade and investment links.

Professor Safarian, for example, examined the operations of 280 foreign-owned companies in Canada. One of his most significant conclusions was that the foreign firms achieved levels of economic efficiency roughly similar to those of Canadian-owned enterprises. He also found that Canada had been receiving too few of the potential benefits of foreign direct investment – mainly because Canadian anti-combines policy was too weak and Canadian and foreign trade barriers were too high. On the political side, he confined himself to suggesting that the increased economic power of the host country was also a political factor to be weighed against the external constraints on domestic decision-making, and that “independence is not an absolute to be necessarily maximized under all circumstances in an increasingly interdependent world”. (A. E. Safarian, *The Performance of Foreign-Owned Firms in Canada*, Montreal, 1969, P. 107.)

The Watkins report, in contrast, was virtually unique in its efforts to probe the political implications of foreign, particularly American, investment in Canada. Running through the study was “a strong presumption that foreign ownership, be-

cause of its effects on the locus of private decision-making, reduces national independence”. (Report of the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry, *Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry*, Ottawa, 1968, P. 297.) But, as things turned out, the political probing hinged mainly on the questions of extraterritoriality and the market power of multinational corporations. The discussion was interesting – and, indeed, quite innovative in several respects. Nonetheless, it came nowhere near establishing the fact of substantially-reduced Canadian independence. What it did, instead, was to put some meat on the bones of the authors’ own conclusion that U.S. investment might weaken Canadian independence along certain lines while strengthening it along others. In the end, it was the economic dimension that received their prime emphasis. And “the important issue... for host countries such as Canada [was] not whether foreign investment is worthwhile, but rather how to increase benefits and decrease costs” (P. 52).

The Wonnacotts’ study on Canada-U.S. free trade was also, essentially, an exercise in benefit-cost analysis. Its focus was exclusively economic, however. Within that context, intensive research led to the basic finding that, even allowing for initial costs of dislocation and adjustment, industrial free trade would probably bring Canadian consumers and wage-earners

gains approximating 10 per cent of real national income. Characteristically, the authors were careful to point out that these very large economic gains must be weighed in the balance with political and social consequences. But they also noted that, although these non-economic issues "have been discussed at great length in Canada, they have not been clarified with any degree of precision". (R. J. Wonnacott and P. Wonnacott, *Free Trade between Canada and the United States: The Potential Economic Effects*, Cambridge, Mass., 1967, P. viii.)

Meanwhile, in the early and middle 1960s, the Canadian-American Committee of the Private Planning Association of Canada (now the C. D. Howe Research Institute) had been striving to raise the level of public debate through studies of major trade and investment links between the two countries (for example, the 1963 Lea report, *A Canada-U.S. Free Trade Arrangement: Survey of Possible Characteristics*). These initiatives were followed by a series of PPA studies on "Canada in the Atlantic economy" — with special emphasis on the impact of trade liberalization on particular Canadian industries. Once again, however, it is significant to note the Canadian-American Committee's exclusively economic focus. Indeed, while sponsoring an abbreviated version of the *economic* Wonnacott study, it felt compelled to specify that "neither the individual signers nor the Committee as a whole necessarily endorse the conclusions drawn by the authors; nor do they necessarily favour the particular approach to trade liberalization used by the Wonnacotts as their model for analysis". (P. Wonnacott and R. J. Wonnacott, *U.S.-Canadian Free Trade: The Potential Impact on the Canadian Economy*, Montreal, 1968, P. vii.)

In general, then, the decade of the Sixties provided Canadians with an ample supply of intellectual ferment on the U.S. relationship. But the gaps and shortcomings were also considerable. The national wooliness on socio-political implications persisted — aided and abetted by economists who typically disqualified themselves from discussing such issues, and by political scientists who had practically nothing to say about them. This would have been serious enough by itself. But, given the rather limited success in precise measurement of economic benefits and costs, it left the door wide open to anyone intent on obscuring an anti-American political bias by heavy concentration on alleged negative economic effects of Canada-U.S. interdependence. Furthermore, there was precious little analysis reflecting a U.S.

perspective on the bilateral relationship, or any awareness of commonality of Canadian and American interests *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world.

The Gray report

In 1972 the Gray report appeared. (*Foreign Direct Investment in Canada*, Ottawa.) It was a valiant attempt to redefine and reinterpret Canadian concerns over U.S. investment. The serious reader could, indeed, get fresh insights into a broad range of economic gains and losses — and particularly into the role of multinational corporations, the characteristics of "truncated" branch-plant enterprise, and the dangers of stunted indigenous technological development. One could also find articulate expression of the fundamental point that many of the benefits of foreign investment are achievable through an appropriate "mix" of policies — taxes, tariffs, competition — designed to increase the efficiency of the Canadian economy, and of the view that a flexible screening agency would provide an effective means of dealing with remaining problems. Like the Watkins study, the report went beyond the economic dimension to discuss political issues — on the whole, in a more balanced fashion. It even ventured into the social realm, noting the "continuous feedback" relationship between U.S. direct investment and Canadian culture (P. 298). Having said all this, however, it is only fair to add that the report left more than a few loose ends: the mysterious "comprehensive industrial strategy", for example, from which "all policies . . . would take their guidance" (P. 443); the practical implications of a "review process through which a government agency would be empowered to negotiate for better performance from certain categories of foreign direct investors" (P. 10); and the analytical basis for suggesting the desirability of considering "whether the establishment of a [U.S.] relationship that is more at arm's length would be possible and more in the Canadian interest in some circumstances" (P. 316).

In fact, there was enough in the Gray report for all Canadians concerned over American investment — and quite enough for those who wished to use it as a supporting crutch for an anti-U.S. credo called "nationalism". As already implied, this kind of twisting process had, indeed, been going on well before the report saw the light of day.

Shrill voices in the air

Shrill voices began to fill the air in the early 1960s. By the end of the decade,

they had swollen into an all-but deafening roar.

Naturally, they took a variety of overlapping forms. There were the "lamenters" like George Grant — just about ready to pull down the curtain: "Canada has ceased to be a nation, but its formal political existence will not end quickly. . . . [It] may be prefaced by a period during which the Government of the United States has to resist the strong desire of English-speaking Canadians to be annexed." (*Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism*, Toronto, 1965, Pp. 86 & 87.) There were the "businessman-philosophers" like Walter Gordon — proclaiming, not so gently, the basic need to buy back predominant control of the Canadian economy, warning against the "trigger-happy" adoption of an across-the-board policy of free trade with the United States", and declaring that Canadian manufacturing industry "would suffer devastation" under any such policy. (D. Smith, *Gentle Patriot: A Political Biography of Walter Gordon*, Edmonton, 1973, Pp. 280, 288, 293.) There were the "economist-politicians" like Eric Kierans — loudly singing the praises of foreign takeovers in 1963 and railing against the U.S. Treasury in 1966 for infringing on Canada's economic and political sovereignty by issuing voluntary guidelines designed to ease the rising pressures of capital outflow on the American balance of payments. There were the "media men" like Peter Newman — pompously expatiating on the grave dangers of cultural contamination by the United States. And, of course, there were the "radical academics" — bent on re-creating an old-fashioned European type of national independence that would be of dubious relevance, to say the least, to a country like Canada in the 1970s and beyond: "Mel Watkins II", for example, who had graduated from the relatively mild "Watkins I" of the Task Force into a fire-breathing critic of capitalism in general and American capitalism in particular; and Kari Levitt, who managed to produce a "call-to-arms" saturated with neo-Marxist rhetoric and with unsubstantiated pronouncements to the effect that "after twenty-five years of heavy American direct investment Canada's freedom of action has been progressively restricted to the point where it is doubtful whether it can be regained". (*Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada*, Toronto, 1970, P. 116.) There were also the "Quebec experts" — who discovered, through some process of divine revelation, that if only Quebec could come close to separation from Canada, then perhaps Canada could,

after all, achieve sufficient "distinctiveness" to separate from the United States.

Why this emotional binge? Reference has already been made to the analytical gaps of the 1960s. But this is far from being the whole story. One can point to a host of other factors: the growing Canada-U.S. interdependence; the frequent combination of U.S. ignorance and insensitivity on bilateral issues; the patronizing connotations in the "quiet diplomacy" recommended by the Merchant-Heeney report *Principles for Partnership*; the widespread Canadian unease over American civil strife and the U.S. war in Vietnam. Perhaps most important of all was the increasing Canadian awareness of the deep frustrations associated with persistent disparities in size and power *vis-à-vis* the United States. Bluntly put: "It is no fun being a little brother. And, if there is no prospect of growing up to be as big as one's sibling, it is less fun still." (P. Wonnacott, "United States Investment in the Canadian Economy", *International Journal*, Spring 1972, P. 276.) These were legitimate, if sometimes self-righteous, Canadian concerns. To understand them, however, is not to condone the failure of the "angry men" of the Sixties to recognize that the United States would simply not go away; that Canada had, in fact, become a solid member of the world community of nations; that neither "continentalism" nor "colonial dependency" provided a rational basis for dismissing any initiative that raised the possibility of closer Canada-U.S. links; and that ordinary common sense required mutually-acceptable mechanisms for the effective handling of Canadian-American problems and opportunities.

Regrettably, our politicians often reflected these same failings. And the result was a hodge-podge of U.S.-oriented policies and would-be policies — on foreign takeovers, on energy, on financial institutions, on the news media, on Canada's role in Latin America — that were pervaded by "ad hocery" and militated against sober assessment of impact on this country's national interests. Given this fuzzy and emotion-charged context, it is not too surprising that the Government's widely-heralded *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, published in 1970, reviewed virtually every aspect of our external ties other than the Canada-U.S. relation.

Increasing awareness of frustrations in relationship

Ad hoc policies militated against assessment of national interests

Early 1970s

By the early Seventies, sounds of reason were being heard across the land. Even Americans had begun to speak, in straightforward terms, about the real problems inherent in the asymmetry of Canada-U.S.

links, and about the need for managing this unique kind of interdependence in ways that would bring larger benefits and lower costs to both countries. For its part, the Canadian Government had produced a lucid and thoughtful "green paper", entitled "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future" (see *International Perspectives*, Autumn 1972); more about this later. But the strident voices of the "new economic nationalism" were still very much alive. Indeed, in some respects, like "U.S. cultural imperialism in Canadian universities", they had grown even louder. And to a considerable extent, they form the backdrop against which Canadian-American issues of the 1970s are being "resolved".

The recent and ongoing irritants may well be unprecedented in number, variety and complexity — magazines, energy and pipelines, defence, cable television, fisheries, automobiles, egg and beef trade, boundary waters, pollution, sports, the Foreign Investment Review Agency, and so on. Canada would, of course, have to receive high marks by such a test of growing maturity and sense of nationhood. But the validity of the test is quite another matter. Some of the bilateral problems have been handled with a great deal of finesse — for example, the reconciliation of statistical differences over the amounts and patterns of trade in automotive products during the past few years. In contrast, the Canadian approach to other problems could hardly have been better designed to sour the U.S. relationship: the harsh export restraints on Canadian petroleum, for example; the "trade war" atmosphere created by questionable Canadian restrictions on beef and egg imports; the heavy-handed defence of "Canadian" football; the well-concealed process of applying the "significant benefit" test to foreign takeovers; the dubious assumption that government can and should monitor the "Canadian content" of Canadian-owned magazines. It is small consolation to recall the U.S. economic restrictionism of 1971, and to realize that Canada has had no monopoly on mismanagement. Surely the most pertinent consideration is that, when we do hurt the Americans, we are very often likely to hurt ourselves much more.

And yet there is another kind of consolation. Many of the specific irritants are transitory, and few go to the heart of the Canada-U.S. economic relationship. The real challenge is to look ahead, to try to perceive the shape of things to come in the world economy, to identify the key Canada-U.S. issues in the 1980s, and to devise the best means for addressing the

problems that divide us and for advancing the interests that we have in common. It would be difficult to conceive of a more hazardous task. And again, this is not the place to spell out blueprints. One cannot, however, escape the responsibility for saying some of the things that need to be said.

Special relationship

First things first. Contrary to what we are so regularly told these days, Canada still has, and will always have, a "special relationship" with the United States — not in the traditional sense of seeking special exemptions and concessions from Washington (while loudly proclaiming Canadian "independence") but rather in the factual sense of unique and massive transborder links over a broad socio-economic front. ("Canada and the United States", in the March/April 1975 issue of *International Perspectives*, is particularly instructive in this connection.)

The general dimensions of this interdependence are well known: the roughly 70 per cent of our merchandise trade, currently over \$40-billion worth, that is carried on with the United States; the more than 20 per cent of American merchandise imports and exports that come from and go to its largest trading partner, Canada; the roughly \$26 billion in U.S. direct investment in this country; the over \$4 billion in Canadian direct investment in the United States, nearly twice as large *per capita* as the corresponding U.S. figure; greater American tourism in Canada than in all the rest of the world; the four Canadians in ten who are tourists in the United States; the unparalleled cultural and educational flows between the two countries. Such facts — and the two-sided wealth that they imply — need continuing restatement because they are so easily and conveniently forgotten or distorted in the heat of the debate on U.S. "dominance".

In part, to be sure, this "special relationship" has been deliberately built up by particular government policies on both sides of the border. The Auto Pact is an outstanding case in point. But economic forces, allied with geographic and social proximity, have unquestionably been the prime mover in this development. It follows that, in the absence of the strongest countervailing measures, Canadian-American interdependence will not only persist in its massive proportions but will probably grow even closer in the years ahead.

A changing world economy

Meanwhile, the world economy will be changing in a variety of important ways. We can be almost certain that some of the

Recent irritants
unprecedented
in number,
variety and
complexity

changes will turn out to have been only dimly perceived in these mid-Seventies, and some wrongly or not at all. There are, however, a number of significant developments already in view: the continuing expansion of regional trading blocs outside North America; the rapidly-growing production, trade and technology of multi-national enterprises; the increasing dual economic role of Western Europe and Japan, as export markets and competitors for Canadian goods and services; the emergence of new growth-centres in the less-developed countries, posing the same types of challenge and opportunity; the widening and deepening of East-West relations, with the Soviet Union and China becoming powerful forces in the trading and investing world community; the intensifying pressures of population and demand on energy resources, and on the environmental balance that is becoming so difficult to sustain; the growing determination of Third World countries to get what they regard as their fair share of this planet's expanding wealth; the paradox of spreading nationalism in an increasingly-interdependent world that tends to see Canada and the United States in a North American economic context.

It would be heroic, if not foolish, to build such perceptions into a grand design of policy prescription for Canada-U.S. relations. But the least they suggest is that trade, investment, energy, technology and the environment will be among the core bilateral issues of the last quarter of this century. Canadians, and Americans, should be taking a long forward look at each of these issues — with due regard for their interconnections and for their implications in terms of national unity and independence. This, of course, is what the Economic Council of Canada has tried to do in its recent report on Canadian trade policy. (*Looking Outward: A New Trade Strategy for Canada*, Ottawa, 1975.)

Undoubtedly, there will be ample scope elsewhere for discussion and assessment of this major work and the background studies that it has generated. Nor could anyone be blamed for a sceptical attitude towards evaluative comments made by those who were intimately associated with producing the Council report. Here, nonetheless, are some brief observations, offered in the conviction that the report sheds a good deal of light on the problems confronting serious Canada-U.S. economic analysis in a climate of vivid rhetoric about this country's "silent surrender of its commanding heights to American imperialism".

The Council's research was by no

means entirely new. Indeed, much of it focused on the substantial earlier literature to probe the economic effects of industrial free trade between Canada and the rest of the world. But the Council did some careful updating. More important, it carried out a thoroughgoing examination of the relative economic merits of the various free-trade options open to this country in the years ahead. And it undertook to spell out — in greater detail than ever before — the Canadian costs of industrial dislocation and reorganization arising from free trade, as well as the policies required to minimize those costs and derive the maximum gains for the economy as a whole.

The central message is clear enough. Multilateral free trade in industrial products could be expected to bring, roughly, a 10 percent increase in Canadian real income, "the most remarkable improvement in the economic well-being of Canadians that could result from a single step by a government today — or at any time since the Great Depression" (P. 82). Failing that option, a number of regional free-trade groupings would yield large benefits, the only proviso being that no such grouping which excluded the United States would prove economically worth while. Thus a Canada-U.S.-EEC-Japan arrangement would produce most of the multilateral gain, a Canada-U.S.-EEC agreement around three-fourths of it, and a Canada-U.S. grouping well over half of it. Then again, the realities of world politics being what they are, Canada might well find itself at the bottom of the high-ranking regional list of options if it persisted in its search for very large economic gains.

The flavour of the message is best captured in the report's own summarizing words:

"'Lingering protectionism' . . . in Canada and foreign countries . . . has contributed to a deterioration of this country's capacity for sustained, dynamic, autonomous growth — a capacity that will become increasingly important in the future We have [accordingly] concluded that Canada's] interests would best be served in the widest possible free trade environment. But since this may well prove unattainable in the near future, Canadians must consider the possibility of reinforcing the basic multilateral approach with additional measures below the multilateral level.

"In our ranking of economic benefits, free trade areas composed of the EEC and Japan, or at least one of them, in addition to the United States were considered the next best options. But cir-

Multilateral free trade would increase real income

cumstances may not permit even these arrangements to be negotiated. In their attempts to establish a regional free trade system, Canadians could in the end be confronted with the necessity of considering a bilateral arrangement with the United States alone – not as a matter of first choice, but as the only option available that would, at least within the coming ten to fifteen years, provide opportunities commensurate with the vast requirements for restructuring Canadian industry.” (*Looking Outward*, Pp. 37, 48 and 108.)

The report goes on to address a number of wider economic concerns – pointing out, for example, that U.S. termination of a free-trade agreement would be unlikely because of the heavy stakes that American businessmen would build up in Canada-U.S. production and trade patterns, and arguing that such an arrangement would probably reduce Canada’s reliance on U.S. capital in the long run, though it would be necessary to guard against a short-run rise in American control of Canadian industry. Furthermore, the report attempts a careful discussion of the socio-political issues, and is led to the view that “there appears little reason to assume that a free-trade area whose members wish it to remain so need become anything else” (P. 115); and that the non-economic issues are “far more complex than is generally assumed, and... may not run counter to the positive effects of Canada-U.S. free trade” (P. 117).

Bearing in mind the strident “new nationalism” of the early 1970s, it was no mean achievement to publish a consensus Council report along these lines. Indeed, it is a tribute to the Chairman’s diplomatic skills and powers of endurance that he was able to complete this kind of controversial document without a single dissenting voice among the Council membership.

There was a price to be paid, however. For one thing, the report had to be constructed in such a way as to weaken the implication that Canada-U.S. free trade ranks among our more attractive policy options; hence the disproportionate emphasis on “the impact of trade liberalization” in a multilateral context, and the splitting-up of the U.S. component among several chapters for reasons with relatively little basis in economic logic. Secondly, in order to achieve the same “U.S.-softening” effect, it became necessary to incorporate a substantial amount of new material that delayed publication of the report without adding much to its analytical strength; the chapter on “a gradual approach to trade liberalization” provides a notable example. Thirdly, and most im-

portant, the Council was unable to make even the mildest specific recommendations on the Canada-U.S. relationship – this despite its own broad statement that “Canadians should probe these [socio-political] issues more deeply than ever before” and that “time is not on the side of this country’s manufacturing industry and... if wider options turn out to be unfeasible, it could be very costly in economic terms to forgo a free trade arrangement with the United States” (P. 117).

In the end, of course, the attempt to mute the anti-U.S. noises was bound to fail. For those minds that refuse to be cluttered by reason, it is no great task to misread and distort even the Council’s diluted analysis. And the noises were not long in coming. One of the more picturesque editorials, entitled “*Looking Southward*”, intoned that the Council’s proposed trade strategy was “but a rationalization of the current degree of integration of the North American economy, heightening American dominance, reducing Canadian social and political choices and channelling this country’s energies and attention inward, not outward”, and that one of the “great things for Canada to do in trade policy... [would be to] get rid of an Economic Council of Canada that wants to give this country to the U.S. as a 200th birthday present”. (*The Gazette*, Montreal, July 12, 1975, P. 6.) At the other extreme, interestingly enough, were some of the staunch defenders of the status quo – including a fair number of senior politicians – who quickly stepped forward with the usual “motherhood” statements extolling the benefits of multilateral free trade.

But there are plenty of signs that sound and fury have been giving way to sober reflection. The overriding point is that the Council report *did* finally appear, and that it is likely to be a positive and enduring force in the continuing Canadian debate over the U.S. relationship.

Mitchell Sharp’s options

In this connection it is worth while recalling Mr. Sharp’s “green paper” on Canadian-American relations. On the basis of an articulate review of underlying factors, it presents and discusses the now-familiar three options: “Canada can seek to maintain... its present relationship with the United States with a minimum of policy adjustments; Canada can move deliberately toward closer integration with the United States; Canada can pursue a comprehensive long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of its national life and in the

process to reduce the present Canadian vulnerability" (P. 1). The Department of External Affairs has already published a set of outside views on this government paper ("Symposium on Canadian-U.S. Relations", *International Perspectives*, January/February 1973), and there is no point in going over the ground here. However, it seems important to make a few observations in the light of the Economic Council's report on trade policy.

One is that, given the forces at work in the world economy, the first and second options are really two sides of the same coin. "Maintaining Canada's present relationship with the United States" is a euphemism for drifting inexorably into a state of closer north-south interdependence. In this context, the real choice is between planned and unplanned interdependence — with the obvious implication that the planning alternative is far more likely to maximize benefits and minimize losses.

In the second place, there is the characteristic political mystique about the Sharp rejection of Option Two. The available evidence simply does not support the view that, "as a matter of internal logic", a Canada-U.S. free-trade area must lead to full customs and economic union and, ultimately, to political union. Indeed, it is worth while seriously pondering the contrary view — which is backed by substantial evidence — that there need be no such chain of progression, and that a Canada-U.S. free-trade area "would result in a modest net gain in Canadian autonomy". (P. V. Lyon, *Canada-United States Free Trade and Canadian Independence*, Ottawa, 1975, P. 36.)

Thirdly, if there is mystique about Option Two, there is downright mystery about Option Three. It turns out, of course, to be the favoured path, on the ground that through a "comprehensive long-term strategy" — never actually fleshed out in a meaningful way — "the continental tide can be stemmed to some extent and contained within bounds that approximate more closely the wider, global thrust of interdependence" (P. 21). The economic costs of stemming the tide are hardly even mentioned, let alone discussed. And the implicit, untested assumption is that Option Three is the only one consistent with Canadian nationalism, that is, with the goal of maintaining a solid and distinctive Canadian entity. Presumably, our Government's new-found aggressiveness on the U.S. bilateral front is intended to reflect this "mutually reinforcing use and adaptation of a wide

variety of policy instruments" (P. 18). Thus far, neither the choice of instruments nor the process of mutual reinforcement gives cause for great optimism.

Presumably, also, the Government's dogged current pursuit of a "contractual link" with the European Economic Community is another manifestation of Option Three. Without prejudging the outcome, it seems appropriate to underscore the point that, if this is a freer-trade initiative, it makes little or no sense in the absence of U.S. participation, and that, if it is not, one is hard pressed to see why it has been assigned such a high publicity profile.

This brings us back full circle to the proposition that myth continues to compete vigorously with reality as Canadians seek to assess their progress in managing the vital U.S. relationship. For all the increased sophistication in analysis and policy-making, there are still wide gaps in our understanding of these links; and, no less important, our socio-political "hang-ups" have shown a remarkable power to survive. It is quite conceivable that, when the "radicals" speak of "the old guard among academic economists [being] the last to reorient their thinking" (A. Rotstein, "Shedding Innocence and Dogma", *International Perspectives*, January/February 1973), they are, in fact, talking about themselves. Be that as it may, there is an urgent need to clear the air as we head into the fourth quarter of the century. Canadians, in particular, cannot afford to move one step forward and two backward in their dealings with the United States.

No doubt, there are many good roads to travel, for Canadians and Americans alike. One is for our own policy-makers to "come clean" with the Canadian people on the implications of growing Canada-U.S. interdependence — by encouraging more focused public debate, for example, and by setting up a Parliamentary standing committee on Canadian-American affairs. A second road is for the Canadian Government to put its policy-making house in better order — by improving its machinery of co-ordination to the point where there is minimal "shooting from the hip" on issues of bilateral concern. And a third is for both governments to take immediate steps to create a permanent joint fact-finding commission — staffed by economic and other experts and designed to analyze bilateral problems and opportunities, to recommend ways and means of handling them, and to identify major areas for co-operative action *vis-à-vis* the industrialized countries and the Third World.

*Gaps remain
in understanding
of relationship*

*Policy-makers
should 'come clean'
on implications
of Canada-US
interdependence*

Reflections on 25 years of development co-operation

By Paul Gérin-Lajoie

The year 1975 is an unusually valuable vantage-ground for gaining a bird's-eye view of the vast and complex part of human activity that we call "international co-operation".

Looking back, we can survey a quarter-century of Canadian development assistance: the beginnings in 1950, with the bold creation of the Colombo Plan to help the new nations of Asia put down roots of economic and social development; the logical extension of this idea to the Commonwealth Caribbean in 1958 and to Commonwealth Africa in 1960; the development of a similar relation with *francophone* Africa, modestly in 1961, then more vigorously following the 1968 Chevrier Mission; and, finally, the effort to help Latin America, through the Inter-American Development Bank, starting in 1964 and later, in 1970, through direct country-to-country assistance. In the third quarter of our century, we see Canada investing \$3.6 billion of public funds in one of the world's most comprehensive programs of development assistance, touching some 80 countries.

Looking back, we also see how the notion of development has changed, grown and shed many illusions. From the easy optimism of the early 1950s we have progressed through the First United Nations Development Decade, with its stress on industrialization, and are now at the mid-point of the Second Development Decade, surrounded by unachieved aid targets and disrupted economies.

When we look ahead, from our present vantage-point, the view is much less clear. Yet I am confident that we are able, if we really try, to decide where our true goal lies and to find a path to it. I should like to describe that goal, and to point as far along the path as I am able to see.

Facts, by now, have been clearly

identified. Some 900 million human beings — roughly half the population of the Third World — live in utter poverty. Robert S. McNamara, President of the World Bank, has described them as subsisting "on incomes of less than 75 dollars a year in an environment of squalor, hunger, and hopelessness". "They are the absolute poor . . .", he added, "(having) a condition of life so limited by illiteracy, malnutrition, disease, high infant mortality, and low life expectancy as to deny its victims the very potential of the genes with which they were born. In effect, it is life at the margin of existence."

Most of the other half of the Third World's people — bringing the total number to one billion, 725 million — live slightly above that level, but still in conditions of "relative poverty", where adequate food, housing, health and educational services are lacking.

To this staggering problem must be added one that is perhaps even more insidious. Let us call it "alienation" — a universal phenomenon afflicting affluent and poor societies alike, since both feel increasingly that they are deprived of the means to understand and control their social, economic and political environments.

Solutions, on the other hand, do not appear so readily. After 25 years of trial and error, of hope and disillusion, new forms of action are needed, because new trends and influences are shaping the future of our societies. These new influences are the irreversible economic and cultural liberation of the Third World and a progressive transformation of industrialized societies. Against these trends, there is the growing threat of the global deterioration of our common environment, which threatens both industrialized and non-industrialized societies.

These are three aspects of a single reality and problem. There are obvious interactions between them; above all, they show that we live on the same earth and that we are all jointly responsible for the way it evolves. These considerations, and

*Development idea
has shed
many illusions*

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their impact on the conception of development, lead me to propose what I call a new project of universal civilization.

Third World liberation

Bandung signalled the "awakening of colonialized peoples" and April 25, 1955, remains a major milestone on the long road to political independence for Asia and Africa. Now economic and cultural liberation has become the new goal, to insure a content to political liberation. When the non-aligned countries met at Algiers in September 1973, they initiated a process that led us through the sixth and seventh special sessions of the United Nations, and several other international forums, into a clear awareness that the existing international economic "order" (some say "disorder") is no longer acceptable and that a new one must be established.

Undoubtedly the 1973 decision of OPEC countries to determine the price of crude oil was historic; after 400 years during which Western countries had controlled international trade, a major economic decision had slipped away from them.

A process of profound and irreversible change has begun. New sets of rules, national and international, will govern the international monetary system and will provide for larger transfers of resources, control over the extraction and transformation of natural resources, security of the market price for commodity products, industrialization and the transfer of technology, the division of labour and access to markets, and a new sharing of decision-making power in international affairs. Step by step, the effects will be felt in the Third World as developing countries organize to make full use of new opportunities. For industrialized countries, the question is not whether changes should be accepted; it is, rather, how the challenge of inevitable change will be met — by preparing for and managing the change, or by just letting it happen, with consequent unmanageable disruptions.

The establishment of a new international order more favourable to the Third World should be welcomed by industrialized countries. Quite apart from the question of justice, I strongly believe it is becoming a major factor of peace and security, and should replace, to that end, the old conception of armaments and military spending. A new economic order can also help build up developing countries as trading partners for the present industrialized countries, as well as new ones, and thereby stimulate the economies of all.

Benefits would accrue specifically to consumers who had access to some manufactured goods from developing countries at lower prices.

Insistence on the Third World's economic liberation should not blur the significance of cultural liberation. The two are essential parts of development, as Third World spokesmen have insisted when telling us about self-reliance, autonomous development and sovereign decision-making. Development takes place in specific societies and for the advantage of men living in society. Development should, therefore, not only take into account the characteristics of such societies but build upon them.

There are, indeed, universal values, such as those related to the satisfaction of fundamental human needs, but specific solutions to the problems of different societies can be as diverse as their human environments. As the 1975 *Dag Hammarskjold Report*, on international development and co-operation, puts it: "The diversity of starting-points entails necessarily the diversity of solutions."

Until recently, most developing countries have tended to imitate or to transplant the models of industrialized countries. That tendency is now receding. Developing countries are becoming more determined to examine their own potentials, to develop their own models and to adopt solutions of their own making. This is the context of mutual respect in which development co-operation can take place.

A second significant change is the transformation of industrialized economies. Surely tomorrow's international co-operation would be easier to foresee if industrialized economies were not also engaged in rather abrupt changes, which are raising many problems and require difficult decisions.

The new economic reality has gone beyond our theories; a new vision and new approaches are increasingly urgent. Phenomena such as "stagflation" (stagnation and inflation combined), generalized world inflation ("transflation"), the stagnating international monetary system, structural unemployment, and the questioning of industrial values all suggest that something is not working any more.

Consumer behaviour, too, seems suddenly less inclined towards consumption; a return can be observed to simpler, less expensive products. The progressive aging of the Western population and the disappearance of revolutionary ferment among young people are more subtle elements, which will alter most of the assumptions of our economic planners. A new economic

Solutions as diverse as human environments

New vision and approaches increasingly urgent

model, expressed in terms of the fulfilment of needs and no longer in terms of product consumption, becomes plausible.

Is it not within our power to choose a simpler way of life? I believe that our own societies are starting to consider a transition from a model of exponential growth to a more balanced development model, and that the consideration of alternative goals for our society, attentive to the private aspirations of its members, has started off in the right direction.

Deterioration of environment

A third concern — this one universal — involves the global dangers threatening the human and physical environment. The Club of Rome studies, which drew wide attention to the risks of global deterioration caused by exponential growth, are confirmed by a whole series of other studies and statements, of a regional or universal scope.

The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the environment showed us that development and environment are not mutually exclusive, as long as we remain within certain "ecological" limits, and that these physical limits depend partly on social and political factors, on how we organize our societies and what values we prize.

The various crises — now almost institutional — that more or less regularly afflict different parts of the globe, affect all of us. Starvation and permanent malnutrition are spread over most of the Third World, where half the young are seriously ill-fed. If it is true that nutritional deficiencies hinder children's physical and intellectual development, we are then seriously hampering the full growth of the next generation's genetic potentialities. "Even if this were only a risk and not a certainty," comments the 1975 *Dag Hammarskjold Report*, "would it not be sufficiently terrifying to justify emergency action? This underdevelopment is worse than death: the history of the year 2,000 is perhaps being written today... in accepting a sub-mankind with diminished faculties, our descendants."

Yet another continuing risk is thermonuclear armament, with reserves now representing a ten-ton TNT explosive energy for every man, woman and child now on earth. More countries, particularly from the Third World, are already joining the mad race. Will it be possible, as contemplated by Prime Minister Trudeau, "to devise and implement techniques which will permit the broad application of nuclear benefits to all nations, while at the same time eliminating the likelihood of weapons proliferation"?

Half the young
of Third World
seriously ill-fed

After two decades of development recipes that have failed to change the world situation, there is a growing awareness that development requires a general philosophy and an approach on a world-wide basis. The increase in gross national product is no longer considered as the *deus ex machina* that will bring, for the masses of poor people, benefits of improved food and nutrition, housing, health and education services, employment and fair distribution of income. These are now more generally recognized as the very essence of development, to be pursued as a comprehensive and interrelated set of goals, within a context of collective cultural aspirations.

This conception of development clearly focuses on man and mankind, rather than on mere instruments. The object of development is to benefit man, not to accumulate goods. Man is the justification for the development process — an end, not a means. Such a view implies the gratification of all the fundamental needs of a human being — those that give him his dignity and his *raison d'être*. These go beyond the mere needs of subsistence. They involve cultural identity and the right to develop on the basis of that identity, adopting development models accordingly.

The use of physical resources and technological achievements should be oriented towards these goals. Institutional restraints, because they are imposed by men, are subject to change and can be modified. The political will must be mobilized in support of such change.

All these signs point in one direction — toward the urgent need to design a new project of universal civilization that can ensure a world in which poverty is eliminated and the gratification of human needs is at the very centre of the development process. Industrialized societies are themselves moving toward alternative development models and new "life-styles". I share in this respect Keynes's perception that the multiplication of the satisfactions of cultural, intellectual and spiritual needs will soon replace the uncontrolled accumulation of material goods.

This is why we must now go beyond the conception of a new economic order and design instead a new global order, within which we can proceed to define the content of new economic relations.

The creation of these new global economic, social and cultural relations must inspire our thinking and our actions. Man's creative capacity has no limits. The transition towards a new project of universal civilization is not only possible, it is necessary. That is the direction that

international co-operation should take in the next quarter-century.

In creating this new kind of development, in building a global civilization that makes possible a new deal and justice for all, what point have we reached? How far has the world come, and what is Canada doing?

The swirl of international events and conferences over the past two years has sometimes seemed chaotic, but it is all part of a continuum related to the solution of the Third World's problems.

The sixth special session of the UN General Assembly in April 1974, with its milestone Declaration and Action Program for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, reflected a dramatic change of mood, a new sense of self-reliance and a new confidence on the part of the Third World, which we can only welcome as a healthy sign of growth and development. If the atmosphere was one of confrontation, an important message was in the air: the winds of change that transformed the world's politics in the 1960s are reaching gale force again in the 1970s, and this time they are transforming the world's economics.

Between the sixth and seventh special sessions, other conferences have echoed the themes of the new international economic order. At Bucharest, perhaps the world learned a little better that population is not a problem to be isolated and solved but one factor in the infinitely complex equation that is life itself, and that the population explosion will be controlled — in fact, will solve itself — only when poor people liberate themselves economically and share in a measure of individual and family economic security.

“Hunger, too, is war,” said former German Chancellor Willy Brandt, and the World Food Conference in Rome brought us closer to having for the first time some general strategy in man's eternal war against his deadliest enemy. The various decisions made at Rome showed a basic recognition that with food, as with so many other world problems, the answer lies in the long run in self-reliance — specifically in optimal food production by the developing countries themselves.

After these and many other conferences, we arrived in September at the seventh special session of the General Assembly. What happened there was, in my view, an all-too-rare victory for reason. From the demands and the refusals, a new synthesis was forged, completing a creative cycle that led us from confrontation to reconciliation. The raised voices of past months — the Third World's aggres-

sive attacks on the existing order and the developed world's defensive reaction against the “tyranny of the majority” — had possibly served to clear the air, or perhaps we had come so close to the brink of international breakdown that we had all glimpsed the futility of turning the session into a sterile quarrel.

Whatever the reasons, the special session produced a resolution that does not make value judgments on national motives but offers specific proposals and undertakings to help shift the world's trade and payments system so it will yield more benefits to those who need them most.

The resolution, of course, left aside key questions on which agreement was impossible, such as a deadline for meeting the development-assistance target. Changes that are satisfactory to 138 different states are not easy to come by, and the world holds many vested interests. But, by opening the way to a variety of trade and financial benefits for the developing countries, as well as accelerated programs for technology transfer, industrialization and enhanced use of food resources, the document formally adopted on September 16 marks a major success for international negotiation in general, and the United Nations in particular. It is encouraging to note in passing that, even before this breakthrough in the General Assembly, a poll of college students in the United States showed the UN to be the most trusted of political and economic organizations.

It is my hope that the precedent set at the seventh special session will now open up new possibilities at such meetings as the forthcoming Paris Conference of Oil Producers and Consumers and UNCTAD IV — possibilities for growing co-operation in the difficult job of building a more just and sound world system.

Canada's strategy 1975-1980

In his New Year message at the beginning of 1975, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau asked the Canadian people to prepare themselves for “an even greater sharing”, both domestically and internationally:

“All things considered, the difficulties of our times cannot be said to be unbearable in Canada and the other industrialized countries; but, in the Third World, millions of men, women and children face the grim spectre of hunger and starvation. Individually, we cannot do much, perhaps; but personal contributions, however small, are valuable. Yet the real power to help is in the hands of governments and international agencies.”

Key questions left aside to achieve agreement

The Strategy for International Development Co-operation 1975-1980, recently adopted by the Government of Canada, is a response to the moral and political demands for a new world order. Used as a type of yardstick, the Strategy will enable us to measure our performance during the next five years, and to adapt our efforts as required to the ever-changing conditions of world society.

This stocktaking, the first in 25 years of Canadian development co-operation, is centred on five major themes:

First, Canada, with several OECD countries, has demonstrated that it intends to shoulder its share of the burden. The Secretary of State for External Affairs restated our commitment at the UN seventh session with these words: "We reaffirm our determination to achieve the official UN target of 0.7 per cent of our GNP and to move toward it by annual increases in our official development assistance in proportion to GNP." The milestone of \$1 billion in official development assistance will be passed this year, representing 0.6 per cent of GNP — or an average annual rate of growth of 20 per cent a year over the last five-year period.

Our Strategy provides that the poorer countries, besides receiving a larger share of Canadian bilateral aid, will benefit more from outright grants rather than loans. Nine-tenths of our allocations for bilateral aid will go to developing countries in which the incomes are lowest, and for projects affecting the poorest social classes.

The second objective of Canada is to support the efforts of developing countries to foster their own economic growth and the evolution of their own societies. Development co-operation is, above all, the support of national efforts towards self-reliance. Thus our Strategy pinpoints our responsibility to choose as major development partners those countries that share such purpose, those that respect the rights of man, and those that direct their resources to improving the state of the majority of their population.

We shall also emphasize co-operation in regional organizations, serving regions or groups of nations in the Third World. Canada will increasingly support regional projects that improve the impact and effectiveness of Canadian development assistance, and those institutions that encourage the development of the poorest countries of their areas.

Third, to create maximum impact, Canada will focus more assistance on the critical development problems examined at major world conferences of the last few years — issues such as food, rural develop-

ment, basic education, public health, shelter and energy, all of which affect the well-being of large masses of people in the Third World. We shall increasingly consider research in and by the developing countries as a true instrument of development, and shall also ensure a permanent planning capacity through dialogue on co-operation with Third World countries.

Fourth, a new world order will consist primarily of new relations among nations acting not as donors and recipients but as equal partners co-operating through a global and organic approach to development. The sixth and seventh special sessions of the United Nations have reached a consensus on the multiplicity of instruments that can be used, and Canada recognizes the need to harmonize the different aspects of its international policy. The new relations will include tripartite and multi-partite co-operation, which can co-ordinate the efforts of many nations, while creating new ties between, for example, oil exporters and consumers.

Finally, since public support for development co-operation depends on an understanding of the issues involved, government must communicate fully with the people, especially with sectors who fear their particular interests may be harmed by the new, wider approach involving trade and financial changes. Canada will encourage not only education about international co-operation but also active personal involvement, believing that success or failure rests in the long run on the collective participation of societies in development.

These are the main themes of Canada's new Strategy. It is characterized primarily by flexibility — a flexibility that should enable us to make quick and appropriate responses as we co-operate in the next stage of international development, the building of a new world order.

This new order represents a striking shift in international relations. By recognizing the need to help build it, we acknowledge that, while the developing countries have achieved political freedom, the after-effects of their colonial past remain — namely, their poverty and their unequal economic position in the world. The changes that are taking place emphasize that international development co-operation can no longer be regarded as a "plea from the poor". It is a challenge to the collective conscience of mankind to establish a new social order in which people of all nations, rich and poor alike, can together shape their common destiny. It is at its best a moral imperative; but it is also a practical possibility.

Outright grants from Canada will benefit poorer countries

Commonwealth of Nations after 25 years of change

By Arnold Smith

This century's third quarter saw the Commonwealth of Nations develop from an association of six independent countries — all relatively rich and predominantly white — to one of 35 sovereign members. Commonwealth meetings now bring together representatives of a significant cross-section of mankind, and of the problems of mankind. The original West European, North American and Australasian members have been joined by Asians, Africans and island peoples from the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific. There are nations of virtually every faith, and at every stage of economic and political development — very poor as well as rich, countries ranging in size from city states to vast multilingual, multicultural federations.

This development has by no means been an automatic by-product of decolonization. The Commonwealth is essentially the deliberate creation of certain leaders of successful national liberation movements. Many nations once ruled by Britain did not, on getting independence, apply for Commonwealth membership — Burma, for example, or Egypt, the Sudan, Iraq, Nepal. Those that asked for membership did so because they saw value for themselves in the development and use of Commonwealth links, and often value for the world as well. As Jawaharlal Nehru put it, an association that brought together for frank discussion but without binding commitments leaders from various parts of the earth could provide "a touch of healing" for a troubled world.

Nehru wanted India to remain in the Commonwealth as a republic. This raised a new question, since, until then, all members had shared the same person as head of state, and some political leaders, as well as many constitutional logicians, considered this feature of a common allegiance indispensable. Ireland had recently decided it must withdraw from the Commonwealth on becoming a republic. Its friends overseas regretted this but did not challenge the Irish logic.

Nehru's wise request precipitated a useful clarification of thought on the whole question. The Statute of Westminster two decades before, and the neutrality of George the Sixth as King of Ireland in the Second World War, had long since made it clear that the Commonwealth was not a bloc, and that membership was not in any sense a derogation from sovereignty but an optional additional attribute of it — as a great New Zealander once put it, "not independence minus but independence plus". So a sensible way was found of meeting Nehru's request, and it has proved, of course, to be not the beginning of disintegration but a condition of growth.

There are now in the Commonwealth some 20 republics and a few hereditary or elective kingdoms, as well as those members that share with Britain the person of their head of state. All recognize the Queen as the symbol of their free association and as such head of the Commonwealth. This collective symbol is appropriate not merely as a recollection of some shared history — and, if you like, the constructive forgiveness of sins — but because it aptly transcends national sovereignty and points towards wider international co-operation. Moreover, the fact that at the centre of London's political establishment there is a dedicated internationalist has proved of no small import.

If the withdrawal of Ireland in 1949 was unnecessary, that of South Africa in 1962 was forced by a solemn collective decision by Commonwealth members on the basic importance of racial equality and non-discrimination. This decision involved a conscious choice of priorities in world politics and looked forward to the prospect, since realized, of a substantial

*Admission
of India
a condition
of growth*

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growth in Commonwealth membership that would lead to a broad multiracial association.

Another essentially structural decision was that taken by heads of government in 1964-65 to establish a Secretariat. This proposal, put forward by the Prime Ministers of Trinidad and Tobago, Malaysia, and Ceylon, facilitated increased use of the association, while moving from the original fact and appearance of Anglocentricity to put emphasis on multilateralism and equality. The control of such limited central machinery as the Commonwealth needed was removed by general agreement from the hands of any one national government and placed in those of a Secretary-General, elected by and responsible to all the heads of government collectively, who is supported by a staff recruited from public services and the professions in all parts of the Commonwealth.

Strengthened

The flexibility and informality of the Commonwealth association, which from the beginning have been among its essential and indispensable features, were not weakened by the establishment of a Secretariat, as some had at first feared, but strengthened. This is important. The Commonwealth, in contrast to the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies, and most regional organizations, has no written constitution. Its decisions are taken by consensus — a term for which I have always been careful to avoid giving or allowing a rigid definition. There is no veto, as has been demonstrated, but very general agreement is sought and usually attained. This system works where people recognize — or can be brought to recognize — that their community of interests transcends their differences. The Commonwealth is essentially pragmatic, more like the common law than legislative codes. Its approach, I have sometimes suggested, is more like that of the gardener, seeking to influence and guide living trends and forces, than like that of the engineer or architect, seeking to dominate.

Thus, when the Commonwealth set up a small central agency charged with the opportunity, and responsibility, of helping to make the association as useful as possible to its members, its terms of reference were typically vague and ambiguous. In effect, I and my colleagues were given offices in Marlborough House and the opportunity to see what we could make of it.

We were given virtually no financial resources beyond our pay and a little for travel expenses. But we had ready access

and the opportunity to talk frankly at any level.

If the Commonwealth had been getting along reasonably smoothly until I was elected and asked to organize a Secretariat, political storms followed quickly. Within weeks the Malaysians and the mainly Chinese-speaking peoples of Singapore got a divorce; India and Pakistan went to war over Kashmir; and the white minority Government of Rhodesia declared illegal independence from Britain to forestall moves toward majority rule. There have been many subsequent crises. Politically, as in other ways, intra-Commonwealth relations, and the work of the Secretariat, have never been dull.

Toward the end of this article I shall say something of the political uses of the Commonwealth, because, if not the most obvious, they are the most important.

The establishment of the Secretariat undoubtedly reduced the association's vulnerability to the vagaries of individual leaders or to the international popularity or otherwise of the policies, at particular periods, of individual governments. It has helped the Commonwealth to outlive and survive various bilateral and interregional stresses and strains of the past decade. It has been essential to have a focal point for the association that belongs as much to each member as to any other, and that can, in practice, during crises continue to be recognized by all — and listened to by all — without loss of political face. This has been relevant not merely for substantive policies, but even for participation. It mattered, for example, that in 1966 Tanzanian and Ghanaian ministers were able to attend a meeting of Commonwealth ministers in Marlborough House despite their Governments having broken diplomatic relations at the time with Britain. It has mattered that invitations to meetings are issued by the Secretary-General, representing the totality of the association, rather than by the host government of the particular meeting.

That there have at times been stresses and strains is not surprising. The modern Commonwealth is, by the range of its membership, often in the centre of relations and problems between rich and developing countries, between regions and continents and cultures. These involve many of the most difficult and potentially dangerous issues in international affairs. Rich-poor confrontations, continental or regional isolationism, racial discrimination or prejudice could, if we are stupid enough, threaten not merely the cohesion but the existence of the Commonwealth. The real threat would be to the world. Conversely,

to the extent that Commonwealth links and machinery can help resolve these issues or bring about readjustments of various national policies to lessen their dangers, the association can make a valuable contribution. That is why the Commonwealth is today so much more significant as an instrument of world politics than the original rich-man's, white-man's club from which it has been evolved.

The two most significant features of the modern Commonwealth are complementary — first its heterogeneity, the variety of its member countries in terms of their size, location, culture, wealth and basic economy, and secondly the fact that all these members nevertheless share a number of facilities or habits in common. Most important among these are: the ability to use English as a working language, though it is not the mother tongue of the vast majority (there are scores of official languages in Commonwealth countries); many similar habits, working methods, and traditions in administration, in law, and in the organization and ethics of the professions; similarities in educational tradition, especially at the higher levels; and an inherited network of contacts and of habits of consultation and mutual helpfulness. These shared aspects can make consultation much less difficult, and functional co-operation more economical and far more effective, than would otherwise be possible on such an international scale.

The value of any political instrument depends on what it is used for (or can be used for), on how effective it is or can be made, and, perhaps not least, on the by-products of its use.

The direct uses of the Commonwealth have from the beginning been in the fields of consultation and of functional co-operation in selected areas where members agree that such co-operation is feasible and desirable. The chief by-products have, I think, been the broadening of contacts, understanding, horizons and friendships.

These fundamentals have not changed. With increased membership, the consultation has, of course, widened; with diversification of membership among races, continents and economic stages, not only has the subject matter been changed — to more far-reaching if more difficult issues — but the discussions have, in my judgment, deepened. And in recent years the range of fields in which consultation and programs of co-operation take place has expanded dramatically.

Heads of the independent governments of the Commonwealth have been

meeting for informal and wide-ranging consultations since the beginning of this century. They now meet biennially, in various capitals.

Commonwealth finance ministers adopted the habit of annual meetings a quarter-century ago.

Commonwealth education conferences, at ministerial level, began in Oxford in 1958, and have been held since then roughly every three years — in Delhi, Ottawa, Lagos, Canberra and, in 1974, Kingston.

Periodic conferences of Commonwealth ministers of health and of law began in 1965. Health ministers now meet annually for a day or two before the yearly meetings of the World Health Organization Assembly, with longer meetings, lasting about ten days, every three years (Edinburgh 1965, Kampala 1968, Mauritius 1971, and Colombo 1975). Law ministers have met in Sydney (1965), London (1966 and 1973), New Delhi (1971) and Lagos (1974).

Commonwealth meetings are not always — or indeed usually — at ministerial level. The top civil servants of all Commonwealth governments — in some countries this was the cabinet secretary, in others the "permanent" head of the office of the president or prime minister — met in Ottawa in 1972, and have been meeting annually since, on their own, with the Commonwealth Secretary-General in the alternate years between the now biennial heads-of-government meetings, and as a separate committee of the whole during such summit meetings.

Leading civil servants now meet annually

Specialized meetings

There are many more specialized meetings at top-official level: for example, regular meetings of the chief statisticians of Commonwealth governments to exchange views, *inter alia*, on techniques and to work out programs of technical assistance to those who need it, and of auditors-general. The heads of the national scientific research organizations of Commonwealth countries meet regularly, and are increasingly focusing on co-operative programs to step up the application of science and technology to economic development and so on.

Nor are Commonwealth meetings all governmental; still less do they all represent the executive branch. Legislators from all over the Commonwealth meet annually under the auspices of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, and there are also regional meetings. There are regular meetings of speakers to exchange experience and ideas, and of

chief justices. Vice-chancellors meet periodically under the auspices of the Association of Commonwealth Universities; the heads of the national radio and television organizations must meet under the Commonwealth Broadcasting Conference; athletes meet in the quadrennial Commonwealth Games; publishers come together at meetings of the Commonwealth Press Union.

Encouraged by the Commonwealth Foundation, a charitable trust established by heads of government in 1965 at the same time as the Secretariat, and co-operating closely with it, there are a growing number of non-governmental Commonwealth professional associations – in such fields as law, medicine, nursing, surveying, architecture, mining and publishing. Altogether there are hundreds of non-governmental Commonwealth organizations.

Commonwealth meetings have become increasingly action-oriented in recent years. This has been particularly so since the Secretariat has been armed with the multilateral Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation (CFTC) established by heads of government when they met in Singapore in January 1971. The CFTC has made it possible for the Secretariat to respond quickly to high-priority needs identified not only by governments of individual developing countries but by meetings of responsible representatives of several or all Commonwealth members.

Meetings of Commonwealth ministers, for example, do not limit themselves to identifying and exchanging experience and views on key common problems (though the usefulness of this should not be underestimated), but increasingly they set in motion co-operative action to help resolve them – meetings of specialists, the organization of joint research, the training of experts to clear bottlenecks, and often programs of co-operative action on a regional or wider scale, where, as is frequently the case, this seems the most economical and constructive course of action.

Thus the last two meetings of law ministers have not only discussed such topics as ways of reducing the delays and costs of litigation, or improving international co-operation on extradition, or law-of-the-sea issues, or ways of dealing with the increasingly sophisticated international movement of funds for criminal purposes; they also asked the Secretariat to organize a meeting of appropriate officials on reforming legislation on patents, trade marks, and industrial designs in relation to problems of economic development and to do the same regarding prob-

lems faced by the smaller and poorer countries in preparing and publishing law reports. They initiated a Secretariat program to cope with the shortage of legislative draftsmen, which has involved the organization of four regional training courses for professionally-qualified officials in East and West Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, and the placing of trained draftsmen on attachment in various government legislative departments. Co-operation among law-reform agencies is being stepped up.

At the request of health ministers the Secretariat has, *inter alia*, organized and financed regional secretariats or bureaus to promote co-operation and rationalization in postgraduate specialist and para-medical training where this helps avoid duplication of costly facilities.

On the initiation of the ministerial series of education conferences, not only has the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan been established, providing annual prestige awards for over 1,000 postgraduate and senior scholars to study in other member countries (this is in addition to the tens of thousands of technical assistance training awards a year), but there has been organized a series of specialist conferences, seminars and workshops on topics ranging from teacher training, curriculum development and education in rural areas, to school inspection, the new mathematics, and a series of training courses for text-book preparation and publishing in developing countries.

Development assistance

It was the fellow feeling engendered by Commonwealth association that first got the richer members involved in the business of assistance for international development. The Colombo Plan was the creation of a meeting of Commonwealth foreign ministers in Ceylon in 1950. Since then it has been extended to non-Commonwealth countries – the Commonwealth has never sought to put a wall around its members or to limit their contacts as some international associations have tried to do. When African countries acquired independence and became Commonwealth members, a rather similar "Special Commonwealth Aid to Africa Program" was developed. Both are essentially plans for harmonizing bilateral programs.

The much more recently established Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation is different – fully multilateral, with voluntary contributions from all Commonwealth countries and wider collective control. It is, in effect, an operating

budget and arm of the Commonwealth Secretariat, making possible the mobilization of human resources and facilities from any part of the Commonwealth to help meet the development needs of its members. It has greatly expanded the use of the association for mutual self-help. About half of the experts on assignment to developing countries are recruited from other developing countries. Often their background experience is particularly relevant.

General technical assistance is provided in a remarkable range of fields, including such sensitive areas as constitutional questions, social policy, law reform, legislative drafting, fiscal planning and international negotiations. The Secretariat has perhaps the most experienced team in the world in the vitally important and sensitive area of resource development and negotiations with multinational corporations. Its services have helped developing countries to the tune of many hundreds of millions of dollars.

Operational experts are also provided in special cases — for example, a Singapore director-general of the new Fiji Ports Authority, a high court judge from Africa for Papua New Guinea, a distinguished Trinidadian educationalist as Vice-Chancellor of the University of the South Pacific.

Under another CFTC program, the Secretariat organizes and finances training, sometimes through formal university courses but often through in-service attachments, study tours, and specialized technical courses, for students or officials from developing countries in other developing countries. And the Export Market Development Program is used to help developing countries earn more foreign exchange for themselves, through market research, design, participation in trade fairs, and other promotional activities.

The idea of development assistance on a multilateral Commonwealth basis was inherent from the beginning in the establishment of a Secretariat, and the developing countries (as well as the Secretary-General!) pressed hard for its realization. It was, however, five years after 1965 before any of the richer members would agree to support it. The argument they made against it was not that it would cost money but that it would involve "duplication". Since its establishment, however, it has done well, and not only requests for CFTC services but the voluntary contributions to its resources from industrialized and developing countries alike have been snowballing. Canada, Britain and Nigeria are the three largest contributors, and New Zealand is by far the largest con-

tributor *per capita*. All member countries, and the governments of several dependent territories, now contribute.

The Fund is still extremely small in comparison with other multilateral funds, such as those of the EEC or the oil-producers or the UN, but it has been approximately doubling each year. It is about \$10 million for the current year. Its reputation for speed of response, flexibility and quality is outstanding. Its administrative overhead is about 12 per cent, compared to an average of 30 per cent or more for most aid agencies. It shows what scope there is for down-to-earth, practical, mutual help in a group such as the Commonwealth. In my judgment, continued rapid expansion would make good sense, developmentally and in terms of basic political strategy. I have always believed that the health of the Commonwealth, and therefore its value to its members, depends on the extent to which it is constructively used.

The Commonwealth Youth Program is an even more recent activity administered by the Secretariat. It was established by heads of government meeting in Ottawa in August 1973 on the recommendation of a conference earlier that year in Lusaka of Commonwealth ministers (variously of education, youth, labour, sports and social services, plus Senator Paul Martin of Canada). It grew out of a series of regional studies and seminars that the Secretariat had organized, at the suggestion of Harold Wilson, on youth problems, especially those of unemployed school-leavers.

One of the key activities under this program is in the recent establishment of three training centres, located in Zambia, Guyana and India, for the advanced training of youth leaders, concentrating on methods of equipping and helping young people to participate constructively in community and national development. The resources, about \$1 million a year for the first three years, are small but the field is challenging and vital.

Food initiative

Commonwealth delegates at the World Food Congress in Rome a year ago, disappointed at the slow progress that was perhaps inevitable on the world-wide front, asked the Commonwealth Secretariat to convene an early meeting of Commonwealth ministers responsible for food production and rural development. This took place in March 1975. The Secretariat has now been charged with establishing a new program of Commonwealth co-operation in this area, which is so crucial to survival.

*Constructive use
regulates
Commonwealth's
state of health*

It will be financed through the CFTC — contributions, it is hoped, being expanded appropriately.

How to sum up this quarter-century? Most people who know the facts — and they are little publicized — would, I think, agree that, in what is called "functional co-operation", relatively specialized and low-key but down-to-earth fields such as law, education, science, health, technical assistance and techniques of government, the Commonwealth is a logical grouping that can be used, and increasingly is being used, effectively for constructive purposes.

Rhodesian issue

When one comes to high politics, or "gut" politics — perhaps the same thing — the verdict might be mixed. I remember being asked at a press conference in Africa a year or two ago, by a rather bellicose radio correspondent, whether I really thought the Commonwealth's record on the Rhodesian issue was satisfactory. I think he expected to put me on the spot. I said I considered it decidedly unsatisfactory, very far from what would be desirable. "So," I added, "is that of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity." But when international organizations are too weak to deal effectively with the challenges they face, the sensible course, I suggested, would be to strengthen them, rather than to weaken them by cynicism and unimaginative hostility. My interrogator did not disagree.

I myself thought that paratroops should be stationed in Zambia in 1965 before the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), and that they could have ended any rebellion in half an hour, with only a show of force, by giving the Rhodesian troops something to rally to. I still think so. But this could not be brought about. Economic sanctions were introduced instead — and unfortunately introduced only gradually, with almost an inoculation effect.

The sanctions policy, for all its inadequacy, was better than nothing — it used the occasion of UDI at least to get not only the whole of the Commonwealth but soon also the UN committed to the real issue, which was not an unconstitutional 1965 rebellion but much more long-standing racial injustice. The second-best policy, adopted *faute de mieux*, at least prevented recognitions and sell-outs.

Another shrill and agonizing crisis over race relations in Southern Africa arose when Mr. Heath's Government, in the summer of 1970, announced a plan to sell arms to South Africa to counter a Soviet naval build-up. I could understand

Troops in Zambia could have ended Rhodesian rebellion

Mr. Heath's concern about the naval build-up on oil-routes. I could not understand how a stepped-up Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic could be sensibly offset by a change of British policy that would alienate virtually every government and people on the coasts of those two oceans.

The upshot of the use of Commonwealth machinery and consultations was that the British Government quietly dropped the idea. There was no public gloating, no face unnecessarily lost. Britain was saved from an error that would in my judgment have been even more costly to British interests than the ill-judged Suez aggression in 1956, and much more costly to the West as a whole. Africa, too, was saved from a costly set-back.

Bringing about basic readjustments in policies towards each other of nations, continents and racial groups is not easy or free from emotional wear and tear. But recollection at least should be cool. On that occasion, the effectiveness of the use of the Commonwealth was, I think, considerable and very positive. Since then Commonwealth influence in Southern African issues, including Mozambique and Namibia, has been fairly consistently constructive, and on occasion very important. The principles approved by the heads of government at their Kingston meeting this year are a good illustration of progress, and the expectation of much more progress to come.

Other crises

There have been many other crises, often less-publicized but nevertheless very dangerous political issues, with which Commonwealth consultation or machinery has had to deal in the past quarter-century — and not least in the past decade. Sometimes Commonwealth action has been successful, sometimes not. It has, I think, never been unhelpful. There is no space to examine most of these issues here, and some crises forestalled are still perhaps best left in silence.

I must, however, refer to one set of issues, arising from Britain's relation with the EEC. Personally, I had urged my British friends from 1950 on, when I was living in Brussels, to join the European institutions. In the early 1960s, other Commonwealth governments rather emotionally opposed Britain's belated decision to apply. I disagreed. When I became Secretary-General in 1965, I did all I could to discourage the idea that there need be any incompatibility between Britain's membership in Europe and its membership in the Commonwealth — a

phony issue. The real issues were what kind of Britain would there be, and what kind of Europe. What would their relations be with developing countries — an attempt to carve out privileged spheres of influence, with reverse preferences, along the lines of the Yaoundé tradition established by de Gaulle? What about Asia? What would be Europe's relations with North America and other industrialized countries?

Commonwealth finance ministers, meeting in the Bahamas in 1971, asked me to organize studies and consultative meetings on the issues that the developing member countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific would have to face in deciding what response to make to the EEC's offer of "association". I urged these countries to reject Yaoundé and any notion of reverse preferences, but to put forward their own counter-proposals for favourable market access and aid, with no discriminatory spheres of interest. Above all, I urged these Commonwealth countries to stick together for maximum bargaining power, and to try to persuade the *francophone* Yaoundé countries to join them in seeking a new deal.

This line of advice made the Commonwealth Secretariat very unpopular in certain circles for a while. But, in the end, the line we had been urging was adopted or acquiesced in by all concerned. The OAU Secretary-General, with whom I maintained close contact on this issue, played a key role in bringing the French-speaking and English-speaking countries of Africa together.

The resulting Lomé Convention, in negotiating which Mr. Sonny Ramphal, then the Foreign Minister of Guyana and now my successor as Commonwealth Secretary-General, played so key a role, is a good start. The African, West Indian and Pacific countries are not split in resentment and bitterness on this issue, as at one time seemed very likely, nor are the EEC and the other industrialized countries. Everyone gained.

I especially valued the contacts and co-operation worked out between Commonwealth and *francophone* countries on this issue, as on some others. I have welcomed also the development in recent years of a secretariat for *francophone* countries (l'Agence de Coopération culturelle et technique). Though there are many differences, I see in "La Francophonie" a possible parallel with the Commonwealth, using similarities of working language and methods to improve understanding among nations of different races, continents and economic wealth. The two

secretariats have been in close touch, and look forward to practical programs of co-operation. It is, I think, a happy fact that Canada and Mauritius are members of both groups, and that the Seychelles may soon be a third.

The record of the practical uses of the Commonwealth on major political issues, like that of other major agencies in world politics, is mixed. But it is, I think, clear that, without it, the world would be more daunting, the prospects less promising.

What of the future?

As technological changes make the world even more interdependent, the need for understanding and co-operation on a broad international scale grows. Unless political leaders are singularly short-sighted (this is never impossible), I expect that Commonwealth links and machinery will be used increasingly to help achieve this. It is not an alternative to the UN or continental and regional organizations; it is a valuable complement to them.

In the area of economic relations between rich countries and developing ones, the Commonwealth has a particularly important opportunity and an increasingly significant role to play if confrontation is to be avoided and practical adjustments of policy are to be worked out. Problems will continue, and indeed increase, as the pace of change increases. But I hope the strains will ease.

Constructive role for Commonwealth in avoiding confrontation of rich and poor

Causes of strains

Strains in politics can be caused not only by the intrinsic complexity of issues faced but by ambivalence of attitudes (these are particularly difficult to avoid at first between former rulers and ruled); by insensitivities, sometimes, on the part of leaders, and by ignorance and prejudice on the part of sections of public opinion in nations differing in race or culture or affluence; by isolationist, or other narrow horizons, geographic or economic or social. We have been over many of these humps by now. They could recur, but need not.

In politics there are inevitably, at times, temptations to posture or play to the gallery of public opinion back home, even at the cost of exacerbating the real problems. Commonwealth leaders, like others, have, of course, not been exempt from these pressures or temptations. But Commonwealth meetings, governmental and non-governmental, have provided as a by-product a remarkably valuable educational process for participants, broadening contacts, knowledge, understanding, and friendships across the lines of racial, cultural, economic, or geographic differ-

ences that could fragment mankind. The Commonwealth is not merely an association of friends, it is an association that can and does make friends.

During the transitional years under discussion, it has been important to get the Commonwealth's public image straight. Most of the statesmen who have created and shaped the Commonwealth have seen it essentially as an instrument to help shape the future; that is why they value it. Sections of their publics have sometimes

thought of it mainly in backward-looking terms, as a ghost of bygone empire — a understandable but inaccurate and unhelpful conception (non-Anglo-Saxons, and young Anglo-Saxons, are seldom nostalgic about an imperial past). The sentiments and attitudes that support the Commonwealth are teleological, deriving not from the past but from the future, from the realistic vision of the Commonwealth as one of the instruments that can help to build the brotherhood of man.

Building the French-speaking community:

An exciting venture in the art of co-operation

By Jean-Marc Léger

The growing awareness and assertion of a kind of shared destiny among French-speaking countries, and the attempts to organize multilateral relations among these countries, probably cannot be considered a major development of the last quarter of a century in the same way as other events discussed in this issue. In its still fragile yet enthusiastic condition, this phenomenon nevertheless takes on considerable significance for the countries involved and is, from both the socio-cultural and political points of view, an innovation worthy of attention. In the end, it can give a fresh dimension to one kind of international relation.

Mr. Léger was the founder of Accueil franco-canadien (later the France-Canada Association) in 1950 and a founding member and later Secretary-General of the Canadian Committee of the French Cultural Union (1954-1958). He has been Secretary-General of the Association of Wholly or Partially French-language Universities (AUPELF) since its foundation in 1961. From 1970 to 1974, Mr. Léger was Secretary-General of the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation in French-speaking Countries, and he is Honorary Secretary-General of the Agency. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr. Léger.

An exciting, ambiguous venture that is high-minded yet still, in certain respects, somewhat vague, the building of the French-speaking community has a place nonetheless in this special issue of *International Perspectives*, on the one hand, because a large number of individuals and institutions from Canada (and particularly Quebec, for which it represents the main, if not the only, way to assert the province's unique personality on the international scene) are committed to this undertaking and, on the other hand, because the emergence of the French-speaking community has coincided, or very nearly so, with the re-entry of the African countries into the mainstream of history and has largely been the work of African political leaders.

Two misunderstandings

Before attempting a necessarily brief analysis of this venture, we should clear up two misunderstandings that arise with respect to everything labelled "French-speaking".

The first is the tendency in certain circles to see the whole undertaking as an attempt to defend and promote the French language. While there are some organizations or associations that quite legitimately and usefully pursue such an admittedly important goal, and while any French-speaking institution is, of course, obviously

ly concerned with the quality and diffusion of the language, that is not the reason for the existence of French-speaking government institutions and agencies, born of and for co-operation.

The second misunderstanding arises from an oversimplified comparison of the French-speaking community with the Commonwealth. Although it would have been acceptable in the past to compare, *mutatis mutandis*, the British Commonwealth, as it was then called, and the French Union, or later, the Commonwealth and the short-lived French Community (these various bodies being the direct heirs of the British and French prewar empires), there is a clear difference now between the Commonwealth and, for example, the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation in French-speaking Countries — a difference not only in size and means but also in origins, structure and goals.

Various meanings

A deceptive expression in certain respects, "French-speaking community" (a term that is still not entirely satisfactory) needs to be examined more closely, as it may take on quite different meanings depending on the milieu, the circumstances and the speakers. We shall note the three main ones, but confine ourselves to the third — the only one with which this article is concerned.

The first definition is elementary and simply factual; "French-speaking community", in this case, merely refers to the group of countries or communities throughout the world that share the common characteristic of speaking or using French regularly as the official or national language or as one of the official or national languages. In this sense, we could also talk about the English-speaking community — and many other such hyphenated communities.

Next, the term is used to emphasize the feeling these countries or certain segments of their populations may have in varying degrees — a feeling of a kind of shared destiny, a certain psychological closeness — either simply because they realize that a common language facilitates relations and exchanges of all kinds and, as a result, common undertakings, or because they believe that this community of language — and, of necessity, of culture — justifies a common approach to some of the major problems of our age and favours and even invites closer co-operation.

Finally, the term "French-speaking community" refers — and this is the meaning we shall be using — to the organ-

ization, or the attempts at organization and development, of relations between countries that are wholly or partially French-speaking, in order to achieve a number of common goals.

The French-speaking community, in this third sense, did not suddenly come into being with the two Niamey Conferences (1969 and 1970), which established the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation. Nor was the Agency the fruit of spur-of-the-moment inspiration. Although not yet called "French-speaking community", this idea, or more precisely, this ideal, had long been nurtured by a number of more-or-less-organized groups, and especially by individuals — intellectuals and professionals. But that, inevitably, was almost exclusively among Westerners, and took the form mainly of efforts to strengthen ties and work out exchanges with France on the part of French-speaking enclaves that felt isolated, weak or threatened. Between the First and Second World Wars, however, an association of French-speaking doctors was formed, as well as the first body of French-speaking jurists, the Henri Capitant Association.

Three main factors

It was not until after the Second World War, however, especially from the Fifties on, that a feeling of solidarity was to be expressed among French-speaking peoples, and that their belief in the usefulness of co-operation based on their common language was to come to the fore.

Three main factors were to favour the rise of the French-speaking community. The first, very general in nature, was the extraordinary development, both in speed and in volume, of means of communication and transportation that drew together in a unique way various French-speaking communities that had long been isolated and scarcely knew one another. They felt all the more the need to meet and work together since the age of great international organizations had begun and the postwar situation called for firm action to restore the French language to the international status it had enjoyed before the war.

The second factor had to do with the coinciding of what was called the "Quiet Revolution" in Quebec and the achieving of independence by some 30 countries that were at least partially French-speaking — first in the Near East, then in the Far East, in the Maghreb and, finally and above all, in Black Africa and the Indian Ocean. For many reasons — the will to assert their national identity, the need to overcome isolation and strengthen their

French-speaking solidarity emerged after World War II

chances of cultural survival, the desire to foster continental unity, and, finally, interest in promoting dialogue between cultures and finding a new form of co-operation — men and groups from Quebec and Africa — the Maghreb as well as Black Africa — were the ones who pioneered in a series of ventures (associations, institutions, publications, and so on) that would one day be grouped together under the name "French-speaking community". The crowning touch was to be the creation of the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation, though, for political reasons and owing to a combination of circumstances, this Agency would come into being with a more limited purpose and infinitely more modest means than its originators had envisaged.

The last factor was the change in opinion in certain influential circles in France, which, after originally showing some reservations about French-speaking undertakings, were to adopt a more and more favourable attitude. Above all, these groups were to promote a new state of mind, a conception according to which, though France is still, obviously, by far the largest member of the French-speaking community, all the other components are legally and morally on an equal footing with France. The French language is their common possession, and all civilizations represented in the French-speaking community should be given equal attention and consideration. (For example, when AUPELF — Association of Wholly or Partially French-Language Universities — was founded, the French universities were the ones that suggested limiting themselves to a third of the total votes in order to preclude their dominating the general assembly by sheer numbers. In another connection, within the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation, France has only one vote in every instance, as does each of the other members. Most international French-speaking organizations have similar provisions.)

Moreover, from the beginning, French authorities showed great discretion. Partly to avoid the ever-latent accusation of "cultural neo-imperialism" but also to emphasize the total freedom and spontaneity of the initiatives taken in the name of the French-speaking community, Paris took care not to "put its shoulder to the wheel"; on the contrary, it showed great reserve, especially when the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation was created — to the point where it was reproached with indifference by some of the architects of the project.

This much, at least, has been accom-

plished to date and may be important for the future: in French-speaking institutions and associations today there is a feeling of trusteeship on the part of an of the constituent countries.

A wide range of organizations

Short-lived or long-lasting, the associations and institutions (as well as periodicals) falling under the heading of "French-speaking community" increased in number after 1960, and especially after 1965, testifying to the attractiveness, if not always the fertility, of the new ideal. It would be tiresome, and not entirely without risk, to try to make an exhaustive list of these organizations; let us mention a few.

Even before 1960, the French Cultural Union — a great plan only partially fulfilled — came into being (1953), as did the International Association of French-language Journalists (1954), which got its second wind and a new name (Union of French-language Newspapers and Journalists) in 1972. From among the 25 or 30 international French-language associations and organizations (non-governmental or agencies), let us mention those that at present are best known and have the greatest influence: AUPELF, created in 1961 and, in effect, the dean of French-speaking non-governmental organizations; the International Council of the French Language (1967), the "linguistic conscience" of the French-speaking community; the International Association of French-speaking Parliamentarians (1968) which played a deciding role in the creation of the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation. Among the "specialized" associations, we should mention particularly the International Federation of Teachers of French, the International Committee of French-language Historians and Geographers, the Institute of French-speaking Countries, the Association of French-language Writers, and the International Union of French-language Publishers, almost all of which came into being between 1965 and 1970. French-language sociologists, economists, doctors and others have their own international associations, as do journalists (as we have already indicated); there is also an International Federation of French-language Junior Chambers of Commerce.

Special mention should be made of an organization about which little is said but which is highly effective — the Radio and Television Community of French-language Countries. Created in the early Sixties, it now links the national radio and television broadcasting companies of France, Belgium, Canada and Switzerland, and

maintains contact with similar organizations in most French-speaking countries.

For almost 15 years, the Radio and Television Community has played a major role in bringing about program exchanges and promoting co-operation among its members. It is certainly the most useful tool for helping French-speaking countries learn about one another. The Radio and Television Community is responsible especially for a great increase in exchanges of news reports and documentaries on all areas of activity in various French-speaking countries. From the cultural and public information points of view, it plays a primary role. This organization is also responsible for various major competitions (theatre, music, song) and regular programs on the situation and problems of the French language, all produced to serve the entire French-speaking community.

Most of these associations and organizations have their headquarters or secretariats in Paris, for reasons of easier liaison and communication, since the French capital is the hub of nearly all French-speaking activity in the world. There is one notable exception: AUPELF, since its creation, has had its general secretariat in Montreal. (Some may be surprised to find no mention of the Alliance Française in the preceding necessarily incomplete list. Created at the end of the last century, the Alliance does not fit into the French-speaking community as it has been defined for the purposes of this article, though its role is of the greatest importance. Set up in France through the efforts of French intellectuals, its basic purpose is to disseminate the language and culture of France and train foreign teachers of French. It should be noted, moreover, that for about 15 years the Alliance Française, whose activity and vitality are remarkable, has been making a strong contribution towards bringing international recognition to French-speaking writers and artists in general — not just those who are of French nationality.)

Two observations must be made with respect to associations and organizations as varied in composition as those we have mentioned. The first is that a considerable, and often primary, role was played both by Quebecers and French-Canadians in general and by Africans; this is readily understandable, given the historical, geographical and psychological factors involved. Then there is the fact that, aside from their professional and technical purposes (and sometimes even more than these), all these organizations are pursuing the goals of mutual understanding and co-operation in the broadest sense. The

letter or spirit of their constitutions expresses the conviction that use of a common language can serve as a basis for a new kind of co-operation that does not exclude other forms of co-operation but complements them, and that this common language should facilitate dialogue among all cultures represented within the French-speaking community.

Government involvement

The impetus given by these non-governmental organizations — in which some governments of French-speaking countries began to become interested and occasionally supported —, and the early results they obtained, were to prepare the way for another international organization, this time of a governmental nature. However, that impetus and its results would certainly not have been enough if several major African politicians had not stood behind the conception, had not taken this grand design to heart and made an enthusiastic personal commitment to it. It would not be an exaggeration to say that it was the participation of the Third World in general and Africa in particular that gave full meaning to the notion of a French-speaking community and that holds the most promise for the future.

In fact, three major African leaders — President Senghor of Senegal, President Bourguiba of Tunisia and the former President of Niger, Diori Hamani — can be given the credit for taking the idea of the French-speaking community to the government level. For cultural reasons — that is, for reasons of an ethical nature as much as, if not more than, those of a political nature — the first two men especially were to spend several years spreading (in statements, speeches, articles and press conferences) the idea of a vast multinational body that could bring about a new kind of co-operation for which the ideal tool would be the French language, seen both as a means of liaison and as a factor of progress. Already, well before 1960 (notably in a famous speech at Versailles in 1955), Senghor had launched the idea that he was to clarify gradually; by a different route, Bourguiba in turn adopted this goal in 1964-65. The association of the two heads of state with this project was henceforth to lend it credibility.

In an indirect but very significant way, General de Gaulle was also to play a major role in this venture. His extraordinary popularity in the Third World and especially in Africa, the attention and authority he regained for France on the international scene, his active, forward-looking policy of decolonization, rejection

Community idea gained meaning from participation of Third World

of hegemonies and innovative co-operation created a climate that was to favour the efforts of the two African presidents in more ways than one. This is not to say, of course, that the evolution of the French-speaking community was essentially a result of circumstances, but the particular circumstance just mentioned was to bring it much closer to being considered at the political level.

New directions

What considerations led Presidents Senghor and Bourguiba to propose this grand design to all countries that were partially or wholly French-speaking? First, they believed that, in this age of large organizations — some world-wide, others regional —, it was possible to build an international community based on the use of a single, widespread language and on all that this implied in the way of spiritual affinity and common customs, all of which would facilitate co-operation. They were also convinced that the French language, having ceased to be an expression of imperial power while remaining a great international language, could be a tool for common progress. There was a realization as well that, because of its geographic distribution, this language could include most of the great civilizations and foster dialogue, the highest form of co-operation, among them. Finally, they thought that, aside from and in addition to large worldwide organizations sometimes threatened with "Babelization", or regional or continental organizations threatened with a certain degree of egotism or self-imposed isolation, there was a need for institutions that would, by their very nature and size, mitigate both these dangers. Let us mention, moreover, since this a very important factor, that the design of Presidents Senghor and Bourguiba was far-reaching and extremely ambitious. Both being inclined to vast undertakings, long-term outlooks and large-scale ideas, and being defenders of national independence and fraternal co-operation on a basis of equality, the two leaders proposed to all French-speaking countries (and even to others that would have liked to join them) the building of a true community whose functions would be as much economic, social and technical as strictly cultural. (Perhaps there was also, and not without reason, a little nostalgia for the great, abortive plan for the Community that had come out of the French Constitution of 1958.)

For all kinds of psychological and political reasons that cannot be dealt with here, the repeated appeals of Senghor and

Bourguiba, although they did receive great deal of coverage in the international press, did not immediately elicit the initiatives that would have been necessary on the part of government bodies, especially in French-speaking Western countries. Nearly five years were to pass between the first proposals by the Senegalese and Tunisian Presidents and the holding of the first Niamey Conference. The climate from 1964 to 1966 might have been considered more favourable for the creation of a large organization with considerable authority and means from the very beginning. But in 1969 there was not the same enthusiasm. France was just recovering from the serious events of the spring of 1968, and tension between Paris, Ottawa and Quebec City had carried over to the two Niamey Conferences to such a degree that it was only after difficult compromise that the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation came into being.

A modest beginning

The most important point, in any case, is that, if an "official" French-speaking community came into being in 1969-70, it was above all thanks to certain African leaders and groups. It was the summit conference of OCAM (at that time, the Common Afro-Malagasy Organization) that, in 1966, at President Senghor's suggestion, unanimously adopted a resolution for the creation of an international organization of French-language countries. Then there came on the scene the man who was to earn the credit for ensuring the concrete implementation of the project. President of OCAM (as he was to remain until 1970), the head of state of Niger, President Hamani Diori, took up his pilgrim's staff, as he liked to say, and spent two years visiting and making tentative proposals in Western, Black African and North African capitals. He finally agreed to risk calling in Niamey the first conference of French-speaking countries — without really having any indication at that point that it would be a success.

What followed is well known — the approval in principle of an organization and the setting-up of a provisional secretariat by this first conference, and the second, tumultuous conference in March 1970, at the conclusion of which the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation came into being. A humble and painful beginning, especially when it is compared to the original plan: the great community envisaged or hoped for in 1963 and 1964 gave way to a rather small organization, with almost absurdly limited means for the first two years. Yet, despite

the disappointment of some and the scepticism of a great number of others, the Agency was to survive, slowly develop, implement some pilot projects, and finally become an undertaking respected for its goals and its seriousness, if not for its means. Even today, after almost six years of existence, it is still not a determining factor in the international policies of the member countries, and plays little or no part in their orientation or basic options.

There are still a number of countries – and not unimportant ones – that should theoretically belong to but are missing from this “official” French-speaking community: Zaire, Algeria, Morocco, the Congo, Switzerland, for example. Individuals and institutions from these nations do belong to various non-governmental French-speaking organizations, but these are decisions that do not commit the states as such and do not have the “militant” nature some groups associate with membership in what is seen as the political arm of the French-speaking community. We should point out here that, among the many factors behind this possibly temporary reserve or refusal, the very term “French-speaking community” is a rather significant one. It is regarded in certain circles, as much in these countries as in others, as both a label and an assertion – that is, as the expression of a doctrine and membership in a politico-cultural “bloc”.

This situation is all the more curious since nowhere in the constitution of the Agency is there any mention of the French-speaking community; nor is the defence or dissemination of the French language one of the goals of the organization. Some of the leading members of French-speaking institutions occasionally find themselves casting a jealous glance at the Commonwealth and wanting to borrow certain of its features – conferences of heads of state, special ministers’ conferences and so on – perhaps forgetting the basic differences characterizing the origins of the Commonwealth and those of the Agency. It might also seem paradoxical that the Commonwealth, essentially a political institution and direct issue of the British Empire, has been able to keep almost all its members (with two or three exceptions: Burma, Ireland, the Union of South Africa), while an undertaking simply for cultural and technical co-operation, and therefore less “compromising”, encounters strong resistance in some quarters. There is reason to hope that such reservations will disappear in time, but this will undoubtedly require more than just an attempt to imitate the structures and mechanisms of the Commonwealth, which came into being

in a totally different context and for other purposes.

In addition to the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation, there are several other international or regional French-speaking government organizations. First of all, there are ministerial conferences, of which there are two at present – one for the national education ministers of French-speaking countries and the other for ministers of youth and sport. The first was originally strictly Franco-African, but since 1969 has come to include Quebec, then Canada-Quebec, Belgium, former Belgian colonies in Africa, and Haiti; the second, since its inception in 1970, has been oriented toward the whole French-speaking community. As for strictly African organizations, there is CAMES (African and Malagasy Council on Higher Education), which receives technical and financial support from certain Western French-speaking countries. In another connection, there are OCAM and its specialized institutions, which bring together most of the French-speaking countries of Black Africa for broad co-operation purposes. We should also mention the Council of the Entente, which links five French-speaking nations of West Africa for political, economic and technical co-operation. As for relations between France and Black Africa, finance ministers from the *franc* area attend annual technical conferences; also, certain “summit meetings” seem destined to become regular events (Paris, 1973; Bengui, 1975).

Solidarity affirmed

What, then, is the state, after some 15 years, of what must be called (using a possibly unfortunate but certainly convenient term, which has now become part of our vocabulary) the French-speaking community? What does it stand for? What hope does it offer and at what price, on what conditions?

We shall not dwell on the futile and somewhat ridiculous calculations of those who try to determine to the closest million the number of *Francophones* in the world, since their results – all of which are questionable – vary, depending on the criteria used, between 60 and 250 million! If the French-speaking community were no more than the sum of its speakers, it would not mean much.

This French-speaking community is first of all an expression of fellowship. It is also the manifestation of the conviction that the French language is particularly suited to fostering real dialogue between cultures (this is one of the greatest re-

*Community
strength
not based
on head count*

quirements of our age, and the key to a new humanism). Finally, it embodies the search for a unique form of co-operation, in no way excluding other, older forms and with much more modest means than most of them, but striking a different, necessary note. The enthusiasm of the early years, a little of the idealism and perhaps certain illusions have disappeared or diminished, giving way to a clearer perspective and more realistic action.

The French-speaking community is not a crusade, a form of nostalgia, or a closed universe. It strives to bring about, within a body that remains on a human scale, an exchange of individuals, accomplishments, ideas, innovations and experiences. Since this body brings together — quite fortuitously — nations belonging to most of the great civilizations, the common language serves as a natural meeting-ground for these civilizations; and, since this body includes peoples who have reached various levels of economic and technical development, the common language should also be useful as a tool for collective progress. At the same time, the French-speaking community is open to all other political and cultural bodies, organized or not, and seeks to establish the closest possible co-operation with international or regional institutions that are culturally, scientifically or technically oriented.

It is no exaggeration to say that, during the decade from 1960 to 1970, non-governmental French-speaking organizations have shown — some of them, at least, and if only on a modest scale — that the use of a common language can serve as a basis for authentic, effective co-operation among equals, an exemplary form of co-operation. For nearly six years now, the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation has been demonstrating the same thing at the intergovernmental level.

Nothing could more clearly show the spirit behind what is authentic about the French-speaking community than an excerpt from the preamble to the Convention establishing the Agency and an excerpt from AUPELF's constitution. For the Agency:

The States Parties to this Convention.

Conscious of the fellowship uniting them through the use of the French language,

Considering that international co-operation is one of the highest aspirations of nations and that it is a necessary factor of progress,

Considering that the promotion and dissemination of national cultures constitute a necessary step toward mutual

understanding and friendship among peoples,

Considering that cultural and technical co-operation is even more productive when it takes place between people from different civilizations,

Seeking to promote and disseminate on an equal basis the cultures of the member states. . . .

This text echoed the preamble to AUPELF's constitution, adopted in Montreal eight years before, in the autumn of 1961:

Convinced of the need for broad international co-operation to ensure both permanent dialogue between cultures and the exchange of individuals, ideas and experiences between university institutions in very different contexts, . . .

Persuaded that the use of one widespread language naturally invites and facilitates close co-operation among universities of many countries and various continents for the purposes of mutual enrichment and common progress,

Realizing that the French language can be a particularly effective instrument in this regard for international co-operation among universities, the universities belonging to AUPELF, . . . In addition, Article I reads: "An international community of university institutions, AUPELF has as its basic goal the development of an international consciousness and a spirit of co-operation for the purposes of multiculturalism and scientific progress."

Some accomplishments

As for its accomplishments, the French-speaking community today is a wide network of organizations and associations, either governmental (the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation being the most important), or non-governmental or agencies. They number about 30, four or five of which are truly international in activity and outlook. It also includes a vast range of periodical and non-periodical publications put out by these organizations and dealing with the most varied fields of human activity. Then again, it is a body of work, research, surveys and inventories, often of a highly scientific nature (by the International Council of the French Language, AUPELF, the International Federation of Teachers of French, the International Committee of French-Language Historians and Geographers, the International Association of French-Language Sociologists, among others). It is also a series of congresses, conferences, symposiums and other meetings, increasing in number every year, making possible the

flow of men and the development of contacts and exchanges between specialists, which further mutual understanding and co-operation.

Finally, the French-speaking community is co-operation put into practice in the form of many and varied programs and projects, especially on the part of the Agency for Co-operation (for example: Bordeaux International School, support for the development of handicrafts and tourism, youth exchanges, audio-visual centres, dissemination of books and films) and, among the non-governmental organizations, primarily on the part of AUPELF, whose work is based on "horizontal co-operation" among African universities and on cultural encounters between the Maghreb, the West and Black Africa.

While it is useful — sometimes extremely so —, this activity is still modest and quite insufficient in comparison with the needs and the vast possibilities for co-operation to be explored within the French-speaking world. It is not only a matter of means, of influence; it is at least as much, if not more, a question of developing co-operation between French-speaking countries, of determining directions and of establishing priorities, of better organization of the relations between French-speaking institutions themselves.

A new plan

From now on, authorities in the countries involved must adopt, if they truly believe in it (even without the name), a policy of

French-speaking community, governed by a general plan, well knowing that, because of psychological circumstances and for reasons of efficiency, non-governmental organizations and agencies will play just as important a role as governmental regional and international institutions.

Over the last 15 years, the non-governmental organizations themselves have shown the productiveness of the French-speaking community conception in matters of international co-operation. We must now try, with caution but with conviction, to work out a wide-ranging, effective new formula for relations between peoples of such fascinating diversity — a formula that will include, among other factors, the use of the French language.

If these nations join a community freely, in a spirit of equality and solidarity, then that community can grow and assert itself. Used as a means of cultural sharing between these peoples, the French language can fulfil its mission as a meeting-ground, as a language of potential and progress and, last but certainly not least, as a language for renewed international co-operation. Provided that this language is the common property of all the peoples who use it to varying degrees, that it serves as a vehicle equally for the cultural heritages of all, that it expresses all questions and soul-searchings, however tumultuous, that it continues to be a factor of progress, it will be the noble language of our age.

*Cautious search
for wide-ranging
new formula*

Foreign policy: 1950-1975 (or should that be 1945-1970?)

By Gérard Bergeron

The beauty of round numbers! From the century's half-way mark to its three-quarter mark — sufficient justification in itself, surely, for a review of the period in these pages. I feel, however, that a slight readjustment in dates would make the whole enterprise less contrived. Rather than starting our journey at 1950, notwithstanding the undisputed importance

of the Korean War and of our contribution to the (so-called) United Nations forces, it would be more appropriate to take off from 1945, the year that marked the end of the war and the entry onto the international scene of Canada as a full-fledged citizen. And, rather than ending our survey at 1975, a year with little to recommend it other than its status as

present title-holder and one of the century's milestones, I would choose 1970, the year our national authorities had recourse to the army, that ultimate instrument of foreign policy, to meet a grave internal policy crisis.

"War Measures Act", "apprehended insurrection" — the glaring discrepancy between the force of these terms and the size of the crisis to which they were applied strikes not a few as even more tragic and ridiculous now than five years ago. News of that singular and interminable "visit" of the army to Quebec attracted world attention. That bizarre inversion of an act that is typical of external defence is perhaps the major political phenomenon of our global history, both international and intra-national.

Beginnings

The first three-quarters of the international history of Canada — it can hardly be called the history of Canada's international policy, for the obvious reason that no such thing existed — can, and in fact must, be covered in very little time. The first quarter, which ends with Laurier's coming to power (1896), was devoted to conquering a territory and pulling together its separate and scattered components. The second quarter (1896-1920) was marked by the entry of the Canadian colony into the international community as a result of compulsory imperial solidarity, with, as background, the well-balanced North Atlantic triangle formed with Britain and the United States, analysed — and even celebrated — by the historian John B. Brebner. From the Congress of Versailles in 1919 to Yalta, aided by the transformation of the Empire into the Commonwealth (a transformation of which it was both principal mover and first beneficiary), Canada took the first timid steps towards establishing a presence on the international scene.

A true foreign policy did not come into being until 1945, with the dawning of

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the age of active and responsible majorities for Canada. An entire diplomatic network was needed, and was put together very quickly during the first few years. This was a period of growth for the various brands of Canadian nationalism, all focusing on the need for an active presence in the world at large. This world, however, was already under the shadow of what was soon to be called the "Cold War". Twenty-five years later it would be October 1970 in Quebec, with the arrival of the khaki-clad "visitors" acting under orders and displaying all their hardware before a local citizenry more bemused than alarmed. Even in the worst days of the conscription crisis during the war military pageants were more discreet.

What must have passed through the mind of the young French-speaking Canadian who was 20 at the time of Yalta, San Francisco, Hiroshima? If he was not obsessed by his Quebec identity, his visions must have been the same as those of the young English-speaking Canadian — provided, of course, that the latter was not, in his turn, torn by the uncertainty of his own Canadian identity. Suddenly we existed internationally — and that felt very strange. The title of André Siegfried's prewar work *Canada, International Power* now seemed less far-fetched. In our northern half of the continent, we had put together an immense arsenal that may have been responsible for saving Britain in its darkest hour and making a useful contribution to the liberation of Europe. From the Dieppe raid to the beaches of Normandy and to various points along the Italian front, from the Ardennes to the Dutch polders, we were in the thick of it as volunteers (as well-trained volunteers) or as a very small number of reluctant conscripts — but all those distinctions were to be forgotten by the time of the armistice of Reims. We should, without broadcasting it too much, take pride in having been the least of the great powers to bring the Axis to an accounting.

One person had first absorbed, then directed, in a manner so careful as to be ambiguous, the crisis of national unity brought about by the conscription issue. That man, Louis St. Laurent, became the external spokesman for Canada and could point to a new-born national unanimity on the major problems of a postwar age without peace. A new defence of the "free world", with NATO as its shield, arrived just at the right time to help us shake off our traditional complexes: the anti-imperial (if not anti-British) sentiment of the French-Canadians, and the colonial attitude — unnecessarily pro-

longed — of Canadians of British descent. There remained only the new Canadians to live a totally-committed form of Canadianism.

But a third complex was quietly to take the place of the old ones; our anti-Americanism would be moderate (everything Canadian is by nature moderate) but it would nonetheless remain an inseparable part of our makeup. Is it not a syndrome as unrelenting as the forces of our unending winters? We should become used to the vague feeling of living, as it were by proxy, off the immense prosperity of our only immediate neighbour, while contributing so handsomely to that prosperity. How should we explain that to an outsider lacking even the crudest historical analogy to aid in understanding?

Passable diplomacy

We managed, nevertheless, a very passable kind of diplomacy; was it of the kind proper to the largest of the small powers or to the most typical of the middle powers? Whatever the formula, our vanity (moderate, of course) found satisfaction in it. Not for long, however, were we dazzled by the supposed link or "letter-drop" between Washington and London, a myth invented by our rhetoric and bolstered from time to time by "diplomats" in both capitals for whom there was something in it. Closer to the truth would be our role of intermediary between Washington and the new nations of the Afro-Asian world, especially those we knew better through our common membership in the Commonwealth. But let us not exaggerate the importance of this role. We moved "on little cat feet" even before the phrase was popularized by Carl Sandburg in a totally different context. And we still adopt an apologetic approach.

This middle-power role did not take the form of intervention between the two great powers, our neighbour to the south and our other neighbour across the northern fastnesses. Not only were we members of the great Western family — by geography and economic penetration, Canada appeared to be welded to one of the great contemporary powers. The diplomatic "arm's length" approach we attempted to maintain with regard to the United States was misinterpreted abroad as a rather reluctant reaffirmation of two destinies inextricably linked. Whatever was said or done, Canada would never have the means to become a Castroist Cuba — even supposing that it was overcome by such a strange desire. It might have had the wish (and, subsequently, the means) to become

a sort of Mexico of the Cardenas-Echeverria variety.

Concentric circles

Our relations are like a series of concentric circles. The first, an asymmetrical one, places us in a situation both constraining and beneficial with respect to the United States. Economic preponderance does not mean consequent loss of political independence, but it does restrict the range of international options. None of us like to be taken for granted — as our prime ministers and ministers of external affairs make a point of going to Washington to say every so often. However, we always come back to the situation outlined in the Heeney-Merchant report. The variation lies in which point is chosen for emphasis.

As a young professor of international relations in the early Fifties, I decided that spending some time in the Department of External Affairs to see at first hand how our international policy was formulated would help me explain it to young people who were literally in the process of discovering the world. I remember, in particular, the irritation I felt at hearing East Block explanations almost always taking the "American factor" into account. It was just as if an international matter could not be understood unless first filtered through that prism. This coloured — right from the start — the perception even of questions that had nothing to do with our forced partnership with the United States. When questions relating to NORAD, nuclear weapons, the Auto Pact or hormone-fed cattle are at stake, such a habit is understandable. It is less understandable when foreign policy as a whole is in question. I am exaggerating, to be sure, but this is my memory of those conversations — conversations of which I probably expected too much.

The intermediate circle of our relations finds us more comfortable because of the diversity of partners and parties with whom we deal. In NATO, in the days when that organization had a better reason for existence than merely assuring its own symbolic survival, we played the role of the promising, trustworthy youth of good background, whose opinions and disinterestedness were appreciated by the grown-ups. We were even promoted to providing one of the "Three Wise Men". We appeared modern, in the American-style, without provoking resentment in the capitals of Europe or the far-flung members of the Commonwealth. We were keeping good company. Canada came to look better by comparison with other countries which met with unpopularity and a certain hesi-

*'American factor'
coloured
Canadian
perception*

tancy. It would not have occurred to us to play an active role in shaping new situations but in crisis situations created by others — in Korea, in Indochina, in the Congo, in Cyprus, in the Middle East — we were able to display acumen and a sense of responsibility. These distant involvements did not arouse the old anti-militarist reflex of the French-Canadian, for it was for a good cause and the volunteer system remained in force.

In the larger circle of our relations at the United Nations, we acquired at some point the reputation of being masters of compromise in corridor and cocktail-lounge diplomacy. In a period marked by the decline of diplomacy, this is perhaps a way to run the risk of being somewhat useful, particularly if the low-key approach is used. We invented rationalizations after the fact, with Canadian values as a basis, to justify attitudes, and even commitments, that had scarcely been a matter of choice for us. It can even be stated that we showed a trifle more creative imagination in international politics than in solving our own serious internal problems. But our foreign policy probably disappointed many of the vague expectations once held by nations of the Third World concerning us. John Holmes has already spoken of the danger that an active determination to "middle-power-manship" may disappoint or even amuse certain members of the international community, "thereby dissipating the reputation for judgment and good sense on which the success of the role depends". By trying too hard not to be taken for someone else we may end up being taken for someone else.

Middle-of-the-road power?

Looking at our image as the prototype of the middle power, I wonder if we are not turning into the most middle-of-the-road and the greyest of the middle powers. This blurring of our image, and especially of the roles it permits, is not very conscious, certainly not deliberate. By analogy, a middle class of society that is too conscious of the need to call itself such is showing that it is in the process of changing into something else — something out of line with the normal order of development.

The predominant idea in the thought of Walter Lippmann during the latter part of his life was that American foreign policy should not exceed the enormous, yet limited, means of the United States. It is worth while wondering if the brains behind Canada's foreign policy are not unduly smitten by the opposite notion. Ultra-conscious of the limited nature of our means in all areas, we perhaps forget to

invest our foreign policy with a little more — let us say *personality*, Canadian or otherwise. The two fictional young Canadians from the different language groups who were 20 in 1945, mentioned at the beginning of this article, have experienced a rapid cooling of the enthusiasm they felt at the end of the 1940s. I admit this is a good thing. We are all the victims of a mirage, and mirages are, as we know, optical illusions caused by the emptiness of the desert.

But what is even more symptomatic is that the young people of 1975 find very little intellectual stimulation in studying what we continue to call *the* foreign policy of Canada. The Canadian International Development Agency? Certainly, it evokes some interest. Who can escape the fascination exerted by the Third World and the guilty conscience created by its very existence? The work of that agency evokes a reaction just like the work of analogous governmental institutions around the world, which is a healthy thing. We are going to help the poorest countries in the 1975-1980 period — good. We acknowledge our special responsibility as a major producer of food — good. But also, with admirable frankness, we associate ourselves with the countries of the Third World as a major exporter of raw materials. Finally, private agencies like OXFAM and CUSO attract more spontaneous active allegiance from young Canadians — which is no less admirable in this country, where a public sector must always be in competition with a private sector.

Binational or bicultural foreign policy? My first reaction (which I shall dismiss immediately as being too cavalier) is "Tell me another!" It is impossible to project externally what does not really exist internally. What has become today of the plans for binational foreign policy drawn up a decade ago by such people as Stephen Clarkson, John Holmes and Louis Sabourin? It has taken the ferment of the Quiet Revolution, a few diplomatic commando raids by those who govern and administer Quebec, and, above all, a certain cry from a renowned general badly in need of retirement for Ottawa to wake up to the fact that a distant world remains to be explored. With Giscard, Trudeau and Bourassa at the helm, everything is now under control; no fear of new diplomatic indiscretions. Relations between France and Canada have been normalized. As this article is written, the appointment of Gérard Pelletier as Ambassador to France is announced. This is an event of great importance; it signals the arrival on Avenue Montaigne of a man who will consider

himself as more than just the administrator of a so-called "prestige" embassy. Well before his entry into politics, Pelletier was aware of the inter-organic importance of this Ottawa-Paris-Quebec City trio, worth watching, without illusions and without complacency, from a triple standpoint.

Triangle to rectangle *

With the need to summarize, my mind goes back to the image of the North Atlantic triangle, that reassuring configuration behind the international adolescence of Canadians of my generation. Now, however, this is no longer relevant and the geometrical configuration needed would be a rectangle, formed by the United States, Europe, the Third World (including Latin America) and Japan. And, depending on the changing situation, the U.S.S.R. and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as China, Indochina, Cuba, the Congo and Chile, come briefly into prominence. The major point to be noticed is that, even from the Canadian point of view, we no longer form one of the angles, as we did in the bygone North Atlantic triangle. Certainly there is no call for tears, for that would be to regret that the world has changed and that our foreign policy has expanded in response to that change. This is not an occasion for regret, or for criticism, but merely for noting that, from being one colonial corner of a restricted and virtually restrictive triangle, we have been placed by the full sovereignty of the postwar period in a situation where we are a moving point within a much greater rectangle.

The variability of this "moving point" is notably limited only in its relation to the corner represented by the United States. Our mobility in relation to the other three corners (Europe, the Third World and Japan) is greater, although it is never sufficient for us to escape completely the pull of our North American destiny, to which we always come back in the end. In sum, our diplomatic relations can be likened to the playground game known as "four corners". We race from one corner to another, but we favour one corner in particular. When Chou En-lai addresses Mr. Trudeau in Peking as "my old friend", it is less compromising than General de Gaulle's "my friend Johnson".

The last few years have seen serious

efforts to define our foreign policy. This may have made us happier at being able to see things more clearly; however, there is no guarantee that we are thereby more effective, for in human relations — especially international relations — so much depends on others. Our range of options will never be very large, but the fact that we can perceive them with greater clarity is of no small importance. The other side of excessive carefulness has already been noted. Another failing would be to devote all our energies to searching for solutions to our internal problems.

After having condemned nationalism, we in many Western nations now find ourselves spectators at its rehabilitation as a style, even a basis, for foreign policy. I have no objection, as I should agree to the premise that two brands of nationalism in conjunction make for a firmer bulwark. However, the two brands of Canadian nationalism are not so much divergent as out of step. At a time when English-Canadian nationalism resolutely takes the form of Canadianism, the French-Canadian nationalism that was once Pan-Canadian is limiting its horizons to the borders of Quebec. The only point they have in common is their defensive posture — against Americanism in the first case, against the ever-growing majority of English-speakers in the second. These two precarious defences stay separate. As far as international affairs are concerned, Canada's image abroad does not appear weakened as long as it can contain its problem at home. But for how long and how "elegantly", if I may put it that way?

Remembering the conscription crisis of 1942 and 1944, my pair of Canadians from the two language groups who were 20 at the time of Hiroshima will see that what we have to work with now is essentially the same. But back then the two agreed on the need to defend Canada, even if they differed hotly on which front was most appropriate. Today, the choice of fronts is no longer at issue; we are now playing for global stakes. With a federal system behind us of which the chief merit has been that it has lasted, but which has the great drawback of generating its own ills, we are called to deal with urgent problems — Bill C132, stagflation, oil. With all this, does a "foreign" policy still exist?

*Two brands
of Canadian
nationalism
out of step*

Canadian missions abroad:

1950	44, including 16 embassies, 7 legations and 5 high commissions
1975	127, including 52 embassies and 19 high commissions
Increase —	288%

Epilogue

The challenge of continuity: directions for foreign policy

By Allan MacEachen

The foreign policy of Canada, like that of any country, is shaped by a few basic factors. The most important are geography, history, population, culture, resource-endowment and economic institutions, internal political conditions and the external environment. Geography and history are relatively stable, despite the impact of technology on geographic constraints and periodic historical reinterpretations. Population, culture, resource-endowment and economic institutions can evolve gradually, but at a pace and in patterns that are fairly predictable. But a country's internal political consensus and its external environment tend to be less stable and their evolution less predictable.

The relative weights of these determinants vary from country to country and from one period to another — and hence a country's foreign policy can be more or less stable or predictable over time. Thus it can be argued that, in recent decades, the influence of external events has grown steadily in relation to other determinants, so that all states, irrespective of their status and power, find themselves with a less-independent control over their foreign policy than they once had. At the same time, the impact of wider education, easier means of transport and communications and changes in "life-styles" have increased the number of participants and the level of interest in the foreign policy process. As a consequence, both external and internal pressures tend to erode the conceptions of state sovereignty and of foreign policy itself.

Yet Canada's relations with other states have remained, on the whole, remarkably stable since the early postwar years. Both the geographical pattern and the variety and intensity of Canada's external relations have continuously expanded, but this expansion has reflected

more a process of adjustment to changes in the external environment than the evolution of the other circumstances that shape our foreign policy: decolonization in Africa and Asia, for example, or the re-emergence of Europe and Japan as major economic powers, or the still uncertain process of *détente* between East and West, or the new potency of developing countries' demands for a more equitable world economic order.

Initiatives triggered

Moreover, the evolution of conditions in Canada did trigger specific initiatives in foreign policy — witness the expansion of cultural relations with France and other French-speaking countries and recent attempts to establish a "contractual link" with the European communities and to expand economic relations with member states. These more recent developments may be a portent for the future; new directions in domestic policies may have a greater impact upon Canada's external relations than has been discernible in the past.

Nevertheless, one is struck more by the continuity than by the elements of novelty in any retrospective survey of Canadian foreign policy. The explanation is clear. First, we have been fortunate in avoiding abrupt or profound political change at home; and most Canadians have not had cause to complain of economic hardship — most certainly not, at least, relative to the process of development in the rest of the world.

Secondly, Canada's major external relationship, that with the U.S.A., has remained dominant over this period, so that the margin for change in foreign policy has correspondingly remained fairly circumscribed. Whatever one may think of this relationship (and Canadians have never spoken with one mind about it), the fact of its central importance in the determination of Canada's foreign policy can hardly be doubted. To a lesser degree, Canada's ties with the countries of Eu-

Less independent control over foreign policy in recent years

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rope, from which 90 per cent of its people have come, are dictated by factors of great stability — based, in this case, on history and culture rather than geography. Immigration, trade and tourism flows keep these ties alive, and defence commitments give them added political significance.

Economic advantage

A third basic element underlying our foreign policy has been Canada's comparative economic advantage. We are a wealthy people in a world two-thirds of whose inhabitants are poor. In 1950, we began to develop special ties with new members of the Commonwealth; and since then we have accepted a wide range of commitments in the field of development assistance. While not different in kind from those of other Western states, these are of unusual scope and variety and reflect a genuine concern for harmonious global development. Canada's fairly recent experience as a colony and its continuing dependence on foreign capital and on the export of primary products have helped it understand the goals of newly-independent states. Our wealth and mainly European origins place us in the category of developed Western states; but the impulse to promote good will and conciliation of divergent interests is not by any means artificial.

Are these factors of stability in our foreign policy likely to remain significant in the future? On the whole, I think so. Assuming we maintain our territorial integrity and unity, there is unlikely to be any sudden shift in the way Canadians perceive their national interests, although internal political consensus may not be as easy to achieve as in the past, particularly where significant provincial interests are at stake. The process of federal-provincial consultation and bargaining on the disposition of our natural resources, for example, complicates and may qualify Canada's participation in international arrangements in this field. But the advantages for all Canadians of international co-operation, of dealing collectively — rather than regionally — with other states will, in my view, be more telling than the possible gains arising from special or short-term interests. It is significant that none of Canada's major political parties, including the secessionist Parti Québécois in Quebec, advocate drastic changes in our foreign policy goals. As long as this is so, the prospects for adjustment and consensus-building and -restoring seem likely to proceed within limits that are compatible with continuity in foreign policy.

The Government will continue to encourage the trend towards a sharper definition of the Canadian "fact" in a North American environment, and will promote the rapid development of trade, industrial co-operation and other relations — including cultural exchanges — with countries elsewhere, particularly in Europe and across the Pacific. But this very process, in my view, will intensify the U.S. dimension of our foreign policy. The conception of a "special relationship", in the sense that, because Canada and the U.S. have much in common, they deserve special treatment from each other, no longer fits the circumstances of the Seventies. But the notion of special relations that derive from the high degree of interaction between the two countries (dictated to a large extent by geography and culture), coupled with disparity in the costs and benefits of such interactions, is very real and will persist. In so far as Canada's interests are seen to be distinct from those of the U.S.A. and appropriate policies are developed to represent these interests, the need for explanation, consultation and negotiation will grow, and the degree of interaction between the two governments will intensify. Moreover, the pivotal position of the U.S. in world politics, while it may gradually become less central, is bound to mean that its influence on other states, wherever located, will remain strong. Those countries that depend on the U.S.A. for external support of various kinds, or that share in general terms a belief in political democracy and social pluralism — circumstances by no means limited to Canada or to Western or "Westernized" industrial economies — will not be much inclined to follow foreign policies thought by U.S. leaders to pose a threat to American security. This does not mean that Canada cannot assert and defend its interests as it sees them; it means that a key segment in Canada's spectrum of interests is the maintenance of relations with the U.S.A. that are marked by mutual respect and confidence.

The third factor of stability mentioned above was Canada's wealth. A country whose people are very poor has no choice but to attempt to change that situation, if necessary by radical measures. Canada's economic circumstances are not of this kind. Indeed, the challenge to Canadians is to share, not to increase, their relative wealth. Canada is, of course, dependent on international trade and investment for its prosperity and will suffer from recession abroad, particularly in the U.S., or from a decline in productivity at home caused by any abrupt retrenchment

Pivotal position of United States in world politics remains strong

of foreign industrial capital and technology. But, aside from petroleum and a few other basic commodities, we are unlikely to be dependent on others for essential imports. Given a more or less open and dynamic world economy and a willingness to make the best of our resources and comparative advantage, Canada should continue to prosper. Consequently, we plan to increase and to improve the quality of our development assistance, and to participate actively in the wide range of initiatives now under consideration to alter positively and significantly the economic prospects of developing countries.

The validity of the above speculations about continuity in Canadian foreign policy is contingent on an external environment that is "surprise-free" in certain important aspects — i.e., relative global peace, sufficient economic growth (which implies continued access to supplies and markets), and effective international institutions. The absence of one or more of these would pose major challenges to Canada's foreign policy. Without at least a modicum of political order and economic growth in the world, we could not achieve goals that are largely determined by our particular situation in the world — a North American country with special ties to Europe, but with a global vocation based on trade, resource wealth and cultural diversity. What, then, are the prospects for world peace and prosperity?

Thirty years after the end of the Second World War, it is still possible to believe that we can continue to avoid a third one. The likely effects of such a war, fought with nuclear weapons, are indeed so terrible that we cannot afford to believe otherwise. Yet the strategic arms race continues, and new competitors advance to the starting-line even while the original contestants attempt to agree on where to place the finish! While the end of the war in Indochina, the agreement between Israel and Egypt to disengage their forces in Sinai, the progress made in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the approval of the Final Act of the CSCE reduce the immediate risk that regional conflicts will trigger global war, the fact remains that such conflicts are endemic in a world of 150 nation states and that nuclear-armaments technology is spreading. It is true that war between the super-powers has been avoided for a generation, in part because both are fully aware of the "Armageddon effects" of nuclear weapons, and it is also true that relations between them are generally improving; so we may hope that caution will continue to prevail in future. But such

hopes cannot be a substitute for policies designed both to deter the use of strategic arms and to remove the incentives for their use.

Parity of forces

Policies in the first category include the maintenance of approximate parity in overall forces and close co-operation in NATO between the U.S. and its major allies. Policies in the second category include: the improvement of relations between the West and the U.S.S.R., between the West and China, and, it is hoped, between China and the U.S.S.R.; arms-control agreements and safeguards; strengthening of the UN as an agent for international peace and security; providing some minimum level of economic security for all states; and regional co-operation.

If more states acquire nuclear weapons, it will be imperative to quicken the pace of advance in these directions, for it seems unlikely that strategic deterrence can be as effective in a multi-polar situation as in the essentially bi-polar one prevalent in the postwar period. In other words, in so far as decisions about war and peace slip out of the control of Washington and Moscow and the risks of global conflict thereby increase, the responsibility for finding new ways to accommodate divergent interests will have to be more widely shared.

The motives impelling states to acquire military power are likely to become increasingly affected by shifts in the distribution of economic power in the world. At one extreme, those states with newly-acquired wealth based on the possession of scarce resources may wish to reinforce their capacity to protect these resources; at the other, states that may face bankruptcy because they cannot pay for the food or fuel they must have, or that are refused access to such supplies, may contemplate desperate measures or may be unable to prevent domestic groups from turning to terrorism and violence abroad. In the light of these probabilities, the need to develop new rules for the global management of resources is compelling. In any case, quite apart from its moral implications, a situation where 100 or more new states compete to obtain the privileges and advantages now held by a small minority, and where differences in *per capita* incomes range as high as 25 to one and are on an average of 14 to one in favour of the industrialized countries, appears to me highly unstable.

There is some doubt that the high average growth-rates of the 1960s and the early part of this decade will soon be re-

Development assistance to be increased

Possible to believe third world war can be avoided

sumed, and even greater doubt, should they be, that they will prove as stable. These doubts arise from the length of the current recession in the industrialized countries, which is related in turn to the high and still-rising price of oil. Assuming that the world adjusts to high-cost fuel, moreover, there is little assurance at present that the inflation/recession phenomenon will not recur. These are matters on which "experts" disagree; but I am tempted to speculate that two parallel series of changes are taking place in the world economy: a readjustment in the relations between the U.S.A., Western Europe and Japan (related to some decline in the relative strength of the U.S.), and the emergence of new sources of demand and of new centres of power outside the group of industrialized countries. These changes have severely strained the international monetary system established in 1945 and, in effect, forced a fundamental reform of this system; they have also called into question the free-trade assumptions, based on more or less unlimited growth, also made in the postwar years.

Distribution problem

It is not necessary, in my view, to postulate a shortage of non-renewable resources to draw the conclusion that the efficient distribution of resources has become a problem of quite different order and magnitude, in a world of resource manipulation by states endowed with them and of very great disparities in the capacity to pay for them. In such circumstances, I find the demand for a new international economic order quite understandable; but the means available to bring this about are not self-evident. To take only one example, slow growth in the industrialized countries, whatever its advantages may be for the environment and the quality of life, will impede the rapid growth-rates that the developing countries must experience if the gap in living standards is to be narrowed. Yet, if the industrialized countries return to high growth-rates, major changes in their aid and trade policies will be necessary for greater equity in international economic relations is to be achieved.

Such changes will not be made easier if, at the same time, the richer countries lose influence within the international institutions designed to transfer resources to poor countries. The case for a restructuring of these institutions, on which a beginning has been made in the IMF and the IBRD, is a strong one; the new wealth of the OPEC countries, for example, entitles them to a greater say in their govern-

ing councils. But the need for reform will have to be balanced against the need for major participants to have confidence in the effectiveness of these organizations. I hope that new procedures for reaching and implementing decisions will take all major interests into account. While the UN system is over 30 years old, it is only now that its members are faced with the real dimensions of global decision-making, involving virtually all states and a host of issues of vital concern to most of them. Like all institutions, it must adapt or disappear; and the onus of adaptation falls mainly on the original members, particularly the major powers.

These cursory speculations about the future imply that we cannot expect a relatively benign external environment in which to achieve Canada's foreign policy goals unless there are significant changes in the policies of the industrialized countries — including the U.S.S.R. — that:

- a) lead to great co-operation among the nuclear powers;
- b) reduce the means and the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons;
- c) begin to close the gap in *per capita* global incomes;
- d) lead to new forms of international decision-making.

There are indications that such policies are beginning to be put in place; the agreement reached at the seventh special session of the UN General Assembly on measures to achieve a new international economic order, for instance, was an encouraging sign — perhaps even a sign-post. But we are still far from the point where success is assured.

Canada is a major industrialized country, and we must contribute to the shaping of policies designed to achieve these global ends. I have noted with interest the recent discussion in these pages of Canada's status as a "medium" power; does our natural-resource endowment, in fact, lay the basis for a claim to higher status? The measurement of power has in the past been relatively easy; the conventional standard was the capacity to apply and sustain superior military force. In an age when resort to military might is circumscribed by nuclear weapons, this standard loses some, but certainly not all, of its reliability. It is also true that the capacity to sustain the use of military force requires access to natural resources such as oil, which are no longer so easy to obtain. States that control significant amounts of these resources have a great advantage if they also possess the manpower and/or the will to accept the risks of modern warfare; states that do not

*United Nations
must adapt
or disappear*

*Canada's status as
'medium' power
discussed*

possess such resources must look to others for their security.

In other words, it seems to me that power today also depends in part on having things that others want, and being able and willing to prevent their exploitation by others, if necessary, and to share them with others, if appropriate. Canada certainly has such valuable things, some in lesser abundance than we imagined not so long ago – oil for example. Whether we have the will and capacity to wield these potential elements of power and influence wisely and in the interests of global security and prosperity, as well as in our own, is very much up to Canadians themselves. If we do, we may take pride in being thought to have power.

I conclude that Canada has a distinct and substantial contribution to make to global security and that this contribution and the attendant costs are compatible with our national interests. But in my view, security is a conception that Canadians will need to explore and assess more comprehensively. In addition to interna-

tional military security, to which we must continue to contribute adequately, and to the protection of our own national interests, we have obligations to the global community that are not always sufficiently recognized.

This is not idealistic rhetoric. Mankind is indeed at a turning-point – in a quandary not unlike that of the Sorcerer's Apprentice. We must manage technologies that have the power to destroy us but that we cannot be sure of controlling. Such control as we have is exercised by government that, whatever their make-up or ideology, have to meet rapidly-rising expectation among their peoples for a more equitable sharing of this planet's finite resources. Such expectations cannot be satisfied soon if at all, without the technology and the capital required to produce wealth. The alternative is the frustration of hope, social revolt and the risk of war. The long term security of Canada requires, therefore, that we take into account, at all times, the global dimensions of national policy decisions.

Will and capacity to wield power up to Canadians

Book review

Mike unmistakably Mike *Pearson Memoirs, Volume 3*

By Eugene Forsey

The third volume of Mr. Pearson's memoirs, like the second, is a composite, woven together, from various documents, by the two editors. In my opinion the weaving has been done with great skill and judgment. People who knew Mr. Pearson better than I did may not agree; but to me the book is unmistakably "Mike", from start to finish.

Senator Forsey is recognized as the leading authority on the Canadian constitution. He is a specialist on labour questions. He has been a member of the Senate of Canada since 1970. Senator Forsey will be contributing a review on the first volume of the Diefenbaker Memoirs for the January/February issue of International Perspectives. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

It is, of course, very different from the first two volumes. In them, we had Pearson the professor, the civil servant and the diplomat. Here we have Pearson the politician; and, to my surprise, a very professional politician. I had always thought of him, I believe correctly, as having taken the plunge into active politics reluctantly, and from motives of sheer public duty. I am sure he never had John Diefenbaker's zest for, and delight in, the game, or Arthur Meighen's "lust for combat". But this volume makes clear that, once he had taken on the job of party politician, and, of course, especially after he became leader, no one could have worked harder at it. In retrospect, also, it seems doubtful whether, in the circumstances he had to cope with, anyone could have done the job more effectively.

He took on the leadership when his party had suffered a severe shock to its morale, the severity mitigated only by a sublime confidence that the Diefenbaker Government could not be more than a brief interregnum, after which the electorate would regain its senses and penitently restore the Liberals to power. This illusion led to the ill-fated want of confidence motion of January 1958, where Pearson was led up the garden path by party "experts" whose monumentally foolish advice he treats with a gentle and generous forbearance. The election of 1958 shattered the illusion and decimated the party. The spectacular recovery over the next four years was the work of many hands and minds, to whom Pearson pays ample tribute; and, of course, he was much helped by circumstances over which no one in Canada had any control, and by the Government's mistakes. But the guiding hand and mind in the reconstruction of the party were unmistakably Pearson's, the product of his special gifts of heart and mind.

When he took office, the situation he had to face was scarcely less daunting. He had no majority. He was saddled with the famous, and imprudent, commitment to "60 days of decision". And, very early, with Walter Gordon's budget, began the series of events in which one after another of the ministers tripped over their feet or tumbled downstairs with the coal-scuttle and the tea-tray. (Professor Peyton Lyon, in his review of Volume II, said Volume III "might contain more to titillate the fans of political scandal". Actually, it skates rather delicately and dexterously over these events — which whets one's appetite for the Diefenbaker memoirs.) Above all, the Government had to cope with the Quebec "Quiet Revolution", a task that required the skill of Agag. Of course it was helped by the divisions in the Conservative Party, and the abysmal weakness of the Conservatives in Quebec. But, even so, just to survive was something of an achievement; to put on the statute book some of the most far-reaching and important social legislation in our history was a triumph, and a triumph that perhaps only Pearson's special blend of qualities could have brought off.

He has been blamed for giving in to Mr. Lesage on the Canada Pension Plan. But the hard fact was (though, curiously, Pearson does not mention it) that Section 94A of the B.N.A. Act gave paramount power over pensions to the provinces (one of Mr. King's more unfortunate legacies). Given Quebec's attitude, and its constitutional power, the only way to get pensions

portable across Canada was to arrive at an accommodation with that province. I have some reason to believe that another large province toyed with the idea of setting up its own plan too. But fortunately this never got even as far as being discussed with the Dominion Government.

There are some striking examples of disarming candour in this volume. Not every Liberal will be grateful for the admission that the Liberal Party, "then [circa 1961], as always, in opposition or in government, included one group anxious to move to the right and a second group eager to steer to the left", and (worse), that this "dichotomy is an essential characteristic of Liberalism"; though those "eager to steer to the left" may derive some comfort from the later remark, apropos of "some informal approaches to a tentative coalition" (an almost Mackenzie-Kingly phrase) with the NDP: "We liked to think that we were a left-of-the-road party and that most of the NDP would have been comfortable in our party, and that most of our party would have been comfortable with them" (surely a most dubious assumption).

The other notable example of candour is the comment on the famous "New Politics" speech of 1964: "This appeal had little or no effect. The country was unmoved." It might have been less unmoved if there had been more outward and visible signs of the new politics, for instance, in senatorial appointments.

Most of what I have said so far may sound as if I had succumbed to the Pearson charm as manifested in this volume: the clarity of style, the good sense, the modesty, the urbanity, the charitableness, the understatement. They are indeed difficult to resist, as they were in the author's lifetime. But there are a number of subjects where the candour is less than complete, vanquished, perhaps, by discretion and a desire not to wound, a wish to be to some faults a little blind, to some virtues very kind; and there are other subjects where I differed, and still differ, so strongly with Pearson that, at moments, I have felt I should never have undertaken to write this review at all.

I do not feel that his abrupt turn-about on nuclear weapons is adequately explained or defended. I am dismayed by the fact that Newfoundland's atrocious labour legislation of 1959 is not even mentioned (though the loggers' strike is) — though this may show only a proper shame for the national Liberal Party's unpardonable failure to denounce it at the time. The rebukes to General Norstad for his speech in Ottawa in January 1963, and to

the American State Department for its subsequent press release (Norstad "was going quite far in coming to Canada and telling us publicly that we were not fulfilling our NATO commitments", and the State Department chose "a tactless method" of replying to "Mr. Diefenbaker's disclosure and assertions") seem to me less than adequate, and sit strangely with the statement (apropos President Johnson's reaction to his Temple University speech on Vietnam): "We would have been pretty angry, I suppose, if any member of the American Government had spoken, in Canada, on Canadian Government policy, as I had spoken in Philadelphia." Perhaps "we" would; but would Pearson?

Sharing Pearson's zeal for national unity, and much of his approach to the subject, I remain, on constitutional matters, an unrevised and unrepentant follower of Sir John A. Macdonald. As such, I was alarmed by what seemed to me the Pearson Government's excessive amiability (to use no stronger phrase) towards the claims of provincial warlords; and Pearson's own exposition of his "doctrine of federalism" (Pp. 238-9) does not dispel my alarm.

Above all, perhaps, I find myself puzzled by the fact that one who was once a professor of history should have been so tone-deaf to certain aspects of our history as this volume shows Pearson to have been. On one elementary point his grasp of that history seems to have been unbelievably deficient. In his not-very-distinguished speech in the inglorious pipeline debate (where his whole party showed a total failure to understand what parliamentary government meant), he described Canada, at the time of the building of the CPR, as "not a self-governing country... but a colony ruled from Downing Street". Macaulay's schoolboy would have known better than that; and why Pearson chose to include this gaffe in his memoirs passes my understanding.

The discussion of the flag debate shows no sign of comprehension of the strong feeling many of us had that our national flag should embody some symbol of our historic past, both British and French. And the confession of preference for an eventual Canadian republic displays the same failure. What is even worse however, is the bland comment (P. 282) on the disappearance of certain historical symbols ("the Coat of Arms is not seen too often, 'Royal' has been widely replaced by 'Canadian'") without so much as a hint of the identity of the quiet revolutionaries who have contrived these disappearances. Why on earth the removal of symbols that so notably mark us off not only from the United States but from every other independent country on the American continents should be regarded as enhancing our national identity is one of the mysteries that are really quite insoluble.

To end on a pleasanter note: not the least attractive feature of this volume is its examples of Pearson's distinctive, often self-deprecating, wit. There are many; but my favourite is the final one, the highly characteristic note on which the volume ends. After his retirement, Pearson attended a Press Gallery dinner, "a very happy occasion". In the taxi, on the way home, he "sank back, and began dozing and wondering about the vagaries of life, about what was going to happen now". Suddenly he realized that the driver had gone past 24 Sussex Drive. "I banged him on the back and said: 'In there, in there'. The taxi driver turned around and looked at me in a friendly but pitying way: 'Mr. Pearson, you don't live there any more'". Who but "Mike" would have chosen to end the volume with that? "So may he rest; his faults lie gently on him!"

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Wiseman, Henry "Has new life been breathed into U.N. peacekeeping?" In *Canadian Defence Quarterly* V. 5 No. 1 22-28 Summer 1975.

Wolfe, Morris "The desperate (and sometimes ridiculous) battle to save Canadian television." In *Saturday Night* V. 90 No. 4 33-42 September 1975.

Zorgbibe, Charles "Québec: scénarios pour l'indépendance." In *Défense nationale* 67-77 July 1975.

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Under this heading will be found a list of the most recent documents published by the Department of External Affairs on international affairs and Canadian foreign policy.

Press Releases, published by the Press Office of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

No. 74 (September 8, 1975) Joint communiqué on Canada/Portugal discussions of fisheries matters of mutual concern, Ottawa, September 4-5, 1975.

No. 75 (September 15, 1975) Visit to Canada of the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, September 17-19, 1975.

No. 76 (September 16, 1975) Diplomatic appointments.

No. 77 (September 16, 1975) Canadian delegation to the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

No. 78 (September 26, 1975) Joint communiqué on Canada-Norway discussions on fisheries matters of mutual concern, Oslo, September 15-16, 1975.

No. 79 (September 26, 1975) Visit to Poland of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 18 to October 4, 1975.

No. 80 (September 22, 1975) Visit of Soviet Foreign Minister.

No. 81 (September 22, 1975) Joint communiqué on Canada/Poland discussions of fisheries matters of mutual concern.

No. 82 (September 26, 1975) Orford Quartet receives grant for European tour.

No. 83 (September 26, 1975) Canada-U.S.S.R. joint communiqué on fisheries, September 26, 1975.

No. 84 (September 30, 1975) Canadian delegation to the First Commonwealth Educational Broadcasting Conference.

No. 85 (October 1, 1975) Canada to salute American Bicentennial at 1976 East-West All-Star College Shrine Game.

No. 86 (October 6, 1975) Chinese education delegation, October 8-23, 1975.

No. 87 (October 10, 1975) Canada's participation in the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration.

No. 88 (October 6, 1975) Message by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, to his Portuguese counterpart, Mr. Ernesto Melo Antunes.

No. 89 (October 8, 1975) Diplomatic appointments.

No. 90 (October 9, 1975) Lyric Trio receives touring grant.

No. 91 (October 9, 1975) External Affairs finances Le Théâtre du Nouveau Monde tour from Paris to Abidjan.

No. 93 (October 3, 1975) Joint communiqué concerning the visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to Poland, September 29 - October 4, 1975.

No. 94 (October 9, 1975) Amendment of the France-Canada Air Agreement.

No. 95 (October 10, 1975) Canadian festival at the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, Washington.

No. 96 (October 10, 1975) Parliamentary observers to the thirtieth session of United Nations General Assembly.

No. 97 (Undated) Visit of Dr. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State of the U.S.A., to Ottawa, October 14-15, 1975, with public statements by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen.

No. 98 (October 17, 1975) Costumes by Alfred Pellan among Canadian art exhibits to visit the United States during the U.S. bicentennial.

No. 99 (October 22, 1975) The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen in Scotland: Canada's new five-year plan for cultural studies and the development of Canadian studies abroad.

No. 100 (October 22, 1975) Joint communiqué on Canada/Norway discussions on fisheries, Ottawa, October 21-22, 1975.

No. 101 (October 23, 1975) Joint IJC reference on the Garrison Diversion Unit.

No. 102 (October 27, 1975) Visit to Ottawa by the Minister of Planning and Co-operation of Senegal.

No. 103 (October 29, 1975) Secondment of foreign service officers.

No. 104 (October 29, 1975) Canada/Belgium Cultural Agreement.

Statements and Speeches, a series published by the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

No. 75/27 Strategy for International Development — 1975-80. A statement to the Diplomatic Corps by the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs and Minister Responsible for International Development, Ottawa, September 27, 1975.

No. 75/28 The United States and Canada — Different Perspectives, Different Imperatives. Remarks by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, at a dinner for the United States Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, Ottawa, October 14, 1975.

No. 75/29 Top UN Concerns — Law of the Sea, Disarmament, Middle East. A speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, September 22, 1975.

No. 75/30 Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. A statement to the Special Political Committee of the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly by Mr. Louis Duclos, representative of Canada, October 23, 1975.

Treaty Information

Bilateral

Britain

Film Co-production Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

London, September 12, 1975
In force November 26, 1975

Cuba

Air Transport Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba

Ottawa, September 26, 1975

France

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the French Republic amending the Air Agreement signed August 1, 1950, as amended

Ottawa, September 8 and 19, 1975

In force September 19, 1975

With effect from September 8, 1975

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the

French Republic concerning the Construction, Maintenance and Operation of a Second Cattle Quarantine Station in the Territory of Saint Pierre and Miquelon

Ottawa, October 29, 1975

In force October 29, 1975

Germany, Federal Republic of

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the continued use of the Churchill Research Range (as amended) signed at Ottawa, July 8, 1969

Bonn, September 16, 1975

In force September 16, 1975

With effect from July 1, 1975

Cultural Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany

Bonn, March 3, 1975

In force November 6, 1975

Morocco

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco relating to the Equipment of Regional Teaching Centres at Rabat and Safi

Rabat, September 8, 1975

Peru

General Agreement on Technical Co-operation between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Peru

Lima, November 23, 1973

In force September 3, 1975

Protocol of Amendment to Article VIII of the General Agreement on Technical Co-operation between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Peru of November 23, 1973

Lima, July 2, 1975

In force September 3, 1975

Development Loan Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Peru

Lima, September 26, 1975

In force September 26, 1975

Institutional Support Loan Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Peru

Lima, September 26, 1975

In force September 26, 1975

United States of America

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Establishment of a Temporary Space Tracking Facility in Newfoundland in connection with Project Skylab

Ottawa, December 20, 1971, and February 23, 1972

In force February 23, 1972

Terminated November 17, 1975

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America extending the Project Skylab Agreement

Ottawa, September 30, 1974, and November 26, 1974

In force November 26, 1974

Terminated November 17, 1975

Multilateral

Second Additional Protocol to the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union

Done at Lausanne, July 5, 1974

Signed by Canada, July 5, 1974

Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited September 8, 1975

In force for Canada, January 6, 1976

General Regulations of the Universal Postal Union and Final Protocol: Annex Rules of Procedure for Congresses

Done at Lausanne, July 5, 1974

Signed by Canada, July 5, 1974

Canada's Instrument of Approval deposited September 8, 1975

In force for Canada, January 6, 1976

Universal Postal Convention with Final Protocol and Detailed Regulations

Done at Lausanne, July 5, 1974

Signed by Canada, July 5, 1974

Canada's Instrument of Approval deposited September 8, 1975

In force for Canada, January 6, 1976

Protocol to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Done at Washington, April 8, 1975

Canada's Instrument of Approval deposited September 18, 1975

Amendments to Chapters II, III, IV and V of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960

Adopted at London, November 20, 1973

Canada's Instrument of Acceptance deposited October 7, 1975

International Sugar Agreement, 1973

Done at Geneva, October 13, 1973

Signed by Canada, December 14, 1973

Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited December 28, 1973

In force for Canada definitely October 15, 1974

Resolution to extend Agreement until December 31, 1976, accepted by Canada October 31, 1975

Amendment to the Annex to the Convention on the Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965

Adopted at London, January 2, 1975

Canada notified the Secretary-General of IMCO of its acceptance of this Amendment, November 5, 1975, subject to the following difference:

"The Department of Manpower and Immigration of the Government of Canada requires that the Master of a ship shall, on each occasion when the ship arrives at a port in Canada from a port outside Canada, forthwith deliver to the Immigration Officers in Charge a crew list on the form prescribed by the Minister (FAL Form 5), and present such members of the crew for examination as may be required."

Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter at Sea

Done at London, Washington, Moscow and Mexico, December 29, 1972

Canada signed at Mexico, December 29, 1972

Entered into force August 30, 1975

Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited London, Washington, Moscow and Mexico, November 13, 1975

In force for Canada December 13, 1975

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
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